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PART XXXV.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

57

July to September 1913.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	India Office ..	..	June 30, 1913	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Transmits letter from Captain Wilson detailing the arrangements made for the survey of, by the Persian Railways Syndicate (see No. 141)	1
2	To Sir W. Townley..	293 Tel.	July 1,	Joint advance. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 463.* May inform Persian Government that first payment on 1913 advances may be made on 1st July, 1915 (see No. 119)	2
3	" "	296 Tel.	1,	Hormuz oxide. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 489. Strick and Persian Government must decide question of contract between them. His Majesty's Government concerned in so far as Strick's ejection would mean Muin's restoration. Trusts that Strick and Ellinger will come to terms (see No. 193)	2
4	To Sir G. Buchanan..	487 Tel.	1,	Regent. Refers to Part XXXIV, Nos. 474 and 476. Approves language held to Regent in Part XXXIV, No. 476 ..	2
5	To Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	1,	Oil company's negotiations with Sheikh of Mohammerah. Acknowledges Part XXXIV, No. 313†. Informs of agreement arranged between company and Sheikh by Sir P. Cox in Part XXXIV, No. 427. Asks for evidence in support of rights claimed by them (see No. 70) ..	3
6	Sir G. Lowther ..	567	June 27,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits French draft of article securing oil company's rights in ceded territory. It differs slightly from English draft in Part XXXIV, No. 379. May he use it as base of discussion with Porte? (see No. 12) ..	3
7	Board of Trade ..	..	July 1,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 420. Suggests redraft of article 9 of draft protocol relating to the control and constitution of the exploitation companies, in more precise terms (see No. 40)	5
8	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	1,	State of roads. Bunder Abbas road again disturbed and a specie caravan delayed near Bam	5
9	Sir W. Townley ..	254 Tel.	2,	Tangistan piracy. Transmits telegram from Bushire reporting conclusion of punitive measures as far as His Majesty's ships are concerned. Is suggesting to Persian Government that districts should be provisionally handed over to Governor of Gulf ports (see Nos. 19 and 120) ..	6
10	Admiralty.. ..	Confidential	2,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 435. Concurs in proposal to defer question of alignment in neutral and British spheres	6
11	[Nil.]				
12	Mr. Marling ..	311 Tel.	3,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Ambassador is making great efforts to conclude question. Is draft article in No. 6 approved? (see No. 20)	7

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
13	To Sir G. Buchanan..	493 Tel.	July 3, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Desirable to send instructions to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to hasten a settlement of the question (see No. 72)	7
14	To India Office ..	..	3,	Lighthouse on Tamb Island. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 462*. Agrees that communication should be made to foreign consuls as previously	7
15	Note communicated by Russian Ambassador	..	3,	Mint contract. Pending a decision as to the validity of the Shuster contract, considers that supply of coin should be suspended. Trusts His Majesty's Government will agree to Russian Bank being given right to supply money (see Nos. 48 and 203) ..	8
16	India Office ..	..	3,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 471. Prefers to await Board of Trade's observations before offering any (see No. 151)	8
17	Sir W. Townley ..	255 Tel.	4,	Russian troops and Kurds. Reports unimportant affray between during a tour by the Russian consul at Urmia (see No. 33)	8
18	Sir G. Buchanan ..	245 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Delay due to absence of head of department concerned, but Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised early reply	9
19	To Sir W. Townley..	298 Tel.	4,	Tangistan. Refers to No. 9. Approves communication made to Persian Government..	9
20	To Mr. Marling ..	295 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 12. Considerations on draft article in No. 6 respecting oil company's rights north and south of Kuretu River (see Part XXXIV, No. 453) (see No. 21).. . ..	9
21	" " ..	300 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 20. Suggests alternative clause safeguarding oil company's rights south of Kuretu River, but it should only be submitted if it will not raise awkward questions (see No. 34)	9
22	" " ..	211 Very Conf.	4,	German cable in Persian Gulf. Transmits Part XXXIV, No. 349. Have German Government obtained from Porte any concession in this connection since 25th September, 1908 (see No. 239)	10
23	To India Office .. " Admiralty .. " General Post Office " Director of Military Operations	Very Conf.	4,	German cable in Persian Gulf. Refers to Part XXXIII, No. 327. History since 1908 and present position of affairs regarding landing rights in the Gulf. Transmits Part XXXIV, No. 349. The objections held to German scheme in 1909 are still presumably valid (see Nos. 143, 164, 165, and 224 and Part XXXVI, No. 58*)	10
24	[Nil.]				
25	[Nil.]				
26	[Nil.]				
27	To Sir W. Townley..	96 Very Conf.	4,	German cable in the Persian Gulf. Transmits No. 23 and Part XXXIV, No. 349. In view of addition to joint note of 7th April to Persian Government (see Part XXII, Nos. 297 and 515), expects that latter will consult His Majesty's and Russian Government before acceding to any German application for right to carry a telegraph line across Persia (see No. 366)	16

No.	Name.	No	Date.	Subject.	Page
28	India Office ..	..	July 4, 1913	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Transmits telegram to Viceroy asking for early observations on Part XXXIV, No. 446 (see No. 73) ..	16
29	Treasury	..	4,	Overland telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 445. Sanctions charge to Imperial funds of half initial cost of construction and recurrent annual charge. Persian Government's share of receipts should go to British and Indian revenues pending repayment by them of capital expenditure (see No. 58)	16
30	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	4,	Mint contract. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 492. Transmits letter from their Tehran manager replying to points raised and indicating bank's position (see Nos. 47 and 68)	17
31	To Mr. Marling ..	302 Tel.	5,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 21. Map is that referred to in Part XII, No. 206	18
32	Sir W. Townley ..	256 Tel.	7,	Oman unrest. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox reporting threatened attack on Muscat, and suggests sending not more than 250 troops to Muscat from Bushire (see Nos. 38, 39, and 41) ..	18
33	" " ..	257 Tel.	7,	Russian troops and Kurds. As a result of affray reported in No. 17, Russian Minister has suggested to Russian Government the creation of a post of Persian Cossacks at Urmia under Russian officers	19
34	Mr. Marling ..	320 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 20 and 21. Proposes not to insert clause suggested in No. 21, but to reply on procedure suggested in Part XXXIV, No. 453 (see No. 35)	19
35	To Mr. Marling ..	307 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 34. Approves omission of clause (see No. 160)	19
36	" " ..	309 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Asks views of Russian Ambassador at Constantinople with regard to formation of two separate commissions (see No. 43)	19
37	To India Office ..	..	7,	British subjects and arms traffic in Persia. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 357. Best plan would be to frame amending order defining term "British subject" ..	20
38	Admiralty ..	Confidential	7,	Oman unrest. Refers to No. 32. 250 Rajputs are to be transferred from Bushire to Muscat. Three of His Majesty's ships remaining at Muscat	20
39	India Office ..	..	7,	Oman unrest. Refers to No. 38. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox reporting on a previous embryo rising against the Sultan of Muscat	21
40	" " ..	..	7,	Trans-Persian railway. Acknowledges Part XXXIV, No. 420. No objection to the text of the three "projets" submitted by the Société d'Études. Observations on the distribution of interests in third "projet"	22
41	Sir W. Townley ..	258 Tel.	8,	Oman unrest. 250 Rajputs left Bushire 7th July	22
42	Mr. Marling ..	322 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Porte will shortly reply to note of 3rd May (see No. 57) ..	22

No.	Name.	No.	Date	Subject.	Page
43	Mr. Marling ..	324 Tel.	July 8, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 36. Russian Ambassador agrees in principle, but would prefer to await receipt of Turkish reply (see No. 51)	22
44	Sir G. Buchanan ..	249 Tel.	8,	Anglo-Russian agreement and neutral zone. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 414. Minister for Foreign Affairs too much occupied to put forward any concrete proposals ..	22
45	(Communicated by French Ambassador)	..	May 25,	Gendarmerie and German Legation. Despatch from French Minister at Tehran. Reports the intrigues of the German Legation (see Nos. 87 and 364)	23
46	India Office ..	..	July 7,	Post-office at Chahbar. Transmits telegram from Viceroy proposing to establish. Suggests concurrence (see No. 88) ..	24
47	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	8,	Mint contract. Refers to last paragraph of enclosure in No. 30. Explains when and by whom the concession was quashed (see No. 68)	25
48	(Communicated by Russian Ambassador)	..	10,	Mint contract. Refers to No. 15. The Russian Bank requests that the Imperial Bank may abstain from issuing any money while the question is under discussion (see No. 105)	25
49	*Admiralty . ..	Confidential	9,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 446. From naval point of view it is important that no antagonistic influence should be exerted over the islands of Kishm and Henjam. Hormuz of less importance (see No. 73, and Part XXXVI, No. 98)	25
50	Captain Wilson to Mr. Parker (Extract)	..	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Possibility of his being able to serve on one of the commissions. Local difficulties to be apprehended in demarcating certain parts of the frontier. Considers a single commission unobjectionable	25
51	To Sir G. Buchanan..	513 Tel.	10,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 43. Would be glad to know whether Russian Government approve the idea of two commissions (see Nos. 60 and 61) ..	26
52	To Sir W. Townley..	100	10,	Gendarmerie. Acknowledges Part XXXIV, No. 484. Should inform colonel unofficially that His Majesty's Government are following his work with great interest	26
53	To Board of Trade ..	..	10,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 435. Are the Board willing that British capital should be employed in the construction of the line from the Russian frontier to Tehran, and that the British group of the Société d'Études should take part in the enterprise (see No. 90)	26
54	India Office ..	..	10,	British officers in Kerman. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 465. As the gendarmerie are shortly to be extended to Kerman, does not press former proposal (see No. 67)	27
55	" " ..	..	10,	Fars advance. Enquires as to correctness of dates of two advances to Persian Government (see Part XXXIV, Nos. 165 and 345, Enclosure 5)..	27

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
56	Sir W. Townley ..	259 Tel.	July 11, 1913	Gendarmerie and Bakhtiari sowars. Reports affrays in Tehran between. Considers moment opportune for getting rid of the sowars, who are incorrigible thieves (see No. 174)	28
57	Mr. Marling ..	329 Tel.	11,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Ambassador has received a reply from Porte to his note. Satisfactory north of Bane, but not as regards oil company's interests south of Kuretu River (see Nos. 61 and 65)..	28
58	To India Office ..	..	11,	Overland telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 363. Transmits No. 29, and proposes to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in the sense of the suggestion as to the disposal of Persian Government's share of receipts (see No. 177)	28
59	Sir W. Townley ..	260 Tel.	13,	Fars advance. Difficulties as regards financing Fars gendarmerie. Suggests allowing greater latitude as to time limits within which money is to be expended (see No. 66)	28
60	Mr. Marling ..	332 Tel.	13,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 51. Commission could not work far north of Zohab in winter (see No. 83)	29
61	Sir G. Buchanan ..	256 Tel.	13,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 51. Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has received Porte's reply, which he considers satisfactory. Minister for Foreign Affairs is ready to appoint officers to the two commissions (see Nos. 65, 71, and 111)	29
62	" " ..	208	8,	Regent. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 474. Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversations with Regent to whom he gave certain assurances	29
63	Persian Railways Syndicate	..	12,	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Asks for information as to possible prolongation of the line beyond Khoremabad (see No. 141)	30
64	Sir W. Townley ..	261 Tel.	14,	Karun irrigation. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 323. Consul-general at Ispahan states that scheme has been abandoned owing to Russian opposition	30
65	Mr. Marling ..	337 Tel.	14,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 57. Grand Vizier's reply to note of 3rd May is identic to that given to Russian Ambassador. Proposes addressing identic note pointing out objections to it (see Nos. 76 and 83)	30
66	To Sir W. Townley..	308 Tel.	15,	Fars advance. Approves recommendation in No. 59	31
67	" "	309 Tel.	15,	British officers for Kerman. Refers to No. 54, and Part XXXIV, Nos. 467 and 473. His Majesty's Government will not press their proposal. To inform Persian Government that failure to extend gendarmerie may involve as only alternative a demand from His Majesty's Government for the employment of British officers (see No. 80)	31

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
68	To Imperial Bank of Persia	..	July 15, 1913	Mint contract. Refers to Nos. 30 and 47. His Majesty's Government cannot support their claim to a monopoly. Suggests compromise with Russian Bank (see No. 105)	31
69	India Office ..	..	15,	Turkish consul at Lingah. Indian Government attach greater importance to his withdrawal than to the Porte apologising (see Nos. 114 and 136)	32
70	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	15,	Oil company and Sheikh of Mohammerah. Refers to No. 5. Thanks for His Majesty's Government's assistance. Considers it better to defer consideration of rights referred to in No. 5 until the company is making profits (see No. 162)	32
71	Sir G. Buchanan ..	261 Tel.	16,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 61. Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained delay in replying to *aide-mémoire* sent in accordance with Part XXXIV, No. 424 (see No. 92)..	33
72	" " ..	215	14,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 61. Transmits *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government. Russian Ambassador at Constantinople is to propose to Porte the formation of two commissions. Unnecessary now to send instructions suggested in No. 13 (see No. 83)	33
73	India Office ..	..	16,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Transmits telegram from Viceroy. Highly undesirable that anyone not a British subject should have control of Kishm, Hormuz, and Larak, which are of great strategic importance (see No. 49)	33
74	Sir W. Townley ..	263 Tel.	17,	Appointment of supervisor for carpets. Treasurer-General wishes to appoint a German to supervise the service in connection with the detection of aniline-dyed Persian carpets. Desirable that a Belgian should be appointed. Russian Minister agrees (see No. 82)	34
75	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	537 Tel.	17,	Turco-Persian frontier. What will be the rank of the Russian commissioners? Should not Persian Government be asked to select commissioners and fix a date for beginning work? (see Nos. 83 and 155)..	34
76	To Mr. Marling ..	338 Tel.	17,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 65. Approves suggested course (see No. 154)	34
77	To Sir W. Townley..	313 Tel.	17,	Persian loans. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 325. Have Persian Government accepted revised amortisation scheme ..	34
78	Sir W. Townley ..	264 Tel.	18,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 429. Salar has surrendered to Russian officer sent against him in Kurdistan. Russian Minister thinks Salar should be given pension and warned not to expect foreign support if he returns to Persia (see Nos. 86 and 96)	35
79	" "	265 Tel.	18,	Kerman mining concession. Interview with representative of Kerman mining syndicate, who complained of injustice of Russian Government's attitude towards syndicate. Can any action be taken (see No. 85)	35
80	" " ..	266 Tel.	19,	British officers in Kerman. Has informed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed in No. 67	35

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
81	To Sir G. Buchanan..	543 Tel.	July 19, 1913	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 475. Suggests procedure for applying to Persian Government for an option and for arranging the constitution of a commission to survey southern alignment (see Nos. 93, 94, and 112, and Part XXXIV, No. 313*)	36
82	" " ..	545 Tel.	20,	Appointment of supervisor for carpets. Refers to No. 74. Concurs that German appointment would be undesirable. Trusts Russian Government will instruct their representative at Tehran to advocate employment of a Belgian or national of a minor Power (see No. 84)	36
83	Mr. Marling ..	353 Tel.	21,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 75. Russian Ambassador is deprecating the appointment of two commissions on grounds given in Nos. 60 and 65. Qualifications commissioners should possess. Mr. Wratislaw would be a suitable person (see Nos. 101, 107, and 111)	36
84	Sir G. Buchanan ..	271 Tel.	21,	Appointment of supervisor for carpets. Refers to No. 82. Minister for Foreign Affairs will instruct Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran as desired (see No. 103) ..	37
85	To Sir W. Townley..	315 Tel.	21,	Kerman mining concession. Refers to No. 79. Hopes to send instructions shortly (see Part XXXVI, No. 148) ..	37
86	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	546 Tel.	21,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to No. 78. Leaves to his discretion the question of Salar's treatment (see Nos. 96 and 97).. ..	37
87	To Sir W. Townley..	105 Confidential	21,	Gendarmerie and German Legation. Asks for observations on No. 45 (see No. 364)..	37
88	To India Office ..	..	21,	Post-office at Chahbar. Refers to No. 46. Concurs in proposal to establish ..	38
89	India Office ..	..	21,	Trans-Persian railway. Transmits letter to War Office enclosing memoranda by the Indian General Staff and asking for the reasoned opinion of the Imperial General Staff upon the effect on the defence of India of the alignment of the railway viâ Kerman (see No. 376, and Part XXXVI, No. 174)	38
90	Board of Trade ..	..	21,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 53. A line from the Russian frontier to Tehran commercially undesirable for the sake of British interests, but if it is to form part of a trans-Persian railway, the British group of the Société d'Études could not well be asked to refrain from participating in it	42
91	Mr. Greenway ..	..	21,	Kerman mining concession. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 477. Gives reasons why Russian group of Société d'Études should not be admitted to same rights as British, and suggests compromise. Considerations as to Russian claims. Trusts His Majesty's Government will continue their support (see No. 110)	42
92	To Sir G. Buchanan..	548 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 71. To ask for an early reply. Delay is causing great inconvenience (see No. 98)..	44

No.	Name.	No.	Date	Subject.	Page
93	To Sir W. Garstin ..	..	July 22, 1913	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, Nos. 334 and 364. His Majesty's Government have no objection to wording of inter-group agreement and declaration submitted. Suggests alteration in protocol (see No. 7). Question of application for option. Refers to No. 81 and Part XXXIV, No. 313* (see No. 130)	44
94	India Office ..	..	22,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 435. Does not take exception to instructions sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh in No. 81; but wishes to make a reservation regarding alignment of southern section, and considers Sir G. Buchanan should not commit His Majesty's Government to findings of proposed commission on this point (see No. 150)	45
95	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	23,	Mint contract. Transmits telegram from Tehran stating Persian Government repudiate mint contract, but are willing to give three years' contract on same conditions as before	46
96	Sir W. Townley ..	267 Tel.	23,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to No. 86. Salar appears to have duped Russian officer, and is said to be going to attack Kermanshah (see No. 102)	46
97	Sir G. Buchanan ..	272 Tel.	23,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to No. 86. Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that the two representatives at Tehran might be left to deal with him as they thought fit (see No. 118)	46
98	" " ..	274 Tel.	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 92. Has pressed for immediate reply (see Nos. 104 and 113)	47
99	To Sir G. Buchanan..	550 Tel.	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. To inform Russian Government confidentially that Sir E. Grey proposes to sign the declaration about frontier between Hawizeh and Persian Gulf on 29th July (see Nos. 109, 113, 133, and 138)	47
100	India Office ..	..	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits telegram from Viceroy respecting appointment of Captain Wilson as commissioner ..	47
101	Communicated by Sir A. Hirtzel	..	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Minute by Captain Wilson. Concurs in views expressed in No. 83. Would be willing to work under Mr. Wratislaw and make preliminary arrangements (see No. 107)	48
102	Sir W. Townley ..	269 Tel.	24,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to No. 96. Reports how Salar escaped from Russian officer and has collected a following ..	48
103	To Sir W. Townley..	322 Tel.	24,	Appointment of supervisor for carpets. Refers to No. 84. To make representations in sense desired	48
104	To Mr. Marling ..	348 Tel.	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 98. To speak to Russian Ambassador in sense of Part XXXIV, No. 444 (see No. 166) ..	49
105	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	24,	Mint contract. Refers to No. 68. Willing to accept suggested compromise on condition that Persian Government will allow them to import enough silver to protect their note circulation (see Nos. 203 and 205)	49

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
106	Sir W. Townley ..	270 Tel.	July 25, 1913	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 451. Muin is again pressing for His Majesty's Government's views (see Nos. 151 and 201)	49
107	To Sir G. Buchanan..	555 Tel.	25,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 83. Do Russian Government concur in Mr. Marling's views? If so, would propose Mr. Wratislaw and Captain Wilson as commissioners (see No. 111).. ..	49
108	To India Office .. „ War Office ..	..	25,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits No. 83. Is not disposed to take definite action as regards appointment of commissioners pending receipt of Russian Government's views (see No. 145)	49
109	Sir G. Buchanan ..	277 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 99. Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objections	50
110	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	26,	Kerman mining concession. Refers to No. 91. Would the advance of 100,000*l.* by the syndicate be affected if their offer respecting participation of Société d'Études to one-third of concession were accepted? (see No. 143*)	50
111	Sir G. Buchanan ..	278 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 107. Russian reply. They propose to suggest as soon as possible formation of mixed commission. No use in having two commissions. M. Minorski would be one of the Russian commissioners (see Nos. 135, 145, and 146)	50
112	„ „ ..	279 Tel.	26,	Trans-Persian railway. Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs entirely in No. 81 (see No. 132)	51
113	„ „ ..	280 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 99. *Aide-mémoire* received from Russian Government approving arrangement regarding Hawizeh-Gulf section and constitution of mixed commission for the navigation of Shatt-el-Arab, on which they would like to be represented, and indicating amendments desired by them (see Nos. 134, 147, and 166)	51
114	Sir W. Townley ..	133	June 18,	Turkish consul at Lingah. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 196. Transmits despatch from Sir P. Cox. Persian Government have been urged to press for consul's removal (see No. 136)..	51
115	„ „ ..	134	20.	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 446. Interview with Muin, who explained his position. Question of Muin's rights is being studied by Persian Government. Memorandum by Mr. Churchill (see No. 389)	55
116	„ „ ..	137 Secret	23,	Russians and Indian tea. Reports efforts being made by Russian officials in Northern Persia to strangle Indian tea trade. Has taken no action, but merely mentioned the matter to Russian Chargé d'Affaires (see No. 209)	56
117	„ „ ..	141	29,	Advance to Persian Government. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 478. Transmits note addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting inclusion of opium receipts and excise of spirits as additional security for recent advance, and Persian Government's reply agreeing	57

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
118	Sir W. Townley ..	142 Very Conf.	June 29, 1913	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 481. Help given to Salar by Russian consuls makes it impossible for the Persian Government to dispose of him (see No. 202)	58
119	„ „ ..	146	July 4,	Joint advance. Refers to No. 2. Transmits note addressed to Persian Government in accordance with authorisation given in No. 2	59
120	„ „ ..	147	4,	Tangistan. Refers to No. 9. Transmits two *aide-mémoires* addressed to Persian Government urging them to take measures to put down disorders.. .. .	60
121	„ „ ..	153	7,	Caravans. Bushire and Shiraz statistics for June	61
122	„ „ ..	154	8,	Meshed. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Meshed reporting capture of Persian robbers by consulate relief escort	61
123	„ „ ..	155	8,	Monthly summary. Transmits, for June ..	63
124	„ „ ..	156 Very Conf.	8,	Political situation. Reports on	65
125	„ „ ..	157	8,	Gendarmerie. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 467. Transmits letter from Swedish colonel to Persian Government advocating extension of (see No. 129)	67
126	„ „ ..	158	9,	Medjliss. Prospect of a new Medjliss being summoned. Does not consider it will assist Persia to restore a normal state of affairs (see No. 152)	70
127	„ „ ..	159	9,	Persian Transport Company's concession for making roads from Tehran to Ahwaz and Burujird to Ispahan. Transmits memorandum from Director of Posts, who complains that, while the company do not make use of their concession, they prevent the Postal Administration doing anything. Suggests ascertaining the real intentions of the company in this respect	71
128	„ „ ..	161	9,	Persian finances. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 207. Transmits exhaustive memorandum by Mr. Maclean on Persian finances	74
129	Telegram communicated by Russian Ambassador	..	21,	Gendarmerie. Telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs deprecating too great an augmentation of the numbers of the Swedish officers (see No. 176) ..	83
130	Viscount Errington ..	..	25,	Trans - Persian railway. Acknowledges No. 93. Accepts proposed alteration in wording of protocol, and welcomes mode of procedure for applying for option. Principle which will guide British group in negotiating with their foreign associates as to southern portion of the line ..	83
131	Sir W. Townley ..	271 Tel.	28,	Customs receipts. Increase of 20 per cent. over last year's (see No. 194)	84
132	Sir G. Buchanan ..	281 Tel.	28,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 112. If His Majesty's Government wished option to be applied for before composition of joint commission were settled, Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran would be consulted (see Nos. 144 and 161)	84

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
133	To Mr. Marling ..	356 Tel.	July 28, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Text of declaration referred to in No. 99 should not to be communicated to Persian Government. To discuss with Russian colleague description of frontier to be recommended to Persian Government	84
134	To Sir G. Buchanan..	558 Tel.	28,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 113. To point out undesirability of Russian subjects serving on commission. Trusts Russian Government will not press their suggestion for exempting certain ships from dues. Meets other Russian objections (see No. 175)	85
135	" " ..	559 Tel.	28,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 111. Agrees with Russian Government. To inform them that Mr. Marling has been instructed to discuss frontier with his Russian colleague (see No. 133) ..	85
136	To India Office ..	..	28,	Turkish consul at Lingah. Acknowledges No. 69. Agrees that withdrawal is more important than apology. His Majesty's Government cannot at present ask Porte to withdraw consul (see No. 340) ..	85
137	India Office ..	..	28,	Reconstruction of Arabistan telegraphs. Refers to Part XXXIII, No. 417. Transmits letter from head of Indo-European Telegraph Department on financial aspects of scheme. Trusts that His Majesty's Government will help the Department with the initial expense of 23,060*l.* pending recovery from Persian Government (see Nos. 148 and 169)	86
137*	Mr. Wratislaw to Mr. Parker	..	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. Suggests communication to Russian Government respecting commencement of commission's work (see No. 142)	87*
138	Declaration ..	..	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 99. Declaration signed by Sir E. Grey and Hakki Pasha respecting frontier line from Hawizeh to the sea	87
139	To India Office ..	..	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. If Mr. Wratislaw accepts post as commissioner trusts Captain Wilson may act as deputy commissioner (see No. 140)	88
140	" " ..	..	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 139. Mr. Wratislaw has accepted post of commissioner (see No. 153)	88
141	To Persian Railways Syndicate	..	29,	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Refers to No. 63. Transmits a report by Captain Wilson (not printed) (see No. 195) ..	89
142	Minute by Mr. Wratislaw	..	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 137*. Suggests preliminary action to put Commission on an official basis (see No. 156)..	89
143	War Office ..	Secret	29,	German cable in the Gulf. Refers to No. 23. Considers German request should be strongly opposed on strategic grounds ..	89
143*	Mr. Greenway ..	..	29,	Advance by mining syndicate. Acknowledges No. 110. Advance would not be affected, but société would be expected to provide a proportion if admitted to concession (see No. 163)	90*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
144	Sir W. Townley ..	272 Tel.	July 30, 1913	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 132. Application for option to Persian Government would be met probably with a request for a large loan. Commercially undesirable that Russia should build line to the edge of her zone before His Majesty's Government were ready to link it up from the south (see No. 285) ..	90
145	To Sir G. Buchanan..	560 Tel.	30.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 111. To inform Russian Government of Mr. Wratislaw's and Captain Wilson's appointments as commissioners (see No. 167)	90
146	Sir G. Buchanan ..	231	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits text of *aide-mémoire* referred to in No. 111 .	91
147	" " ..	233	26.	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits text of *aide-mémoire* referred to in No. 113 ..	91
148	India Office ..	..	29,	Reconstruction of Arabistan telegraph lines. Refers to No. 137. Transmits notes by head of Indo-European Telegraph Department discussing the reconstruction in connection with projected Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway and its telegraphic requirements, and suggesting arrangement between railway syndicate and Telegraph Department (see No. 204)	92
149	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	30,	Lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island. Persian Embassy is enquiring as to the buildings the company are constructing on Abadan Island. To what extent may they inform them of agreement in Part XXXII, No. 64? (see No. 223)	94
150	To India Office ..	..	31,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Nos. 81 and 94. Sir E. Grey never intended to commit His Majesty's Government to the Commission's findings	95
151	India Office ..	..	30,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 16. In view of No. 106, will not await Board of Trade's observations. It is of vital importance that the control of the mouth of the Gulf should not be lost by His Majesty's Government. Trusts Sir W. Townley will do his utmost to frustrate Muin's designs. Transmits memorandum by Captain Wilson about the Muin's opposition to British interests (see Nos. 201 and 305)	95
152	Sir W. Townley ..	273 Tel.	Aug. 1,	New Medjliss. Shah has announced that it is proposed to hold elections for new Medjliss (see Nos. 184 and 278) ..	98
153	India Office ..	..	1,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 139 and 140. Will be glad to allow Captain Wilson to act as deputy commissioner ..	98
154	To Mr. Marling ..	371 Tel. Confidential	2,	Turco-Persian frontier. What is present position of matter? Has action been taken on No. 65? (see No. 160) ..	98
155	To Sir G. Buchanan..	568 Tel. Confidential	2,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 75. Enquires as to technical staff which will accompany Russian commissioner (see No. 214)	98
156	To Consul-General Wratislaw	..	2,	Turco-Persian frontier. Acknowledges No. 142. Course to be pursued in connection with the formation of the Commission	99

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
157	Sir W. Townley ..	274 Tel.	Aug. 3, 1913	Kurdistan. Reports considerable fighting near, between Russian troops and Kurds caused apparently by Russian action ..	99
158	War Office ..	..	2,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 108. Very desirable that a new map should be made of frontier district in advance of Commission, to take the place of the *carte identique* (see No. 170)	99
159	Mr. Marling ..	384 Tel.	5,	Transport of Bagdad Railway material. Refers to "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia," Part XV, No. 202. "Pionier" has returned to Basra	100
160	" " ..	389 Tel.	5,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 154. Delay caused by circumstances reported in "Turkish War," Part X, No. 581, but line is now being traced. Grand Vizier accepts article safeguarding oil company's rights (see Nos. 168 and 218)	100
161	To India Office .. " Board of Trade ..	..	5,	Trans-Persian railway. Transmits Nos. 81, 112, and 132, and Part XXXIV, No. 313*. Transmits draft of note to be presented by two representatives at Tehran applying for option which is to take the place of letter enclosed in Part XXXIV, No. 313*. Asks for suggestions as to commission to examine southern alignment (see Nos. 206 and 255, and Part XXXVI, No. 4) ..	101
162	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	5,	Oil company and Sheikh of Mohammerah. Agrees with company's suggestion in No. 70 provided such delay does not commit His Majesty's Government to a definite line of action in the matter ..	102
163	" " ..	..	5,	Advance by mining syndicate. Refers to No. 143*. What security do company propose to offer société for their share in the advance? (see No. 207)	102
164	General Post Office ..	Confidential	5,	German cable in the Gulf. Refers to No. 23. Supplements information of history of question given in No. 23. Question must be determined on political considerations. Informs of proposed arrangement for laying German cables between British companies and German Government (see No. 224)	103
165	Admiralty	Confidential	5,	German cable in the Gulf. Observations on No. 23 from naval strategical point of view. Concession should not be given without a *quid pro quo*	104
166	Mr. Marling ..	393 Tel. Confidential	6,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Refers to No. 104 and "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia," Part XI, No. 199. Conversation with M. Minorski If Russian Government raised no objection they would expect similar complaisance on our part, if the occasion arose. They insisted on desirability of having a Russian subject on the Commission (see No. 181)	105
167	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	574 Tel.	6,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 145. Should Captain Wilson confer with Russian authorities at Constantinople or St. Petersburgh *en route* for Tehran respecting arrangements for Commission (see No. 185)	105
168	To Mr. Marling ..	380 Tel.	6,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 160. To send home copy of draft article safeguarding oil company's rights (see No. 211)	105

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
169	To Treasury ..	..	Aug. 6, 1913	Reconstruction of Arabistan telegraph lines. Transmits No. 137. Trusts they will comply with Indo-European Telegraph Department's request. Calls attention to political importance of the matter referred to in Part XV, No. 302 (see No. 270) ..	106
170	Memorandum by Mr. Mr. Wratislaw	..	6,	Turco-Persian frontier. War Office were unaware of existence of Colonel Williams's triangulated map. Two Indian survey officers will be sufficient to accompany the Commission (see No. 158)	106
171	Mr. Wratislaw ..	1	5,	Turco-Persian frontier. Submits recommendations for the composition of the staff of the Commission—technical, military, medical, and clerical (see No. 182) ..	106
172	" " ..	3	6,	Turco-Persian frontier. Submits estimate of expenditure on account of Commission (see Nos. 182 and 190)	108
173	India Office ..	..	6,	German trade in the Gulf. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 156. Transmits letter from Government of India. Undesirable politically that British commercial supremacy in the Gulf should be weakened.	109
174	Sir W. Townley ..	275 Tel.	7,	Bakhtiari and Tehran gendarmes. Refers to No. 56. Reports serious affray between. Thinks time has come for disbandment of Bakhtiari force in Tehran (see Nos. 183, 189, and 367)	113
175	Sir G. Buchanan ..	289 Tel.	7,	Shatt-el-Arab Commission. Refers to No. 134, and "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia," Part XI, No. 200. Gives substance of *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government. They wish the right to recommend Russian subjects for posts on the Administration (see No. 188) ..	113
176	To Russian Ambassador	..	7,	Gendarmerie. Refers to No. 129. His Majesty's Government see no objection to extension, but would be willing to exchange views with Russian Government if in the future the latter considered their interests injured	114
177	India Office ..	Confidential	7,	Overland telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas. Refers to No. 58. Concurs in instructions to Sir W. Townley, and suggests addition.	114
178	Sir W. Townley ..	276 Tel.	8,	Gendarmerie. Twelve gendarmes have deserted and taken refuge with Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli	114
179	" " ..	277 Tel.	8,	His Majesty's consul at Shiraz. Submits favourably his request for permission to tour for a month in Fars (see No. 210) ..	115
180	To Sir W. Townley ..	342 Tel.	8,	Swedish officers for Tehran police. Refers to Part XXXII, No. 341. Does Russian Minister agree to employment of three or four additional Swedish officials for Tehran police? (see No. 264)	115
181	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	579 Tel.	8,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Refers to No. 166. Arguments to be used to Russian Government. M. Minorski overrates importance of convention, which, moreover, is a self-denying one on His Majesty's Government's part, as they lose by it. Impracticable to admit Russian subject	

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
				on to Commission. Refers to Part II, No. 274. To avoid raising question of His Majesty's Government showing "similar complaisance" to Russia (see No. 188)	115
182	To Treasury ..	Confidential	Aug. 8, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits Nos. 171 and 172. Trusts expenditure in connection with Commission will be sanctioned. Half to be borne by India (see No. 228)	116
183	Sir W. Townley ..	279 Tel.	9,	Bakhtiari and Tehran gendarmes. Makes correction in No. 174. Legations have told Persian Government that they consider Bakhtiari force in Tehran should be reduced. Swedes have aggravated Persian Government, who side with Bakhtiari (see Nos. 186, 189, 191, and 192)	117
184	Sir G. Buchanan ..	296 Tel.	9,	New Medjliss. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers two representatives at Tehran should warn Persian Government that they should have been consulted before steps were taken to convoke (see Nos. 200, 213, and 237) ..	117
185	" " ..	297 Tel.	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 167. Russian Government will reply as soon as possible (see No 208)	118
186	To Sir W. Townley ..	345 Tel.	9,	Bakhtiari and Tehran gendarmes. May act as indicated in No. 189 (see No. 197)..	118
187	To Mr. Marling ..	392 Tel.	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Point where eventual concessions might be made to Turkey on frontier. Desirable to get Turks and Persians to accept line on map before Commission begins work, and to secure right of arbitration for Russian and British commissioners (see No. 218)..	118
188	To Sir G. Buchanan..	583 Tel.	9,	Shatt-el-Arab Commission. To thank Minister for Foreign Affairs for reply in No. 175. Need not act on No. 181 (see No. 275)	118
189	" " ..	585 Tel.	9,	Bakhtiari and Tehran gendarmes. Refers to No. 174. To request instructions to Russian Minister at Tehran in sense of of No. 174 (see No. 198)	119
190	To India Office ..	..	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 172 and 182. Are Government of India prepared to pay half Commission's expenses? What sum should be allowed for entertaining?	119
191	Sir W. Townley ..	280 Tel.	10,	Bakhtiari and Tehran police. Refers to No. 183. Publication of article in "Near East" referred to will be stopped ..	119
192	" " ..	281 Tel.	10,	Bakhtiari in Tehran. Refers to No. 183. Conversations with Prime Minister. Gendarmerie colonel and khans (see No. 220)	119
192*	Lieutenant - Colonel Sir P. Cox	10 Confidential	July 16,	Pollution of Shatt-el-Arab. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 206. Transmits report from consul at Mohammerah. Turkish complaint devoid of any material justification	120

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
193	Sir W. Townley ..	162	July 21, 1913	Hormuz oxide. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 330. Transmits letter from Messrs. Strick to Persian Minister in London setting forth their position towards the Weir-Ellinger claims. On receipt of No. 3 informed Persian Government that he was awaiting His Majesty's Government's views	122
194	" " ..	33 Commercial	28,	Customs receipts. Refers to No. 131. Transmits statement showing increase of 20 per cent. over last year	123
195	" " ..	163	27,	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox respecting possible alignments for the railway between Dizful, Mohammerah, and Khor Musa (see Nos. 212, 252, and 257) ..	123
196	" " ..	164	29,	Attack on Mr. Anderson. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 463. Vice-consul at Sultanabad hopes to get the claim settled soon. Proposes to present claim for 100*l.* to Persian Government as personal compensation to Mr. Anderson (see No. 217)..	124
197	" " ..	283 Tel.	Aug. 11,	Bakhtiari in Tehran. Situation did not admit of waiting for instructions sent in No. 186. Trusts arrangement has been reached to prevent recurrence of disorders (see No. 199)	125
198	Sir G. Buchanan ..	298 Tel.	11,	Bakhtiari in Tehran. Refers to No. 189. Minister for Foreign Affairs will issue desired instructions	125
199	To Sir W. Townley..	351 Tel.	11,	Bakhtiari in Tehran. Refers to Nos. 183 and 192. Action entirely approved (see No. 220)	125
200	" " ..	352 Tel.	11,	New Medjliss. Refers to No. 184. Asks for observations. Was Shah's announcement made without communicating with the Regent? (see No. 213)	125
201	" " ..	347 Tel.	11,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 106. Could arrangement be made to meet objections in Nos. 49 and 151, or to induce Persian Government to give concessions to British subjects? (see No. 305)	126
202	To Sir G. Buchanan..	269 Secret	11,	Salar-ed-Dowleh and Russian consuls. Transmits No. 118. To bring matter to Minister for Foreign Affairs' notice (see No. 288)	126
203	To Russian Ambassador	..	11,	Mint contract. Refers to No. 15, and Part XXXIV, No. 389*. Contests Russian arguments, and suggests compromise outlined in No. 105 (see No. 355)	126
204	To Persian Railways Syndicate	..	11,	Arabistan telegraph lines and Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Suggests an arrangement between the syndicate and the Indo-European Telegraph Department by which duplication of railway and ordinary telegraph lines might be avoided and conflicting telegraphic privileges reconciled, as suggested in No. 148 ..	127
205	Sir G. Buchanan ..	245	8,	Mint contract. The Russian Government attach great importance to the Russian Bank having a monopoly for supplying silver (see No. 355)	128

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
206	India Office ..	..	Aug. 11, 1913	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 161. Sufficient if the application is made by His Majesty's and the Russian Ministers. Might not the French Minister also join in with advantage? (see Nos. 387 and 400)	129
207	Mr. Greenway ..	..	11,	Advance by mining syndicate. Refers to No. 163. Security which would be offered to the Société d'Études (see No. 246) ..	129
208	Sir G. Buchanan ..	300 Tel.	12,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 187. M. Minorski will not be at Constantinople when Captain Wilson arrives (see Nos. 214 and 215)	129
209	To Sir G. Buchanan..	278 Secret	12,	Russians and Indian tea. Transmits No. 116. May speak seriously to Minister for Foreign Affairs about the matter, but without mentioning names (see No. 287)..	129
210	To India Office ..	..	12,	His Majesty's consul at Shiraz. Transmits No. 179. Propose to reply that it might be well if Major O'Connor remained at his post during the operations against Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, but will leave it to Sir W. Townley to decide (see No. 299)	130
211	Mr. Marling ..	710	8,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 168. Transmits draft article safeguarding Anglo-Persian Oil Company's rights in transferred territory in form it was submitted to, and accepted by, the Porte. Refers to Nos. 6, 35, and 160	130
212	Sir W. Townley ..	285 Tel.	13,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 195. Muin says he has got concession from Persian Government to build tramway from Sheleli to Shuster, but will do nothing without consulting His Majesty's Legation (see No. 252)	132
213	" " ..	286 Tel.	13,	New Medjliss. Refers to Nos. 184 and 200. Regent was consulted, but it does not appear from Part XXXIV, No. 458, that he gave any assurance to Russian Government. In any case, Persian Government cannot be accused of breach of faith (see No. 237)	132
214	Sir G. Buchanan ..	301 Tel.	13,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 208. Russian Government consider it unnecessary for Captain Wilson to visit St. Petersburgh (see No. 215)	132
215	To Mr. Marling ..	397 Tel.	13.	Turco-Persian frontier. When does M. Minorski leave for St. Petersburgh, or has he left already? (see No. 219) ..	133
216	" " ..	398 Tel.	13.	Turco-Persian frontier. What is the cause of the delay in frontier negotiations? ..	133
217	To Sir W. Townley..	114	13,	Attack on Mr. Anderson. Approves proposal in No. 196	133
218	Mr. Marling ..	404 Tel.	13,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 160. Has discussed identic note to be presented to Porte with Russian Ambassador and Grand Vizier. Unable to lay down line of *status quo* frontier between Mendeli and Hawizeh, as suggested in No. 187, owing to lack of knowledge. Proposes action for presentation of note (see Nos. 221, 253, and 317)	133

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
219	Mr. Marling ..	405 Tel.	Aug. 14, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 215. M. Minorski does not leave for five or six days. Hopes Captain Wilson may be able to come to Constantinople as suggested in No. 167 (see No. 226) ..	134
220	Sir W. Townley ..	288 Tel.	14.	Bakhtiari in Tehran. Refers to No. 199. Reports arrangement arrived at, reducing numbers of Bakhtiari in Tehran (see Nos. 225 and 367)	134
221	To Mr. Marling ..	400 Tel.	14.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 218. Sanctions proposed action. Map should be signed by a representative of the Porte when they accept the note (see Nos. 230 and 234)	134
222	To India Office ..	..	14.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 214. Strongly deprecates Captain Wilson serving on a mission to be sent by the Admiralty to investigate Arabistan oil-fields. Attaches great importance to his being with the frontier commission the whole time. Suggests that various members of mission should meet at Mohammerah and not visit Constantinople (see No. 229*)	135
223	" " ..	..	14,	Lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island. Refers to Part XXXII, No. 101. Transmits No. 149. Suggests answer to Persian Government in case approached (see No. 254)	135
224	India Office ..	..	13,	German cable in Gulf. Refers to Nos. 23 and 164. Transmits telegram to Indian Government informing of proposed arrangement mentioned in No. 164. Would await their observations before convening inter-departmental conference (see No. 366 and Part XXXVI, Nos. 1* and 58*) ..	136
225	To Sir W. Townley..	357 Tel.	15,	Bakhtiari in Tehran. Refers to No. 220. Congratulates on successful result ..	136
226	To Mr. Marling ..	405 Tel.	15.	Turco-Persian frontier. Discusses possible plans for British members of Commission. To talk matter over with Russian Ambassador (see No. 230)	136
227	To Board of Trade ..	..	15,	German trade in the Gulf. Any observations on No. 173? (see No. 298) ..	137
228	Treasury	..	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 182. Sanctions proposed expenditure ..	137
229	India Office ..	..	15,	Trans-Persian railway. Transmits telegram to Viceroy, asking for observations as to constitution of British section of Commission to study alignment of section beyond Tehran	138
229*	" " ..	..	15.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 222. Captain Wilson will take his orders from the Foreign Office from 14th August. Refers to No. 216. On what date will Commission meet?	138*
230	Mr. Marling ..	408 Tel.	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 221. Russian Ambassador considers it unnecessary to obtain Turkish signature to maps. Suggests alternative. Refers to No. 214. When is Captain Wilson to arrive at Constantinople (see No. 231)	138

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
231	To Mr. Marling .. [839939]	406 Tel.	Aug. 16, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 230. Maps need not be signed. Will Russian and British commissioners have power to arbitrate? Captain Wilson arrives Constantinople on 23rd August. To prepare communication, which could be handed to Persian Government by Captain Wilson (see Nos. 235, 236, 258, and 300) ..	138
232	To Turkish Ambassador	..	16.	Turco-Persian frontier. Informs of appointment of Mr. Wratislaw and Captain Wilson as British commissioners. Asks for names of Ottoman commissioners (see Part XXXVI, No. 113, Enclosure 1).. ..	139
233	Sir W. Townley ..	290 Tel.	17.	Turco-Persian frontier. There is a map at Tehran which appears to be large identic map used by Shipley-Minorski Commission (see No. 243)	139
234	Mr. Marling ..	415 Tel.	17.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 221. Believes that Porte will accept note with some trifling alterations concerning frontier north of Zohab. Russian Embassy proposes to agree to these modifications (see No. 258)	139
235	" " ..	416 Tel.	17.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 231. Cannot Captain Wilson come earlier? Improbable that Persian Commission can get to Mohammerah by 31st October (see No. 244)	139
236	" " ..	417 Tel.	17.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 231. Proposed communication to Persian Government. Instructions and "règlement" for Demarcation Commission (see No. 244)	140
237	To Sir G. Buchanan..	600 Tel.	17.	New Medjliss. In view of No. 213, should defer representations mentioned in No. 184. To ask for views of Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 242) ..	140
238	Lieutenant - Colonel Sir P. Cox	12 Commercial Confidential	July 27.	Customs tariff. Refers to Part XXXIII, No. 437. Informs of proposal for further modifications of the tariff. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Chick, and supports the suggestions made therein for a reduction of duties on Indian tea and European provisions	140
239	Mr. Marling ..	700 Very Conf.	Aug. 2.	German cable in the Gulf. Refers to No. 22. Ministries of Interior and of Telegraphs know nothing about an application by the German Government for landing rights ..	141
240	Captain Wilson ..	..	16.	Turco-Persian frontier. Is informing Mr. Greenway that he will not be able to undertake railway survey in Luristan. Suggests arrangements in connection with expenses of the Commission (see Nos. 250 and 251)	141
241	Sir W. Townley ..	291 Tel.	18.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 231. Desirable that Persian Government should be communicated with regarding arrangement of final details (see No. 262) ..	142
242	Sir G. Buchanan ..	306 Tel.	18.	New Medjliss. Refers to No. 237. Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to postponing representations	142
243	To Sir W. Townley..	368 Tel.	18.	Turco-Persian frontier. Map mentioned in No. 233 is the one in question	142

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
244	To Mr. Marling ..	408 Tel.	Aug. 18, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 235 and 236. Trusts M. Minorski may delay his departure. Agrees as to communication to Persian Government, but some preliminary communication should be made at Tehran urging immediate preparations (see Nos. 248 and 258)	143
245	To Sir G. Buchanan..	604 Tel.	18.	Turco-Persian frontier. To communicate Nos. 235, 236, and 244 to Russian Government	143
246	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	18.	Advance by mining syndicate. Refers to No. 207. Undesirable that Persian Government bonds to be issued for the amount of the loan should set forth the nature of the security (see No. 261)	143
247	Sir W. Townley .	292 Tel.	19.	Cabinet crisis. Crisis has arisen as a result of intrigues in which the Regent was concerned (see No. 269)	143
248	To Mr. Marling ..	411 Tel.	19.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 241 and 244. Wishes to secure arrival of missions at Mohammerah by 31st October. Could details of preliminary communication to Persian Government be telegraphed to Tehran? (see No. 297) ..	144
249	To Sir W. Townley..	120	19.	Overland telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas. Transmits Nos. 29, 58, and 173; Part XXXIII, Nos. 417 and 529; Part XXXIV, Nos. 68, 363, and 445. To enter into negotiations with the Persian Government for an agreement for the construction of the line on the basis of the draft in Part XXXIV, No. 363 (see Part XXXVI, No. 130)	144
250	To India Office ..	..	19.	Turco-Persian frontier and Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Transmits Nos. 240 and 251. Could not officer to replace Captain Wilson in railway survey proceed to Dizful in time to accompany the survey party? Suggests all the Commission's accounts should be rendered to India Treasuries in first instance (see No. 292)..	145
251	To Persian Railways Syndicate	Confidential	19.	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Reasons why Captain Wilson will be unable to undertake the survey of (see No. 260)	145
252	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	19.	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Transmits enclosure in No. 195, and informs of No. 212 (see No. 296)..	146
253	Mr. Marling ..	720 A	14.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 218. Transmits, with comments, draft identic note and annexes discussed with Grand Vizier and Minister of War (see Nos. 258, 294, and 297)	146
254	India Office ..	..	19.	Lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island. Refers to No. 223. Concurs generally in proposed reply to Persian Government, but would made reservation as to visit of Persian official to the island	152
255	Board of Trade ..	..	19.	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 161. Considers application should be presented by the two representatives at Tehran, and concurs in terms of note to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 291)	152

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
256	Persian Railways Syndicate	..	Aug. 19, 1913	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. What steps do His Majesty's Government intend taking to replace Captain Wilson? (see No. 363 A)	152
257	India Office ..	..	20,	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Transmits telegram from Viceroy respecting alignment. Strategical considerations should be outweighed by commercial and engineering ones (see Nos. 195 and 296)..	153
258	Mr. Marling ..	421 Tel.	19,	Turco-Persian frontier. Grand Vizier states that identic note will be accepted practically without alteration. He is agreeable to procedure proposed in No. 244. British and Russian delegates will have powers of arbitration (see No. 300)..	154
259	To Mr. Marling ..	412 Tel.	20,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 258. Turkish assent to delegates' powers of arbitration should be placed formally on record. Suggestion that for doubtful localities two lines should be laid down on the map	154
260	Persian Railways Syndicate	..	20.	Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. Acknowledges No. 251. Extremely necessary that experienced person should accompany survey party. Suggests Mr. Soane (see No. 363A, and Part XXXVI, No. 148)	154
261	Mr. Greenway ..	..	20.	Advance by mining syndicate. Refers to No. 246. Concurs. Suggests procedure for avoiding the difficulty (see No. 295) ..	155
262	Mr. Marling ..	424 Tel.	21,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 241. Persian Embassy have been kept fully informed of negotiations and are well satisfied with the result. Suggests Persian delegate on Delimitation Commission (see Nos. 268 and 276)	155
263	" " ..	425 Tel.	21,	Turco-Persian frontier. Advisable that steps should be taken at Tehran to ensure prompt payment of Persian members of Delimitation Commission (see Part XXXVI, No. 119)	155
264	Sir W. Townley ..	293 Tel.	22,	Swedish officers for Tehran police. Refers to No. 180. Request for extra police officers was approved by Persian Government. Sees no objection to the request	156
265	To Sir W. Townley..	377 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 268. To act accordingly when Russian Minister is so instructed	156
266	To Mr. Marling ..	418 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. May communicate direct with Sir W. Townley about the details of arrangement about the Persian Commission	156
267	" " ..	419 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. M. Minorski appears to object to starting demarcation from the south (see Nos. 271 and 272) ..	156
268	To Sir G. Buchanan..	620 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. To inform Russian Government of Nos. 262 and 263, and suggest Russian Minister at Tehran proposing Persian delegate for Delimitation Commission (see No. 345)	156

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
269	To Sir G. Buchanan..	623 Tel.	Aug. 22, 1913	Cabinet crisis. Refers to No. 247. Most important to retain Ain-ed-Dowleh in the Cabinet. Useless to retain Vossuk. Ala-es-Sultaneh might be suitable Minister for Foreign Affairs. To inform Russian Government (see No 273)	157
270	Treasury	..	22,	Reconstruction of Arabistan telegraph lines. Refers to No. 169. Asks for further particulars (see No. 318)	157
271	Mr. Marling ..	428 Tel.	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 267. Captain Wilson and M. Minorski will begin work in the south (see No. 272) ..	157
272	" " ..	429 Tel.	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 267 and 271. Conversation between Captain Wilson and M. Minorski (see No. 290) ..	157
273	Sir G. Buchanan ..	311 Tel.	23,	Cabinet crisis. Refers to No. 269. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who desires to retain Vossuk, and has no objection to Ain-ed-Dowleh remaining (see No. 327)	158
274	To Sir W. Townley..	381 Tel.	23,	German interests at Kerman. German Government desire His Majesty's consul to give protection to Persian Carpet Company, in which Persian capital is largely interested. To instruct him accordingly..	158
275	Sir G. Buchanan ..	312 Tel.	24,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Refers to No. 275. Substance of *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government. Their objections to the position of Russian subjects and the Sheikh of Mohammerah under the convention (see Nos. 293* and 302)	158
276	" " ..	313 Tel.	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 241. Steps taken by Russian Government to communicate result of negotiations to Persian Government (see Nos. 262 and 300)	159
277	Sir W. Townley ..	166 Very Conf.	1,	Anglo-Russian Agreement and Azerbaijan. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 414. Discusses meaning of M. Sazonof's phrase, "more elbow-room in North Persia." Transmits letter from Mr. Smart reporting enormous extension of Russian influence in North Persia (see Nos. 365 and 375) ..	159
278	" " ..	168	2,	Shah and new Medjliss. Refers to No. 152. Shah's declaration that it was proposed to hold elections for a new Medjliss immediately	163
279	" " ..	169	4,	Monthly summary. Transmits for July ..	163
280	" " ..	170	4,	New Medjliss. Proclamation published regarding a general election. Convocation of a Senate foreshadowed	166
281	" " ..	171 Confidential	5,	Fars. Reports fully on situation in. A general improvement. Unpleasant gendarmerie incident (see No. 320).. ..	166
282	" " ..	173	5,	Caravans. Transmits reports from Bushire and Shiraz for July	170
283	" " ..	174	5,	Russian troops in Persia. Transmits table showing numbers estimated at 17,000 ..	170
284	" " ..	175	5,	General situation. Reports on. Cabinet, new Medjliss, gendarmes, and Bakhtiari (see No. 327)	171

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
285	Sir W. Townley ..	176	Aug. 6, 1913	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 435. Highly desirable that northern and southern sections should be built simultaneously. Anglo-Russian co-operation is essential. Application for option will probably be met with request for a large loan	172
286	" " ..	178	8,	Roads. Refers to No. 282. Reports robberies on Bushire–Shiraz and Ispahan roads	173
287	Sir G. Buchanan ..	254	19,	Russians and Indian tea trade. Has spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed in No. 209. M. Sazonof will have enquiry made (see Part XXXVI, No. 18)..	173
288	" " ..	255	19,	Salar-ed-Dowleh and Russian consuls. Refers to No. 202. Conversation with M. Sazonof, who said he would have enquiries made into the matter.. ..	174
289	Mr. Marling ..	430 Tel.	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 272. Need of a secretary being attached to both British and Russian delegations (see No. 304)	175
290	To Mr. Marling ..	425 Tel.	25,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 272. Agrees as to postponing date of starting work. Captain Wilson will presumably be free for the railway survey in this case (see No. 292)	176
291	To Board of Trade ..	..	25,	Trans-Persian railway. Acknowledges No. 255. Proposes additions to draft note to safeguard société's rights as to alignment beyond Tehran, and point where line should reach the sea (see Part XXXVI, No. 4)	176
292	Mr. Marling ..	432 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier and Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. Refers to No. 290. Captain Wilson will be free for railway survey. Perhaps Mr. Greenway will now allow Dr. Young to go with the Frontier Commission (see No. 351*)	177
293	" " ..	433 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 236. M. Minorski thinks it may not be necessary for commissioners to hold preliminary meeting at Constantinople ..	177
293*	To Sir G. Buchanan..	628 Tel.	26,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Replies to Russian objections in No. 275 as to position of Sheikh of Mohammerah. Further communication will follow (see "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia," Part XII, No. 84) ..	177*
294	To Mr. Marling ..	267	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Acknowledges No. 253. Asks for information as to steps to be taken to give the arrangement a binding force. Asks for draft of instructions to be issued to British commissioners (see Nos. 326 and 331) ..	177
295	To Russian Chargé d'Affaires	..	26,	Advance by mining syndicate. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 462. Informs that syndicate would be willing to admit Société d'Études to one-third part of the concession. Conditions. Trusts Russian Government will accept arrangement (see note from Russian Ambassador 5th February, 1914)..	178
296	To Mr. Greenway ..	Confidential	26,	Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. Refers to No. 252. Choice of alignment should be governed by engineering and commercial considerations only	178

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
297	Mr. Marling ..	733	Aug. 21, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 253. Transmits British and Russian notes. Observations as to suggestion for communication to Persian Government made in No. 248 (see No. 317)..	178
298	Board of Trade ..	..	26,	German competition in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 227. Have nothing to add to Part XXXIV, No. 156..	185
299	Sir W. Townley ..	295 Tel.	27,	His Majesty's consul at Shiraz. Refers to No. 179. He has decided to abandon his proposed tour. Fears recrudescence of trouble in Fars (see No. 316)	185
300	To Sir W. Townley..	390 Tel.	27,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 276. To make arrangement, in concert with Russian Minister, for right of arbitration for British and Russian Ministers (see No. 336)	186
301	" " ..	128	27,	Reconstruction of Arabistan telegraph lines. Refers to Part XXXIII, No. 133. Should not article 3 of the agreement with the Persian Government be ratified? (see Paper No. 47590/13, not printed) ..	186
302	Sir G. Buchanan ..	260	24,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Transmits copy of *aide-mémoire* referred to in No. 275 ..	186
303	Sir W. Townley ..	296 Tel.	28,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. He has reached Kermanshah, and taken bast at Russian consulate	187
304	To Mr. Marling ..	437 Tel.	28,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 289. Secretary from the diplomatic service will not be attached to the British delegation (see Nos. 307 and 322)	187
305	Sir W. Townley ..	297 Tel.	29,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 201. Conversation with Muin. Preferable to make an arrangement with him than to try to oust him (see Nos. 321 and 342) ..	188
306	Mr. Marling ..	444 Tel.	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. Reports departure of Captain Wilson for Tehran	188
307	" " ..	446 Tel.	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 304. Considers secretary advisable owing to Commission's proposed method of working (see No. 311)	188
308	To Sir W. Garstin ..	..	29,	Trans-Persian railway. Asks for observations on draft application for option to Persian Government (not printed) (see No. 377)	188
308*	Director of Military Operations	..	30,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 436. When will reply be made by His Majesty's Government to Part XXXIV, No. 257? (see No. 335) ..	189*
309	Sir W. Townley ..	298 Tel.	30,	Anglo-Indian loan. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 325. Persian Government accept revised amortisation table	189
310	To Sir W. Townley..	394 Tel.	30,	Turco-Persian frontier. To report Captain Wilson's movements up to end of November. Important that work should be completed as far as Kasr-i-Shirin by beginning of April (see No. 312) ..	189
311	To Mr. Marling ..	442 Tel.	30,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 307. Is asking Cairo if Mr. Hubbard, a Levant officer, can be spared to act as secretary (see No. 313)	189

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
312	To Sir G. Buchanan..	641 Tel.	Aug. 30, 1913	Turco-Persian frontier. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of No. 310, and express hope that Russian mission may be at Mohammerah by 15th December (see No. 322)	189
313	To Mr. Cheetham ..	81 Tel.	30,	Turco-Persian frontier. Can Mr. Hubbard be spared to act as secretary to the British mission? (see Paper No. 40875/13, not printed)	190
314	Memorandum by Mr. Oliphant	..	30,	Financial control in Persia. Refers to Part XXXIII, No. 553. Gives an account of scheme proposed by the Société d'Études of the Trans-Persian railway, and by M. Sabline, and Treasury's and Indian Government's criticisms (see No. 382)	190
315	Board of Trade ..	..	30,	Persian customs tariff. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 487. Submits observations on (see No. 363)	196
316	To Sir W. Townley..	396 Tel.	Sept. 1,	Fars. Refers to No. 299. Would like to know further details about situation in Fars and possible necessary action (see No. 391)	197
317	To Mr. Marling ..	444 Tel.	1,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 297. Asks for maps. Asks for explanation as to point in No. 218 (see No. 319) ..	197
318	To India Office ..	..	1,	Reconstruction of Arabistan telegraph lines. Refers to No. 137. What reply should be returned to No. 270? (see Part XXXVI, No. 69)	197
319	Mr. Marling ..	450 Tel.	2,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 317. Explains omission (see No. 326) ..	197
320	To Sir W. Townley..	129	2,	Fars. Refers to No. 281. Approves action taken in connection with conduct of Swedish major. Proposes communicating substance to Swedish Government unofficially (see Part XXXVI, No. 16) ..	197
321	To India Office .. „ Board of Trade ..	..	2,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 151. Transmits No. 305. Asks for observations as to Muin's denial of hostility to British interests (see Nos. 328 and 329) ..	198
322	Mr. O'Beirne ..	322 Tel.	3,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 304 and 312. M. Minorski will be ready to start work on 1st January. His views as to a secretary (see No. 325)	198
323	India Office ..	..	3,	Henjam coaling station. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 151. Work will be a charge on Indian revenues	198
324	To Sir W. Townley.. „ Mr. Marling ..	400 Tel. 449 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. M. Minorski will be ready to start work on 1st January, and will be at Mohammerah about 15th December	199
325	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	647 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 322. Thought Indian native clerk would suffice, but is willing to reconsider the matter ..	199
326	To Mr. Marling ..	448 Tel.	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 319. Action to be taken as regards initialling maps and safeguarding against possible Turkish evasion. To discuss points raised in this and in No. 294 with Russian colleague and report fully (see No. 331) ..	199

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
327	To Sir W. Townley..	131	Sept. 4, 1913	Cabinet. Refers to No. 284. To inform Regent when he arrives that His Majesty's Government attach importance to the retention of Ain in the Cabinet	200
328	Board of Trade ..	..	4,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to Part XXXIV, Nos. 321 and 470. Discusses, from commercial point of view, possible lines of action in connection with Muin's concessions. Question of royalties payable to Persian Government (see No. 354) ..	200
329	India Office ..	..	4,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 321. Is consulting Government of India (see No. 354)	201
329*	Consul-General Wratislaw	5	5,	Turco-Persian frontier. Suggests obtaining Porte's preliminary consent to free movement of escort on their side of the frontier (see No. 352*)	201*
330	Sir W. Townley ..	302 Tel.	6,	Governor of Kain. He wishes His Majesty's Government to act as executor of his will for his whole estate, and as trustee for a third of his landed estate. Desirable to give him such assurance as is possible (see No. 334)	201
331	Mr. Marling ..	456 Tel.	6,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 326. Has discussed points with Russian Ambassador, who deprecates preparation of instructions at present. "Règlement intérieur" drafted. Reasons for Turkish delay (see Nos. 333, 346, 347, and 384) ..	202
332	Sir W. Townley ..	303 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Skirmish between Russian troops and Turkish regulars who had crossed frontier line. No untoward results anticipated	202
333	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	650 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 331. Considers convention should be signed and ratified, with signed maps attached. To inform Russian Government, and press them to agree and make arrangements accordingly (see No. 336)	202
334	To Sir W. Townley..	404 Tel.	8,	Governor of Kain. Refers to No. 330. What assurances are suggested? His Majesty's Government cannot become responsible as executors or otherwise (see Paper No. 41919/13, not printed) ..	203
335	To Director of Military Operations	..	8,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 308*. Main point of difference between His Majesty's Government and Russian Government concerns southern alignment. Mixed Commission is to examine and report. For this and other reasons reply cannot yet be returned to Russian note of 14th May	203
336	Mr. O'Beirne ..	330 Tel.	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 331. Russian Government consider course suggested by His Majesty's Government in No. 333 would involve fresh delays, and consider a protocol would be made sufficiently binding. Alternative to clause providing powers of arbitration for British and Russian commissioners (see No. 339, and Part XXXVI, No. 17)	204
337	Sir W. Townley ..	308 Tel.	10,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 294. Has Porte expressed concurrence in writing to Anglo-Russian notes? (see Nos. 343 and 344)	204

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
338	To Sir W. Townley..	407 Tel.	Sept. 10, 1913	Regent and Nationalists. There are said to be two prominent Nationalists returning with the Regent. Asks for suggestions (see No. 341)	204
339	To Mr. O'Beirne ..	656 Tel.	10,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 336. Will defer to Russian Government's views if protocol is made absolutely binding. It should be prepared without delay ..	205
340	India Office ..	..	10,	Turkish consul at Lingah. Refers to No. 136. Considers that protest suggested by Government of India should now be made to Turkish Government (see No. 380)	205
341	Sir W. Townley ..	310 Tel.	11,	Regent and nationalists. Refers to No. 338. Regent has made terms with the more progressive element, whose presence in Medjliss is likely to be distasteful to Russia	205
342	" " ..	311 Tel.	11,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Transmits telegram from Sir P. Cox suggesting conditional support to Muin. May he proceed on these lines? (see Nos. 357 and 389)	206
343	To Sir W. Townley..	408 Tel.	11,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 337. Turkish reply not yet received (see No. 384)	206
344	To Mr. Marling ..	455 Tel.	11,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 337. To support Russian Ambassador in urging Porte to accept frontier specified in notes of 18th August (see No. 384)	206
345	Mr. O'Beirne ..	332 Tel.	12.	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 268. Russian Government suggest appointment of Itila-ul-Mulk as assistant commissioner (see No. 351)	206
346	To Mr. Marling ..	456 Tel.	12,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 331. What are maps referred to in last paragraph. To urge on Russian Ambassador use of Greenwich meridian for the Commission's work	207
347	Mr. Marling ..	777	6,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 331. Transmits draft "Règlement intérieur" and article providing arbitration powers to British and Russian commissioners to be inserted in instructions to commissioners (see Part XXXVI, No. 40) ..	207
348	" " ..	778	7	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 294 and 326. Steps remaining to be taken before Commission can start work ..	209
349	Sir W. Townley ..	317 Tel.	13,	Shuja and fedais. Transmits telegram from Tabriz. Shuja has arrested five fedais and hung one. Russian consul-general's attitude	210
350	" " ..	319 Tel.	14,	Shuja and fedais. Transmits telegram from Tabriz. Unlikely that any more of the prisoners will be executed. Suggests approving Mr. Smart's action (see No. 360)	210
351	" " ..	320 Tel.	14,	Turco-Persian frontier. Belgian officer to accompany Persian Commission. Names of proposed Persian commissioners. Enquires as to declaration to be obtained from Persian Government of their wish that commissioners of the two Powers should take part in work of delimitation (see Paper No. 42126/13, not printed) ..	210

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
351*	Sir W. Townley ..	321 Tel.	Sept. 14, 1913	Mohammerah – Khoremabad Railway. Captain Wilson leaving for Hamadan, and thinks he can get through in spite of disturbed state of Luristan (see Nos. 363A and 386)	211*
352	" " ..	323 Tel.	15,	Gendarmerie and Kerman. 200 gendarmes, 2 Maxims, and 3 Swedish officers have left for Kerman viâ Ispahan and Yezd (see Part XXXVI, No. 71)..	211
352*	To Mr. Marling ..	293	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits No. 329*. To take necessary action (see No. 396) ..	211*
353	To Hakki Pasha ..	..	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. Earnestly trusts that Turkish reply to Anglo-Russian notes may be expedited (see No. 384) ..	211
354	To India Office ..	..	15,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 329. Transmits No. 328. Any observations? (see No. 385)	211
355	Russian Chargé d'Affaires	..	15,	Mint contract. Refers to No. 203. Transmits note from Russian Government, who consider that the two banks should be authorised to proceed to an exchange of views in order to reach a compromise as to the supply of silver (see Part XXXVI, No. 5)	212
356	Sir W. Townley ..	324 Tel.	16,	Gendarmerie and Governor-General of Fars. Reports execution of a gendarme in circumstances derogatory to prestige of gendarmerie. Acting consul considers Governor-General should be dismissed. Concurs owing to importance of supporting gendarmerie. Refers to No. 370 (see Nos. 361 and 395)	213
356*	Mr. Marling ..	471 Tel. Confidential	16,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Ambassador is suggesting to his Government that instructions be sent to Tehran to urge that full powers be given to Persian Ambassador to sign final agreement ..	213*
357	To Admiralty .. " India Office .. " Board of Trade ..	..	16,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Transmits No. 342, and asks for observations (see No. 385) ..	214
357*	Sir W. Townley ..	325 Tel.	17,	Financial administration in Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 371. Reports continual opposition to Belgian financial administration in North Persia by Russian officials. Considers that movement is part of a systematic absorption of Azerbaijan by Russia (see No. 362)	214
358	" " ..	328 Tel.	17,	Regent. Regent has arrived at Enzeli ..	214
359	" " ..	329 Tel.	17,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Reports arrangement between Persian Government and Russian Legation, by which Salar is to reside in Switzerland and be given a pension (see Part XXXVI, No. 22)..	214
360	To Sir W. Townley..	415 Tel.	17,	Shuja and fedais. Refers to No. 350. Approves Mr. Smart's action	215
361	Sir W. Townley ..	330 Tel.	18,	Gendarmerie and Governor-General of Fars. Refers to No. 356. Swedish colonel's account of the incident. Persian Government consider Governor-General acted wrongly	215

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
362	Sir W. Townley ..	331 Tel.	Sept. 18, 1913	Financial administration in Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 357*. Russian Chargé d'Affaires has rebuked Russian consul at Tabriz (see Part XXXVI, No. 2) ..	215
363	To Sir W. Townley..	10 Commercial	18,	Persian customs tariff. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 487. Transmits No. 315. Useless to pursue the matter further at present	215
363A	To Persian Railways Syndicate	..	18,	Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. Informs of No. 351*. Captain Crosthwaite is to replace Captain Wilson as political officer at Dizful	215*
363*	To Sir W. Townley..	416 Tel.	20,	Financial administration in Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 357*. Will take up matter seriously with Russian Government on receipt of No. 371 (see No. 398) ..	216
364	Sir W. Townley ..	180	Aug. 14,	Gendarmerie and German Legation. Refers to No. 87. Comments on No. 45. The French Minister has exaggerated the matter	216
365	" " ..	181 Very Conf.	15,	Russia and Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 277. Transmits letter from Treasurer-General remonstrating against the sale of State land by the Governor-General of Azerbaijan to Russian subjects at Tabriz. Comments	217
366	" " ..	182 Very Conf.	21,	German cable in the Gulf. Refers to No. 27. Transmits letter from the Director, Indo-European Telegraph Department, giving reasons for considering it most important to prevent any foreign Government having a direct means of communication over the Turkish lines to the Gulf, and through Persia to Far East	218
367	" " ..	185	25,	Bakhtiari and gendarmes in Tehran. Refers to No. 174. Extends Nos. 174 and 183, and transmits text of arrangement mentioned in No. 220 drawn up by Persian Government (see Part XXXVI, No. 48) ..	219
368	" " ..	186 Very Conf.	26,	Gendarmerie. Refers to No. 367. The majority of the Swedish instructors show an unfortunate disregard for the political exigencies of the situation. Is inclined to have doubts about their suitability for their task	224
369	" " ..	188 Secret	30,	British instructors for Bakhtiari. Refers to Part XXXII, No. 229. The Bakhtiari would welcome British instructors. The danger of too great an extension of Russian influence (see Part XXXVI, No. 9)	225
370	" " ..	189	Sept. 1,	Governor-General of Fars. Transmits telegrams from acting consul at Shiraz, Mr. Smart, and Sir P. Cox, discussing desirability of removing Mukhber and appointing Kawam. Inclined to doubt desirability of making a change, but if it were necessary, Kawam would make the best Governor-General (see Nos. 356 and 391, and Part XXXVI, No. 15).. ..	226

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
371	Sir W. Townley ..	190 Confidential	Sept. 2, 1913	Financial administration. Treasurer-General's project for the appointment of eighty-two fresh Belgian officials. Systematic opposition to Belgian administration in North Persia (see No. 398) ..	232
372	" " ..	191	3,	Monthly summary. Transmits for August..	233
373	" " ..	192	2,	Salar-ed-Dowleh. Refers to No. 303. Reports on Salar's present situation ..	235
374	" " ..	193 Confidential	2,	Political situation. Cabinet practically non-existent. Its members and possible substitutes. A generally disheartening situation	235
375	" " ..	194	3,	Azerbaijan. Transmits extract from a letter from Mr. Smart reporting on Russian action. They seem to be trying to create a neutral frontier zone ..	238
376	Mr. O'Beirne ..	277 Secret	17,	Trans-Persian railway. Refers to No. 89. Discusses Russian attitude in recent negotiations. Considers Indian military authorities are wrong in attributing unfriendly intentions to Russia (see Part XXXVI, No. 87)	239
377	Paper communicated by British group of Société d'Études	..	11,	Trans-Persian railway. Letter from M. Raindre to Sir W. Garstin. Application for option. The directorate consider that there should be a clause assuring the company eventual necessary harbour concessions, and that a nominee of the French Government should be a member of the alignment commission to safeguard the company's interests (see No. 387 and Part XXXVI, No. 4)	240
378	Sir W. Townley ..	333 Tel.	22,	British claims in Fars. These claims could be met by the sale of certain villages recently confiscated by the State (see No. 401)	242
379	" " ..	335 Tel.	22,	Regent. Has arrived at Tehran	242
380	To India Office ..	..	23,	Turkish consul at Lingah. Refers to No. 340. Cannot agree to Government of India's suggestion, but would be prepared to protest strongly if consul's behaviour hereafter gave cause for complaint	242
381	Sir W. Townley ..	336 Tel.	24,	Southern roads. Refers to Part XXXIV, No. 426. Great part of stolen goods has been recovered	243
382	To India Office ..	..	24,	Financial control. Refers to Part XXXIII, No. 553. Asks for observations on société's scheme in the light of Treasury's and Indian Government's criticisms. Refers to No. 314 (see Part XXXVI, Nos. 62 and 163)	243
383	Sir W. Townley ..	196	11,	Caravans. Transmits statistics from Bushire and Shiraz for August..	243
384	Mr. Marling ..	483 Tel.	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 331. Turkish reply received. Gives main points of interest (see No. 397) ..	244
385	India Office ..	..	25,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to Nos. 354 and 357. Considers Muin's application should be strenuously resisted. If this is impracticable Sir P. Cox's scheme would do (see No. 342 and Part XXXVI, No. 8) ..	244

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
386	Sir W. Townley ..	337 Tel.	Sept. 26, 1913	Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. Refers to No. 351*. Persian Government consider Captain Wilson should not undertake journey to Burujird owing to danger. Asks for instructions (see No. 392)	245
387	Note communicated by Russian Embassy	..	27,	Trans-Persian railway. Considers French Minister should join in application for option. Supports French and Russian groups' demand respecting harbour concessions and representation on the alignment commission (see Nos. 206 and 400)..	245
388	Sir W. Townley ..	338 Tel.	27,	Cabinet. Regent said to have reconciled temporarily the differences in the Cabinet	246
389	" " ..	339 Tel.	27,	Muin-ut-Tujjar. Refers to No. 342. Persian Government have signed a declaration granting concessions for fifty years to Muin. Suggests drastic action (see Part XXXVI, Nos. 20, 37, and 132) ..	246
390	" " ..	340 Tel.	27,	Elections in Azerbaijan. Possibility that elections may not be held there. Shuja's position. Russian Minister's views (see Part XXXVI, No. 12)..	247
391	" " ..	341 Tel.	27,	Fars. Refers to Nos. 299 and 370. Kawam has been appointed Governor of part of Fars. A good arrangement (see No. 393)	247
392	To Sir W. Townley..	419 Tel.	27,	Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. Refers to No. 386. Leaves the matter to Sir W. Townley's discretion. Period of option should be extended if journey is postponed (see No. 394, and Part XXXIV, No. 41)	247
393	" " ..	420 Tel.	27,	Fars. Refers to No. 391. Does he no longer consider present Governor-General should go? (see Part XXXVI, No. 7) ..	248
394	Sir W. Townley ..	342 Tel.	28,	Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway. Refers to No. 392. Captain Wilson has reached Burujird, and is proceeding to Khoremabad. Gendarmerie action at Burujird has increased his difficulties (see No. 399 and Part XXXVI, No. 55) ..	248
395	" " ..	199*	26,	Gendarmerie and Governor-General of Fars. Extends No. 356. Transmits telegrams from acting consul at Shiraz	248
396	Mr. Marling ..	812	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 352*. Liberty for escort to move on Turkish side of the frontier is mentioned in "Reglement intérieur" enclosed in No. 347 (see Part XXXVI, No. 40) ..	250
397	" " ..	817	25,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 384. Transmits, without comment, Turkish reply (see Part XXXVI, Nos. 1 and 30) ..	250
398	To Sir W. Townley..	421 Tel.	29,	Financial administration in Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 371 (see No. 363*). In view of No. 362, does he still consider representations to Russian Government desirable? (see Part XXXVI, No. 2) ..	253
399	Sir W. Townley ..	343 Tel.	30,	Luristan. Gendarmerie action reported in No. 394 has greatly enhanced their prestige. Colonel knew nothing of Captain Wilson's journey	253

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
400	To Sir W. Townley..	422 Tel.	Sept. 30, 1913	Trans-Persian railway. If French Minister joined in application, would chance of a favourable reply be increased? (see Part XXXVI, No. 3)	253
401	" " ..	144	30,	British claims in Fars. Deprecates proposal in No. 378 for meeting claims. Asks for further observations (see Part XXXVI, Nos. 106 and 121)	254

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. October 1913.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

Part XXXV.

[30103]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure received in a covering letter from Captain A. T. Wilson, dated the 29th June, 1913, *re* railway surveys in Arabistan.

India Office, June 30, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Captain Wilson to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

Sir, *Worcester, June* 29, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to detail below, for your information, the dispositions that have been made up to the present by the Persian Railways Syndicate for the survey of the projected Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway, the arrangements for which have been entrusted by the syndicate to Messrs. S. Pearson and Sons, engineers and contractors.

2. Of the four engineers now in Arabistan, two—Mr. Douglas and another—have been instructed to proceed viâ Bagdad and Kermanshah to Hamadan, arriving at the latter place by the 7th September, there to meet me on my return from leave, viâ Tehran. I myself leave London on the 14th August, reaching Resht on the 22nd August and Tehran on the 25th, whence I shall proceed to Hamadan *en route* for Burujird and Khoremabad.

3. The two engineers with me will make reconnaissance between Khoremabad and Dizful with a view to eliminating from consideration some at least of the alternative routes, and thus enabling the preliminary survey party, which will, it is hoped, leave Dizful in October *en route* for Khoremabad, to concentrate their attention upon one or at most two alignments.

On arrival at Dizful these engineers will join hands with the engineers (Mr. Whitelaw and another) who are remaining in Arabistan, and, accompanied by me, will commence a survey of the selected alignment.

4. It is not at present in contemplation to send out any more engineers for the survey, but Messrs. Pearson have agreed, at my suggestion, to engage an experienced man with a good knowledge of Persian to take charge of the camp, transport, payment of coolies, &c.

5. I scarcely expect to arrive from Khoremabad at Dizful with the reconnaissance party before the end of October, whilst the engineers who are remaining in Arabistan (Mr. Whitelaw and another) propose to commence work north of Dizful at the beginning of the same month. It is not, however, likely that they will wish to survey more than the first 15 or 20 miles north of Dizful, in regard to which the responsible tribes, the Sagwand and the Kalawand, have already promised me their co-operation.

Our Dizful agent, Sheikh Abul Hassan, Majd-ul-Islam, should be able to make the necessary arrangements, and in addition to writing letters to the chiefs concerned from Khoremabad, I shall perhaps send down our agent at that place in advance, in order to do what is necessary to ensure as far as may be that Mr. Whitelaw's party is not interfered with.

6. After making substantial allowance for the delays which are inevitable in such an undertaking, it is hoped that the preliminary survey may be completed as far as Khoremabad by May or June 1914, when the party will, I understand, be recalled to England to prepare the necessary plans and estimates for submission to the Persian Government.

7. I learn from the Persian Railways Syndicate that "the Persian Government has decided to appoint a survey party under charge of M. de Brucq to co-operate in the Arabistan railway survey." M. de Brucq proposes to reach Mohammerah from Brussels on about the 8th October.

It will be interesting to see in what manner this Belgian engineer, whose reputation for energy and sobriety is, I am told, none too good, will give effect to the instructions of his Government.

In order to save time, I have ventured to send a copy of this letter to the Political Secretary, India Office.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON.

[29741] No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 293.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 247 of 28th June: Joint advance.

Yes.

[29915] No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 253 of 30th June: Hormuz oxide.

Contract in question is matter between Persian Government and Messrs. Strick. It followed dispossession of Muin-ut-Tujjar by former, and caused all difficulties which have since arisen with Messrs. Ellinger. We have no motive and are under no obligation to help Persian Government in the matter. Messrs. Strick, on the other hand, know that they have no claim to ask our help and have not yet approached us.

Action of Persian Government in thus seeking pretext to get rid of Strick is doubtless designed to leave field clear for restoration of Muin to his former position (see your telegram No. 243 of 20th June), and we cannot decide on our attitude towards situation which will be created by that restoration till we have views of Board of Trade as to its commercial aspect and those of India Office and Admiralty as to its strategical aspect (*i.e.*, possible effect on our position in Persian Gulf of possession by Muin of concessions in islands at entrance). We are consulting all three Departments.

In the meanwhile, pressure by Persian Government on Strick may make him more disposed to come to terms with Ellinger, which is what we want.

If you think it desirable to answer Persian Government's note you might say that you have referred question to His Majesty's Government, and are awaiting their views.

[29694] No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 487.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 234 of 27th June and 237 of 28th June: Regent.

I approve.

[27960] No. 5.

Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 1, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th May regarding your negotiations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah for permission to bore for oil in his territory.

Sir E. Grey has now received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to the effect that His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah recently availed himself of a favourable opportunity and succeeded in arranging an agreement between your company and Sheikh Khazal to the following effect:—

Your company may carry out oil-boring operations in any locality you may determine. In the event of your company tapping the oil found, the sheikh will be allotted nominally 3 per cent. of the shares—the same percentage as the Bakhtiaris received—in a subsidiary company which will be formed thereupon. Of this 3 per cent. the sheikh will return to the company 1 per cent. as a sign of his good-will, and will retain only 2 per cent. for himself.

With reference to the last paragraph of your letter under reply, I am to say that Sir E. Grey takes note of your reservation of your company's rights under their concession, and with a view to His Majesty's Government being in a position to lend such support as they properly can to those rights, I am to ask that Sir Edward may be furnished with such evidence in support thereof as may be in the possession of your company, and in particular with any evidence to the effect that at the date of the granting of the concession to Mr. D'Arcy the cultivated lands which your engineers consider necessary for the construction of any works in connection with the proposed boring operations were the property of the State.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[30221] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 567.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 27, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 546 of the 19th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith French draft of the article to be inserted in the Turco-Persian Frontier Convention for the purpose of maintaining the rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in any territory that may be ceded by Persia to Turkey under that instrument.

While taking the English draft enclosed in your despatch No. 176 of the 7th June as a basis, I have introduced into the French draft certain modifications intended to secure the objects to which I invited your attention in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have caused this draft to be shown to my Russian colleague, and at his suggestion made some minor modifications in paragraph (*a*) to make it clear that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company do not claim a monopoly of the sale of petroleum. I also complied with M. de Giers's request for a copy of the draft, as he said that, in view of the great interest of Russia in everything that concerns the petroleum industry, he must inform his Government of its scope, which he said he would do by telegraph.

In view of the importance of avoiding delay, I shall be grateful if you would inform me by telegraph if you find yourself able to authorise me to use this draft as the basis of discussion with the Porte.

I may add that, in spite of the constant and urgent pressure employed by my Russian colleague, he has not yet succeeded in inducing the new Grand Vizier to embody in writing the proposals verbally agreed on as regards the frontier in the Zohab districts.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Projet d'Article.

LES hautes parties contractantes étant d'accord que la concession octroyée par la convention du mois de mai 1901 par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah de Perse à William Knox D'Arcy, et actuellement exploitée, en conformité des dispositions de l'article 9 de ladite convention, par la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), ayant son siège principal à Winchester House, Londres (convention ci-après désignée "la convention," et dont copie est ci-annexée) reste en pleine force et vigueur dans toute l'étendue des territoires transférés par la Perse à la Turquie en vertu des dispositions du présent traité / de la présente convention (ci-après désignés "les territoires transférés"); et désireux ainsi de pourvoir au maintien et à l'exécution intégrale dans lesdits territoires des divers droits et obligations créés par la convention sont convenues ainsi qu'il suit :—

(*a.*) (La Turquie) déclare reconnaître la concession comme maintenue en pleine force et validité dans les territoires transférés, et que la concession, accordée par l'article 1er de la convention, constitue un monopole absolu et exclusif dans la limite des droits acquis par la convention dans toute l'étendue des territoires transférés; aucune concession de même nature propre à léser ou porter préjudice aux droits et privilèges de la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) ne sera octroyée à quelque individu, société ou association que ce soit.

(*b.*) Tous les droits, privilèges, franchises et autres avantages accordés à la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) par (la Perse) en vertu de la convention, et dont celle-ci jouit actuellement lui seront respectés et maintenus par (la Turquie) dans les territoires transférés en stricte conformité des dispositions de la convention.

(*c.*) Sauf les cas prévus aux alinéas (*d*) et (*e*) du présent article (la Turquie jouira dans les territoires transférés) en stricte conformité des dispositions de la convention de tous les droits, privilèges et avantages réservés ou acquis à (la Perse) en vertu de la convention.

(*d.*) La Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), ayant versé à (la Perse), conformément à l'article 10 de la convention, les deux sommes y mentionnées, à savoir, 20,000*l.* en espèces et 20,000*l.* en actions entièrement libérées, (la Turquie) ne pourra rien réclamer (à la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)) de ce chef.

(*e.*) La Perse n'aura droit à aucun versement de la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) en vertu de la dernière phrase de l'article 10 de la convention, du chef des bénéfices résultant de l'exploitation de la concession dans les territoires transférées. La redevance à payer en vertu de cette phrase du chef de cette exploitation sera versée par la compagnie à (la Turquie), et (la Perse) ne réclamera rien à la compagnie du chef de ces bénéfices.

(*f.*) Afin d'assurer l'exécution effective des articles de la convention relatives à l'installation des "pipe lines," la Turquie reconnait que ces articles assurent à la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) le droit d'exécuter cette installation de façon à relier les gisements pétrolifères dans les territoires transférées, avec un point proprement situé pour faciliter l'exportation par le Golfe Persique des produits de la compagnie. Ce point sera déterminé par un accord à intervenir entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) dans un délai de (? six) mois à partir de la date de la signature (du présent traité). / (de la présente convention).*

(*g.*) (La Turquie) reconnait que les dispositions de l'article 9 de la convention comportent la formation facultative, en conformité des stipulations de cet article, d'une nouvelle société, pour l'exploitation de la concession dans les territoires transférés, et que dans le cas de la création éventuelle de pareille société celle-ci sera chargé de toutes les obligations et jouira de tous les droits et privilèges de la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), à laquelle elle se trouvera ainsi pleinement et entièrement substituée.

(*h.*) Tout différend ou question de quelque nature que ce soit qui pourrait surgir entre (la Turquie) et la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) sera soumis à deux arbitres à Constantinople, dont l'un sera nommé par chacune des parties, et à un tiers arbitre qui sera désigné par les arbitres avant de procéder à l'arbitrage. La décision

* See No. 35.

des arbitres, ou, dans le cas où ces derniers ne tomberaient pas d'accord, celle du tiers arbitre, sera concluante.

(*i.*) (La Perse) se charge d'obtenir l'adhésion de la Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) aux dispositions de cet article. Le moyen de signifier cette adhésion à (la Turquie) sera arrêté ultérieurement de commun accord.

[30340] No. 7.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, July* 1, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 16th June, transmitting copy of two letters from the British group of the Société d'Études, with enclosures, relative to the proposed formation of two companies in respect of the trans-Persian Railway, and the consequent division of interests between the three national groups included in the Société.

With regard to the inter-group agreement and the declaration to be made by the British and Russian groups as to the rights of the French group, the Board have no observations to offer. But with regard to the draft protocol relating to the distribution of control over the various portions of the line, the Board are disposed to think that the terms of paragraph 9 are unduly wide and vague, and might be interpreted as giving the Société d'Etudes a larger measure of control over the operations of the exploitation companies than would be compatible with the object which His Majesty's Government had in view in proposing the formation of separate companies for the northern and southern sections of the line. Moreover, it is not made clear that the exploitation companies will be organised on the same lines as the construction companies, to which all the other articles of the draft protocol expressly relate.

I am to suggest, therefore, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that, in the event of the British group abandoning their intention to withdraw from the Société d'Études, they should be requested to recommend to their colleagues the modifications of this article shown in the enclosure to this letter.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Redraft of Article 9.

THE work of construction having been completed, the sub-companies formed for that purpose shall be continued as working companies, or shall be replaced by working companies constituted in the same manner. The contracts between the sub-companies and the Société d'Études shall assure to the latter such rights of intervention and control with respect to through traffic as shall protect its interests in the undertaking, and guarantee the unity of policy requisite to secure its primary object, namely, the creation of a main line of communication.

[30302] No. 8.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)

Sir, 25, *Abchurch Lane, London, July* 1, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose an extract from a letter addressed to us on the 28th May by our Yezd branch, in reference to the Bunder Abbas road, in case it might be of interest to you.

I am, &c.
(*Pro* Manager),
G. W. KELBE.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Imperial Bank of Persia (Yezd) to Imperial Bank of Persia (London).

(Extract.) *Yezd, May* 28, 1913.

BUNDER ABBAS road.

We regret to have to inform you that this route is again disturbed, and that Mr. Wright and a specie caravan are delayed at Massoon, a place in the neighbourhood of Bam. Robbers are waiting for them, and the Governor of Bam has been informed and the British consul, Kerman. The latter is doing all he can to ensure the safety of Mr. Wright and we await further news. The Baloochis have perpetrated large robberies in the last week or two, and have defeated forces sent against them by the Governor of Bam. A large camel caravan for Yezd was plundered, but the extent of loss is not yet known. It is to be regretted that provincial Governors cannot be supplied with light machine guns, as these are much feared. One of these taken by the escort of large caravans would prove a good passport.

[30393] No. 9.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 2, 1913.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative at Bushire :—

"Punitive measures against Tangistan are now finished as far as His Majesty's ships are concerned. As the result of the attitude of the inhabitants twenty sailing craft had to be destroyed, and eleven are held to ransom for a further fortnight under Rajput guard at Kharag. Full report to higher authorities by mail. Meanwhile, as senior naval officer is leaving the Gulf, I beg to express my high appreciation of his cordial co-operation with myself and officer commanding troops and of judicious and effective arrangements made in spite of combination of heat and rough sea. I am sorry that any loss of life should have occurred, but I believe that wounded are doing well, and we are really lucky to have suffered so little.

"(Sent to India.)"

In advising the Persian Government of the satisfactory conclusion of the punitive operations I am urging them that opportunity should not be lost of taking necessary steps to enable Governor of Bushire to assert authority of the Central Government in district by means of armed force, which his Excellency can raise if he receives the necessary financial assistance from Tehran. The district in question is properly under the Governor-General of Fars, but as he is unable under present circumstances to exert his authority in Dashti and Dashtistan and collect revenue I am suggesting that these districts should be handed over, pending a settlement of the question of their allocation to Shiraz or Bushire, to Governor of Gulf Ports.

Both Sir P. Cox and the British consul at Shiraz advocate this course, which appears to have the approval of the Governor-General and the financial agent.

(Repeated to Bushire and Shiraz.)

[30533] No. 10.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 3.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, July* 2, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th ultimo relative to the proposed trans-Persian railway, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they concur in the proposal to defer the question of alignment in the neutral and British spheres until a joint commission has examined and reported upon the routes viâ Shiraz and Kerman.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[30544] No. 11.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 2nd July, 1913, regarding Mohammerah.

India Office, July 3, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 2, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH.

Please refer to your telegram dated 28th April and to that from Resident, Bushire, dated 28th ultimo. Your Lordship will, I assume, issue instructions on the latter. Sir P. Cox's telegram to the Minister, Tehran, dated 21st August last, contains the test of connection between island and mainland, referred to.

[30556] No. 12.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 311.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 3, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Russian Ambassador is making great efforts to conclude this question without any further delay, and I should be glad to be informed if the draft article concerning rights of oil company enclosed in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 567 is approved, and if I may press its acceptance on Turks.

[30706] No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 493.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 3, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I am a little puzzled by the delay which is taking place with regard to these negotiations. I had hoped, from the language of Hakki Pasha, that the Turks were ready to accept the line desired by Russia in the north, and that a settlement with regard to the Zohab region could be reached by a compromise approved by British and Russian representatives at Constantinople. The reports from His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople confirm Hakki Pasha's language.

I think there is serious objection to not turning to account the present conciliatory disposition of the Turks in order to settle a question which has been a source of trouble for so long, and I should particularly welcome a settlement to the attainment of which Great Britain and Russia have co-operated for so many years.

Please communicate in this sense with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say that I consider it would be desirable to issue instructions accordingly to the two embassies at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 294, and Tehran, No. 297.)

[29093] No. 14.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 3, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo relative to the lighthouse on Tamb Island, and to inform you,

in reply, that he concurs in the proposal of the Marquess of Crewe to authorise the Government of India to make the necessary communication on the subject to foreign consular officers, as was done on previous similar occasions.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[30681] No. 15.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 4, 1913.

M. SAZONOF, dans une lettre reçue par le dernier courrier, revient sur la question qui a fait l'objet tout récemment d'un *pro-memoriâ* remis par l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Sir Arthur Nicolson.

M. Sazonof revient sur les arguments déjà développés qui, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, invalideraient le contrat passé entre la Banque Impériale de Perse et Mr. Shuster au sujet du privilège de fournir l'argent en métal nécessaire à la Monnaie de Perse.

S'appuyant sur les données tirées d'une lettre du Ministre des Finances, M. Sazonof pense que, au cours des pourparlers diplomatiques à ce sujet, il serait de justice que les fournitures du métal à la Monnaie soient suspendues.

Or, tout récemment une nouvelle fourniture de la valeur de 500,000 roubles a été faite, portant à 1,500,000 roubles le total des fournitures effectuées ces derniers temps.

M. Sazonof relève toute l'importance pour la Banque d'Escompte d'être chargée de ce service, qui en une certaine mesure servirait d'équivalent pour le privilège de la Banque Impériale pour l'émission des billets de banque.

De son côté, le Gouvernement persan paraîtrait bien disposé pour cette combinaison.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie est chargé de porter à neuf la bienveillante attention du Ministre britannique des Affaires Étrangères sur cette question, au règlement équitable de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial attache une considérable importance.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 20 juin (3 juillet), 1913.

[30675] No. 16.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

Sir, *India Office, July 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th June, 1913, as to the Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession for minerals in the Persian Gulf, I am directed to inform you that, in accordance with the suggestion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Crewe will defer his observations on the subject until the views of the Board of Trade on the commercial aspect of the question have been received.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[30725] No. 17.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 255.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 4, 1913.*

THERE has been an affray between Russian troops and Kurds in Mergewar district. Russian vice-consul at Urmia appears to have been making unimportant tour in contested zone; he was accompanied by small Cossack escort and several horsemen belonging to a Kurdish chief. Another Kurdish chief, with whom the latter was at feud, attacked consular party. Small Russian detachment at Syr with their guns were summoned as reinforcements and enemy's village was bombarded. Other Russian troops were summoned from Urmia in case of need. All Russian troops were eventually withdrawn to their respective posts at Syr and Urmia.

Russian casualties were one officer wounded, two gunners killed, and five men seriously wounded; six Kurds were picked up dead, and it is thought enemy carried off others.

Affair, which was probably due to local intrigues and jealousies amongst Kurdish chiefs, was of small importance.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[30729] No. 18.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 245.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 488 of 1st July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Delay is owing to absence of head of Department concerned, but Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I have spoken twice on subject, has promised early reply.

[30393] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 254 of 2nd July: Tangistan.

I approve.

[30556] No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 295.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 311 of 3rd July: Turco-Persian frontier.

The preamble of draft article is satisfactory provided the article by which the transfer of territory is made is specifically designated by its distinctive number.

Clause "A" of draft article is satisfactory in so far as concerns the territory actually to be transferred, but this, I understand from Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 546, is confined to territory north of Kuretu River, and does not cover any rights or claims of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company south of Kuretu River.

Do you think a clause safeguarding Anglo-Persian Company's claims within neutral zone of identic map, as regards region between Kuretu and Mendeli, or even Bedrai, would have any chance of being accepted by Turkey? If you can obtain acceptance do so; if not, as Persia secures greater part of neutral zone by *status quo* line, you can waive it.

The rest of your draft article is satisfactory.

[30556] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 295 of 4th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

If you are of opinion that there is any prospect of Turkey admitting a clause safeguarding Anglo-Persian Company's claims south of Kuretu River subjoined draft clause might meet the case.

I realise, however, that our position in regard to such a clause might be difficult to defend in view of the fact that by proposed treaty the territory in question will be recognised as belonging to Turkey already and will not be made the subject of a transfer by Persia to Turkey, and I am anxious to avoid any provisions respecting oil which might appear to be anything more than a recognition by Turkey of rights which the company had, in fact, acquired from Persia under the concession of 1901. To do more would expose arrangement to the criticism that it was in effect a grant by Turkey of fresh rights in violation of those claimed under alleged Turkish concessions in Mosul

and Bagdad. Anglo-Persian Oil Company seem prepared to admit that it would be difficult for them to maintain south of Kuretu River claim to anything west of *status quo* line, as shown by dotted line on map, and in these circumstances, if you think it advisable, I am prepared to abandon altogether suggested new draft clause.

The clause, if inserted, might run as follows:—

"For the purposes of the provisions of this article the territories between the Kuretu River on the north and Mendali (or Bedrai if possible) on the south, which lie within the so-called 'neutral' zone as delimited on the Anglo-Russian 'Identic Map' of 1869, and which under article blank of this convention are now definitely assigned to Turkey, shall be considered as in the same position as the transferred territories, and the provisions of this article shall apply as fully as if such territories were included among those specifically transferred by Persia to Turkey by article blank of the present convention."

[25763] No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 211. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 4, 1913.

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 595 of the 21st September, 1908, relative to the reported desire of the German Government to obtain the right to land a cable at Basra, I transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum handed to me by the German Ambassador at this Court,* expressing the wish of his Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and China, by means of a land line across Turkey and a cable which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The German Government ask for a declaration from His Majesty's Government that they will not oppose in principle the landing of a cable at such a point, and for a confidential intimation whether they would prefer that the cable should be landed in Turkish or in Persian territory.

You should endeavour to ascertain by confidential enquiry whether the German Government have obtained from the Turkish Government any concession conferring such a right since the date of Sir G. Lowther's despatch above referred to, reporting that they had not then done so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[25763] No. 23.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 4, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to refer to correspondence relating to landing rights for cables in British and French possessions in the East, ending with the letter from this Office of the 18th February last.

The Marquess of Crewe is aware that so long ago as 1908 a report reached Sir E. Grey that a scheme was in contemplation for the construction, with German capital, of a telegraph cable connecting Pulo Wey, in the north of Sumatra, with Basra, by way of Goa. This cable, it was stated, was to be joined by means of a line passing along Sumatra and Java, and thence by sea to Menado, in the north of Celebes, with the already existing German cable which connects the last-named place with Chefu by way of Jap Island, Shanghai, and Tsingtau. It was thought probable that the scheme would include the construction of a branch line to Bahrein, the centre of the pearl shell industry, which has now passed almost entirely into German hands, and it appeared clear that the landing of such a cable at Basra, after passing through the Persian Gulf, would give to the German Government a claim to make their voice heard in the settlement of questions affecting that region.

Sir E. Grey at once ascertained from the Portuguese and Turkish Governments that they had not granted and had no intention to grant to the German Government any concessions for the landing of cables at any points within their territory. He then

* Part XXXIV, No. 349.

proceeded to ask the Portuguese and French Governments to grant to His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to set up wireless telegraph installations in their respective Indian possessions.

The reply of the Portuguese Government, of which official note was taken at the time, was satisfactory, while the French Government, after a long delay and several reminders through His Majesty's Embassy at Paris, finally consented to consider the matter as part of a negotiation in progress at the time for the settlement of a number of questions at issue between the two Powers, demanding, in exchange for the rights asked for by His Majesty's Government, the transfer to themselves from the Eastern Telegraph Company the right to land at Perim a cable to Obokh which they had taken over by arrangement with that company.

These negotiations came to an end in 1909 without any agreement having been reached, and the question was allowed to rest till, in the course of last year, the French Government once more applied for the right to land their cable at Perim.

His Majesty's Government declined to accede to this application unless the French Government in return were prepared to renew the offer which they had made in 1909 to grant His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to erect radio-telegraphic apparatus in the French possessions in India.

After considerable delay, the French Government, in January last, agreed to this demand in so far as it concerned landing rights, but as regards wireless telegraph refused to go further than to pledge themselves to grant to no other foreign Power permission to erect such apparatus in French India.

This offer appeared to Sir E. Grey to be adequate, and the Postmaster-General shared this view, but the Marquess of Crewe proposed that, before ceding to France the landing rights at Perim, His Majesty's Government should obtain from them the right to exercise a censorship on cables and wireless stations in French India in time of war.

Sir E. Grey was disposed to think that such a demand was inadvisable for several reasons, and notably because it would be a breach of neutrality on the part of France to allow Great Britain to establish such a censorship in a war in which France was not engaged.

The Marquess of Crewe has suggested a reference of this point to the Law Officers of the Crown, and the question whether this step should be taken is still under discussion.

Such being the present position, the German Ambassador has handed to Sir E. Grey a memorandum, copy of which is enclosed,* expressing the wish of his Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and China, by means of a land line across Turkey and a cable which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The German Government ask for a declaration from His Majesty's Government that they will not oppose in principle the landing of a cable at such a point, and for a confidential intimation whether they would prefer that the cable should be landed in Turkish or in Persian territory.

Sir E. Grey is advised that Germany has no great commercial need for a cable such as that described, and he is accordingly led to the conclusion that the object of their request is political.

Sir E. Grey is consulting the Departments concerned, and he presumes that the objections entertained in 1909 to this scheme still hold good, but he would be glad to have the considered views of Lord Crewe, and in the event of his thinking it desirable in British interests to oppose the project, he would be glad of any suggestions which his Lordship could make as to the reply that should be returned to the German Ambassador.

Sir E. Grey has in the meanwhile addressed a despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, instructing him to ascertain, if possible, whether the German Government have obtained a concession for the landing of a cable in the Persian Gulf since the date of Sir G. Lowther's report, in September 1908, that they had not then done so.

I am to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the Admiralty, Director of Military Operations, Committee of Imperial Defence, and Post Office.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Part XXXIV, No. 349.

[25763] No. 24.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Very Confidential.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that so long ago as 1908 a report reached Sir E. Grey that a scheme was in contemplation for the construction with German capital of a telegraph cable connecting Pulo Wey, in the north of Sumatra, with Basra by way of Goa. This cable, it was stated, was to be joined by means of a line passing along Sumatra and Java and thence by sea to Menado, in the north of Celebes, with the already existing German cable which connects the last-named place with Chefu by way of Jap Island, Shanghai, and Tsingtau. It was thought probable that the scheme would include the construction of a branch line to Bahrein, the centre of the pearl-shell industry which has now passed almost entirely into German hands, and it appeared clear that the landing of such a cable at Basra after passing through the Persian Gulf would give to the German Government a claim to make their voice heard in the settlement of questions affecting that region.

Sir E. Grey at once ascertained from the Portuguese and Turkish Governments that they had not granted, and had no intention to grant, to the German Government any concessions for the landing of cables at any points within their territory. He then proceeded to ask the Portuguese and French Governments to grant to His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to set up wireless telegraph installations in their respective Indian possessions.

The reply of the Portuguese Government, of which official note was taken at the time, was satisfactory, while the French Government, after a long delay and several reminders through His Majesty's Embassy at Paris, finally consented to consider the matter as part of a negotiation in progress at the time for the settlement of a number of questions at issue between the two Powers, demanding, in exchange for the rights asked for by His Majesty's Government, the transfer to themselves from the Eastern Telegraph Company the right to land at Perim a cable to Obokh which they had taken over by arrangement with that company.

These negotiations came to an end in 1909 without any agreement having been reached, and the question was allowed to rest till, in the course of last year, the French Government once more applied for the right to land their cable at Perim.

His Majesty's Government declined to accede to this application unless the French Government in return were prepared to renew the offer which they had made in 1909 to grant His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to erect radio-telegraphic apparatus in the French possessions in India.

After considerable delay, the French Government in January last agreed to this demand in so far as it concerned landing rights, but as regards wireless telegraph refused to go further than to pledge themselves to grant to no other foreign Power permission to erect such apparatus in French India.

This offer appeared to Sir E. Grey to be adequate, and the Postmaster-General shared this view, but the India Office proposed that, before ceding to France the landing rights at Perim, His Majesty's Government should obtain from them the right to exercise a censorship on cables and wireless stations in French India in time of war.

Sir E. Grey was disposed to think that such a demand was inadvisable for several reasons, and notably because it would be a breach of neutrality on the part of France to allow Great Britain to establish such a censorship in a war in which France was not engaged.

The India Office have suggested a reference of this point to the Law Officers of the Crown, and the question whether this step should be taken is still under discussion.

Such being the present position, the German Ambassador has handed to Sir E. Grey a memorandum, copy of which is enclosed,* expressing the wish of his Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and China, by means of a land line across Turkey, and a cable which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The German Government ask for a declaration from His Majesty's Government that they will not oppose in principle the landing of a cable at such a point, and for a confidential intimation

* Part XXXIV, No. 349.

whether they would prefer that the cable should be landed in Turkish or in Persian territory.

Sir E. Grey is advised that Germany has no great commercial need for a cable such as that described, and he is accordingly led to the conclusion that the object of their request is political.

Sir E. Grey is consulting the Departments concerned, and he presumes that the objections entertained in 1909 to this scheme still hold good, but he would be glad to have the considered views of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and, in the event of their thinking it desirable in British interests to oppose the project, he would be glad of any suggestions which their Lordships could make as to the reply that should be returned to the German Ambassador.

Sir E. Grey has in the meanwhile addressed a despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople instructing him to ascertain, if possible, whether the German Government have obtained a concession for the landing of a cable in the Persian Gulf since the date of Sir G. Lowther's report—in September 1908—that they had not then done so.

I am to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the India Office, Committee of Imperial Defence, Director of Military Operations, and Post Office.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[25763] No. 25.

Foreign Office to General Post Office.

(Very Confidential.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to refer to correspondence relating to landing rights for cables in British and French possessions in the East, ending with the letter from this Office of the 18th February last.

I am to state that, so long ago as 1908, a report reached Sir E. Grey that a scheme was in contemplation for the construction, with German capital, of a telegraph cable connecting Pulo Wey, in the north of Sumatra, with Basra, by way of Goa. This cable, it was stated, was to be joined by means of a line passing along Sumatra and Java, and thence by sea to Menado, in the north of Celebes, with the already existing German cable which connects the last-named place with Chefu by way of Jap Island, Shanghai, and Tsingtau. It was thought probable that the scheme would include the construction of a branch line to Bahrein, the centre of the pearl shell industry, which has now passed almost entirely into German hands, and it appeared clear that the landing of such a cable at Basra, after passing through the Persian Gulf, would give to the German Government a claim to make their voice heard in the settlement of questions affecting that region.

Sir E. Grey at once ascertained from the Portuguese and Turkish Governments that they had not granted, and had no intention to grant, to the German Government any concessions for the landing of cables at any points within their territory. He then proceeded to ask the Portuguese and French Governments to grant to His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to set up wireless telegraph installations in their respective Indian possessions.

The reply of the Portuguese Government, of which official note was taken at the time, was satisfactory, while the French Government, after a long delay, and several reminders through His Majesty's embassy at Paris, finally consented to consider the matter as part of a negotiation in progress at the time for the settlement of a number of questions at issue between the two Powers, demanding, in exchange for the rights asked for by His Majesty's Government, the transfer to themselves from the Eastern Telegraph Company the right to land at Perim a cable to Obokh which they had taken over by arrangement with that company.

These negotiations came to an end in 1909 without any agreement having been reached, and the question was allowed to rest till, in the course of last year, the French Government once more applied for the right to land their cable at Perim.

His Majesty's Government declined to accede to this application unless the French Government, in return, were prepared to renew the offer which they had made in 1909 to grant His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to erect radio-telegraphic apparatus in the French possessions in India.

After considerable delay the French Government, in January last, agreed to this demand in so far as it concerned landing rights, but, as regards wireless telegraph, refused to go further than to pledge themselves to grant to no other foreign Power permission to erect such apparatus in French India.

This offer appeared to Sir E. Grey to be adequate, and the Postmaster-General shared this view, but the India Office proposed that, before ceding to France the landing rights at Perim, His Majesty's Government should obtain from them the right to exercise a censorship on cables and wireless stations in French India in time of war.

Sir E. Grey was disposed to think that such a demand was inadvisable for several reasons, and notably because it would be a breach of neutrality on the part of France to allow Great Britain to establish such a censorship in a war in which France was not engaged.

The India Office have suggested a reference of this point to the Law Officers of the Crown, and the question whether this step should be taken is still under discussion.

Such being the present position, the German Ambassador has handed to Sir E. Grey a memorandum, copy of which is enclosed,* expressing the wish of his Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and China by means of a land line across Turkey, and a cable which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The German Government ask for a declaration from His Majesty's Government that they will not oppose in principle the landing of a cable at such a point, and for a confidential intimation whether they would prefer that the cable should be landed in Turkish or in Persian territory.

Sir E. Grey is advised that Germany has no great commercial need for a cable such as that described, and he is accordingly led to the conclusion that the object of their request is political.

Sir E. Grey is consulting the Departments concerned, and he presumes that the objections entertained in 1909 to this scheme still hold good, but he would be glad to have the considered views of the Postmaster-General, and, in the event of his thinking it desirable in British interests to oppose the project, he would be glad of any suggestions which Mr. Samuel could make as to the reply that should be returned to the German Ambassador.

Sir E. Grey has in the meanwhile addressed a despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, instructing him to ascertain, if possible, whether the German Government have obtained a concession for the landing of a cable in the Persian Gulf since the date of Sir G. Lowther's report in September 1908 that they had not then done so.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has caused a similar letter to be addressed to the India Office, Admiralty, Director of Military Operations, and Committee of Imperial Defence.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[25763] No. 26.

Foreign Office to Director of Military Operations.

(Very Confidential.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Operations, and is directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state as follows:—

So long ago as 1908 a report reached Sir E. Grey that a scheme was in contemplation for the construction, with German capital, of a telegraph cable connecting Pulo Wey, in the north of Sumatra, with Basra by way of Goa. This cable, it was stated, was to be joined by means of a line passing along Sumatra and Java, and thence by sea to Menado, in the north of Celebes, with the already existing German cable which connects the last named place with Chefu by way of Jap Island, Shanghai, and Tsingtau. It was thought probable that the scheme would include the construction of a branch line to Bahrein, the centre of the pearl shell industry, which has now passed almost entirely into German hands, and it appeared clear that the landing of such a cable at Basra, after passing through the Persian Gulf, would give to the German Government a claim to make their voice heard in the settlement of questions affecting that region.

* Part XXXIV, No. 349.

Sir E. Grey at once ascertained from the Portuguese and Turkish Governments that they had not granted, and had no intention to grant to the German Government any concessions for the landing of cables at any points within their territory. He then proceeded to ask the Portuguese and French Governments to grant to His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to set up wireless telegraph installations in their respective Indian possessions.

The reply of the Portuguese Government, of which official note was taken at the time, was satisfactory, while the French Government, after a long delay and several reminders through His Majesty's Embassy at Paris, finally consented to consider the matter as part of a negotiation in progress at the time for the settlement of a number of questions at issue between the two Powers, demanding, in exchange for the rights asked for by His Majesty's Government, the transfer to themselves from the Eastern Telegraph Company the right to land at Perim a cable to Obokh, which they had taken over by arrangement with that company.

These negotiations came to an end in 1909 without any agreement having been reached, and the question was allowed to rest till, in the course of last year, the French Government once more applied for the right to land their cable at Perim.

His Majesty's Government declined to accede to this application unless the French Government, in return, were prepared to renew the offer which they had made in 1909 to grant His Majesty's Government exclusive rights to land cables and to erect radio-telegraphic apparatus in the French possessions in India.

After considerable delay the French Government, in January last, agreed to this demand in so far as it concerned landing rights, but as regards wireless telegraph refused to go further than to pledge themselves to grant to no other foreign Power permission to erect such apparatus in French India.

This offer appeared to Sir E. Grey to be adequate, and the Postmaster-General shared this view, but the India Office proposed that, before ceding to France the landing rights at Perim, His Majesty's Government should obtain from them the right to exercise a censorship on cables and wireless stations in French India in time of war.

Sir E. Grey was disposed to think that such a demand was inadvisable for several reasons, and notably because it would be a breach of neutrality on the part of France to allow Great Britain to establish such a censorship in a war in which France was not engaged.

The India Office have suggested a reference of this point to the Law Officers of the Crown, and the question whether this step should be taken is still under discussion.

Such being the present position the German Ambassador has handed to Sir E. Grey a memorandum, copy of which is enclosed,* expressing the wish of his Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and China, by means of a land line across Turkey and a cable which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The German Government ask for a declaration from His Majesty's Government that they will not oppose in principle the landing of a cable at such a point, and for a confidential intimation whether they would prefer that the cable should be landed in Turkish or in Persian territory.

Sir E. Grey is advised that Germany has no great commercial need for a cable such as that described, and he is accordingly led to the conclusion that the object of their request is political.

Sir E. Grey is consulting the Departments concerned, and he presumes that the objections entertained in 1909 to this scheme still hold good, but he would be glad to have the considered views of the Director of Military Operations, and in the event of his thinking it desirable, in British interests, to oppose the project, he would be glad of any suggestions which Brigadier-General Wilson could make as to the reply that should be returned to the German Ambassador.

Sir E. Grey has in the meanwhile addressed a despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople instructing him to ascertain, if possible, whether the German Government have obtained a concession for the landing of a cable in the Persian Gulf since the date of Sir G. Lowther's report in September 1908 that they had not then done so.

Sir A. Nicolson is to add that a similar letter has been addressed to the India Office, Admiralty, Committee of Imperial Defence, and Post Office.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.

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* Part XXXIV, No. 349.

[25763] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 96. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 4, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith for your information copies of correspondence relative to the desire of the German Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and the Far East by means of a land line across Turkey, or across Turkey and Persia, to be linked to a cable landed at some point on the Persian Gulf.*

As regards the proposal to carry a land line across Persian territory, I have to call your attention to the explanatory note, dated the 20th May, 1910, annexed to the joint Anglo-Russian note to the Persian Government of the 7th April, 1910, in which the following words occur :—

"Vu la difficulté de spécifier les concessions qui pourraient porter atteinte à leurs intérêts politiques ou stratégiques, les deux Puissances s'attendent à ce qu'avant de délivrer des concessions quelconques de voies de communication, de télégraphes et de ports à un sujet étranger, le Gouvernement persan entre dans un échange de vues avec elles afin que les intérêts politiques et stratégiques des deux Puissances puissent être dûment sauvegardés."

The Persian Government would, in consequence of this note, be expected to consult His Majesty's and the Russian Governments before acceding to any application which they might receive from the German Government for the right to carry a telegraph line across Persian territory, and the fact is one which should not be lost sight of in connection with the question raised in the German Embassy's memorandum.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30851] No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd July, 1913, regarding the Persian Gulf.

India Office, July 4, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 2, 1913.

MUIN-UT-TUJJAR.

Please inform me by telegraph at earliest possible date of your views on telegram dated the 6th ultimo from Resident, Persian Gulf, to Minister, Tehran, especially with reference to strategical necessity of our keeping control of the islands. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is doubtful whether either alternative suggested by Resident can be acted upon.

[30741] No. 29.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received July 5.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, July* 4, 1913.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 19th ultimo, with enclosure, further regarding the

* Nos. 23, 24, 25, and 26; and Part XXXIV, No. 349.

proposed construction of an overland telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas in place of the establishment of a portable wireless station at Lingah.

From a perusal of the latest consular report on the trade of Lingah, my Lords are still doubtful of the commercial importance of the place from the point of view of British interests; but, in deference to the political considerations urged by the Secretary of State and the India Office, they will no longer withhold their sanction to the charge against Imperial funds of one-half of the initial cost of constructing the line (4,010*l.*) and of the recurrent annual charge (75*l.*), it being understood that any profits derived from the undertaking should be equally shared by the British and Indian Governments.

I am to add that their Lordships consider that a proviso should be inserted in the agreement with the Persian Government to the effect that, pending the repayment by that Government of the capital expenditure incurred, the share of the receipts which would normally accrue to it should go to the credit of British and Indian revenues in repayment of the money advanced, and in respect of interest thereon.

I am, &c.
T. L. HEATH.

[30854] No. 30.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received July 5.)

Sir, 25, *Abchurch Lane, London, July* 4, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, in reference to the Mint Agreement between the Persian Government and the bank, dated the 27th November, 1911.

The directors have consulted Mr. Wood, the chief manager of the bank in Tehran, who is now in London. Mr. Wood was in Tehran at the time the contract was entered into, and is cognisant of all the circumstances of the case, and I am requested to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a copy of Mr. Wood's letter to the London manager of the bank, dated the 3rd instant, which my directors think replies to the points raised in your letter under acknowledgment, and, they venture to think, completely vindicates the bank's position in the matter.

I have, &c.
G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

Enclosure in No. 30.

Mr. Wood to Mr. Newell.

St. Ermin's Hotel, St. James's Park, London, July 3, 1913.

Dear Mr. Newell,

WITH reference to the Foreign Office letter of the 30th June, which I now return.

In article 1 of the Law of the 13th June, 1911, it is clearly stated that the Treasurer-General is charged with the "direct" and effective control of all financial operations, such as our Mint contract. Therefore, if he had to refer that operation to the Medjliss, it would not be direct control.

In clause 3 of article 2 it is stated that the Treasurer-General shall establish an office for all transactions of the Government with the bank (the State Bank) and operations respecting the minting of bullion, &c. Under the circumstances, it would be quite impracticable for every transaction between the Government and the bank to be first viséd by the Minister of Finance, in order that it may have the force of law. Otherwise, we would come to a standstill, and defeat the very ends of the law which gave the Treasurer-General power to exercise his own discretion in matters of this nature. Article 6 therefore has no bearing on the subject, especially as the business of minting has been carried out by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the entire satisfaction of the Persian Government, who sought no "improvement" in that direction. "Improvement" was assured when the Medjliss closed the Mint to the public, and placed the coinage entirely in the hands of the bank, and Shuster was only carrying out the policy of the Medjliss when he gave us the Mint for ten years. Several members of the Medjliss told me how pleased they were at what Shuster had done, and thus secured the Mint on a sound basis.

We rely entirely upon the Law of the 13th June, 1911, which the Russian Minister himself was eventually compelled to accept. In this connection I beg to cite the incident of a cheque for some 300,000 roubles (30,000*l.*) drawn by the Minister of Finance on the Imperial Bank of Persia in favour of the Russian Minister and in payment for certain arms, &c., purchased from the Russian Government. When that cheque was presented the Imperial Bank of Persia, in view of the Law of the 13th June, 1911, declined payment, and the Russian Minister was obliged to obtain a new order on the bank signed by Mr. Shuster. With regard to the granting of a concession by the Medjliss to two natives to import silver, the two natives in question were members of the Medjliss, and represented a constituency of Tabriz, where they had sustained (so they said) considerable loss during the disturbances at that place. Their claim on the Persian Government was settled by the Medjliss granting them a concession to benefit by the import of a stated quantity of silver for coinage, if it did not contravene the Government's existing arrangements with the bank.

As that concession did contravene existing arrangements the bank protested, and the matter was quashed, and the two natives have not imported a single ounce of silver to this day. Apart from this question of principle, the two natives have not the necessary capital to import silver, but rely on the bank advancing the money to do so. This of course was merely the Oriental way of circumventing an awkward situation, and leaving the bank to do what the Medjliss shirked. The same applies to our ten-year contract. The Persian Government is glad to know that the contract exists, but gladder still to think that the onus of fighting the issue does not lie with them, although I've no doubt they would cave in to the side which makes the most noise about it.

Yours sincerely,
A. O. WOOD.

[30856] No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 302.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1913.

MY telegram No. 300 of 4th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

The map with "dotted line" referred to is that described in Foreign Office memorandum of 7th November, 1907 (see "Persia" print).

[31231] No. 32.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 256.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 7, 1913.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Bushire, 6th July, No. 315, marked "Urgent":—

"There has been considerable unrest recently in Oman, which appears now to have come to a head, safety of Muscat itself being threatened. In addition to other measures proposed was one for immediate transfer by to-morrow's mail of Rajputs, now at Bushire, to Muscat. Regarding this proposal I have wired following:—

"'Muscat telegram No. 98.

"'Strength of Rajputs at Bushire, exclusive of residency guard, guards at private houses, and guard at Kharag Island, is, roughly, 400 men. While recent action on Tangistan coast has undoubtedly excellent effect, considerable irritation has not unnaturally been aroused, and any wholesale reduction at the present moment of the troops at Bushire might conceivably invite repetition of incursion of 1909, when Tangistanis were able to bring some 1,000 men into Bushire. Governor himself has no troops at his disposal, and relies on presence of British force to maintain tranquillity. Under these circumstances, after consultation with the officer commanding the troops here, I doubt desirability of sending more than 200–250 men to Muscat. This will leave at Bushire, exclusive of guards, a force of 143 men and three machine guns, which number could be reinforced by 50 men and one machine gun from Kharag Island, leaving at the latter place a guard of 20 men. Troops are ready to embark on receipt of orders, and in the meantime I will endeavour to hold up mail steamer.

"'(Addressed to Foreign Secretary; repeated to Muscat, Admiral, Chief of General Staff.)'"

I concur in the view that it would be undesirable entirely to denude Bushire of British Indian troops at the present moment.

[21433] No. 33.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 7, 1913.

MY telegram No. 255 of 4th July.

My Russian colleague tells me that he has represented to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the recent incident proves that the system under which certain Kurdish chiefs have been subsidised by Russia to preserve order in the Urmia and adjoining districts has proved a failure. As has been seen elsewhere, such an arrangement invariably breeds inter-tribal jealousy.

My Russian colleague has submitted for his Government's consideration advisability of creating a post of Persian Cossacks under Russian officers at Urmia. Portion of force would be mobile and would patrol frontier.

Value of the presence of Russian officers has recently been demonstrated by Salar-ed-Dowleh, who has humorously requested Russian consul at Kermanshah to obtain recall of the Russian officers from Cossack force which has been sent against him, on the score that he could then make his own terms with the Cossacks, but that if the officers remain he must flee to Luristan.

[31018] No. 34.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 7, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegrams Nos. 295 of 4th July and 300 of 4th July: Area of oil company's rights south of Kuretu.

I do not think that we could justify claim to western limit of neutral zone, as, so far as I am aware, it does not represent any frontier to which Persia ever laid claim, and I believe that attempt to do so would be resisted by Turkey.

Status quo frontier, however, seems to be safe ground, as at time of grant of D'Arcy concession it was recognised by both Powers under 1869 Convention.

I propose, therefore, unless otherwise instructed, not to insert clause, of which text is given in your telegram No. 300, but to rely on procedure suggested in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 546 of 19th June. Is six months' limit mentioned in clause (*f*) satisfactory?

[31018] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 307.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 320 of 7th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

I approve omission of clause indicated in my telegram No. 300 of 4th July.

It would be preferable to omit a specific time limit in clause (*f*), and to insert the words "aussitôt que possible," so as not to bind company.

[31558] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 7, 1913.

A RECENT Reuter telegram to the "Times" stated that the demarcation commission for the Turco-Persian frontier was about to be appointed. I shall be glad

to know if your Russian colleague approves the suggestion that there should be two commissions, to work respectively north and south from Zohab, and to be composed of four principal officers, viz., Russian, British, Turkish, and Persian, in each case. It seems desirable that the work of local demarcation should be done as soon as possible after the line on the map has been fixed, as otherwise there may be agitation on the frontier, as at the time of former commission. As soon as I know approximate date of commencement of work I will consult with War Office and India Office as to suitable officers. Steps will also have to be taken at Tehran.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 502, and Tehran, No. 300.)

[25551] No. 37.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 7, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd ultimo, regarding illicit arms trading by alleged British-Indian subjects in Ispahan and Yezd.

I am to request you to inform the Marquess of Crewe, in reply, that the subject matter of that communication having been discussed orally between the legal advisers as well as other members of your office and of this department; Sir E. Grey is advised that in view of the extreme difficulty of arriving at any certainty with regard to the true construction of the definition of "British subject" in the Persia Order in Council, 1889, the best course to pursue will be to set the matter at rest for the future by framing an amending Order in Council substituting the definition of "British subject" from the Persian Coast and Islands Order in Council of 1907 for the existing definition.

I am to observe, in this connection, that the section of the Act of 39 and 40 Victoria, referred to in section 3 of the Order in Council, 1889, has now been repealed and replaced by section 15 of "The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890." This fact would appear to render the course above proposed preferable to that of simply repealing the words "in so far as His Majesty has jurisdiction in respect of any such person."

An examination of the archives of this department has revealed the fact that the above quoted words were inserted, apparently as an afterthought, by the late Mr. Justice R. S. Wright (who drew the Order) as one of a number of amendments in pencil which he described as being "of a formal kind, which do not require explanation or observation." It would therefore appear useless now to speculate as to what can have been the object of their introduction.

Sir E. Grey considers that the fact of the words being, as they are, a unique occurrence in the *corpus* of the Foreign Jurisdiction Orders in Council, strengthens the case for an amending Order, which is already rendered strong enough by reason of the obscurity which the phrase has introduced into the Order.

Should Lord Crewe concur in Sir E. Grey's views as above set forth, I am to express his opinion that it would be unnecessary to submit the draft Order in Council to the law officers, as the alteration is being made merely for the purpose of assimilating the language of the definition of "British subject" in the Persia Order in Council, 1889, to that in all the other extra-territorial or foreign-jurisdictional Orders in Council.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[31351] No. 38.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, July* 7, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs decypher of a telegram dated the 7th instant relative to affairs in the Persian Gulf.

Copy has been sent to the India Office.

I have, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *July* 7, 1913.

ORDERS given for 250 Rajputs to be transferred from Bushire to Muscat in view of threatened attack on Muscat and Matra. "Philomel," "Pelorus," and "Odin," will remain at Muscat till danger is past.

[31363] No. 39.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 19th June, 1913, relative to rebellion in Muscat.

Copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, July 7, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, June* 1, 1913.

IN case there may be any development of the movement, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, an extract from the last Muscat diary, dated 24th May, dealing with an embryo rising against the Sultan on the part of certain disaffected tribes of the Wadi Maawal and the Nazwah district.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

Extract from Muscat Agency Diary for the week ending May 24, 1913.

SEVERAL reports have been received by His Highness the Sultan during the week from Rustaq, Nazwah, and other places to the effect that what may prove to be a powerful rising is forming in those quarters under the ringleadership of the Chief Abadhi Sheikh, Abdulla-bin-Hamed-es-Salimi, who, himself an old and almost blind man, wishes to proclaim a religious war against the Sultan, with the object of setting up his son-in-law, Salim-bin-Rashid, as Imam of Oman, the cause being the supposed leaning of the Sultan to foreign Governments and institutions.

This faction comprises the tribes of Bani Riyam Ibriyin and the Bani Hina tribes of Jabal-Riyam and Wadi-al-Maawal. The troubles originated at the village of Tanuf, near Nazwah, and it is supposed that the rebels might come down on Nazwah and Rustaq, as both of these places are said to be insufficiently garrisoned by His Highness the Sultan's askaris.

His Highness the Sultan seems perturbed at these manifestations, and is taking steps to strengthen his garrisons at Nazwah and Rustaq with men and provisions, but it is feared that he may be unable to do so, as it is believed that the communications are in the enemy's hands.

Letters received subsequently, and transmitted by His Highness to the political agent, show that the ringleader is already calling himself the Imam of the Moslems, and has been trying to persuade the chiefs of the Bani Ruwaha and other smaller neighbouring tribes to join his cause.

[31423] No. 40.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

India Office, July 7, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th June on the subject of the trans-Persian Railway, and to say that he sees no objection to the text of the three "projets" submitted by the British group of the Société d'Études.

He observes, however, that before effect can be given to the distribution of interests proposed in the third "projet," it will be necessary to induce the Russian Government to modify the view expressed in their *aide-mémoire* of the 1st (14th) May, that in the new zone there must be absolute equality between the three parties.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[31447] No. 41.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 256 of 7th July: Situation at Muscat.

Two hundred and fifty Rajputs left Bushire last night.

[31514] No. 42.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 7, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Grand Vizier informs me that reply to our note of 3rd May is being drafted and will be sent to us at once.

[31454] No. 43.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 324.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 8, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 309 of 7th July.

Before agreeing to commissions Russian Ambassador desires to await receipt of Turkish reply, text of which will probably be adopted as that of definitive treaty, the conclusion of which must be awaited before delimitation can begin. He fears that, if such text should be lacking in precision, differences of interpretation by the two commissions might arise, and he also suggests that it may be difficult to find sufficient suitable officials. He is not opposed to the suggestion in principle.

[31450] No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 249.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 216 of 15th June: Proposed division of neutral zone in Persia.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday whether it was his intention to put forward any concrete proposals with regard to neutral zone and Russian zone. His Excellency replied in the negative, saying that he was too much occupied with other matters to give this question his attention.

[31560] No. 45.

M. Lecomte (French Minister Plenipotentiary at Tehran) to M. Pichon.—(Received at Foreign Office, July 9.)

Téhéran, le 25 mai, 1913.

LA gendarmerie suédoise et la Légation d'Allemagne.

Je n'ai pas voulu charger ma lettre No. 52, tout à l'éloge des officiers suédois, de détails qui auraient pu en rendre difficile la communication au Cabinet de Stockholm, si votre Excellence la juge opportune. Il en est un, toutefois, que je n'ai pas le droit d'omettre dans cette correspondance.

En organisant la première expédition, le Colonel Hjalmarson, qui est un très bon soldat, ne s'est préoccupé naturellement que des conditions propres à en assurer le succès militaire. Il était loin de songer à faire de cette expédition en pays nouveau et mal famé un convoi de touristes, et j'ai justement considéré comme un honneur spécial adressé au Ministre chargé des intérêts suédois l'invitation qu'il avait bien voulu me faire de profiter des commodités et sûretés dont il disposait pour exécuter un voyage longtemps projeté.

Je savais, en outre, que le Ministre d'Angleterre, conscient des dangers inhérents à cette expérience, avait interdit à des officiers anglais de se joindre à l'expédition du Colonel Hjalmarson, dont il ne voulait pas augmenter les responsabilités.

Aussi ne fus-je pas peu surpris quand, au moment de partir en automobile, j'appris que le convoi de cavalerie déjà en route emmenait avec lui un officier allemand, le Capitaine Klein, attaché à la Légation d'Allemagne. Le Colonel Hjalmarson, à qui je montrai mon étonnement, me répondit qu'il n'avait pu résister à une demande du Ministre d'Allemagne, Prince Reuss. Je crois, en effet, que le Colonel Hjalmarson ne peut résister à aucune demande du Ministre d'Allemagne, et j'en ai eu la preuve non moins surprenante en apprenant qu'un autre officier allemand, appartenant également à la Légation d'Allemagne, allait bénéficier de la même faveur et partir avec la seconde expédition.

Je n'en ai pas moins cru devoir faire observer au colonel qu'il avait, pour décliner la demande du Prince Reuss, l'excellent prétexte fourni par l'attitude plus correcte du Ministre d'Angleterre; je lui rappelai qu'il n'était pas sans danger de livrer à la curiosité d'Allemands, fort compétents et pas nécessairement bienveillants, une expérience militaire qui n'était pas sans risques. Si le prestige que le Ministre allemand exerce sur le Colonel Hjalmarson ne l'avait pas tant ébloui, il se serait rappelé à quelles attaques avait été exposée sa gendarmerie, l'an dernier, dans la presse allemande, comment il vint, assez penaud, me montrer un article hostile paru à Stockholm et reproduisant ces attaques pour me prier—ce que je fis—d'envoyer à son Gouvernement une réfutation à la communication audit journal. Or, l'un de ces officiers, avec qui j'ai fait route, ne ménageait pas ses critiques aux opérations et ne se cachait nullement d'envoyer, outre ses rapports officiels adressés à son Ministère, des correspondances destinées à la presse. Avant la fin du voyage, les officiers suédois avaient pris à son égard une attitude très réservée.

Le danger de se voir mal jugés par la presse allemande n'est pas le seul auquel aient été exposés les officiers suédois, en acceptant étourdiment ces compagnons de voyage. Dans un pays où les moindres faits s'observent et se commentent, on n'a pas vu passer ces troupes, dont le voyage excitait un si vif intérêt, sans remarquer la présence de personnages aussi considérables que ceux qu'on désignait du nom d'attachés militaires allemands. Partout, chez les Russes, chez les Anglais, comme chez les Persans, j'ai recueilli l'expression d'une surprise qui se satisfaisait par les explications les plus baroques et, je dois dire, les moins flatteuses pour les officiers suédois. "Les officiers allemands, dont on ne mettait pas en doute la supériorité militaire, avaient été emmenés pour diriger de leurs conseils leurs camarades suédois." On en arrivait à les présenter comme les véritables conducteurs de la colonne. Cela est stupide, mais cette explication, déjà très désobligeante en Perse, peut devenir plus pernicieuse encore si, comme il est vraisemblable, elle se présente à l'esprit de journalistes allemands, je n'ose dire si elle leur est suggérée par leurs correspondants.

Je regretterais que ces aimables officiers suédois fussent payés par une telle mortification de l'hospitalité que leur cordialité ingénue avait offerte à des camarades étrangers et qu'ils avaient même voulu étendre à un touriste français, le Capitaine Schneider, qui n'en a pas profité. Il est surtout regrettable que cette ingénuité, qui existe au même degré chez le colonel, soit secondée chez lui par une prédilection pour les choses d'Allemagne, qui le livre sans défense aux entreprises du Prince Reuss.

J'ai signalé en son temps, au département, la mauvaise humeur avec laquelle la Légation d'Allemagne avait vu la protection française s'étendre en Perse sur les suédois "qui nous appartiennent," disait la Comtesse Quadt, interprète candide des pensées de son mari. Je dois dire que cette disposition ne s'est trahie, du temps du Comte Quadt, que par cette manifestation platonique et n'a pas contrecarré les efforts que je faisais pour créer des liens de sympathie entre la Légation de France et une petite colonie qui n'a que peu d'affinités avec notre pays. Il n'en est pas de même de son successeur qui, peut-être spontanément, je croirais plutôt sur des avis de Berlin s'efforce d'attirer dans son entourage et sous sa tutelle les officiers de gendarmerie et de reconquérir, par ce détour, l'influence sur l'armée persane à laquelle des accords internationaux ont réduit son pays à renoncer officiellement.

C'est d'ailleurs par les procédés les plus avouables, sinon les plus discrets, que mon collègue s'efforce de gagner les officiers et leurs femmes; il les attire, les fête de la façon la plus flatteuse, les héberge à la campagne dans des conditions que cette légation n'est pas en état d'égaler, et je ne saurais en vouloir à ces jeunes gens de prendre leur plaisir où il leur est offert et dans un milieu peut-être plus rapproché comme idées, langage et manières de leurs propres habitudes. Je puis regretter, par contre, que leur colonel, qui a charge de diriger la conduite de ses officiers, semble plus accessible qu'eux-mêmes aux séductions de la Légation d'Allemagne, et ne sente pas le danger auquel il expose sa mission en la laissant glisser sous l'influence allemande. J'espère qu'il s'en apercevra à temps sans que j'aie à lui rappeler que le fait d'être protégé par la Légation de France n'a pas été étranger au choix qui les a appelés ici et que si, par contre, les Suédois de Perse s'étaient trouvés placés sous la protection allemande, ce n'est pas à des officiers suédois qu'on aurait confié la gendarmerie.

Il n'y a là qu'un flirt encore assez innocent, bien que le public l'ait déjà remarqué et dont j'espère pouvoir combattre le développement. C'est pourquoi si votre Excellence croit devoir communiquer les observations qui précèdent à notre légation de Stockholm, je lui serais reconnaissant de recommander à notre Ministre, dont le tact m'est d'ailleurs un garant suffisant, la plus grande réserve dans l'usage qu'il croirait opportun d'en faire.

[31400] No. 46.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

Sir, *India Office, July 7, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding the establishment of a branch post-office at Chahbar. The correspondence referred to therein was sent to your Department on the 18th March last.

Although it now seems unlikely that the Trans-Persian Railway scheme will involve any important developments at Chahbar, at all events in the near future, the establishment of a post-office there would be in accordance with the policy of consolidating British influence in the British sphere. Lord Crewe therefore proposes, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, to approve it.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 17, 1913.*

PERSIAN Gulf: Postal arrangements.

Please refer to the 15th and 16th paragraphs of the letter, dated the 9th February, 1913, from the Resident, Bushire, copy of which was enclosed in my Foreign Secretary's weekly letter of the 20th February.

In view of possibility of important development hereafter at Chahbar, as well as for the reasons stated by the Resident, we propose, if you approve, to establish unostentatiously at that port a branch office on the lines of that in existence at Jask. Union rates will be charged. The estimated annual cost is 600*l*.

[31513] No. 47.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

Sir, *25, Abchurch Lane, London, July 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day's date, and have communicated the contents to Mr. Wood, the chief manager of the bank in Persia, who writes to me as follows:—

"The two natives were instructed by the Medjliss to apply to Mr. Shuster, who referred the matter to me, and quashed it as the result of my protest. This is exactly what the Medjliss expected, and, in fact, aimed at, for reasons which I have already explained. The concession was for one year, and when M. Mornard became Treasurer-General the matter was referred to him and again quashed at my instance."

I have, &c.
G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

[31979] No. 48.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, July 10, 191

LA Banque d'Escompte demande que, pendant le cours des négociations, au sujet de la livraison d'argent à la Monnaie persane, entre les Gouvernements britannique et russe, la Banque Impériale s'abstienne de toute livraison. Cette demande de la Banque d'Escompte mérite, selon nous, d'être prise en considération. Veuillez attirer l'attention de Sir E. Grey sur notre point de vue, et exprimer l'espoir qu'il usera en ce sens de son influence sur la Banque Impériale de Perse.

[31656] No. 49.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 10.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, July 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th [*sic*] ultimo, requesting observations on the attempt by Muin-ut-Tujjar to obtain concessions on islands in the Persian Gulf, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it is, in their opinion, important from a naval point of view that no influence likely to be antagonistic to British interests should be exerted over the islands of Kishm and Henjam, Hormuz being of less importance. My Lords are not in a position to judge whether an arrangement can be made with Muin which secures the absence of such antagonism, but they do not precisely understand how the written undertaking which Sir W. Townley proposes to obtain from him could be enforced.

Generally speaking, it appears to my Lords, so far as they are able to judge, that a development of trade in these islands on normal lines, with as little intrusion as practicable of political or other intrigue, would best conduce to the naval as well as the commercial interests of this country.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[31686] No. 50.

Captain Wilson to Mr. Parker.—(Received July 10.)

(Extract.)
My dear Mr. Parker, *East India United Service Club, St. James's Square, S.W., July 9, 1913.*

MANY thanks for your letter of the 7th July, and for the very kind support which you are prepared to give to my application to go on the Frontier Commission. Acting on your advice I went to see Sir A. Hirtzel at the India Office yesterday, and presented an unofficial application for the job in question.

It remains to be seen how far employment on the commission would clash with my railway work, but I think that unless the commission should begin before the middle of November (and I can scarcely imagine the four Powers getting anything arranged before that), I could join the Southern Commission after going through Luristan (viâ Tehran), and after making the preliminary arrangements for the railway survey party.

As regards the actual demarcation of the frontier, my impression is that up to the date when I left Bushire, no preliminary understanding had been arrived at as regards the frontier in the vicinity of Pusht-i-Kuh, and in particular regarding the Baksai-Saiyid Hasan-Ghurabah lands, and I anticipate a good deal of local difficulty here. The Turks seem to have right on their side, but the Persians are *beati possidentes*.

As regards the two commissions, I should, of course, prefer the southern one, but I venture to express the view that (if the matter is not already *res judicata*) we could view with complacency the appointment of one instead of two commissions, mainly because there will probably still be mutual concessions to be made between Turkey and Persia in course of the local demarcation, and these are likely to be made easier if both portions of the frontier are dealt with by the same Turkish and Persian officials, than if the northern and southern sections are dealt with in watertight compartments, but I quite realise the possibly superior advantages of getting the work done as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,
A. T. WILSON.

[31454] No. 51.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 513.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1913.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 324 of 8th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

I agree that frontier should as far as possible be definitely laid down by treaty and indicated on a map before work of commissions begins, and I think that work of commissions should, if possible, be confined to demarcation of that frontier in accordance with the line indicated on the map. But I think we should proceed as soon as possible with selection of British and Russian officials so as to avoid unnecessary delay, and I should be glad to know if Russian Government approve the idea of two commissions, and appointment of British and Russian commissioners to serve on both—a point to which we understand Turkey attaches importance.

I am still awaiting Russian reply to our last communication respecting the southern part of frontier and Shatt-el-Arab.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 317, and Tehran, No. 303.)

[29769] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 100.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 128 of the 10th ultimo reporting a long conversation which you recently had with the Swedish colonel of gendarmerie on the subject of the force.

I am glad to hear so good an account of the gendarmerie, and request you to inform Colonel Hjalmarson unofficially that I am following his work with great interest and approval.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[31556] No. 53.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 18th ultimo relative to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to ask

whether the Board of Trade are willing that British capital should be employed in the construction of the line from the Russian frontier to Tehran, and that the British group of the Société d'Études should take part in the enterprise.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[31847] No. 54.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 11.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 10, 1913.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th June regarding the proposal to employ British officers in Kerman, and to enclose copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India on the subject.

In view of the reported intention of the Swedish commandant to begin to organise a force of gendarmerie in that province at an early date, the Marquess of Crewe feels that he cannot press his former proposal. But he would suggest that it should be made plain to the Persian Government that failure to carry out the scheme without delay may involve, as the only alternative, a demand from His Majesty's Government for the employment of British officers.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 6, 1913.

IN view of prospect mentioned in your telegram of the 28th ultimo, that Kerman will shortly be provided with force of gendarmerie, we do not wish that employment of British officers there should be pressed further. We hope result desired may be obtained by Swedish colonel's proposals, and that steps will be taken to make sure that they are put into effect without delay.

[31908] No. 55.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 11.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 10, 1913.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 4th July enclosing copies of letters from the Imperial Bank of Persia, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to request that, if Sir E. Grey has no objection, Sir W. Townley may be instructed to report whether the dates 30th April* and 6th May,† given in the bank's letter as the dates of advance of 200,000*l.* and 100,000*l.* respectively to the Government of Persia, are correct.

I am to add that the Accountant-General of this Office is about to address a letter direct to the bank (in accordance with the procedure agreed to in Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 4th January, 1911) enclosing the receivable orders asked for by the bank, and accepting the amount stated, subject to confirmation of the dates of advance mentioned, and to adjustment on receipt of information that the revised scheme of amortisation has been accepted by the Persian Government.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

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* Yes. See Part XXXIV, No. 165.—L. O. † Yes. See Part XXXIV, No. 345, enclosure 5.—L. O.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[31964] No. 56.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 259.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 11, 1913.*

TWO affrays occurred in Tehran yesterday between the gendarmes and Bakhtiari sowars, proving that ill-feeling between the two forces is still alive. Khans affect not to understand the cause of this ill-feeling, which, as I explained to Samsam this morning, is patent to everyone else. As soon as the gendarmes began to exercise their police duties round Tehran, they fell foul of the Bakhtiari, who have very hazy ideas respecting a man's right to his own property.

I told Samsam, who called on me about yesterday's incidents, that, unless the sowars and gendarmes could live in peace in the same town, it appeared to me it would be necessary for the former to return to their own country.

We can do quite well without the Bakhtiari sowars in Tehran now, and the present seemed to me a good moment to drop a hint to this effect. I think that they should go soon unless they can be established as a properly organised force. They are incorrigible thieves.

[31956] No. 57.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 11, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Russian Ambassador has received a reply to note of 3rd May, and I expect to receive corresponding communication very shortly.

Russian Ambassador considers the note satisfactory as regards frontier north of Bane, but from point of view of interests of Anglo-Persian Oil Company wording of the note as regards line south of Kuretu River is objectionable, as it describes new frontier as being that of *status quo*. I propose to invite the Grand Vizier to employ different wording in his reply to us.

[30741] No. 58.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 11, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th ultimo, regarding the proposed telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a letter from the Treasury conveying the sanction of the Lords Commissioners to the charge against Imperial funds of one-half (2,005*l.*) of the initial cost of constructing the line, and of one-half (37*l.* 10*s.*) of the recurrent annual charge, provided that any profits from the undertaking be shared equally by the two Governments.*

I am to invite attention to the suggestion made in the last paragraph of the letter from the Treasury, and to state that Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran accordingly.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[32200] No. 59.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 12th February.

British consul at Shiraz states that there is considerable difficulty in financing the Fars gendarmerie on hard-and-fast principle of 8,000*l.* a month, though force of close

* No. 29.

upon 2,000 men can be maintained on 100,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government for one year, provided more latitude can be exercised in the matter of spending the money. Larger purchases have to be made at some seasons of the year than at others: as, for instance, at the moment it is most essential that forage and firing for whole year should be bought, because prices will rise very considerably in a month or two. Expenditure of money is entirely in hands of British consul, Swedish officer commanding, and Belgian financial agent, reference being made to colonel commandant, M. Mornard, and myself, so that there is no danger of money being diverted to other purposes.

For above reasons I would beg to recommend for your favourable consideration that money should be made available for year without tying it down to 8,000*l.* a month. British consul would hold himself responsible for proper expenditure of money in such a manner that it will suffice for year.

[32162] No. 60.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 332.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 13, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 317 of 10th July, repeating telegram No. 513 of 10th July to Sir G. Buchanan: Turco-Persian frontier.

I understand that it would be impossible for a commission to work very far north of Zohab in winter.

[32165] No. 61.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 256.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 513 of 10th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has now received the Turkish reply, which he considers satisfactory.

He is ready to proceed at once with appointment of officers to the two commissions.

He has given instructions for immediate answer to be sent to our former communication.

[32218] No. 62.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 208.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 234 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the *aide-mémoire* dated the 26th June and addressed to me, in which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me of his conversations with the Regent of Persia and the assurances which he had given to the latter.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

DANS ses entretiens avec le Régent de Perse, M. Sazonof a informé son Altesse de ce qu'il n'avait pas d'objection à la proclamation, dans un an, de la majorité du Schah Sultan Ahmed, à condition que le jeune Souverain soit préalablement préparé par le Régent lui-même au rôle politique qu'il sera appelé à jouer.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

M. Sazonof a également consenti en principe à ce que le Medjliss ou le Sénat, ou un autre corps législatif quelconque, soient convoqués, sans préciser toutefois la date de cette convocation, et en se réservant le droit de se prononcer définitivement sur cette mesure, après un accord préalable avec le Cabinet de Londres, lorsque le Gouvernement persan lui aura communiqué son plan à ce sujet, et que le moment de réaliser ce dernier sera venu. L'attention toute particulière du Régent a été attirée sur la nécessité de veiller à ce que cette mesure n'entraîne pas de conséquences pareilles à celles qui ont résulté de l'activité des deux Medjliss précédents et surtout de l'attitude hostile envers la Russie du second Medjliss.

M. Sazonof a aussi promis au Régent et au Gouvernement persan tout l'appui du Gouvernement Impérial, en attirant en même temps l'attention de son Altesse sur plusieurs questions intéressant particulièrement le Gouvernement Impérial, telles que la navigation du lac d'Ourmiah, la brigade persane de Cosaques, &c.

Pour ce qui concerne la personne du Régent et ses propriétés, le Gouvernement Impérial, tout comme le Gouvernement britannique, se déclare prêt à user de ses bons offices pour mettre son Altesse à l'abri de tout péril qui pourrait le menacer en Perse.

Le Gouvernement Impérial pense qu'en vue du caractère strictement privé que le Régent a voulu donner à ses visites à Londres et à Saint-Pétersbourg, il est préférable que les deux Gouvernements se bornent à une communication verbale dans le sens susindiqué et en informant les deux légations à Téhéran.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 13 (26) *juin*, 1913.

[32408] No. 63.

Persian Railways Syndicate to Foreign Office.—(Received July 14.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
July 12, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your favour of the 27th June, in which you enclose two copies of a report made by Captain Wilson on the country between Mohammerah and Khoremabad, we are instructed by our Board to enquire whether you can let us have any information that may be in your possession in regard to the possible prolongation of the line beyond Khoremabad. As it is of importance that our directors should obtain some information on this section, they will be greatly obliged by any assistance or information you can give them.

We are, &c.
(For British and Foreign General Securities and Investment Trust (Limited)),
A. B. STODART, *Secretary*.

[32437] No. 64.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 249 of 29th May.

Consul-general at Ispahan reports that scheme for diverting the waters of the Karun has been abandoned owing to strong Russian opposition.

[32625] No. 65.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 337.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 14, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

My telegram No. 329 of 11th July.

Grand Vizier handed to me reply to our note of 3rd May on 12th July. It is identical with the reply sent to Russian Ambassador (copy of which was sent you in my despatch No. 614 on 11th July), and thus contains references to conversations, &c.,

between his Excellency and the Grand Vizier which are quite inapplicable in addressing this embassy.

I pointed out this to Russian Ambassador [two groups undecypherable]. I proposed to urge Grand Vizier to draft fresh reply omitting such references and also objectionable description of frontier south of Kuretu River as *status quo* frontier. His Excellency thought it preferable to formulate our objections to that description in identic notes taking act of Turkish proposal. I agreed to this course, and also, as Turkish description of frontier line is exceedingly vague, to ask the Grand Vizier to trace line on map in conjunction with us and leave it to the two embassies to describe in our identic reply.

Grand Vizier has no objection, and I think this course will be most expeditious.

[32200] No. 66.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 260 of 13th July: Fars advance.

I approve your recommendation.

[31847] No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 15 1913.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 249 and 251 of 26th and 27th June respectively: Gendarmerie for Kerman.

In view of Swedish colonel's intention to begin to organise gendarmerie force in Kerman at end of this month, His Majesty's Government will not press former proposal.

In reply to hope expressed by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (see second paragraph of your telegram No. 249) you should make the Persian Government aware that failure to carry out scheme without delay may involve as only alternative a demand from His Majesty's Government for employment of British officers.

[31513] No. 68.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 15, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for the information of the directors of the Imperial Bank of Persia, that he has given careful consideration to your recent communications regarding the question of the Mint Agreement of the 27th November, 1911, between the Persian Treasurer-General and the Imperial Bank, against the validity of which instrument he has received energetic protests from the Russian Government.

Sir E. Grey is unable to share your opinion that the Treasurer-General received by the law of the 23rd Janza, 1329 (13th June, 1911), full authority to conclude agreements for long periods of time on his own initiative and without reference to the Medjliss.

Sir E. Grey was unable to allow His Majesty's Legation to take ~~notes~~ notice of the agreement at the time of its being presented for registration five months after its conclusion, because its validity appeared to him to be doubtful, and because it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to approve of a monopoly in favour of your bank when they had obtained assurances from the Persian Government that they would not grant such a monopoly to any one bank, institution, or person.

Sir Arthur Hardinge obtained an assurance in the above sense from the Atabeg-i-Azam in 1901 and again in April 1907. Sir C. Spring-Rice received a promise from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that no preference in the matter of the importation of silver for coinage should be granted to anyone by the Persian Government.

In view of their attitude in the past His Majesty's Government might expose themselves to a charge of inconsistency should they now support your claim to such a

monopoly, even if they held that the validity of your agreement could not be called in question.

Sir E. Grey is, however, fully alive to the claim of your bank under your concession, and is of opinion that, even if you had not under that concession the implied grant of a right to import silver for minting, and such right remained exclusively in the hands of the Persian Government, the latter could not divest themselves thereof in favour of any third party to such an extent as would put it out of their own power to permit your bank to import for minting purposes sufficient silver to enable you to perform your concessionary obligations.

I am accordingly to suggest, for the favourable consideration of your board, that a compromise might be effected on the following lines, viz., that the right to import for minting purposes enough silver for the fulfilment of your concessionary obligations be assured to the Imperial Bank, and that, subject to that right, the privilege of importing silver for coinage should be shared by the Imperial Bank and the Banque des Prêts et d'Escompte.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[32777] No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 15, 1913.

IN continuation of my letter of the 13th June, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of a letter that has been received from the Government of India regarding the appointment of a Turkish consul at Lingah.*

Sir E. Grey is aware of the misgivings with which the Marquess of Crewe regards this appointment—and which are increased by a perusal of the précis enclosed in Mr. Vice-Consul New's letter of the 2nd April last. It would seem probable that the longer the Turkish consul is allowed to remain the more difficult it will be to secure his withdrawal, and it is to his withdrawal rather than to an apology by the Turkish Government that his Lordship attaches importance. Subject to this remark he concurs in the recommendation of the Government of India.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[32699] No. 70.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
Sir, *July* 15, 1913.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, regarding our negotiations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah for permission to bore for oil in his territory.

I am directed by my board to express their appreciation of the assistance which His Majesty's Government have afforded us in this matter, whereby the satisfactory agreement between our company and Sheikh Khasal, indicated in your letter under reply, has been arranged.

With reference to the point raised in the last paragraph of your letter, my board are of opinion that it would be better to defer the consideration of this matter until the time comes for payment of royalty to the Persian Government, *i.e.*, when our company is making profits. My board would then furnish you with all available evidence and information which would be of value in substantiating our claim to deduct from such royalty any amounts paid to the Bakhtiari chiefs or the sheikh.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

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* Not printed.

[32800] No. 71.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July* 16, 1913.

MY telegram No. 256 of 13th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs again apologised for delay in replying to *aide-mémoire* based on your telegram No. 458 of 17th June, and said Russian Ambassador at Constantinople had not yet replied to his telegram inviting his views on the subject. His Excellency had telegraphed to him yesterday requesting him to reply at once.

[32855] No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 215.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* 14, 1913.

WITH reference to previous telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Russian Government with regard to the delimitation of the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 72.

M. Nératof to Sir G. Buchanan.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 30 *juin*, 1913.

NOUS venons de recevoir un télégramme de notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople qui annonce que la Porte lui a confirmé par écrit tous les points de son accord verbal avec le Grand Vizir par rapport au litige frontière turco-persan et que cette grave question, qui était en suspens depuis 1843, peut être considérée comme résoulue en principe. Ainsi, il devient inutile d'envoyer aux représentants russe en anglais à Constantinople les instructions dont vous parliez dans votre lettre du 21 courant.* Nous télégraphions à M. de Giers, lui disant qu'il faudrait immédiatement proposer à la Porte la constitution de deux commissions de délimitation, l'une pour le nord, l'autre pour le sud, auxquelles participeraient des délégués russes et anglais, afin que nous puissions tracer la ligne frontière durant la belle saison.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
A. NÉRATOF.

[32949] No. 73.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th July, 1913, regarding the Persian Gulf.

India Office, July 16, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 16, 1913.

MUIN-UT-TUJJAR. Please refer to your telegram dated the 2nd instant.

Not only are approaches to any port we may make near Bunder Abbas commanded by the islands of Kishm, Hormuz, and Larak; these also constitute the key to position

* See No. 13.

from which Gulf would be controlled. It follows that to retain control of them is matter of essential and commanding importance to us, and the opinion of the Resident that every effort should be made to prevent the Muin recovering the position which the firman of 1904 gave him, has our concurrence. Firstly, if the rights of a third party had to be considered, excuses for evasion would be afforded to Persian Government, and the situation would be correspondingly complicated in event of strategic considerations making it necessary for us to get from that Government concessions granting, or affecting control of, these islands. In second place, possession of concessions on them for mining oxide, &c., by persons other than British subjects is highly undesirable. If control of islands rests in hands of Central Government, we could more easily make sure that undesirable parties do not obtain such concessions, than if some person hostile to British interests possesses control of them.

[32987] No. 74.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 263.) *Tehran, July* 17, 1913.
(Telegraphic.)

TREASURER-GENERAL has approached Russian Chargé d'Affaires and me with a view to ascertaining if appointment of a German expert in dyes for purpose of supervising the service connected with detection of aniline dyed Persian carpets would be acceptable to two Governments.

Mornard represents that it is difficult to find competent Belgian examiner, and fixes the period of service at two or three years.

It would appear to me desirable that services of a Belgian should be secured, if possible. All the chemical dyes imported are of German manufacture, which is good reason for not appointing a German. I need not dwell on other reasons that make it undesirable to enlist services of a German.

My Russian colleague has telegraphed to St. Petersburgh in this sense.

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[32855] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 537.) *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1913.
(Telegraphic.)

PLEASE enquire what will be rank of Russian commissioners on Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, and what technical staff it is proposed to attach to them.

Should not Persian Government soon be approached with a view to selection of commissioners and fixing date for beginning work on frontier?

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 310, and Constantinople, No. 337.)

[32625] No. 76.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 338.) *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1913.
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 337 of 14th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

I approve course you suggest; please send home copies of map indicating approximately the frontier line agreed upon. Extra copies of reduced identic map go to you to-night.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 539, and Tehran, No. 312.)

[31908] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 313.) *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1913.
(Telegraphic.) R.

MY despatch No. 77 of 29th May: Amortisation of loans, &c.

Have Persian Government accepted the revised scheme of amortisation?

[33199] No. 78.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 18, 1913.

MY telegram No. 237 of 18th June: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Salar has surrendered to Russian officer commanding Persian Cossacks who were despatched to operate against him in Kurdistan. It appears that in addition to securing Salar detachment has done excellent work in collecting revenue from tribes that have not paid land tax for years. It is expected that Russian commanding officer will bring Salar to Tehran. He is being treated as an honoured prisoner whose personal safety is guaranteed.

(Very Confidential.)

My Russian colleague is of opinion that Salar should receive pension compatible with the resources of the Persian Government, that he should leave for Europe very soon after his arrival at Tehran, and that he should be warned that he will receive no foreign support if he returns to Persia. I agree entirely with my Russian colleague, who thinks that it would help matter if you would let it be known at St. Petersburgh that this is your view. He appears to apprehend that Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs may adopt different attitude, and does not wish his name to be mentioned. He is also afraid that a suggestion from you as to the treatment to be accorded to Salar may be badly received unless it is made most informally. I personally see no great need for Salar to come here, more especially as the Shah sympathises with him.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[33197] No. 79.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 265.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 18, 1913.

REPRESENTATIVE of Kerman mining syndicate called on me this morning and showed me a copy of memorandum embodying the views of Russian Government, which was communicated to Mr. Greenway on 15th January. Reference to Tabriz-Julfa Railway concession will show that the only mining rights safeguarded under it are coal and petroleum, and that area is 40 versts on each side of line. Mr. Maclean represented that he can do no further useful work here without my support, and that it is very hard [group undecypherable] this veto upon the syndicate at the moment when negotiations are nearing a settlement, considering that the Russian Government have all along been kept fully informed of the aims of the syndicate. He also pointed out that we have the promise of present Administration that the concession will be granted, and that experience has shown that the one Persian Administration does not accept the assurances of its predecessors.

Can I take any action?

[33337] No. 80.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 266.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 19, 1913.

I HAVE communicated message contained in your telegram No. 309 of 15th July to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who took note of the same, and expressed hope that measures being taken by the Persian Government to secure order in the province of Kerman would be successful.

[31762] No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 543.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 236 of 28th June: Option for Trans-Persian Railway.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to Russian Ambassador that he had not intended to send further instructions to Tehran, but that, now that the difference between His Majesty's Government and the British group appears to be settled, he sees no objection to an application for an option at Tehran.

You should therefore propose to his Excellency that, in the first instance, the two representatives at Tehran should be instructed to ask the Persian Government to grant to the Société d'Études an option for the construction of a railway traversing Persia from north-west to south-east. Details could be settled later by consultation between the two Governments and the société.

The two representatives must also be eventually instructed to inform Persian Government of the proposed despatch of an Anglo-Russian Commission to survey that part of Persia through which the southern part of the line will run with a view to recommend which alignment should be adopted, and to ask their consent. This step might be deferred till Persian Government have replied to application for the option, but in any case it would be well that the two Governments should proceed without delay to appoint the members of the joint commission, so that it may be ready to begin work as soon as Persian Government have consented to its despatch.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 314.)

[32987] No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 545.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 263 of 17th July: German expert in Persia.

I endorse entirely opinion of His Majesty's Minister, and hope that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will share the same view, and will instruct Russian chargé d'affaires to advocate employment of a Belgian, or, failing that, of a national of a minor Power.

[33604] No. 83.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 353.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 537 of 17th July to Sir G. Buchanan: Turco-Persian frontier.

The Russian Ambassador informs me that he is deprecating the appointment of two commissions on grounds given in my telegram No. 332 of 13th July and my telegram No. 337 of 14th July.

As to the composition of the commission, I venture to offer the following remarks:—

We hope that it will be possible to define frontier in such geographical terms that in actual delimitation only line of tribal conditions will have to be taken into consideration. Familiarity with such questions, and also knowledge of Turkish and Persian languages and character to enable commissioners to keep the peace between the Persian and Turkish commissioners, will be far more requisite than technical skill in surveying or cartography. Russian Ambassador concurs in this view, and we believe that success of the commission will be better assured by appointment as British and Russian first commissioners of civil officials possessing above qualifications than by superior engineer officers. Technical work can well be performed by junior engineer officers.

I would suggest His Majesty's consul-general at Crete as particularly suited for the post.

[33626] No. 84.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 271.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July* 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 545 of 20th July: German expert in Persia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs quite agrees, and will instruct Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran accordingly.

[33197] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 315.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 265 of 18th July: Kerman mining concession.

Proposals based on the Russian memorandum of 25th June were made to Mr. Greenway on 28th June, and I am pressing for his reply.

I hope to be able shortly to send you instructions.

[33199] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 546.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 264 of 18th July: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

It is most satisfactory to learn of this success by the Persian Cossacks.

(Confidential.)

Salar does not deserve any pension at all, but if the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of it, as likely to keep him quiet, I should acquiesce on the understanding that he resides in Europe, and if he returns to Persia will lose his pension and all support. It would be better that he should not go to Tehran. Your Excellency is the best judge of whether it would be wise to open these questions with M. Sazonof. I leave it to your discretion.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 316.)

[31560] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 105. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from your French colleague to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,* which has been communicated to me by M. Cambon, reporting that considerable influence is exercised by the German Legation over the Swedish officers of the gendarmerie.

I should be glad to receive an expression of your views on this despatch, especially as to the influence said to be exercised over the Swedish officers by the German Legation, and to learn whether you think it desirable to make any observation to the Swedish commandant, Colonel Hjalmarson, as to the advisability of avoiding any action which may excite international jealousy.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

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* No. 45.

[31400] No. 88.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, July 21, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant regarding the establishment of a branch post office at Chahbar.

I am to request you, in reply, to inform the Marquess of Crewe that Sir E. Grey concurs in his Lordship's proposal to approve the Government of India's suggestion to establish a branch office there at a cost estimated at 600 rupees a-year.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[33730] No. 89.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter to the War Office dated the 19th July, 1913, on the subject of trans-Persian railway. Copies of Enclosures Nos. 1 and 4 are not available.

India Office, July 21, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 89.

India Office to War Office.

(Secret.)

India Office, July 19, 1913.

Sir,

THE Army Council are aware that the construction of an international railway across Persia has for some time been under the consideration of the British and Russian Governments. In connection with this scheme I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copies of—

1. Memorandum by chief of Indian General Staff, dated the 5th September, 1912;*
2. Despatch No. 160 from Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, dated the 15th May, 1913;*
3. Memorandum by chief of Indian General Staff, dated the 6th June, 1913;
4. Memorandum on projected railway construction in Russian Central Asia 1913;*
5. Extract from diaries of military attaché, Meshed, Nos. 18 and 19, for periods ending the 17th and the 24th May, 1913;*

and to request that he may be furnished at an early date with the reasoned opinion of the Imperial General Staff upon the effect on the defence of India of the alignment of such a railway viâ Kerman, with special reference to the considerations urged in the memorandum of the chief of the Indian General Staff dated the 6th June last.

I am to request that Nos. 1 and 4 may be returned in due course.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 89.

Memorandum by the Indian General Staff on the Trans-Persian Railway.

(Secret.)

THE following remarks by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief are submitted upon the points raised in the Private telegram of the 29th May, 1913, from the Secretary of State to his Excellency the Viceroy:—

* Not printed.

1. Taking the first points raised in the telegram—whether an immediate increase to the army in India, or other measures, will be necessary if the main line is taken to Kerman, and, if so, what increase or other measures—no satisfactory attempt to frame the reply can be made without an endeavour to gauge the Russian attitude of mind as it appears to us to be therein revealed.

2. If no intention inimical to British interests or to the security of our military possession of India can be discovered we might conclude that Russia will adhere for some considerable time to the spirit and letter of the convention and to her declared policy of respecting our wishes and interests, and we might, therefore, postpone steps to protect ourselves against future dangers. It is no part of our business to speculate on the influence, temporary perhaps, which has brought about the present remonstrance, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the building of railways has an effect far beyond the present generation, and that the influence now at work may reassert itself again and again and have a permanent effect on Russian policy.

With every wish to credit Russia with friendly intention we find in the telegram under consideration evidence of a contrary nature which, in our opinion, cannot be ignored with prudence, especially if we remember her present attitude on the Afghan border. Her protest against the omission of Kerman from the direct line is accompanied by an assertion of freedom to build elsewhere, including Meshed and southwards of that place. But Russia is already free to build where she likes in her own sphere, though in the neutral sphere "previous arrangement" with us, if we wish it, is implied in the convention. Her claim for freedom must, therefore, have reference to the neutral sphere, and amounts to an intimation that she will consider herself released from the "previous arrangement" clause.

3. The reference to a line to Meshed and southwards is in this light significant. The line can hardly be intended to foster her own trade, for it would lead to no industrial or commercial centre without crossing the limit of our sphere. There can be no pretence that it is designed for a through connection between Russia and India, between West and East, for it would involve either the crossing of the Caspian Sea or a very circuitous route viâ Tashkend and Orenburg. Moreover, it is *ex hypothesi* to be built without our consent, which, therefore, excludes any idea of linking India with Russia by means of this line.

On the other hand, any line from the Central Asian railway in the direction of Seistan constitutes a direct menace to our strategical position covering the north-west frontier, which it threatens in flank. The Russian General Staff are well aware of this, and by choosing this line as an alternative they show how anxious they are to ensure that any line that is built should benefit Russia strategically. This would appear to have been in their minds from the first, when Captain Rittich mooted the through trans-Persian line as a strategic measure, with Chahbar for its terminus as a port on the open sea under Russian influence.

From the extracts which we have been allowed to see from the memorandum which accompanied the original consortium proposal, it is also clear that the Russian strategical requirements were therein carefully safeguarded. Later on M. Sazonof expressed his disappointment at the selection of Bunder Abbas, and contrasted that port with Chahbar or Gwattar much to its disadvantage, though his information on that point was incorrect, Bunder Abbas being, in fact, the best port on that coast.

4. It therefore seems to be a fair deduction from her present attitude, following on what has preceded it, that Russia desires the through railway to be built in such a way that she shall benefit strategically, and rightly thinks that any such benefit would be neutralised by its leading direct to Bunder Abbas instead of to Kerman. The threat which she now holds out, and the length to which she is prepared to go in disregard of the convention, is a measure of her disappointment at having to forego the strategic value of a direct connection between the railways of Southern Russia and Kerman.

It may also be pointed out that, should we withdraw from our present position and agree to the main line passing through Kerman, Russia will still be at liberty to construct a line south from Meshed, and will, indeed, have an additional inducement to repeat the process of bringing pressure to bear on us by this means. At present, even if she means to fulfil the threat conveyed in the communication under reference, we should, as will be shown later, lose less by her so doing than by yielding to the pressure she is bringing to bear.

5. The strategic advantage to Russia and the corresponding disadvantage to us of a direct line to Kerman have already been discussed in Sir P. Lake's paper of the 5th September, 1912 (with which the Commander-in-chief was in complete agreement),

which was laid before the Honourable Mr. W. H. Clark's Committee on the subject of the proposed railway.

In that paper it was shown that the military strength of Russia as compared with that of India was so great that if she were in a position to develop the whole or even a large proportion of it at the front the army of India would be overwhelmed. As Sir Ian Hamilton told the Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907 in this connection: "How can a non-conscript nation stand up against a conscript nation?"

It was further shown in the original scheme for the defence of India prepared by Lord Kitchener in 1906, and examined by the Imperial General Staff and the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907, as well as in its further recent examination by the Indian General Staff in 1911, that the whole of the available mobile forces of India, together with such reinforcements as it was hoped might be contributed by Great Britain and the dominions overseas, would only be sufficient to oppose approximately equal forces to those which Russia could, under existing conditions, deploy on the two lines of advance against Cabul and Candahar alone.

It was also demonstrated that no troops could be made available from the Indian army to oppose a further Russian advance, should a third line of attack become open to her, without reducing the forces employed upon the two first named lines to a dangerous extent.

At best we could not hope to be able to spare more than perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 troops for the purpose, while, judging from previous actual performances by Russia, it was calculated that she could fairly rely upon maintaining at least 200,000 men at any point on such a line as the trans-Persian railway is intended to be.

6. It was for this reason, viz., that we could only spare but very few troops to act on this line, that the Indian military authorities unanimously wanted the Trans-Persian Railway to be made vulnerable to our sea power, by being easily accessible from the sea for as great a distance as possible—for then we could hamper the hostile advance by threatening the rear of the enemy's force from the sea as it advanced, and, with good fortune, by cutting its communications. If we cut them, it would be forced to return to restore them, or starve. If it decided to guard them so strongly as to make them safe against our attack on such a long line open to the sea, then its offensive force would be enormously reduced and we might eventually hope to meet what remained, face to face, with some prospect of success.

On the other hand, if the railway ran far inland, we could only try to cut it from the sea under great disadvantages. In fact, all the chances would lie on the enemy's side and against us. We might fairly hope that, with the line running along the seashore from Bundar Abbas, the enemy would require 100,000 men to protect it, but with the line running inland via Kerman–Regan–Bampur to Chahbar, probably half that number would suffice, leaving 150,000 of the 200,000 mentioned above available to meet us at the front.

If the main line, as desired by Russia, is made to pass through Kerman, prolongation to the coast at or near Chahbar would follow as a matter of course, and would enable Russia to deploy an army in war time at any point on the line without our being able to interfere with the operation. In course of time, except we took steps as suggested in paragraph 9, and if no war occurred previously, the sea port on the Indian Ocean would practically become a Russian port, as obviously intended from the first, with results both financial and moral upon the political position of India which might completely change the balance of power in the East, and seriously imperil our hold on this country. In war time Russia could construct a line from Kerman towards Siestan and Nushki, with sufficient rapidity to turn our flank at Quetta, this forcing us to form front to a flank, from which operation, as well as for an advance southwards, she would then have more than sufficient troops. These manœuvres would be rendered practically impossible if the main line led direct to Bundar Abbas. By the strong action she is now taking, Russia shows she understands this fully, and that she is prepared to risk much to secure the strategic advantages of a direct line to Kerman, with its consequent effect on public feeling in India.

7. From what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, we arrive at the conclusion, therefore, that we shall want at a low estimate 100,000 more men in the field if the railway runs by Kerman, out of reach of our attack from the sea, than if it runs along the coast.

This means that, in addition to large immediate increases to our Indian forces, we should have to call upon Great Britain and the rest of the Empire for further assistance. As we are already calculating on getting from the above sources the largest reinforcement possible at present, besides drafts to replace wastage, it is evident that the bulk

of the increase must come from India, probably at least 50,000 men, or the equivalent of three divisions and one cavalry brigade.

Moreover, Lord Kitchener estimated, and his estimate has never been seriously disputed, that we should need as a minimum nine divisions and eight cavalry brigades across the frontier to meet the advance by Cabul and Candahar. The Army in India Committee considered that, if Russia could be excluded from our calculations, five instead of eight cavalry brigades would suffice beyond the frontier, and also that one division more than Lord Kitchener contemplated, besides the cavalry thus set free, might have to be retained in India for internal security.

Assuming the Army in India Committee calculations to be accepted, then three cavalry brigades and one division will have to be added to the 50,000 men to be provided by the Army in India, as just mentioned.

8. If, therefore, access to India by a line of railway safe from interruption is to be allowed to Russia, India will apparently, under the most favourable circumstances of internal peace and unrestricted assistance from other parts of the Empire, need the following additions to her army for war:—

Four cavalry brigades (including three to replace those detailed for internal security);

Four divisions (including one to replace the division detailed for internal security); and

Some army troops.

This means a total of about 60,000 fighting men, of whom, working on the accepted proportion, 24,000 would be British and the remainder Indian.

This can, of course, be nothing more than a rough, general estimate, but, having in view the uncertainty of the attitude of Afghanistan and the frontier tribes in such a contingency, it is more likely to be an under—than an over—estimate.

The raising of the Indian portion of such an additional force must require consideration in view of the political factors involved, including the price of labour and the paucity of fighting races in India; and, to judge from past experience, it must inevitably take a long time to carry a scheme of such magnitude to completion, both from the point of view of finance and of the provision of equipment and barracks. If, however, it is to be available, say eight years hence, its organisation should be proceeded with at once, with the least possible delay.

9. It is also asked what other measures are advocated in the event of the Kerman alignment being adopted. In the General Staff Memorandum of the 3rd January, 1911, on this subject, the advisability of fortifying Bundar Abbas was urged, should this port be selected as the point at which the railway would first reach the coast. It was, however, pointed out that this might be politically impossible, as it would involve the cession on lease or otherwise of the port in question. Should, however, the more dangerous alignment from Kerman to the Mekran coast be adopted, the necessity for controlling and fortifying the port at which the railway reaches the coast would be even more urgent. For this reason it would be advisable that the port should be at the mouth of the Dasht River at Gwattar rather than at Chahbar, so that no question of our right to control and fortify the port could be raised. Gwattar has also been pronounced the better port.

Outside the increase to our military forces already referred to, we know of no other measures save that just mentioned which can be recommended as minimising the danger of this alignment.

10. The foregoing remarks outline the position if we allow a Trans-Persian railway to be built and aligned through Kerman. For purposes of comparison, the question is further raised: What is the real amount of risk involved in the Russian threat to build railways in her sphere, or south from Meshed, if we do not consent to the Kerman line? That when those lines were completed to Seistan or south, there would be risk cannot be doubted. On the other hand, such railways while within her sphere could not for some time harm us much. Presumably no railway could be built within our sphere without our consent, without constituting a direct challenge to us. If we took up that challenge, then Russia would find herself at war with us with a railhead several hundred miles from our frontier, and possibly in difficult and barren country. She would not be even within 100 miles of Seistan.

Moreover, such a line would not constitute an independent line of operations, as would a direct connection from European Russia to Kerman; and as operations to the south of Meshed, as well as any she might undertake via Herat towards the Helmand, would be dependent on the single line of rail from the Caspian Sea to Askabad, it

follows that the numbers which could be supported at the two railheads would be less than were separate and independent lines of railway available.

11. In such circumstances it is doubtful whether she could deploy an appreciably greater number of men against us in front line than under present conditions. And while it may be that indications of a hostile attitude on her part would make it wise for the Government of India to increase its armed forces with a view to eventualities, still that increase would be quite insignificant compared with what would be required, were the Trans-Persian Railway ever to take concrete shape on the Kerman or other cognate inland alignment.

It would be for consideration when the time came whether the best retort to any such action or her part would not be to start the construction of a railway from the Mekran coast to Seistan as soon as she began to commence construction towards Meshed; although we must recollect that there are serious military objections to developing Seistan, which in our interests it would on no account be permissible to do from the direction of Nushki.

12. To sum up, the commander-in-chief considers that for England to yield to the implied threat and to agree to the alignment of the main line through Kerman would involve at least the addition of the forces named above to the army in India, as well as further demands upon the United Kingdom and the rest of the Empire for assistance in the event of war. On the other hand, the risk involved in leaving Russia at liberty to carry out her threat if she likes is by no means commensurate with the expense involved in such an increase to the army.

If, however, it should be decided to agree to the alignment through Kerman, then it will become imperative to undertake these increases without avoidable delay.

PERCY LAKE, *Lieutenant-General,*
Chief of the General Staff.

June 6, 1913.

[33744] No. 90.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

Board of Trade, July 21, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th July, relative to the proposed construction of a railway line from the Russian frontier to Tehran.

Any such line would tend to facilitate Russian trade with Persia in competition with British trade, and would, therefore, in itself be disadvantageous rather than advantageous to British trade. From the purely commercial point of view, therefore, the Board do not think it would be desirable for His Majesty's Government to encourage British capitalists to co-operate in a scheme which would undoubtedly assist Russian traders to oust British goods from Persian markets. On the other hand, if the projected line is to be regarded as the first link in a complete trans-Persian line, its construction bears another aspect, and if His Majesty's Government desire that the British group should still remain in the Société d'Études, it seems difficult to stipulate that they should refrain from participating in what is quite likely to prove the most profitable section of the railway.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[33807] No. 91.

Mr. Greenway to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street,
July 21, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th ultimo and to the Memorandum enclosed therein, I beg to state that I have now submitted the proposals of the Russian Government to my colleagues of the Persian Mining Syndicate, and am requested to point out that we cannot reasonably be expected to admit the Russian group of the Société to the same rights as ourselves, because:—

1. Our application for the concession has all along been supported by His Majesty's Government, with the full knowledge of the Russian Government.

2. The Persian Government pledged themselves, through His Majesty's Minister in February last, to conclude the concession solely with us, as a distinct condition of our accepting the option on the Mohammerah–Khoramabad Railway.

Moreover, the advance of 100,000*l.** which we agreed to make to the Persian Government on the signing of the concession was contingent upon our obtaining the concession as a whole, and could not, of course, be made if a Russian group were admitted to equal rights.

With regard to the Russian Government's various contentions in support of the claim put forward by the Société d'Études, I am desired to make the following comments:—

1. *Mineral Rights always given to Railway Concession Holders in the East.*

This contention is, we believe, not supported by facts. There are, we understand, many instances in the East of railway concessions being granted without any accompanying grant of mineral rights.

2. *If the Land on each side of the Line were held by a Foreign Company the Trans-Persian Railway would have its very existence threatened.*

The negotiations for our concession have been in progress for four years, *i.e.*, they began at a date prior to the formation of the Société d'Études, and were practically completed with Mr. Shuster in 1911. The Russian Government have all along been aware of our negotiations and of the zone intended to be covered, and the Russian Minister in Tehran, on more than one occasion, expressed his approval of the scheme and his desire that our group should secure the concession.

It is therefore somewhat late in the day for the Société d'Études to discover that a scheme which came into existence long before their own, and which has all along received the tacit approval of the Russian Government, should threaten its existence. In any case, this is not a reason for acceding to their demand for equal rights.

3. *Special Studies regarding Mining Deposits by the Société d'Études.*

These studies, whatever they may be, must be of a date subsequent to those made by ourselves, and constitute no claim whatever.

In view of the above facts my group hope that His Majesty's Government will see their way to continuing the support that has always hitherto been given to us, and will inform the Russian Government that, as both His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government are pledged to us in the matter of the mining concession, without any objection having previously been made by the Russian Government, the claim of the Société d'Études to be admitted to the same rights as ourselves, cannot be entertained.

At the same time, should His Majesty's Government desire it, we are still ready to admit the Société d'Études to a participation of one-third in the part of our concession situated in the neutral sphere, as indicated in my letter of the 11th ultimo.

In this connection I am desired to point out that the value of such a participation to the Société d'Études from a financial point of view is greater than would be a grant of 60 versts on each side of the projected route of the Trans-Persian Railway, inasmuch as (1) the concession as a whole can be worked more advantageously than if divided in the manner suggested; (2) one-third of the whole would give them an interest in a larger area than would be secured by a grant on each side of the line only; and (3) it would ensure the economical alignment of the railway not being sacrificed to a desire to secure certain mineral deposits.

I am also desired to point out that His Majesty's Government have recognised that the Persian Railways Syndicate have a prior claim to their support in respect of practically the whole of the proposed Trans-Persian Railway route through the zone to be covered by the mining concession, and therefore that the claim of the Société d'Études put forward by the Russian Government is in this respect alone entirely debarred from any recognition by His Majesty's Government.

From the enclosed telegrams received from Mr. Maclean it would appear that the Persian Government are now ready and anxious to conclude the concession, and are only deterred by the absence of support from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

* The Persians are said to be intending to devote this to the gendarmerie.

Mr. Maclean also points out that no time should be lost, as the tenure of the present Cabinet is very uncertain.

In these circumstances, and in view of the understanding on which the railway option was accepted by us, I trust that His Majesty's Government will see their way to sending instructions at once to Sir Walter Townley to give his active and immediate support to the conclusion of our negotiations.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 91.

Telegram received from Mr. Maclean (Tehran), dated July 15, 1913.

ACTING Minister of Foreign Affairs assures me that no foreign pressure is being exercised to delay mining concession, and that he expects to proceed with the matter in a few days.

Enclosure 2 in No. 91.

Telegram received from Mr. Maclean (Tehran), dated July 19, 1913.

REFERRING to your telegram of the 17th, I am making strong efforts to conclude at once, although success doubtful in the absence of support of British Legation, which British Minister cannot give us until Foreign Office dispose of Russian protests. Ask Foreign Office to maintain that the concession has been supported by the British Government during the last two or three years with the full knowledge of Russian Government, and that Persian Government are themselves pledged to us through British Minister last spring, in the course of railway negotiations, to conclude concession; therefore it is impossible to withdraw now support of British Legation to concessionnaire. Impress upon Foreign Office that the pledge by the Persian Government to conclude concession loses force unless pressure applied to present Cabinet, who have uncertain tenure.

[32800] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 548.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 22, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 261 of 16th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Please inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should be grateful if he could let me have a reply to your communication to him and to my memorandum of 19th June to Russian Embassy as soon as possible. This delay is causing very great inconvenience.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 317, and Constantinople, No. 342.)

[31423] No. 93.

Foreign Office to Sir W. Garstin.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 30th May and the 4th ultimo asking for an expression of the views of His Majesty's Government on drafts of (1) an intergroup agreement, (2) a declaration to be made by the British and Russian groups of the Société d'Études to the effect that nothing in that agreement shall be taken as modifying the existing rights of the French group as regards their economic, financial, and technical participation in the Trans-Persian Railway, and (3) a protocol, designed to give effect to the wishes expressed by His Majesty's Government to the British group with regard to the distribution of control over the various portions of the line.

I am to state in reply that, as Viscount Errington was informed orally on the occasion of his visit to this Office on the 2nd instant, His Majesty's Government have no objections to offer to the text of the first two documents referred to.

As regards the third draft, His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the terms of article 9 (see p. 8 of the paper forwarded to this Office) are unduly wide and vague, and, moreover, that it does not make sufficiently clear that the exploitation companies will be organised on the same lines as the construction companies, to which all the other articles of the draft protocol expressly relate.

I am accordingly to suggest that the British group should invite their French and Russian colleagues to adopt the modifications of this article shown in the enclosure to this letter.*

I am further to observe that the distribution of interests proposed in the third draft, which appears satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, would not seem to be in accord with the stipulation made by the Russian Government in their memorandum of the 14th May, copy of which was handed to Lord Errington on the occasion above referred to, that in the neutral zone there must be absolute equality between the three parties. The point, however, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, is one which it may be left to the Russian group, who are doubtless aware of the attitude of their Government on the subject, to raise when the draft is discussed by the Société as a whole.

With reference to your letter of the 27th May, relative to the question of asking the Persian Government to grant to the Société an option for the construction of the line, I am to state that Sir E. Grey addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the 19th instant instructing him to suggest to the Russian Government that His Majesty's and the Russian representatives at Tehran should forthwith be directed to take this step.

I am further to inform you that so soon as the consent of the Russian Government to this procedure is received, the British group will be given an opportunity of expressing their views as to the precise language which should be used in making the application.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[33833] No. 94.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 23.)

Sir,

India Office, July 22, 1913.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to advert to Sir E. Grey's telegram of the 19th instant, to His Majesty's Ambassador, St. Petersburgh, on the subject of the Trans-Persian Railway, and to say that he had deferred replying to your letter of the 18th June, because he understood that the proposals contained therein were undergoing further consideration, and that the instructions to be sent to Sir G. Buchanan would be communicated for his concurrence before they were issued.

The Marquess of Crewe does not take exception to the instructions which have now been sent to his Excellency, but he desires to make a reservation as regards the eventual alignment of the southern section. As Sir E. Grey is aware, from my letter of 19th instant to the War Office (copy of which was sent to your Department on the 21st instant), the Indian military authorities have advised that an alignment viâ Kerman will necessitate the addition of 60,000 men to the Army in India, of whom 24,000 would be British. The views of the Imperial General Staff have been invited, and, when they are received, his Lordship proposes that the question shall be referred for final discussion to the Committee of Imperial Defence. If the estimates of the Indian military authorities are confirmed, he considers that His Majesty's Government would not be justified in accepting the Kerman route, unless they are prepared to relieve India of a responsibility which is clearly beyond her own resources. And he would propose that the project of an Anglo-Russian Commission to examine the possible alignments (including that viâ Kerman), should be subject to an express condition that His Majesty's Government will not be thereby committed to accept the finding of the Commission without further examination of its military and political results. It is for consideration, therefore, whether Sir G. Buchanan should not be instructed not to commit His Majesty's Government to this part of the subject until the Imperial General Staff and the Committee of Imperial Defence have reported.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

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* Enclosure in No. 7.

[33964] No. 95.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received July 23.)

25, Abchurch Lane, London, July 23, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to the interview that Sir Thomas Jackson and Mr. Wood had with Sir L. Mallet on Monday on the subject of the mint in Tehran, I have the honour to enclose, for your information, translation of a telegram received this morning from Tehran, which will be placed before the board of directors at their meeting this afternoon.

I am, &c.
SYDNEY ROGERS, *Sub-Manager.*

Enclosure in No. 95.

Translation of a Telegram received by the Imperial Bank of Persia from Tehran, July 23, 1913.

MINISTER of Finance informs us directly Persian Government repudiate mint contract on the grounds that never referred to Cabinet or Medjliss.

Persian Government are willing to (have) mint remain with us, but for a short period, offering three years' contract on same conditions as before, with no commission. What are your views as to?

[33954] No. 96.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 267.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 546 of 21st July to St. Petersburgh: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

The Russian officer commanding the Persian Cossacks would appear, from the latest information, to have been duped by Salar. The Prince has not surrendered, and is on the way again to attack Kermanshah. The Governor General has been warned, and Cossacks are pursuing Salar.

The statement about the collection of the land tax was also hasty, as it is now clear that the tribes refuse to pay the same, while the officer above mentioned states that force under his command is not large enough to enable him to exercise pressure on well-armed tribesmen.

(Sent to St. Petersburgh.)

[33989] No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 272.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 546 of 21st July: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that you had heard with much satisfaction of Salar's capture, and asked what he proposed should be done with him.

His Excellency at first spoke of leaving him at Tehran under surveillance, but on my telling him that this would not meet with your approval and that you thought that if he received a pension he ought to be sent abroad and to forfeit pension if he returned, he expressed concurrence. He would, he said, instruct Russian Chargé d'Affaires to do nothing without previous arrangement with Sir W. Townley, and suggested that our two representatives might be left to deal with the matter.

[33991] No. 98.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 548 of 22nd July: Turco-Persian frontier.

I have pressed Minister for Foreign Affairs for immediate answer.

His Excellency took a note and promised to telegraph again to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, whose views he has not yet received.

[34127] No. 99.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 550.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 23, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Please inform the Russian Government confidentially that I propose to sign the declaration about the Turco-Persian frontier between Hawizeh and the Persian Gulf on 29th July.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 320, and Constantinople, No. 346.)

[34142] No. 100.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 17th July, 1913, regarding the Turco-Persian frontier.

India Office, July 23, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 17, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegram from Resident in Persian Gulf is repeated with reference to your telegram regarding Turco-Persian frontier, dated 11th instant:—

"Selection of Captain Wilson to act on Boundary Commission is, I agree, expedient. On assumption that Soane would act as employé of railway syndicate, attending to their interests alone and not to those of Government, and in the hope that it will be possible for Wilson to travel with him from Hamandan to Dizful and instal him before proceeding on frontier work, provided also that Wilson's return may be expected in about two months, I support proposal that Soane should act for him. But if it is probable that this deputation will be for longer period I would urge that another political officer should be appointed in Wilson's place to Dizful to watch over British interests in Luristan, with instructions to work in concert with Soane; and latter should be instructed to seek his advice freely."

The above has our concurrence. We propose that Lieutenant Loch, the present second assistant at Bushire, should be deputed if a political officer is required in Wilson's place.

[34214] No. 101.

Minute by Captain Wilson.—(Communicated by Sir A. Hirtzel July 24.)

Sir A. Hirtzel.

REFERENCE Mr. Parker's letter of the 22nd July. I submit the following remarks as requested :—

1. I concur generally in the views expressed by Marling, and in particular in the view that knowledge of languages and of local conditions should constitute the main qualifications for a commissioner who should be (as I am) a civil official.

2. Subject to the views of Sir P. Cox and of the Government of India, I should, if desired by the Foreign Office, be glad to serve under Wratislaw as an assistant commissioner, with power to continue work in case of his absence or illness, a very necessary provision, for which there are precedents.

3. I think that Sir P. Cox and the Government of India would take the view that if the principal British commissioner is not to be an official nominated by the Government of India, a Government of India officer should be associated with him. I presume that the survey staff escort, &c., are still to be supplied by India (who will no doubt be asked to pay half the cost of the commission).

As Mr. Wratislaw is in Crete, not able to undertake preliminary arrangements, and not entirely familiar with local necessities at the Mohammerah end, nor in touch with the Government of India, I venture to suggest with great deference that in the event of Government being pleased to nominate me as assistant commissioner, I may be officially informed of the fact as soon as possible, and simultaneously instructed to make all preliminary arrangements for the commission. Mr. Wratislaw would then be relieved of the preliminary work of obtaining equipment, arranging details of the party, &c., with India, &c., which I am sure he would find it difficult to do satisfactorily without great delay, seeing that he is established in Crete with his wife and family, &c.

As regards the composition of the British commission, my note of the 20th July holds good *mutatis mutandis*.

A. T. WILSON.

[34203] No. 102.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 269.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 24, 1913.

MY telegram No. 267 of 23rd July: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Salar, after remaining four days in the Cossacks' camp, tricked the Russian officer commanding. He obtained permission to visit sick friend, giving his word of honour that he would return the same evening. Instead of doing so he sent a message to say that he had determined to try his luck again. It would appear that he has collected a considerable following of well-armed tribesmen. Governor-General at Kermanshah has been warned, and is believed to be preparing to oppose him.* His Highness's loyalty is somewhat doubtful, and he is as arrant a coward as Salar. He has quite lately received considerable reinforcements in men and military stores, and Cossacks are stated to be pursuing Salar closely.

[33626] No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1913.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 271 of 21st July: German dye expert.

You are authorised to make representations in desired sense in conjunction with Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 552.)

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* *i.e.*, Farman Farma.

[33991] No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 348.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 274 of 23rd July.

You should see your Russian colleague and speak to him in sense of my memorandum of 19th June to Russian Embassy (see "Persia" print), using such arguments as you can in support of our view. If Russian objections are persisted in it will cause us great inconvenience and delay the whole settlement.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 553, and Tehran, No. 324.)

[34286] No. 105.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received July 25.)

Sir, 25, *Abchurch Lane, London, July* 24, 1913.

I AM instructed by the board of directors to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, and to inform you that, with a view to arriving at some definite conclusion regarding the mint in Tehran, they are prepared to accept the compromise suggested in the last paragraph of letter under reply, with the provision that the Persian Government confirms in writing the right of the Imperial Bank of Persia to import from time to time and whenever it thinks fit, for minting purposes, enough silver for the protection of its note circulation; this being secured, the bank will have no objection to the Persian Government importing half their own silver requirements through the Banque d'Escompte de Perse should they decide to do so, it being understood that the other half will be imported through the Imperial Bank of Persia.

I am, &c.

SYDNEY ROGERS, *Sub-Manager.*

[34369] No. 106.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, July* 25, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 282 of 21st June: Concessions in Persian Gulf.

Muin-ut-Tujjar has again pressed me for the views of His Majesty's Government.

[34214] No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 555.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1913.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 353 of 21st July.

I am prepared to agree to views of Russian Ambassador and Mr. Marling, and I should like to know as soon as possible if Russian Government concur.

In that event I would propose Mr. Wratislaw as principal British commissioner and Captain Wilson as assistant commissioner, with power to act in event of illness of principal commissioner—a provision which it appears desirable to make so as to avoid any possible delay.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 325, and Constantinople, No. 350.)

[33604] No. 108.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1913.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram, dated the 21st July,

* Also to War Office.

from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople,* respecting a proposal made by the Russian Ambassador to his Government that there shall only be one commission to demarcate the Turco-Persian frontier, and that the principal Russian and British commissioners should be civilians.

In view of this telegram, Sir E. Grey is disposed to take no definite action with reference to the appointment in question until he is in possession of the views of the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[34527] No. 109.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 550 of 23rd July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs raises no objections.

[33807] No. 110.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Foreign Office, July 26, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant regarding your negotiations for a mining concession in Kerman.

With regard to the second paragraph of that communication, I am to enquire whether the advance of 100,000*l.* which your syndicate agreed to make to the Persian Government would be affected if your offer to admit the Société d'Études to a participation of one-third of the part of your concession situated in the neutral sphere were accepted.

Sir E. Grey will be obliged if you will send a reply to this enquiry at your early convenience.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[34543] No. 111.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 278.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day contents of your telegram No. 555 of 25th July, but before doing so had already received *aide-mémoire* from his Excellency to the following effect, which virtually answers it:—

Imperial Government desire to take advantage of present conciliatory dispositions of Porte, and to proceed at once to delimitation, if only of a portion of frontier, so as to create an accomplished fact and prevent possibility of fresh difficulties being raised by Porte. With this end in view Imperial Government propose to communicate officially to Persian Government result to which negotiations have led, and as soon as their adhesion has been obtained to propose to Cabinets of Constantinople and Tehran to form at once mixed delimitation commission composed of Turkish, Persian, English, and Russian delegates, which should proceed to the spot towards end of summer, and commence work of delimitation during fine season. It will probably be necessary to give up idea of two separate commissions for north and south, as it would be impossible for them to work simultaneously. From end of October to March snow renders roads in north impracticable, while in south heat would stop work of commission already [group undecypherable] April. One single commission should, therefore, suffice for whole frontier.

* No. 83.

Russian Government consider that principal English and Russian delegates should be chosen from members of diplomatic or consular services who have had most to do with frontier question. They therefore propose to appoint M. Minorski as Russian commissioner. Officers of general staff and of topographical corps will naturally be joined to commission to do real work of delimitation. Russian Government would like to know views of His Majesty's Government with regard to present *aide-mémoire.*

[34528] No. 112.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1913.*

TRANS-PERSIAN Railway.

Aide-mémoire from Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses entire concurrence in views expressed in your telegram No. 543 of 19th July, and states that his Excellency will send instructions to Russian Chargé d'Affaires as soon as His Majesty's Government inform him of composition of British half of Joint Commission.

[34544] No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 274 of 23rd July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Following is summary of *aide-mémoire* just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Imperial Government have no objection to conclusion of arrangement with regard to Turco-Persian frontier from Hawizeh to Persian Gulf on lines of declaration signed in London on 6th May.

They equally approve constitution of a mixed commission for navigation of Shatt-el-Arab which would guarantee full and entire liberty of navigation and occupy itself with introducing improvements calculated to promote passage of merchant vessels. As Russian maritime trade in those regions is very considerable Imperial Government would like, more especially if that trade continues to develope in near future, to take part in labours of that commission. Imperial Government would like to see some Russian subjects invited to occupy some responsible posts in administration of commission, especially if subjects of other Powers should be so employed.

As commission has not yet been appointed, it is too early to discuss details of its competence and attributions, but Imperial Government would indicate certain amendments which it would like introduced into draft scheme, namely, right of consuls to have direct relations with commission; communication to consuls and authorities of vilayets of reports of its proceedings and expenditure; in the event of direct relations between commission and captains of ships or landed proprietors on either bank, coercive measures to be applied to foreign subjects only through medium of their respective consuls; regulations affecting foreign ships, more especially with regard to tariffs and taxes, to be enforced exclusively after preliminary agreement with consuls; ships of light tonnage that are not now stopped by bar and that consequently do no tbenefit by works of deepening to be free from all dues.

[34566] No. 114.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 133.)

Sir, *Tehran, June 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 219 of the 3rd May and to previous correspondence respecting the recent arrival of a Turkish consul at Lingah, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire on the subject.

I have pressed upon the Persian Government several times the desirability of

securing the recall of the newly appointed Turkish consul, and have been told in reply that a favourable opportunity for preferring this suggestion to the Turkish Ambassador is being awaited.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 114.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, May 11, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence regarding the representation of Turkish interests at Lingah, ending with Foreign Department endorsement No. 803, dated the 18th April, 1913.

I am grateful for the support accorded us by the Government of India, as therein indicated.

2. I beg to submit a copy of Mr. Vice-Consul New's last report on the incident. When it is remembered what an exaggerated significance such incidents acquire locally the document is not very pleasant reading, and I cannot help feeling that neither Sir W. Townley nor His Majesty's Government have given as much consideration as it deserved to the local aspect of the question; and speaking with the highest respect, I find it difficult to understand how His Majesty's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, if they have been informed of the facts, can hold the opinion expressed in their telegram No. 118 to His Majesty's Minister, that "it cannot be maintained by us that there was any obligation on the part of the Porte to notify to us in any more formal way the appointment in question."

The circumstances being that the British vice-consul at Lingah, having been in charge of Turkish interests for some three years, his first intimation of any change in the arrangement was that one Rifaat Bey wrote to him on the 3rd March signing himself Turkish representative at Lingah, and informing Mr. New of his arrival and the assumption of his duties. His Majesty's Minister apparently received no intimation of the appointment from the Turkish Embassy until the 7th March, four days after the individual's arrival at Lingah. I can only say that if, as acting French or acting Dutch consul, Bushire, I were to find myself dealt with in such a manner, I should feel that both personally and as a consular official of the British Government I had been treated with extreme discourtesy, and should refuse to hand over the duties until I had been duly instructed by the legation concerned.

It seems to me unfair upon British consular officers that they should be permitted to suffer such discourtesies without vindication by their Government, and I trust the Government of India will see their way to press that steps in that direction may now be taken.

3. We no doubt owe the new Turkish appointment to the intrigues of Mohamed Abdulla Khaja, which have been a periodical subject of protest by His Majesty's Legation, and we may now confidently expect trouble of the same nature, as we have had before, in connection with the passport question and other cognate matters.

4. In case it may assist towards an understanding of the local significance of the appointment, I venture to attach a précis of the record for information.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 114.

Vice-Consul New to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

WITH reference to my diary No. 14, entry 149, on the subject of the opening of the Turkish consulate and the hoisting of the flag, I have the honour to report that no other course was open to me than to officially partake in the ceremony, in response to an official written invitation from M. Rifaat Bey, in accordance with the instructions contained in Sir Walter Townley's telegram No. 105, dated the 15th March, 1913.

2. The Turk has in consequence gained a great success and naturally took the opportunity of making as much as possible of the ceremony.

He erected his flagstaff, an 80-feet wooden post in two pieces, painted red and white, which, I understand, was presented by Haji Abdulla Khaja, a Persian subject, on the 30th March. The staff is placed on the ground in the compound of Salim Khaja house, where the ceremony took place at 10 A.M. on the 31st March.

The principal guests were invited to stand round the flagstaff. The house, the roof, the compound, and the tops of surrounding houses were crowded with guests and spectators, of which there were some thousands, who shouted and cheered, after the Mullah, Sheikh Muhammad Mehdi, had offered a prayer, when the flag was hoisted.

3. Numerous rumours are already rife among ignorant people that the entire Sunni population of Lingah and of this part of the Gulf is henceforth Turkish, and that I will be recalled.

It is undoubtedly a great blow to our interests, and both Khan Bahadur Agha Bedr and I are very naturally affected with deep mortification; we will, however, set our minds to guard our interests watchfully and to guide the deputy-governor in the same path.

Lingah, April 2, 1913.

Enclosure 3 in No. 114.

Précis of Bushire Residency Record regarding Turkish Consular Representation at Lingah, 1905–1913.

IN February 1905, the Turkish Ambassador at Tehran requested His Majesty's Minister, Sir Arthur Hardinge, that the local protection of Turkish subjects and interests at Lingah might be undertaken by the British agent, "as is done in other places throughout Persia where the Sublime Porte has no representative of its own." His Majesty's Minister acquiesced in the proposal, and instructions were issued accordingly to the residency agent at Lingah.

In July 1905, however, a report was received by the Resident from the residency agent at Lingah, Agha Bedr, to the effect that a member of the Khaja family of Lingah (Persian subjects) Mohammed Abdulla Khaja, who acted as honorary Turkish agent previously, but had been deposed from the position, had been reinstated, the deputy-governor having himself hoisted the Turkish flag and read out a congratulatory letter from the then Governor of Bushire, the Darya Begi. In addition to this, a salute of seven guns had been fired for him. There was reason to believe at the time that the said Mohammed Abdulla had bribed the Darya Begi and the deputy-governor of Lingah with 1,000 tomans in return for which they gave him local recognition. In consequence of this, the instructions issued to the residency agent to consider himself in charge of Turkish interests were cancelled in August, and nothing further of note transpired till the end of January 1906, when a complaint was received from His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas to the effect that Mohammed Abdulla Khaja had been arrogating to himself at Lingah a rank and duties to which he was not properly entitled, *e.g.*, that he was using a seal inscribed "Consulate of Turkey, Lingah." The matter was represented to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and by him to the Turkish Ambassador, with the request that the status of Mohammed Abdulla Khaja might be defined. In reply, it was stated that the latter had been appointed "consul honoraire" only, and had not been recognised by the Persian Government.

In April 1907, Mohammed Abdulla Khaja commenced interfering in affairs concerning subjects of Trucial Oman, finally arresting four of them, on the ground that he had orders not to allow the subjects of Oman, Muscat, Bahrein, Koweit, or El Katif to leave Lingah without taking out Turkish passports, a course which they had refused to take. His Majesty's Minister was communicated with and informed of the above, and also that, in spite of orders from the Governor of Bushire, Mohammed Abdulla refused to cease flying the Turkish flag.

Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, in reply, dated the 14th September, stated that he had complained to the Turkish Ambassador, and that if there were any further complaints he would address the Persian Government officially.

The nuisance continued, however, Mohammed Abdulla's next amenity was to address to the Sanitary Council, Tehran, as "honorary consul for Turkey," a complaint against our quarantine doctor at Lingah, which duly appeared in the 43rd séance of the Sanitary Council.

His Majesty's Minister was again addressed on the 17th November. In the result the Darya Begi received definite orders in January 1908 to insist on Mohammed Abdulla hauling down the Turkish flag. He took no action, however, and his deputy at Lingah was believed to be in the pay of the Khaja family. In March 1908 Mohammed Abdulla had erected a bigger flagstaff than before; meanwhile, the Darya Begi absented himself at Charbar. After great pressure his Excellency caused the removal of the flagstaff in April. Mohammed Abdulla, however, at once started his intrigues again, and a Turkish official from Basra shortly afterwards visited Lingah to enquire into the removal of the flagstaff.

After a few months, Mohammed Abdulla devised another method of continuing his pose, namely, by obtaining permission to fly the Hamidieh Steamer Company's flag when the company's steamers were actually in port, an event occurring about once a year. Six months later a Turkish gunboat visited Lingah, and was assisted in every way by the residency agent who visited the ship. Mohammed Abdulla Khaja also paid a visit to the ship, wearing numerous badges and flying a flag at the bow and stern of his boat. A complaint was lodged regarding his procedure to the Turkish consul at Bushire, Nebil Zia Bey, who stated that Mohammed Abdulla Khaja had no consular status, and was to present himself at the residency agency at Lingah formally to apologise for his conduct, which was done after a delay of nearly three months.

About this time Nebil Zia Bey issued instructions to the British Residency Agent, who had now resumed charge of Turkish interests, to make a list of the Turkish subjects at Lingah.

In May Mr. New proceeded to Lingah, and took up the appointment of vice-consul at that place. Soon after this Mohammed Abdulla Khaja received an "Hamidieh" flag, very closely resembling that of the Turkish Empire, to hoist over his house, and was ordered by the Turkish consul at Bushire to fly it, though the latter repudiated his order the day after it had been issued. In spite of remonstrance, Mohammed Abdulla Khaja insisted on hoisting the flag; it was pulled down, however, by Mr. New in person.

At the end of October, Mr. New was asked by Nebil Zia Bey to verify the list of Turkish subjects which had been drawn up by the residency agent, and eventually, after careful enquiries had been made, reported only a single individual was found to be a *bonâ fide* Turkish subject.

In July 1911, the Hamidieh steamer agency was handed over to Salim Khaja during the absence of Mohamed Abdulla Khaja in Constantinople. About this time, Nebil Zia Bey wrote to Mr. New asking why the claims of Turkish subjects were not being satisfactorily looked after, and in reply was asked to state any case in which such neglect had occurred. No answer was elicited.

In the middle of August 1911, Nebil Zia Bey himself paid a visit to Lingah, and was invited by Mr. New to stay in his house, but the offer was declined in favour of Salim Khaja at whose house the Turkish consul's flag was hoisted. Nebil Zia Bey commenced to enrol people as Turkish subjects to the number of several hundred, the only qualification of the majority of whom, according to his own statement, being the allegation that their ancestors had come over from Turkish territory.

He reported that in his estimation, on the return of the pearling fleet, the number would be increased to about 5,000. The Governor of Bushire (now Mowaggar-ed-Dowleh) reported the matter to the Minister of the Interior, and telegraphed to the Deputy Governor that he should try to get the papers issued by Nebil Zia Bey back from them by peaceful means. He also asked the Resident to take what measures he thought fit over the matter. At a meeting of the so-called Turkish subjects whom he had enrolled, Nebil Zia Bey advised them to petition for a proper Turkish representative. Two of the men who had received papers repented and tried to hand them back, upon which he abused them and imprisoned them in his house.

On the 4th September, 1911, a telegram was received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to say that, in consequence of his proceedings at Lingah, Nebil Zia Bey's appointment had been revoked, and that an expression of regret for the discourteous conduct of their consul had been tendered by the Turkish Government. It should be noted, however, that the consul was not compelled to apologise at the scene of his evil doings on the grounds that, as he had been dismissed from his appointment, the Government had jurisdiction over him no longer.

Attempts were also made by this individual to intrigue with the Sheikh of Debai, who, however, resisted the advances made to him, and it was said that, should the Turks establish a representative at Lingah, many of the inhabitants of Oman and the Shib Kuh Coast would attempt to get themselves enrolled as Turkish subjects, the latter in order to enable them to evade their obligations as Persians.

The Deputy Governor having received orders that he was to confiscate all Turkish passports held by Persian subjects, on the 7th September convened a meeting of the Khaja family and of other people who were known to have taken out papers of Turkish nationality at which Abdulla Khaja, the head of the family, certified in writing that he was a Persian subject and had never taken out Turkish papers of any kind. A couple of days before this Salim Khaja had returned and boasted of having received a telegram from Mohamed Abdulla Khaja at Constantinople to the effect that the latter had been appointed Turkish consul at Lingah.

The appointment of a new Deputy Governor, who commiserated with the Khaja family, and did not enforce the confiscation of passports, despite categorical orders to that effect, threatened to undo all the good of the repressive action of his predecessor. Mr. New, however, explained the true state of affairs to him, while at Bushire the Governor was urged to maintain vigilance against the vagaries of the Khaja family, who were said to have expended over 10,000 rupees in the pursuit of their intrigues.

In March 1912 it was rumoured that one Sharif-ud-Din Beg had been appointed Turkish representative at Lingah, but His Majesty's Minister at Tehran was then averse to approaching the Turkish Ambassador on the subject, and nothing transpired till in a letter dated the 4th March, 1913, Mr. New reported the arrival, without premonition, at Lingah of a person named Rifaat Bey who claimed to be a newly-appointed Turkish consul, took up his abode in the house of Salim Khaja and was also closely attended by Mohamed Abdulla Khaja. It is this development which gave rise to the correspondenec now current.

[34567] No. 115.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 134.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 20, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 243 of to-day's date, on the subject of the negotiations now in progress between Muin-ut-Tujjar and the Persian Government, whereby the former desires to regain possession of the islands in the Persian Gulf, and other places mentioned in the firman of 1904, I have the honour to enclose, herewith, copy of a memorandum of an interview, between myself and the concessionaire, on the 18th instant, at which I requested him to explain how the matter of his concessions in the Gulf actually stood.

Mr. Churchill had, by my instructions, spoken to the Minister of the Interior previously on the subject, and had pointed out to His Highness that the sole rights possessed by the Muin were those conferred by the Act passed by the Medjliss in November 1911, which related to the island of Hormuz alone. Mr. Churchill went fully into the circumstances under which the firman of 1904, dealing with various other islands and places, had been terminated.

Ain-ed-Dowleh appeared to think that Muin had still an interest in these other islands and places under the firman in question, but admitted that he was not very familiar with the case, which, he said, was being studied by a committee. Subsequently Mr. Churchill was told that the whole question is now being considered by a committee of members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and that the grant of a new concession, on the lines of concessions granted to foreign subjects, is under contemplation.

Mr. Churchill expressed the hope that this legation would be consulted as His Majesty's Government were interested in the matter.

I have, &c.

W. TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Memorandum.

MUIN-UT-TUJJAR called on His Majesty's Minister yesterday, and was asked how the matter of his concessions in the Persian Gulf now stood. He maintained that his 1904 firman was perpetual, and that his rights to the islands and places (other than Hormuz), according to that document, remained unshaken. He stated that all the Ministers of the last Cabinet, and all the members of the present Cabinet (including Vossuk-ed-Dowleh), had given him separate signed declarations stating that they considered his firman to be perpetual.

His Majesty's Minister told him that the Persian Government had officially

informed His Majesty's Legation that his firman had lapsed. His Majesty's Government were of opinion that the Persian Government had every right to terminate the firman, and had so written to certain third parties. According to our view the Muin's only mining interests in the Gulf now were those dealt with in the Medjliss Decree of November, 1911, relating to Hormuz.

Having thus cleared the ground, His Majesty's Minister proceeded to speak very plainly to the Muin. He was told that he must realise that conditions had much altered in the Gulf of late, and he should try to conform to the altered circumstances. His Majesty's Government had very important political interests at stake there. The Muin's influence in the past had been harmful, and had made for corruption and bad government. From this state of affairs the Gulf was now slowly emerging, and unless he could assure us that he would loyally co-operate in the work in hand, His Majesty's legation would have to use all the influence it possessed to prevent him from regaining his old position in respect to the islands in question.

Muin-ut-Tujjar declared that he was fully alive to the altered circumstances, and said that he was quite prepared to give the legation a written undertaking that he would, in all matters concerning his interests in the islands of the Gulf, take into consideration the desires and interests of the British Government, and follow the advice given to him by the British Representative. His object had been, and would continue to be, solely the furtherance of his own commercial interests, and, if in the past, the pursuance of those interests had sometimes brought him into conflict with ours he was very sorry for it, but he would see that this did not occur in the future.

His Majesty's Minister reminded Muin that in the past his connection with the Gulf had been a régime of bribery and corruption. If he had been in the past the strong man of the Gulf, with the local Governors under his influence, he must understand that such a state of affairs would no longer be tolerated by His Majesty's Government, who were now the real masters in that region. His Majesty's Minister made a strong appeal to the Muin to try to work in unison and co-operation with the British Legation and the British Resident at Bushire. Otherwise the legation would undoubtedly be obliged to block his present attempt to regain control over the islands and places, other than Hormuz, over which only, as at present advised, did we consider him to have any control whatever.

The Muin reiterated his willingness to fall in with the wishes of His Majesty's Minister, and it was arranged that, at a subsequent meeting, a detailed agreement on the subject should be arrived at.

June 18, 1913. G. P. C.

[34570] No. 116.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 137. Secret.)

Tehran, June 23, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a memorandum on the subject of endeavours which are being made by Russian officials in Northern Persia to strangle the Indian tea trade by bringing pressure to bear on the importers of these teas or their agents at Resht.

It does not seem to me desirable to take any action in the matter, because, were I to do so even in the most friendly manner, I should certainly bring down an increase of Russian oppression on the head of the Resht merchant in question. I have accordingly authorised Mr. Churchill to inform the applicant that his case is not one in which this legation would be justified in taking action.

I have, without mentioning names, told M. Sabline that complaints have reached me to the effect that the Russian authorities are putting obstacles in the way of importers of Indian tea, by virtue of the free transit accorded to that commodity through Russia, and of European articles by parcel post. He replied that probably M. Nécrassof was to blame in the matter, and that doubtless the situation would be changed after his departure from Resht. I am unable to attach much importance to this assurance in view of the fact that the plaintiff has been approached by the Russian Legation since he came to Tehran in a manner which implies that, unless he abandons his obnoxious trade and accepts certain Russian proposals, his path will be strewn with thorns.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Memorandum.

(Secret.)

IN June last a certain Resht merchant named Haji Agha Reshti (or Kerimof) called at the legation.

This merchant has for some years carried on a considerable business at Resht in goods imported in transit through Russia. Tea is allowed transit in Russia, and this he imports from India in large quantities, both on his own account and on commission. The rest of his imports from England and other European markets have been made by the means of the parcels post system, which is allowed transit in Russia.

Haji Agha stated that the Russian consul at Resht (M. Nécrassof) used every means in his power to bring him to sever his business relations with Europe and to force him to do business with Russia alone. The manager of the Resht branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia bears out Haji Agha's account of the Russian consul's high-handed action in the matter, and gives the following account of the manner in which pressure had been exercised on the merchant in question by that official.

Haji Agha was in Europe at the time of the revolutionary troubles of 1909, and took out, before returning to Resht, a Russian passport in Russia. Early in 1912 he wished to return to Europe, and applied to the Russian Consulate at Resht for a fresh passport. This was refused him. In a personal interview which ensued between Haji Agha and the Russian consul, M. Nécrassof informed the former that as he had done nothing for Russian interests, but was one of the principal importers of Indian tea into Persia—"a trade which was directly opposed to Russian interests"—the Russian Consulate could do nothing for him. His passport had, therefore, been cancelled, and a new one would only be issued to him when he had signed a written undertaking to break off all connection with the import trade of Indian tea into Persia. Haji Agha replied that the demand that was made of him was impossible, as he had at that actual moment consignments in transit and uncleared to the value of several thousands of pounds. The merchant then went to the Imperial Bank at Resht. The manager of the branch confined himself to advising the man to try and obtain a written statement from the Russian Consulate. This Haji Agha did, and the document was shown to the manager of the bank. It was in the form of a letter from the head clerk of the Russian Consulate stating that M. Nécrassof would only consent to give him the required passport on the condition that he signed the undertaking described, and paid over a sum of 50*l.* to the Russian school at Resht. In August 1912, Haji Agha again visited the bank and informed the manager that as he believed his life to be in danger he had signed the document and paid over the money to the Russian school.

The statement made by the merchant in Tehran in June last is as follows:—

On arrival in the capital, he states that he was approached by the commercial attaché to the Russian Legation, who offered him the post of attaché to the Russian bank at Resht and a servant in Russian uniform, on the condition that he severed his business relations with Europe. To prove this last statement he showed a paper authorising the bearer to wear the uniform of a Russian Legation servant to be attached to his person. This document was signed by M. Sabline.

[31629] No. 117.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 141.)

Tehran, June 29, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 252 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th ultimo requesting that the opium receipts and excise of spirits should be included as additional security for the recent advance made by His Majesty's Government, together with copy of the reply received from the Persian Government on the 28th instant.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 117.

Sir W. Townley to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Tehran, May 24, 1913.

M. le Ministre,

IN my note dated the 30th April I had the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government consider the advance of 200,000*l.* recently made to the Imperial Persian Government, secured upon the surplus of the southern customs receipts.

His Majesty's Government are, however, now of opinion that the surplus of these customs receipts is not sufficient guarantee for the repayment of the numerous advances already charged thereon, amounting in all to 440,000*l.*

I am therefore instructed to inform the Persian Government that my Government desire additional guarantees, and they request that the Imperial Persian Government will agree to the southern opium receipts, as also the excise of spirits being considered as the additional security which they deem necessary.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 117.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Tehran, June 28, 1913.

Your Excellency,

THE contents of your note of the 24th May, 1913, regarding the security for the advance of 200,000*l.* recently obtained from the British Government have been communicated to the Ministry of Finance. In reply, the Ministry of Finance has informed the Foreign Office that in the event of the southern customs receipts proving insufficient guarantee for the payment of the above-mentioned advance, the opium receipts and the excise of spirits will be considered an additional security.

I have, &c.
MUSHAVAR UL MAMALEK.

[34573] No. 118.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 142. Very Confidential.)

Tehran, June 29, 1913.

Sir,

THE last chapter as yet published of the serial novel "Salar-ed-Dowleh," which formed the subject of my despatch No. 124 of the 8th June, shows how dangerously mischievous may be the apparently incurable habit of Russian consuls in Persia of adopting and following a policy of their own, that is possibly entirely at variance with that of the Russian Government and of the legation at Tehran. It is obvious that such action on the part of the consuls engenders a feeling of suspicious distrust of Russian methods in the Persian mind at a moment when the Government of St. Petersburgh would appear to be genuinely desirous of assisting the Persian Government of the day in its uphill task. How can any reliance be placed upon official assurances when it is of common knowledge that the consuls have quite openly advocated a policy that the Central Government have disavowed.

As you are aware, Sir, the Russian Foreign Minister recently officially informed the Persian Government that they were free to take such action as they might see fit, to make an end of the constant state of anxiety caused by the continued presence in Persia of Salar-ed-Dowleh as a rebel. The Persian Government were given to understand that the Russian Government would maintain a neutral attitude on the question and that only in the event of Russian interests being threatened, it might be found necessary to protect the same by the despatch of a Russian force to the disturbed district. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires loyally carried out this undertaking, and assisted the Government of Tehran as far as it lay in his power in the preparation of the necessary punitive measures.

It was, however, plain from the first that Salar was receiving the moral support

of the Russian consul at Asterabad, a form of co-operation which meant much more under existing circumstances than the mere words themselves would imply, because the Russian official in question is to all intents and purposes the ruler of Asterabad, so that the knowledge that he looked benevolently upon Salar's subversive movement sufficed to stifle all possible opposition to the Prince. It has since transpired that M. Ivanoff was in constant communication with M. Nécrassoff, the Russian consul at Resht, and that Salar's unlucky attempt to take possession of Resht was made with their connivance and approval. That it did not succeed was due to a fortuitous circumstance over which they had no control.

M. Sabline informs me confidentially that there is no manner of doubt that the two consuls mentioned above acted in this way, and he added that it was certainly at M. Nécrassoff's instigation that the Persian Cossacks at Resht were preparing to side with Salar, who could have been captured with ease at Resht, had not the local authorities realised that such action would not be agreeable to the Russian consul. Subsequently, some sixty of Salar's fugitive followers returning to Kurdistan from Mazanderan were captured by Shuja-ed-Dowleh during their voyage through Azerbaijan. This fact is well known to the Persian Government and to the generality of Persian politicians, and it is equally notorious that Shuja had to release these men at the instance of the Russian consul who claimed that they had been accorded a safe passage to their homes, presumably by the Russian consul at Resht, as no such order had been issued by the Persian Government.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Government have lost all hope of ever capturing Salar, and place but little faith in the genuine intention of the Cossack force under Russian officers that has been sent in pursuit of him, to come up with the Prince, who is now once more amongst the robber tribes of Kurdistan.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[34576] No. 119.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 146.)

Tehran, July 4, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 293 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, copy of the note that I have addressed to the Persian Government, informing them that His Majesty's Government accept the 1st July, 1915, as the date upon which the first payment on account of the moneys advanced in 1913 shall be made.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Sir W. Townley to Persian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Tehran, July 3, 1913.

Excellence,

IN my note of the 30th April, I had the honour to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should let his Excellency know at a later date the views of His Majesty's Government respecting the date upon which the first instalment of the liquidation of the advance of 200,000*l.*, made on the 30th April by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government, should be paid by the latter.

I am now authorised by His Majesty's Government to inform your Excellency that they accept the 1st July, 1915, as the date upon which the first payment on account of the moneys advanced in 1913 shall be made.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[34577]

No. 120.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 147.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 4, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 254 of the 2nd July respecting the operations undertaken by His Majesty's ships against the Tangistan coast, I have the honour to transmit herewith, copies of two *aide-mémoire* which I have addressed to the Persian Government in this connection.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Persian Government, June 25, 1913.

AS the Imperial Persian Government are aware, His Majesty's Government have recently been compelled to undertake punitive operations against certain Tangistan coast villages.

This action should prove of great service, firstly, to the customs administration by dealing a severe blow to smuggling, and secondly, to the administration of the Gulf Ports by placing the natives of Tangistan in a considerably weaker position *vis-à-vis* the local authorities.

If the recommendations of the Governor of the Gulf for the provision of a local force or for funds for the creation of such a force had already been adopted by the Central Government, the governor would now have been able to place a garrison of his own at the chief Tangistan port in co-operation with the customs administration, the advantages of which will be apparent to the Imperial Government.

His Majesty's Legation understand that the governor is of opinion that he could even now do so, pending the creation of a proper force, provided that the Central Government would give him the necessary authority to do so and sufficient funds for the maintenance of about 200 men.

It is in the highest degree important that his Excellency should be placed in a position to take full advantage of the recent British expedition against the Tangistanis, and His Majesty's Legation have the honour to request that the Imperial Government may see fit to send the Governor of the Gulf immediate telegraphic instructions to raise a force of 200 men, to be employed as suggested, and that, at the same time, sufficient money for the upkeep of such a force may be remitted to his Excellency.

Gulahek, June 25, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Aide-Mémoire communicated to Persian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 3, 1913.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Minister presents his compliments to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and, in continuation of the *aide-mémoire* he had the pleasure to hand to his Excellency on the 25th ultimo, begs to state that he learns from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire that the punitive measures which it was found incumbent to take against Tangistan, in order to obtain reparation for a gross act of piracy, have now been satisfactorily concluded as far as His Majesty's ships are concerned. Sir P. Cox states that as a result of the hostile attitude assumed by the Tangistanis it was found necessary to destroy twenty sailing craft whilst eleven other vessels are held to ransom within a fortnight under a Rajput guard at Kharaj.

Sir Walter Townley takes this occasion to remind his Excellency Mushawar-el-Mamalek that it would appear most important that the occasion should not be missed of enabling the Governor of the Gulf Ports to establish the effective authority of the Imperial Government in this disaffected district. He would beg to suggest, for the consideration of the competent authorities of the Imperial Government, that it is desirable under existing circumstances that the districts of Dashti and Dashtistan should be placed, for the time being at all events, under the Governor of the Gulf Ports.

His Excellency may be able, should he receive the moral and financial support of the Central Government, upon which Sir Walter Townley feels convinced he may count, to recover the revenue which the Governor-General of Fars confesses himself unable to collect with the force now at his disposal.

His Majesty's Minister understands that the suggestion concerning Dashti and Dashtistan has the approval of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh and of the Financial Representative of the Imperial Government at Shiraz, and for this reason permits himself to recommend its adoption to the urgent and favourable consideration of the Imperial Government.

[34582]

No. 121.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 153.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 7, 1913.

HIS Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that a total of 2,039 mules and 309 donkeys arrived at and left that place during the month of June, the donkeys moving viâ Firuzabad.

A report from Borasjun states that 3,056 mules left for, and 2,341 arrived from, Bushire.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports 3,141 arrivals from Bushire, and 2,268 departures for that port.

Major O'Connor adds that 900 animals arrived from, and that 2,270 left for, Ispahan; there is, however, some doubt respecting the latter figure, as a sub-report from Dehbid states that only 900 animals passed towards Ispahan.

All the figures which reach me from Shiraz are admittedly only approximate, and donkeys and mules are not enumerated separately.

Major O'Connor has no robberies to report for the period under review.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Previous month.

Mules, *1,081.*
Donkeys, *1,197.*
Mules, *1,900* to Bushire.
Mules, *2,089* from Bushire.
8,293. 7,212.

None but gendarmerie animals last month.

[34583]

No. 122.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 154.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 8, 1913.

ON the 5th May His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed informed me by telegraph that the consulate relief escort on the way to their post from India had captured and brought to Meshed a gang of Persian robbers led by one Seyyid Hasan.

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a full report on the whole matter which I have now received from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 122.

Major Sykes to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 24.)

Sir,

Meshed, June 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to make a report on the capture of Seyyid Hasan and his gang of five men by the relief escort of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

2. The escort, fourteen in number, was travelling between Birjand and Turbat-i-Haidari, and a large caravan had joined it for protection. At Robat-i-Kumai, some 40 miles from Turbat-i-Haidari, a man came out of a tower, erected for the use of road guards, and asked the pilgrims for supplies. They informed Duffadar Sher Mohammed, who had previously done a tour of service in Persia, that the tower was held by robbers. Sher Mohammed went towards the tower and talked to Seyyid Hasan, who threatened him with his Mauser pistol. Meanwhile, the other sowars had seized the first-mentioned robber. They then moved their camels to a safe distance, and taking cover in the ruined caravanserai opened fire on the robbers. The latter dared not show their heads above the wall, and *more persico* fired off their rifles into the air

and so Sher Mohammed and another sowar were able to approach the tower. They wounded a robber slightly, and broke open the gate when the white livered gang surrendered. There were no casualties on our side. At Turbat-i-Haidari, the Adil-u-Dola was most anxious to have the prisoners handed over to him, but the Governor-General and I finally decided to have them brought to Meshed, where they were placed in the consulate prison.

3. I venture to think, Sir, that Duffadar Sher Mohammed and the members of the escort displayed considerable initiative and courage, which has produced a good political effect, and that to have left the Persians who had trusted to their protection to be robbed would have been unworthy of the traditions of the British army.

4. Upon being examined by the attaché, Seyyid Hasan confessed to various robberies. He declared, however, that throughout he was acting under the orders of the Adil-u-Dola. As previous reports mentioned in my diaries had corroborated this, and as M. Leleux possessed similar information, I discussed the matter with my colleague, and it was decided to ask the Governor-General to summon the Adil-u-Dola from Turbat-i-Haidari. It was also decided that the Seyyid should be examined by three officials, namely, a representative of the Governor-General, M. Leleux, and the Karguzar, and that representatives of both consulates should be present.

5. At the examination the attaché stated, on my behalf, that my desire was for the Seyyid to have a fair trial, and to see whether there were any extenuating circumstances. The result of the first sitting of the enquiry was to show that if it were continued, the Adil-u-Dola would be proved guilty of instigating the Seyyid. The Governor-General sent the Karguzar to me with a message to the effect that having been twenty years in Persia I was bound to know that the Governor was in league with robbers, and that he would do exactly what I wished. What was finally settled was that Seyyid Hasan and his gang should be flogged and imprisoned and be released on security. The Governor-General also wrote me a letter of thanks for the capture of the gang, which I attach. It may be urged that the case against the Adil-u-Dola should have been concluded. My colleague stated that he wished this, but he apparently gave instructions to prevent the truth being arrived at, much to the indignation of M. Leleux.

6. A resumé of one of the robberies is instructive, and I hope of interest. The Governor instructed the Seyyid to rob a certain Haji Kazim of Baiq, and stated that he would detain him at Turbat-i-Haidari settling his revenue account until after the robbery. The gang broke into their victim's house, forced his strong box and took 4,700 tomans. Of this 3,000 tomans were sent to the Adil-u-Dola, and the Governor-General informed me that he was aware of this, possibly he also took his share! There were naturally many complaints about this robbery: so the Governor hit on an ingenious plan worthy of Haji Baba. He sent an official who arranged for Seyyid Hasan to occupy a mound near the village and threaten an attack. He then collected a large sum of money ostensibly to save the village from Seyyid Hasan, and with this Haji Kazim was indemnified to the tune of perhaps 1,000 tomans, the Governor pocketed more, and the Seyyid was paid by receiving a pardon.

7. Such has been the state of Persia since I have known it, and as there is no change in this respect it is unreasonable to expect any improvements in administration from the Persians themselves.

8. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
P. M. SYKES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 122.

Governor-General of Khorassan to Major Sykes.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *June* 12, 1913.

WHILE expressing my sincere gratitude to you for your kind assistance which you always have rendered me in the performance of my duties, I write to thank the Indian sowars of the British Consulate-General who seized the famous brigand Seyyid Hasan and brought him to Meshed. I request that the British Consulate-General may bring their services to the notice of the authorities concerned.

[34584]

No. 123.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 155.)
Sir,

Gulahek, July 8, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 123.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending July 8.

Diplomatic movements.—The Turkish Ambassador, Emin Bey, took leave of the Shah on the 28th June, and has returned to Constantinople.

The Cabinet.—Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek left for Paris on the 16th June.

Prince Reza Khan, Arfa'-ed-Dowleh, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople and Minister at St. Petersburgh, has been invited to return to Tehran, and it is understood that he will be offered a portfolio in the Cabinet. His candidature for the post of Foreign Minister is even talked about.

The Medjliss.—During the past four weeks there has been a considerable movement, fanned chiefly by Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the former Prime Minister, and a number of persons renowned for their reactionary proclivities, directed towards the re-establishment of parliamentary institutions. A letter was addressed on the 18th June by these people to the Cabinet asking for a Medjliss and Senate. The Cabinet replied favourably on the 21st, and a committee was formed to go into the matter.

Cossack Brigade.—A force of about 450 Persian Cossacks under Russian officers left Tehran on the 12th June in the direction of Zenjan to deal with Salar-ed-Dowleh. This force has since proceeded towards Kermanshah.

G. P. C.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

Although some of Salar-ed-Dowleh's personal following were captured after his departure from Resht on the 3rd of last month, the Prince himself managed to evade such parties as were sent in pursuit and escaped into Kurdistan, where he still is.

Amir Assad, on defeating Salar-ed-Dowleh's Turkomans near Tunkabun, as reported in last month's summary, is said to have robbed the custom-houses at Rudisar and Chumkaleh, but on pressure being brought to bear by the Russian authorities the money was returned.

A Russian officer with fifty Persian Cossacks arrived at Resht at the end of June and took over command of the detachment of the Cossack Brigade, which now numbers about 200.

Meshed.

The road between Meshed and Shahrud is still unsafe owing to the presence of Turkomans in the neighbourhood of Abbasabad and Maiomai, where they have been committing various depredations during the past month.

Some six weeks ago Juju, a notorious bandit, joined forces with one Musir Khan, an ex-Governor of Shirwan, and, after pillaging several villages in the Kuchan district, commenced interfering with travellers and caravans on the main road. Colonel Khakandokof, the commandant of the Russian troops in Khorassan, thereupon left Meshed with a party of eighty Cossacks, and, coming up with the robbers near Kuchan, surrounded them. In the fight which ensued, Juju and seven of his followers were killed and twenty-one were captured. The Cossacks suffered no casualties.

During the past two months over a hundred families of Hazaras, amongst whom are several old soldiers of the Indian army, have emigrated from Afghanistan and arrived at Meshed. They state that they have been compelled to leave Afghanistan owing to the tyranny in that country being intolerable.

There are rumours of another outbreak of plague on the Afghan frontier near Karez, but as there appears to be some doubt as to whether the disease really is the plague, the Conseil sanitaire have not yet declared quarantine.

The Russian consul-general has informed the Governor-General that, unless a new Governor is sent to Kuchan to replace the Governor deported last May, the Russian authorities will be compelled to appoint one themselves.

The enquiry into the robberies perpetrated by Seyyid Hassan and his gang showed that the Adil-ed-Dowleh was implicated, and it was finally agreed not to pass death sentences on the gang, but to flog and imprison them.

Captain Thorburn took over his duties as medical officer attached to His Majesty's consulate-general on the 31st May, *vice* Captain Wilson.

Ispahan.

The condition of the town and environs is once more far from satisfactory. His Majesty's consul-general reports that encounters between the police and gangs of thieves take place almost every night in the town, and that the environs are a prey to an organised band of Seichani robbers numbering about 120 men, the majority of whom are well mounted and well armed. On the 28th June an attempt was made by the local authorities to round up a portion of this gang, but the result was not very successful.

The relations between the Governor-General and M. Kornelis, which hitherto have been so satisfactory, appear to have reached a critical point owing to the refusal of the Governor-General to desist from collecting revenue on his own account.

A large caravan was robbed near Garpeesch, on the Ahwaz–Ispahan road, last month, and upwards of 100 mules were carried off by the robbers, who are believed to have been Bakhtiari. His Majesty's consul-general has made the usual representations regarding the protection of this portion of the road, which lies in Ispahan territory.

The people of Kashan complain that Naib Hussain's sowars, who are paid by the Central Government to guard the roads in the district, oppress the local inhabitants and rob travellers and caravans. They further allege that Naib Hussain is in communication with the Russian consuls at Tehran and Ispahan, and that he is being encouraged by them.

On the 17th June about sixty inhabitants of the village of Mahabad took refuge in the Indo-European Telegraph Department's office at Ardistan as a protest against the action of four seyyids of that town, whom they accused of having appropriated the sum of money granted by the Central Government as compensation for losses suffered at the hands of Naib Hussain's followers in 1912. On the following day a counter-demonstration was made by the Ardistanis, and a collision between the two parties was feared. However, on the matter being reported to the Governor-General of Ispahan, the four seyyids were arrested and a reconciliation was effected. The Mahabadis are now reported to be returning to their homes.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Sultanabad reports that, owing to the inability of the local authorities to maintain law and order, the majority of the roads in the district are unsafe, and that the condition of the town is going from bad to worse.

Yezd.

In spite of the absence of road guards along certain sections of the road, owing to the non-receipt of pay and to the scarcity of water and fodder, and of the ever-increasing rates of "rahdari," most of the routes in the districts are open to traffic.

The fate of Timur, the brigand who was captured last March, still remains unsettled. Several notables, who for reasons of their own desire his release, are said to be offering bribes to the Governor of Yezd in the hopes that he may be liberated.

Shiraz.

The Kawam-ul-Mulk, after subduing the Arabs and restoring order in the district east of Shiraz, moved against the Shibani Arabs. Two of their chiefs, Askar Khan and Mahomed Kuli Khan, who had been plotting against the Kawam, surrendered, and were brought into Shiraz. Askar Khan was hanged on the 11th June, and Mahomed Kuli Khan on the 20th.

News has been received from Darab that Sheikh Zachariah, a turbulent Sarkuhi Arab chief, has been killed.

The removal of these chiefs has greatly enhanced the prestige of the Kawam, and should facilitate the eventual settlement of the eastern districts of Fars.

Caravan traffic on the road to Ispahan is recommencing, and the Bushire road continues to be safe.

Seistan.

Although the various parties of robbers mentioned in last month's summary are still at large in the Kainat and the Sarhad, no further depredations are reported during the past four weeks.

There has been some intertribal fighting in the district to the south of Seistan, but apparently without any very serious results.

The branch of the Russian Bank at Birjand has been definitely closed, and its outstanding claims made over to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Mufakham, the Governor-General, is still on tour. He is at present in Sirjan, where, out of the four notables chiefly responsible for acts against his authority, two have come to terms with him and two are still at large. Raschid-us-Sultan, one of those who has made his peace with the Amir-i-Mufakham, has been appointed Deputy-Governor of Sirjan.

Etemad-ul-Mulk, who was appointed Deputy-Governor of Kerman by the Minister of the Interior, left Tehran for his post without the knowledge of His Majesty's Legation; but, as he was not considered suitable for the post, steps were taken to cancel the appointment.

Kermanshah.

A force of some 250 Persian Cossacks, under a Russian officer, has reached the neighbourhood of Kermanshah with a view to capturing Salar-ed-Dowleh, who was last reported as being about 50 miles to the north of the town.

An affray took place on the 3rd July near Mergavar between two parties of Kurds, one of whom was acting as an escort to a Russian consular officer. Russian troops were summoned from Urmia to the assistance of the escort, and the assailants were driven off. The Russian troops afterwards returned to Urmia.

Bakhtiari Country.

Sardar-i-Jang has telegraphed to the khans at Tehran and to the British Minister that he cannot continue to carry on the Governorship of Bakhtiari; but he has given no reason for his action, although pressed to do so. The khans have sent two influential members of the clan to try and induce him to retain his post, but up to the present he maintains his determination to resign.

W. M. FORDHAM, *Major,*
Military Attaché.

[34585] No. 124.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 156. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 8, 1913.

THERE is a lot of "if" and no small share of "but" in the present political situation in Persia. Six months ago we were somewhat complacently anticipating the work of a Cabinet of "all the talents," despite the fact that our complacency was a little tempered by a prevision that "the talents" were too numerous for perfect peace, and that their political ambitions pointed in too many directions to ensure prolonged harmony. It was soon evident that our forebodings would be realised, but not, fortunately, until the object for which the gathering together of these representatives of

various political creeds had been brought about, the granting of the railway concessions, had been secured. Very soon the brothers Motamen-ul-Mulk and Mushir-ed-Dowleh, seeing that their pet schemes stood small chance of a hearing in the Cabinet, ceased to attend the meetings of the council. Finally, without any fuss or Cabinet crisis, they resigned, and their places remained empty. Then Montaz-ed-Dowleh found the duties of the Minister of Justice too arduous for his health to support, and, at his own request, passed on to the Department of Commerce. No Minister of Justice has been found to replace him.

Gradually, it would appear, the old Sadr Azam, Ain-ed-Dowleh, began to assert himself, at first merely by manipulating his chair in such a skilful manner, in order to give his gouty foot full play, as to place himself on the same level in the council chamber as Ala-es-Sultaneh, the Prime Minister, whilst at the Ministerial luncheon table he at once took first place as a Prince of the Blood (Kajar). Then bickerings became of nearly daily occurrence between the veteran Prince and the upstart Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, whose brother, the Minister of Finance, sided with Ain-ed-Dowleh. Fate willed it that at this particular juncture several tiresome questions cropped up that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had to bring to the notice of the Cabinet in the name of the Russian Legation. Each one concerned some special pet or some particular hobby of the Minister of the Interior, who found it hard to bring himself to swallow rebukes or rebuffs within his province. For two months or more these scenes went on, with the result that the Minister of the Interior frequently had to take to his bed with gout, whilst the Minister for Foreign Affairs was from time to time prostrated by sharp bouts of fever to which he is subject, but which, as he himself told me, he attributed to his nerves being upset at the Cabinet councils.

Quarrel after quarrel was patched up by the assiduous attentions of Ala-es-Sultaneh and Maustaufi-ul-Mamalek, until at last the Minister for Foreign Affairs could stand no more, and said he must either resign or go to Europe for his health. The latter alternative was deemed the better, as it was feared that his resignation would inevitably entail a Cabinet crisis that might have disastrous results. The Cabinet being already much reduced in numbers, it was decided that Vossugh's place should be occupied temporarily by the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Almost immediately after the departure of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh it was decided that Maustaufi-ul-Mamalek the Minister of War, should proceed to Paris to bring back the Regent to Persia, it apparently being considered that his powers of persuasion were likely to be more efficacious than those of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh.

It seems almost inconceivable under the circumstances that the Government coach goes on at all, but it rumbles along all the same for all the world like one of the Noah's Ark vehicles that convey the unfortunate traveller over the stony, bumpy road between Resht and Tehran. Chiefly due to the personality of Ain-ed-Dowleh, there is a distinct improvement in the general situation; distant governors who have become more than half brigands are beginning to realise that they must pay some attention to orders from Tehran. It is a curious relic of the despotic past. There is no apparent reason why men who snapped their fingers at previous Ministers of the Interior should listen to Ain-ed-Dowleh, but there is no doubt that they do so. One example is Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General of Azerbaijan, who is now on such excellent terms with the Central Government that he is trusted by them, and has proved his good-will towards them, and is rendering excellent service by maintaining order in the province on Persian lines, whilst he continues his cordial relations with the Russian consul.

Meanwhile, the path of the Government is beset by political intriguers. There is small doubt that Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Sipahdar, and Saad-ed-Dowleh are all working, each in his own way, for their own hands. The two last named are more discreet than the veteran Bakhtiari chieftain, who allows himself to be pushed forward by people who have axes to grind behind his back. Samsam has lately closely identified himself with the movement that has been set on foot to secure early elections for a third Medjliss. He affirms that he is not influenced by any private motives, but is merely sincerely desirous that a National Assembly should be summoned again. He is strongly in favour of two Chambers. He has no very good answer to the natural question why he showed so little anxiety for a Medjliss when he was Prime Minister, but declares that his present attitude is quite consistent with his past, and that he is genuinely endeavouring to assist the Cabinet at the present moment. Such is not the view of Ministers, who think that he is purposely endeavouring to create mischief, though they profess their intention to issue the necessary election proclamation at a very early date.

The expected return of the Regent has given zest to the intriguers, who anticipate

that His Highness's arrival at Tehran will be the signal for a change of Cabinet. One aspirant, Saad-ed-Dowleh, can be eliminated in that case, and it is believed that the resignation of Ain-ed-Dowleh would synchronise with the return of Nasr-ul-Mulk. It would, in my opinion, be a great pity were the old Prince to vacate a post in which he has done much good work. To my mind he is the only real statesman that I have met in Persia, although it may be objected against him that he is a little dictatorial and old-fashioned in his methods. It is doubtless somewhat hard for an old man who was Grand Vizier in the days of despotism to accustom himself to altered circumstances, and it may be especially irksome to him to feel that the wishes and advice of the two legations must be sought continually. I have seen no trace of this in my dealings with His Highness, whom I have always found most anxious to do all he can to further our legitimate interests and meet our wishes. He is the moving spirit in the Cabinet at the present moment. There are many rumours current about the bribes he receives. Given his past reputation this was but to be expected, but there is probably much exaggeration attached to these stories, and many people in a position to know deny their accuracy. Unfortunately there is good reason to believe that a large number of Persian public men are shamelessly corrupt. For this reason charges of taking bribes are made somewhat loosely. The present Minister for Foreign Affairs and his brother are counted among the most flagrant offenders, due possibly to the fact that there is no other reason to account for their evident wealth, whilst Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh, who was Minister of the Interior in Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet, has acknowledged to his late chief that he made 10,000*l.* during the time he held office, and appeared to consider that he had been very reasonable in amassing so small a sum.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[34586]

No. 125.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 157.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 8, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 249 of the 26th ultimo, in which I had the honour to inform you that the Persian Government have decided to immediately extend the scope of the operations of the national gendarmerie under Swedish instructors to the province of Kerman, and in other directions, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to the Minister of the Interior by Colonel Hjalmarson, in which that officer repeats a request formerly made for an increase of the numbers of the Swedish military instructors in the service of the Persian Government.

The first point made in Colonel Hjalmarson's letter to Ain-ed-Dowleh concerns the section of the Tehran Bushire road between Kashan and Yezdikhast. It is clearly most desirable, if the necessary funds are forthcoming, that this gap in the chain of police protection on this most important trade route should be filled up as soon as possible. For this purpose Colonel Hjalmarson considers that the services of four additional instructors are required.

The colonel then proceeds to show reason why it is necessary that the staff of instructors at Shiraz should be increased by two officers, a doctor, and a veterinary surgeon. The experience of the recent march to Shiraz has proved that it is not sufficient to rely upon the skill of Persian practitioners. On that march several lives were lost that could almost certainly have been saved had the force been accompanied by a competent European doctor.

Further, it having been decided by the Government that it is desirable that the gendarmerie should be established in the province of Kerman as soon as may be possible, Colonel Hjalmarson asks for three executive instructors, an accountant, and a doctor for the organisation of the force to be raised there. In conversation Colonel Halmarson has told me that he proposes to send a force of 150 and 200 men to Kerman at the end of the present month when the somewhat longer and cooler nights will make marching possible. The force will be commanded by two tried officers who have been some time in Persia, and have a knowledge of the language and people.

I would beg to call your attention to the request for an officer to replace Major Petersen. This necessity has been caused by the fact that Major Petersen, an

officer of great promise, has had to be invalided to Europe in consequence of his health having broken down during the recent expedition to Shiraz. There is reason to believe that Major Petersen's lungs were affected before he came to Persia, but he appeared to have quite recovered and enjoyed good health during the two years that he had been here, until he unfortunately caught a chill on the march to Shiraz when he was in command of the first gendarmerie detachment that left here in March.

I have discussed the question of the increase of the European staff of the gendarmerie with the responsible Cabinet Ministers and also with the treasurer-general, as, of course, with my Russian colleague. I have represented that though the gendarmerie have proved their great value most fully, and that it is highly desirable that their numbers should be increased as far as may be possible, the question of expense should not be overlooked. It would be a most unfortunate thing were the Persian Government to find themselves one day with this large force, officered by Europeans, on their hands and without the necessary funds to maintain them.

In this matter of the gendarmerie we find ourselves face to face again with the same difficult problem that makes the solution of all Persian questions, if not impossible, at least most laborious. The good results derived from the gendarmerie are indisputable, but one cannot make bricks without straw or gendarmes without money, and it is extremely difficult to know to what extent financial risks may be run. A check to the development of the gendarmerie would be most unfortunate at the present moment, and yet it would seem fool-hardy of the Persian Government to run too great risks until there has been more time to judge of the extent to which the resources of the country will be increased by the gendarmerie. A marked improvement is noticeable in the districts where the gendarmerie have been posted, not only on the actual roads but in the general situation, due to the fact that their presence has served to bring home to the people that the Tehran Government are not devoid of all means of making themselves felt.

In a recent conversation with Colonel Hjalmarson about the future of the gendarmerie, that officer informed me that, though some of his brother officers have announced their intention of going home at the end of their contract, others will remain, and that there will never be any trouble about securing more officers. I gathered that he himself would be willing to remain, if he got six months' leave in which to perform his regulation military duties in Sweden.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 125.

Consul Hjalmarson to Minister of Interior.

Téhéran, le 2 saratan, 1331 (23 *juin*, 1913).

DANS plusieurs lettres précédentes j'ai fait ressortir le besoin d'engager de nouveau instructeurs étrangers pour la gendarmerie. Mon voyage à Chiraz et les travaux exécutés jusqu'ici m'ont pratiquement montré la nécessité de faire appel aussi à une autre catégorie de fonctionnaires étrangers. Enfin, les désirs qui viennent de m'être exprimés par le Conseil des Ministres comportent l'engagement de ces instructeurs et fonctionnaires.

Pour donner à votre Altesse une vue complète des besoins actuels de la gendarmerie, je crois utile d'en présenter le résumé suivant :—

Par ma lettre en date du 14 juillet, 1912, j'ai exposé au Ministre de l'Intérieur à cette époque qu'il était nécessaire d'organiser la gendarmerie sur la route Kachan-Ispahan-Yazdikhast pour réunir le groupe de gendarmerie de Téhéran avec celui de Chiraz. Par ma communication du 13 février, 1913 (24 dalw, 1331), je me suis permis d'attirer la haute attention de votre Altesse sur le même point et j'ai proposé pour cette organisation l'engagement de quatre officiers instructeurs.

Dans la même communication, j'ai signalé également le besoin de deux nouveau instructeurs pour l'organisation dans le Fars; un de ceux-ci, appelé pour remplacer le Colonel Merrill quand cet officier a présenté sa démission, se trouve déjà engagé de telle façon qu'à l'heure actuelle il n'est besoin que de un instructeur au lieu de deux.

Mais l'expérience a montré que deux autres fonctionnaires son indispensables.

Le chef de gendarmerie de Fars m'a fait observer que le service médical là-bas laisse beaucoup à désirer. Les médecins persans dont la gendarmerie dispose en Fars ne sont pas suffisamment au courant de leur profession. Dans les cas graves il a fallu demander l'assistance des deux médecins anglais habitant Chiraz. Mais il est évident que la gendarmerie ne peut avoir recours à eux que dans la ville même et jamais sur les routes ni dans les expéditions. Au reste, l'un de ces médecins est récemment parti avec la cavalerie indienne.

Ayant appris par le médecin-chef de la gendarmerie qu'il n'y a ici, à Téhéran, aucun médecin persan suffisamment au courant de sa profession qui veuille aller à Chiraz, il ne me reste qu'à proposer à votre Altesse l'engagement d'un médecin suédois pour le Fars.

Bien entendu, ce médecin ne devra pas se borner à traiter les gendarmes blessés ou malades; il devra aussi organiser des cours pour l'instruction à Fars de médecins de la gendarmerie—des autres médecins s'il y a lieu—afin de compléter leurs connaissances, leur donner plus de pratique et les mettre à même ainsi de remplir leurs importantes fonctions.

Enfin, il est nécessaire d'avoir là-bas un vétérinaire qui manque depuis le départ de la cavalerie indienne. Il suffit, je pense, d'attirer votre haute attention sur la valeur représentée par les chevaux de la gendarmerie pour vous rallier à notre avis que l'engagement d'un vétérinaire constitue, en vérité, une économie pour la gendarmerie.

Avant-hier, le Conseil des Ministres m'a exprimé le désir qu'une organisation de gendarmerie soit faite immédiatement à Kerman dans le but principal d'assurer la sécurité de la route Kerman-Bender-Abbas et de la région de Kerman.

Je tiens à vous dire que j'avais espéré ne plus augmenter le nombre des instructeurs et pouvoir me tirer d'affaires en utilisant des officiers persans tout en continuant à laisser la direction aux instructeurs étrangers dans les diverses régions.

Pour arriver à ce but il eût fallu naturellement que nous ayons le temps matériel suffisant de pousser l'instruction d'un certain nombre d'officiers persans de façon à les mettre à même, sans l'appui d'un instructeur étranger, de diriger les exercices et l'instruction ainsi que de discipliner les hommes.

Mais vu le développement rapide de la gendarmerie des routes, il nous a fallu jusqu'ici nous borner à ne donner aux officiers persans que l'instruction strictement nécessaire pour permettre au service de surveillance des routes de s'effectuer; nous n'avons pas eu le temps de faire de ces officiers persans des instructeurs.

Il faut donc pour l'organisation de Kerman le groupe ordinaire des instructeurs, à savoir :—

Un chef.
Un instructeur pour les exercices à pied.
Un instructeur pour les exercices à cheval.
Un comptable.

Je ne propose pas de vétérinaire pour Kerman, parce que cette organisation devant prendre au moins une année pour se faire j'espère que le vétérinaire à Chiraz pourra instruire quelqu'un dans l'art vétérinaire et lui donner assez de connaissances pour remplir ce service.

Mais un médecin étant indispensable à Kerman, je propose d'ajouter un médecin à la liste donnée plus haut.

Je me permets, d'autre part, de référer votre Altesse à ma lettre en date du 22 djauza (12 juin), par laquelle je l'ai prié de vouloir bien prendre les mesures utiles pour qu'un officier soit engagé en remplacement du Major Petersen.

Enfin, je crois utile de vous faire connaître qu'au cours des travaux d'organisation j'ai eu à souffrir, et avec moi les autres officiers-instructeurs, du manque de cartes topographiques; je pense, du reste, que toutes les administrations auraient la tâche extrêmement facilitée si elles avaient de telles cartes à leur disposition.

Je n'hésite donc pas à proposer à votre Altesse l'engagement de deux cartographes bien au courant des méthodes modernes. Je suis convaincu que ces deux cartographes pourront, en trois ans, lever les cartes de quelques-unes des routes principales de la Perse et en même temps instruire un certain nombre d'élèves persans. Je crois qu'ils feront là une œuvre très précieuse pour l'ordre et l'administration de la Perse.

En résumé, je propose l'engagement des instructeurs suivants :—

	Appointements. Fr.	£
Pour Teheran—		
1 officier remplaçant le Major Petersen.		
Pour Ispahan—		
1 officier, chef du régiment	12,000	
1 " pour les exercices à pied	8,000	
1 " " " à cheval	8,000	
1 intendant-militaire	12,000	
		=1,600
Pour Chiraz—		
1 officier pour les exercices à pied	8,000	
1 médecin	20,000	
1 vétérinaire	12,000	
		=1,600
Pour Kerman—		
1 officier, chef du régiment	13,000	
1 " pour les exercices à pied	10,000	
1 " " " à cheval	10,000	
1 intendant-militaire	12,000	
1 médecin	20,000	
		=2,600
Service spécial—		
1 cartographe	12,000	
1 "	12,000	
		= 950

En soumettant les propositions qui précèdent à la haute approbation de votre Altesse, je la prie, &c.

Le Chef-Instructeur de la Gendarmerie gouvernementale,
H. HJALMARSON.

[34587] No. 126.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 158.)

Tehran, July 9, 1913.

Sir,

FROM recent conversations with the Prime Minister it would seem that the Government have decided to proceed to elections for a third Medjliss. It would appear that the elections are to follow the procedure laid down in the Electoral Law passed by the second Medjliss that amounts practically to manhood suffrage. There is some uncertainty in certain quarters as to whether the Regent ever endorsed the law in question. This doubt is apparently based upon the fact that, when affixing his signature, Nasr-ul-Mulk, in accordance with his unfortunate instinct for endeavouring to escape responsibility, added a rider to the effect that as time pressed he had not read the law, but had signed it and passed it on unread to the Minister of the Interior.

My Russian colleague and I have represented to the responsible Ministers that great care must be taken to ensure the return of more suitable members to Parliament than was the case on the two previous occasions. Some anxiety has been expressed as to the attitude that might be adopted in Azerbaijan and the northern provinces towards the elections, but the Government seem now to have satisfied themselves that Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabriz intends to co-operate loyally with them.

The President of the Council asserts that the Cabinet has for some time past been determined to proceed to new elections, but it is very doubtful if such a step would have been taken had not Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the former Prime Minister, put himself at the head of a movement having this object in view. There have been several meetings held at various places, and threats have been uttered that, if the Government continue to neglect the wish of the people, recourse will be had to the pressure of a large "bast" of leading people in the Medjliss building. I have represented to Samsam-es-Sultaneh and others that such a proceeding would be most severely condemned, and I have called upon him to use all his influence to prevent the occurrence of any incident that might tend to disturb public order. Samsam and his followers lay great stress upon the necessity for the new assembly to take the necessary constitutional measures at once for the formation of a Senate. Previous experiences of National Assemblies in Persia have not been very successful, and I am of opinion that it would therefore be desirable to try the effect of a second Chamber on the present occasion. Preparations in this direction are being made by a special commission appointed for the purpose.

It is very doubtful whether in their hearts the politicians, like Samsam-es-Sultaneh and his followers, really desire a Medjliss, but it suits their political book to profess to do so, and it would place the Cabinet in a somewhat awkward position if opposition were to be maintained to what is said to be the unanimous wish of the people. One cannot but feel serious doubts as to the advisability of the step that is about to be taken, and it is far from improbable that the progress of affairs will be checked rather than advanced by the presence of a Parliament, but to oppose the elections would be to run the risk of stirring up a popular movement that might result in serious disorders. Such a situation would offer a favourable field for the intriguers against the Cabinet of whom there are always a goodly number in Persia.

On the whole, it would appear to me that the time has come when it is desirable that a new Medjliss should be summoned, but it must be somewhat of a lottery and one can only hope that a more suitable class of representatives may be chosen than on the former occasions, that they may be more reasonable in their views, and that some measure of control may be established by the early formation of an upper Chamber. I frankly do not anticipate that the work of endeavouring to assist Persia in the restoration of a normal condition of affairs will be facilitated by this fresh recourse to a legislative assembly, but one must hope for the best.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[34588] No. 127.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 159.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 9, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, copy of a memorandum which I have received from M. Camille Molitor, Director-General of Posts, setting forth the inconvenience caused to his Department, and to trade generally, by the fact that the Persian Transport Company (Limited) has, under a concession originally granted to Yahya Khan, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, by Nasser-ed-Din Shah, the right to construct a road from Tehran to Ahwaz and from Burujird to Ispahan. M. Molitor does not protest against this monopoly, although he appears to entertain small faith that any advantage will be taken of it, but he complains that the Persian Transport Company, while doing nothing itself to improve communications, prevents the Postal Administratian from carrying out constructive works on any of three alternative roads that connect Burujird with Ispahan, the company claiming under its concession that it has the right to select any one of the roads that it chooses, whilst refusing to name the route it proposes to adopt.

M. Molitor points out that, as long as the Persian Transport Company maintains its present attitude, it will be impossible for the Postal Administration to take any steps to improve existing conditions, which are injurious to the postal service and to trade alike. In conversation, M. Molitor has told me that he has received a most favourable proposal for putting the post road in order from Kum to Shiraz, but that he is unable to go on with the scheme because the Persian Transport Company refuses to make up its mind about the road it will make. The scheme M. Molitor has in view would include the establishment of a motor service between Tehran and Shiraz by the Persian Government, an arrangement that would clearly be of great value from every point of view.

M. Molitor encloses with his memorandum copy of a firman dated the 3rd March last, by virtue of which the construction period of the road granted in the Yahya Khan concession is prolonged for seven years, with faculty of prolongation for a further three years, should the company be able to establish that *force majeure* has prevented it from carrying out the conditions of the agreement. I understand that on the strength of this firman M. Molitor has concluded a five years' contract for the conveyance of the post with the company, and that he intends to establish a motor service between Tehran and Sultanabad.

The agent of the Persian Transport Company here has not communicated to me a copy of this firman, although, acting under your instructions, Sir, I have frequently pressed the Persian Government to settle this long-standing question, which would now appear to have been done on the basis that the company has a prolongation of ten years

within which to construct the road from Tehran to Ahwaz, but that no further period of construction will be accorded, and that the concession will be cancelled if the road is not completed throughout its entire length within ten years, which means that so much of the road as may have been finished will pass into the hands of the Persian Government.

Mr. Wilson, the company's agent, had told me that some sort of an arrangement had been made, but he expressed his opinion that his London principals would not accept it, and I heard no more about it. M. Molitor states that the Persian Government maintain that the company has accepted it.

It would appear most improbable that under these conditions, and with the probability that a railway will before long be built from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, that the company will ever seriously undertake the construction of the road in question, as they can neither expect the section from Tehran to Khoremabad to repay them their outlay in ten years, nor can they intend to compete with the prospective railway that will probably follow much the same alignment as the road from Khoremabad to Ahwaz.

Under these circumstances, I would venture to suggest that it is desirable in the interests of trade with Persia to ascertain the real intentions of the Persian Transport Company. It would appear to be most undesirable that progress in ways of communication should be delayed for ten years if the company has no intention of going on with the concession. Even if they do intend to do so seriously, it would be but fair to Persia that the route it is proposed to adopt between Burujird and Ispahan should be forthwith announced, in order that more energetic pioneers than the company has proved itself up to the present may set to work on the alternative routes.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

Memorandum communicated to Sir W. Townley by M. Melitor.

LA concession du 3 rabiol-sani, 1307, accordée par Sa Majesté le Schah à son Altesse Yahya Khan, Mochir-ed-Dovleh, actuellement en possession de la Persian Transport Company (Limited), reconnait au concessionnaire "le droit de construire une route entre Ahwaz et Téhéran, et une autre entre Broudjerd et Ispahan."

La Persian Transport Company (Limited) a repris la section Téhéran–Koum et a construit la section Koum–Sultanabad de la première de ces routes.

Ayant repris la concession en 1902, cette compagnie n'a, en somme, pendant la période de dix années qui s'est écoulée depuis cette date jusqu'à ce jour, construit que 24 farsakhs de route—travail insignifiant en lui-même, et surtout en regard de ce qui reste à faire (environ 150 farsakhs).

Le dernier délai qui avait été accordé pour l'achèvement de ces routes étant expiré depuis la mi-août 1912, un nouveau délai de sept années, qui pourra être prolongé encore de trois années, si la Persian Transport Company (Limited) le demande, vient d'être accordé encore à cette compagnie.

Copie du firman relatif à ce nouveau délai est jointe à la présente.

De ce firman il résulte que la compagnie concessionnaire qui ne parait pas prête à remplir dès maintenant ses engagements, pourra pendant dix ans encore prétendre être seule en droit de construire une route de Broudjerd à Ispahan.

Aux termes stricts de la concession, le tracé de cette route devrait être indépendant du tracé de la route de Téhéran à Ahwaz (Téhéran–Koum–Sultanabad–Broudjerd, &c.) et emprunter par conséquent la voie directe actuellement suivie par les caravanes qui se rendent de Broudjerd à Ispahan, et qui est celle de Welian–Talidar–Mianroud–Kaledabad–Daroum–Tiran–Ispahan.

Mais il résulte des entretiens que j'ai eus avec les représentants de la Persian Transport Company (Limited), Messrs. Malison, Wilson, et Sothan, que cette compagnie a l'intention du choisir un autre tracé, qui emprunterait l'une des voies suivantes :—

1. La voie des caravanes de Broudjerd à Sultanabad, Khomein, Golpayegan, Khonsar, Tiran, Nedjefabad, Ispahan ;

2. La voie de Broudjerd à Sultanabad–Radjerd (route de Koum)–Diligaan–Mortchekkar–Ispahan ;

3. La voie de Broudjerd–Sultanabad–Koum–Kachan–Natanz–Targh–Mortchekkar–Ispahan.

Quel que puisse être le tracé sur lequel la compagnie concessionnaire portera son choix, il est évident que le Gouvernement persan ne pourra entreprendre aucun travail d'amélioration ou d'aménagement des trois autres voies avant que ce choix ait été fait ; et les relations postales et commerciales directes de Broudjerd, de Sultanabad et de Koum à Ispahan, continueront à rester dans la situation précaire actuelle, aussi longtemps que durera cette situation.

L'administration désire améliorer ces relations pour les mettre en rapport avec les nécessités du commerce et du public, en aménageant en route carrossable, et pratiquable aux véhicules automobiles, l'une des voies qui fait communiquer Ispahan et le centre de la Perse avec la capitale, et les villes de l'ouest ; mais, elle ne peut donner suite à aucun des projets qui lui sont soumis, puisque la Persian Transport Company (Limited) pourra pendant dix ans s'y opposer en invoquant le droit qui lui confère sa concession.

L'Administration des Postes a soumis le cas au Ministre des Travaux publics, des Postes et des Télégraphes, et celui-ci a prié le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'inviter la compagnie prénommée à désigner d'urgence et officiellement le tracé qu'elle a choisi.

Mais il a été répondu qu'il fallait attendre les renseignements demandés à Londres.

Quoi qu'il en soit, il est évident que l'Administration des Postes, malgré ses meilleures intentions de perfectionner les voies de communication en cause, ne pourra donner aucune suite favorable aux vives et justes réclamations du commerce et du public, avant qu'une décision n'intervienne, pour mettre définitivement au point cette situation préjudiciable aux intérêts généraux du pays.

Téhéran, le 3 juillet, 1913.

C. MELITOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Firman.

(Translation.)

AS the period of ten years stipulated in the firman dated 19 Jemadi-ul-Avel, 1320, for the completion of the roads enumerated in the said firman terminated on the 19th Jemadi-ul-Avel, 1330, and as the Lynch Company, which is the owner of the concession for the above-mentioned roads, declared that *force majeure* prevented it from completing the above-mentioned roads and requested an extension of time, the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah gives the owner of the aforementioned concession time from the date of this document up to seven years for the completion of the roads on the following condition:—

If during the course of these seven years extraordinary events and disorders occur in the kingdom which can be described as *force majeure*, and on account of which the completion of the said roads will not be possible for the owner of the concession, three further years will be added to the seven years. If at the expiration of the last three years the building of the roads is not completed, the said concession will be entirely terminated and null and void, and the owner of the concession will on no account be able to make any excuse or urge *force majeure* for an application to the Persian Government for a renewal. If during the course of this period which is available to the company for making the roads, the company proposes to exchange its numerous documents relating to the concession, for one single concession, and should an agreement be come to with the Persian Government authorities, there will be no refusal.

24 *Rebi-ul-Avel*, 1331 (*March* 3, 1913).

[34590] No. 128.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 161.)

Gulhek, July 9, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 65 of the 6th May, in which you were kind enough to forward me a copy of a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Harrison, the representative of the British group on the Société d'Etudes, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. H. W. MacLean, showing the present state of Persia's finances. I have been fortunate in securing the views upon this subject of such a competent authority as Mr. MacLean, who is especially well fitted to review the financial situation, both by reason of his technical knowledge of finance, and of his long acquaintance with Persia. His interesting and comprehensive memorandum will be found, I think, to contain all available knowledge on the subject in question.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Memorandum by Mr. MacLean on Persian Finances.

CERTAIN statements prepared by the Treasurer-General of Persia of the receipts and disbursements of his administration for the year to 20th March, 1913, are before me. They are interim statements, not closed accounts, and he expressly points out that they will be subject to great modification before being rendered in final form. Moreover, he claims that the delay in rendering closed accounts, which will not be available before August, is unavoidable as he has to collect from his provincial agencies the materials for this return the first annual statement of the revenue and expenditure of Persia. I accept that claim. Under these circumstances there is no room at present for criticism of the Treasurer-General or his administration.

The statements before me are accounts of receipts and disbursements—they are not full statements of revenue and expenditure, nor do they convey in definite form information regarding the financial position of the Empire. But they are, in case of need, a valuable base on which to found budget or financial investigations.

The statements are appended in abridged form to this memorandum.

The first statement (Table A) gives the receipts on account of revenue, indicating a gross revenue for the year of 2,040,000*l.* M. Mornard expects that restoration of order in the provinces will enable Government to collect during the current year from the same sources of revenue 2,400,000*l.*, independently of any new taxation. This estimate probably includes recoverable arrears of land tax at the close of 1912–13 of about 92,000*l.*

The statement of disbursements (Table B) is much less complete. It shows only the payments made by the Treasurer-General 1,598,000*l.*, leaving a difference of 442,000*l.*, to be "justifiée" by Treasury agencies in the provinces, or by certain departments which make payments from their own revenues such as the customs, posts, telegraphs, and consulates. As the Government was evidently in straitened circumstances at the end of the financial year, there can be little hope that any part of this difference represents a surplus.

There is little use in following in detail figures which are subject to so great adjustment, and I pass to other matters of comment.

Mr. Harrison has furnished an interesting memorandum on Persian finance, it may be useful to supplement it with such information as may be gathered from the statements of the Treasurer-General or others.

In Table C I have endeavoured to collect together the more important particulars of the Foreign Debt of Persia with such accuracy as the time at my disposal for this memorandum permits. I find that the foreign loans of the Persian Government extant at 20th March, 1913, amounted to 6,254,000*l.* New loans to the extent of 500,000*l.* have been since negotiated.

Of these loans 4,750,000*l.* has been contracted with Russia, and 2,004,000*l.* with the British Empire, the first security in each case being respectively the northern and the southern customs revenues. Four loans aggregating 5,000,000*l.* are on a gold basis at 5 per cent. interest with long terms of amortisation. 1,100,000*l.* is on a silver kran basis at 7 per cent. interest, with a sinking fund redeeming it in fifteen years, and the remainder are of the nature of temporary advances at 7 per cent. awaiting opportunity for consolidation.

The sterling gold loan of 1911 is quoted on the London Stock Exchange at 90 to 95, which shows that Persia cannot expect to raise money on the open market at less cost than 5½ per cent. per annum with the best security she can offer. Consequently the relief to revenue from a consolidation of these temporary advances would not exceed 25,000*l.* per annum in interest, but the smaller sinking fund necessary for a long dated loan would set free large sums now hypothecated to the repayment at short date of these advances. In other words, if Persia can offer good enough security for a long loan of 2,000,000*l.* at 5 per cent. interest at an issue price of 87½, she could pay off the 1,750,000*l.* of debt bearing 7 per cent. interest, and the service of the new debt would be met by an annual payment of 110,000*l.*—which is 10,000*l.* less than the sum in krans at present required to pay interest and sinking fund on the kran consolidated loan of 1911. Of course she would in that case accept the risk of converting into gold a debt of 6,000,000 tomans now payable in silver. But that is a reasonable risk to accept.

It is obvious that the possibility of consolidation on such terms must depend on the security which can be offered.

The first security which occurs to anyone conversant with the affairs of Persia is the revenues of the customs administration. In annex I, I have set out the net customs revenues for the year 1912–13, a total of 711,000*l.* This has been adapted to suit my purposes from a return furnished by the administrator of customs. I have distinguished between southern and northern customs; the former comprises the revenues of all southern ports from Baluchistan to Dizful, and the latter all other customs revenues. The southern customs produce slightly less than five years ago, the northern show progressive increase.

It is worthy of note that the geographical position of Persia is such that the great centres of production and consumption are naturally a little more accessible to European trade by way of Batoum than by way of Bushire or Mohammerah, and that a considerable part of the trade, even with Great Britain, adopts the southern instead of the northern route, simply on account of the transit difficulties imposed by Russia, and which she can modify at pleasure. The power which Russia can exercise in this direction is well illustrated in the tea trade; at one time a great part of the tea consumed in Khorassan was landed at Bunder Abbas. Russia granted transport facilities through her territory, and the tea from India and China forthwith went to Batoum.

In annex II, I have shown how the customs revenues of Persia are affected to the service of the existing foreign loans. Assuming the revenue to remain constant, the position as regards the southern customs is that after providing for the service of the two gold loans of 1910 and 1911, forming first charges on the revenues, there is an available balance till 1915 of 55,000*l.*, and thereafter of 49,000*l.* The British advance of 1912 is entitled to absorb the whole of this surplus, and would be liquidated therefrom in 1916. The British advance of 200,000*l.* of 1913 would require a service of nearly double the then available balance of 49,000*l.*, and the Persian Government in order to meet it punctually, would have to provide about 35,000*l.* per annum for two years from 1916 from other sources. The remaining advance of 100,000*l.* of 1913, and arrears of interest would be liquidated by about 1920 from the available surplus which would then be freed to the Persian Government.

The northern customs are sufficient to meet all the foreign claims secured upon it. These are the Russian loans of 1900–02, 1911, and 1913, and certain annual charges for maintenance of the Cossack Brigade and allowances to the ex-Shah amounting together to 90,000*l.*, and ranking next after the 1902 loan. The free balance of northern customs revenues is 100,000*l.*

The present position therefore is that the southern customs are pledged for a larger annual sum than they can immediately satisfy, and that the northern customs are pledged to an extent which affords an annual free balance of 100,000*l.* for other purposes.

If the consolidation I have suggested were effected, the customs revenues of 711,000*l.* would have to bear a total annual service for foreign loans and other

secured charges of about 475,500*l.*, leaving an annual free balance of 236,000*l.* for other purposes, or a margin of 50 per cent.

But obviously any such consolidation might have to be effected in two parts, proportionate to the respective British and Russian debts to be paid off. In that case the Russian consolidated loan would be 1,500,000*l.*, with an annual interest and sinking fund of about 82,500*l.*, and the British consolidated loan would be 500,000*l.*, with an annual interest and sinking fund of about 27,500*l.*

The northern customs would then have to bear a total annual service of 349,700*l.*, and would show a free annual balance of 213,000*l.*, or 61 per cent. margin, and the southern customs would have to bear a total annual service of 126,300*l.*, and would afford a free annual balance of 21,500*l.*, or a 17 per cent. margin. The former seems to be a good margin on an improving security, the latter an unsatisfactory margin on a weak security.

There are records, however, of certain annual payments noted at the foot of annex II, which by habit or necessity are levied on the customs revenues. I have not found opportunity to study these items, but the first three cannot be in any sense essential to the administration of the customs, and in any case are easily met out of the free balance of the northern customs, whilst the following three items, if chargeable to the southern customs, would entirely absorb the free balance.

The remaining considerations in this connection are :—

1. Whether other sources of revenue of a satisfactory nature can be pledged in support of the weak security available for the existing British advances.

2. Whether the relief to Persian finances gained by passing on part of the immediate liabilities to future generations, would enable the Government to meet annual expenditure out of income, and to secure a stable and progressive administration.

These are questions which would demand a more exhaustive examination of the material supplied by the Treasurer-General than I have had opportunity to make. It seems to me unnecessary to offer uninstructed opinion on them now, as there is promise of more complete accounts being shortly available.

H. L. MacLEAN.

July 5, 1913.

TABLE (A).—Provisional statement by the Treasurer-General of Receipts by the Financial Administrations during the Year to the 20th March, 1913.

(A.)	£
1. Customs	794,250
2. Land Tax*	693,210
3. Crown domains (Khalaseh)	119,600
4. Licenses (on factories, business shops, &c.)	4,410
5. Excise (opium, spirits, wine)	129,930
6. Slaughter-houses and offal taxes	28,280
7. Mines and oxide, iron	6,030
8. Mint	12,800
9. Land register ("cadastre")	160
10. Tolls (included in land taxes)	
11. Sundry taxes (brickmakers, auctions, pawnshops)	1,580
12. Sundry dues (tobacco, "régie", transport agency, Baluchistan telegraphs, oil company	2,170
13. Fortuitous receipts	1,390
13a. Receipts from financial agencies	5,210
	1,799,020
(B.)	
14. Passports	31,680
15. Chancery receipts, included in passports	
16. Court fees, &c. (Ministry of Justice)	3,540
17. Religious endowments (public works)	1,250
18. Posts	67,290
19. Telegraphs	50,900
20. Navaghai (Tax on transport animals, &c.)	22,880
21. Lambskins	9,300
22. Fruits (fresh) and raisins	1,990
	1,987,850
In a subsequent note Mr. Mornard says that receipts will exceed these figures by 55,000*l.*	55,000
	2,042,850

* NOTE.—For the southern provinces of Burujird, Kerman, Shiraz, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and Arabistan this tax produced 98,960*l.*

TABLE (B).—Provisional statement of Disbursements by the Treasurer-General, Tehran, for the Financial Year to 20th March, 1913.

	£
Interest and sinking fund on loans (see Annex III)	536,400
Expenses of Ministries (see Annex IV)	678,300
Expenses of Treasury-General (see Annex V.)	25,900
Expenses of administrations	66,000
Other Government expenditure (see Annex VII)	111,700
Grants to financial agents (see Annex VIII)	159,200
Audit of current accounts (see Annex IX)	4,800
Payments made on account of Arbab Jamshid (Annex X)	16,300
	1,598,600

NOTE.—This statement shows only the payments made by the Treasury-General.

TABLE (C).

Foreign Debt of Persia at June 30, 1913.

(Krans converted at 54 to the £, and roubles at 9·45 to the £.)

1. Date of loan, 1900. Sinking fund, 75 years. Earliest date repayable, the 1st January, 1910. Original amount 22,500,000 roubles. Rate of interest 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 1,156,288 roubles. Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, uncertain—at least 22,000,000 roubles.

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Gold loan 1900. Secured on customs receipts of Persia, excepting those of Fars and Persian Gulf ports. All revenues to be paid into bank at Tehran, and surplus to be released by them to Persian Government. Control, and in last resort, administration in default. Persia not to make new foreign loans without Russia's consent whilst any part of this loan outstanding.

Remarks.—Issued at 85 per cent. Any bonds issued are to bear full guarantee of Russian Government. The bank receives ¼ per cent. commission on amounts collected for interest and sinking fund.

2. Date of loan, 1902. Sinking fund, 75 years. Earliest date loan repayable, 1st January, 1912. Original amount, 10,000,000 roubles. Rate of interest, 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 514,006·20 roubles.* Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, uncertain, but nearly 10,000,000 roubles.

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Gold loan 1902. Secured as above (1). Whilst loan outstanding Persia cannot contract for new foreign loan without consent of Russia.

Remarks.—Issued at 85.

Total of above two loans—

Original amount, 32,500,000 roubles, equals, at 9·45, 3,439,000*l.*

Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 1,670,294·20 roubles, equals, at 9·45, 176,700*l.*

Remarks.—The present value of the sinking funds of these two loans is roughly estimated at 65,000*l.*, thus making amount of loan outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 3,374,000*l.*

3. Date of loan, 1910. Sinking fund, 15 years from 1913. Earliest date loan repayable, 21st March, 1928. Original amount, 314,281*l.* 16*s.* 4*d.* Rate of interest, 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 30,278*l.* 12*s.* 7*d.* Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 314,281*l.* 16*s.* 4*d.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. Indian gold loan, sterling, secured firstly on revenues of Caspian fisheries, then on revenues of posts and telegraphs, and in ultimate resort on customs receipts of Fars and Persian Gulf ports, including Mohammerah and Ahwaz. No alteration can be made in mode of payment without mutual consent.

Remarks.—Issued at par. Interest only (15,714*l.* 1*s.* 10*d.*) is payable till the 20th March, 1913.

4. Date of loan, 1911. Sinking fund, 15 years from July 1910. Earliest date loan repayable, 1925. Original amount, 1,111,100*l.* Annual amount needed for interest and sinking fund, 120,800*l.* Amount of loan outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 976,100*l.* (see Remarks).

* NOTE.—The total is obtained from a Persian customs return; the amortisation of 1902 loan is deduced therefrom.

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Krans consolidated, 60,000,000. Secured on customs receipts of Persia, excepting Fars and the Persian Gulf ports, but ranking after the gold loans of 1900 and 1912, and also after allocation to Cossack brigade and ex-Shah's civil list of together about 102,000*l.* per annum. The profits of the Imperial Persian Mint are pledged as a second security.

Remarks.—The annual amortisement is 6,524,559 krans. The value of the sinking fund at the 20th March, 1913, is roughly estimated at 135,000*l.*

5. Date of loan, 1911. Sinking fund, 50 years from 1916. Earliest date loan repayable, 1st January, 1917. Original amount, 1,250,000*l.* Rate of interest, 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 68,470*l.* Amount of loan outstanding at the 30th June, 1913, 1,250,000*l.*

Particulars. Imperial Bank of Persia. Gold bonds sterling. Secured on customs revenues of Persian Gulf ports, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammerah, and Ahwaz, which are to be paid into the bank without other deduction than customs administrative charges. The free surplus to be handed back monthly. The telegraphs are a second charge up to 1928 in case of deficit. All these charges are subject to prior lien of 1910 loan.

Remarks.—Issued at 87½ per cent. Sinking fund estimated. Only interest is payable (62,500*l.* per annum) till 1916.

6. Date of loan, 1912. Sinking fund, years. Earliest date loan repayable, . Original amount, 140,000*l.* Rate of interest, 7 per cent. Annual amount needed for interest and sinking fund, (surplus southern customs revenue). Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 140,000*l.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. Anglo-Indian advance, March, August, October. Secured on Southern customs. Is to be repaid out of approaching loan, and until then the entire surplus of southern customs receipts is to be applied to amortisement.

Remarks.—Apparently only interest has been paid up to the 20th March, 1913. A similar Russian advance of 125,000*l.* appears to have been paid off in 1912–13. No arrears at 20th March, 1913

7. Date of loan, May 1913. Sinking fund, 3 years. Earliest date loan repayable, . Original amount, 200,000*l.* Rate of interest, 7 per cent. Annual amount needed for interest and sinking fund, 75,000*l.* (a rough estimate). Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 200,000*l.*

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Russian Government advance in roubles at 9·45½ per £. Secured on surplus of customs receipts of Persia, excepting Fars and Persian Gulf ports. Repayment to be made in six half-yearly instalments.

Remarks.—Nil.

8. Date of loan, May 1913. Sinking fund, 2½ years from July 1915. Earliest date repayable, . Original amount 200,000*l.* Interest, 7 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 92,500*l.* (*vide* Remarks). Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 200,000*l.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. His Britannic Majesty's Government advance. Secured on southern customs, and repayable out of proposed loan. If no loan made by the 1st July, 1915, the advance to be repaid by half-yearly instalments of 250,000 tomans each, beginning on that date out of surplus southern customs receipts, and in case of insufficiency to be met out of other revenues by the Persian Government.

Remarks.—(92,500*l.*), with amortisement of 92,500*l.* per annum, *i.e.*, 500,000 tomans per annum, the debt will be extinguished in about 2½ years. Presumably interest 14,000*l.* per annum will be paid till the 1st July, 1915.

9. Date of loan, May 1913. Sinking fund, years. Earliest date repayable, . Original amount, 100,000*l.* Interest 7 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund (blank, originally 46,300*l.*, with a note "on the assumption that no customs revenues will be available till July 1918, and that the same proportional allocation is then made"). Amount of loan outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 100,000*l.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. His Britannic Majesty's Government advance for gendarmerie purposes. Secured on surplus of southern customs. To be repaid out of projected loan, and if no loan made, then repayable out of surplus of southern customs revenues after previous British Government advances of 340,000*l.* have been paid off.

Remarks.—Nil.

Totals.

—	Original amount.	Annual amount needed.	Outstanding.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Loans (1) and (2) ..	3,439,000 0 0	176,700 0 0	3,374,000 0 0
Loan (3)	314,281 16 4	30,278 12 7	314,281 16 4
Loan (4)	1,111,100 0 0	120,800 0 0	976,100 0 0
Loan (5)	1,250,000 0 0	68,470 0 0	1,250,000 0 0
Loan (6)	140,000 0 0	(surplus Southern customs revenue)	140,000 0 0
Loan (7)	200,000 0 0	75,000 0 0	200,000 0 0
Loan (8)	200,000 0 0	92,500 0 0	200,000 0 0
Loan (9)	100,000 0 0	?	100,000 0 0
	6,754,000 0 0*	563,600 0 0†	6,554,000 0 0

* 6,754,000*l.* shows total at March 20, 1913.
† And surplus southern customs revenues till British advance 1912 and 1913 paid off.

ANNEX I.—*Persian Customs Revenues for the Year* 1912–3.

(A.) Southern customs—

Revenues of Persian Gulf Ports, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammerah, and Ahwaz. Revenues for 1912–13, less administrative charges (amounting in all to 20,440*l.*)—

	£
The south (Persian Gulf)	80,310
Extreme south and Mekran (Bunder Abbas)	24,380
Arabistan	43,140
	147,830*

(B.) Northern customs—

Revenues of Persian customs other than southern customs as above. Revenues for 1912–13, less administrative charges (amounting in all to 57,970*l.*)—

		£	
Azerbaijan		140,470	
Talesh, Astara, Moghan		30,990	
Gilan		186,150	
Mazanderan		42,800	
Astrabad		25,480	
Khorassan-Seistan		63,310	
Kermanshah-Kurdistan		69,100	
Tehran		10,660	
		568,960	
Deduct Central Administration—			
Expenditure	8,470		
Receipts	2,890		
		5,580	
			563,380†
Total net revenue, 1912–13			711,210

—	1906–7.	1907–8.	1911–12.
	£	£	£
* Net revenues..	142,200	189,800	164,500
† Net revenues..	322,200	368,800	547,400
Totals	464,400	557,600	712,900

Annex II.—Memorandum of Sums secured on the Persian Customs Revenue.

				£
(A.) Southern customs—				
Net revenue, 1912–12				147,830
Interest and sinking funds on external debt—				
	£	s.	d.	
Anglo-Indian Loan, 1910	30,278	12	7	
Sterling Gold Bonds, 1911 (interest)	62,500	0	0	
(68,470*l.* after 1915)				
Balance available	55,051	7	5	
				147,830

Note.—This balance, if maintained, would serve to pay off in 1916 the British advance, 1912, 140,000*l.*, and the reduced amount (49,000*l.*) available after 1915 would liquidate by 1928 the remaining British advances, 1913, of 300,000*l.*, with arrears of interest.

(B.) Northern customs—			
Net revenues, 1912–13			563,380
Interest and sinking funds on external debt, and allocations for Cossack brigade and ex-Shah's allowance—		£	
Rouble Loans Gold, 1900 and 1902		176,700	
Cossack Brigade		65,500	
Ex-Shah's allowances		25,000	
Krans Consolidated Loan, 1911		120,800	
Sterling Loan, 1913 (terminates 1916)		75,000	
			463,000
Balance available			100,380

Note of sums said to be customarily paid from customs revenues—

	£
European pensions and salaries	22,000
Sanitary Council	5,180
German school	2,200
Service of eight steamers	16,600
Coast Guard Gulf	2,960
Dues of Governor, Bushire	3,700
Dues of ports and customs officers, Meshed, Fars, and Astara ..	2,680
Cost of transferring customs funds from south	2,770
	58,400

Annex III.—Interest and Sinking Funds on Loans.

		£
Banque d'Escompte—		
Gold Rouble Loans, 1900–1902		181,200
Krans Consolidated		120,800
Gold Loan, 1912 (principle?)		125,100
" " (interest)		5,400
		432,500
Imperial Bank of Persia—	£	
Gold Loan, 1911	64,700	
Gold Loan, 1912 (interest)	7,900	
Indian Gold Loan	17,000	
		89,600
Floating debts to banks (interest)		5,000
Sundry debts (Daria Begi, Jehanian, &c.)		9,300
		536,400

Annex IV.—Expenses of Ministries.

		£	£
1. National Assembly—			
Travelling and other expenses			1,330
2. Prime Minister—			
Salary (2,000*l.*), staff-office expenses			4,540
3. Ministry of War—		£	
Central administration and European staff (2,400*l.*) ..		6,260	
Guards (Imperial, Regent's, leration, &c.)		7,450	
Bakhtiari contingent		25,450	
Arrears (of expenses)		3,250	
Expeditions, sundry		81,300	
Brigade, allocations and allowances		65,500	
Army (arsenal, artillery, arms, accoutrements, &c.) ..		27,890	
			217,040

		£	£
4. Ministry of Interior—			
Central administration and M. de Morgay (1,240*l.*) ..		8,860	
Governorships (Tehran, 2,830*l.*; Ispahan, 2,030; Kermanshah, 6,400*l.*; Kerman, 11,730*l.*; Shiraz, 22,400*l.*; Azerbaijan, 16,700*l.*; and nine others, 7,930*l.*)		65,170	
Arrears		2,400	
Civil guard (Nazmieh) (Tehran and provinces, 49,000*l.*; arrears, provincial, 1,930*l.*)		50,930	
Tehran Municipality		2,730	
Extraordinary and other expenses		10,120	
Imperial hospital		2,960	
Sanitary council (allocation)		5,200	
			148,370
5. Gendarmerie			154,730
6. Ministry of Finance—			
Staff (4,820*l.*), Expenses (1,050*l.*)			5,870
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs—			
Staff		13,740	
Embassies (21,100*l.*), and consulates (2,130*l.*)		23,230	
Pension (1,410*l.*) and other expenses		6,550	
			43,520
(Passport and chancery dues are collected, but not accounted for).			
8. Ministry of the Court—			
Court		50,600	
Regent		5,850	
Persian functionaries (3)		1,570	
European " (4)		1,820	
Grain deliveries (2,900*l.*), travel, and motor expenses ..		4,210	
			64,050
9. Ministry of Education—			
Central administration		4,800	
Schools		5,160	
Students in Europe		3,375	
Teachers, European		3,440	
German school		2,220	
Other expenses and arrears (15*l.*)		995	
			19,990
10. Ministry of Justice—			
Staff and M. Pernay (820*l.*)		14,310	
Expenses, travel, &c.		550	
			14,860
11. Ministry of Public Works—			
Minister (900*l.*), staff (880*l.*), M. de Brucq. (1,040*l.*) ..		2,820	
Construction, public service, and other expenses		1,180	
			4,000
Total			678,300

Annex V.—Expenses of Treasury-General.

	£
Staff	20,080
Buildings and furniture	1,290
Expenses, general	4,530
	25,900

Annex VI.—Expenses of Administrations.

		£	£
1. Posts—			
M. Molitor (1,300*l.*) and staff			4,530
Despatch of mails			11,200
Debt to Banque d'Escompte			1,050
Other expenses			6,010
			22,790
2. Telegraphs—		£	
Staff (Mr. New, 800*l.*)		13,500	
Adjustments (Indo, 6,400; posts, 3,040*l.*)		9,440	
Materials, repairs, and other expenses		5,920	
			28,860
3. Mint—			
Administration (salaries and allowances)		1,630	
Working charges (wages, materials, &c.)		5,910	
Upkeep (buildings, machinery, &c.)		1,700	
Sundries		360	
			9,660

	£
4. Crown Domains (Khalisseh)—	
Staff (1,130*l.*) and other expenses (1,970*l.*)	3,100
5. Concessions committee—	
Allocations for eleven months	120
6. Ormuz oxide mines—	
Customs charges, Bunder Abbas	1,190
7. Customs administration—	
Payment to Sardar Seyed	280
	66,000

Annex VII.—Other Government Expenses.

	£	£
Pensions—		
Civil pensions (monthly)		19,740
Pensions on Tangouzil list		23,250
Pensions on 1912–13 list		9,960
Sundry pensions		5,580
Pension, ex-Shah		13,900
Advance, "		11,110
Pension of European employes (included arrears, 2,170*l.*)		7,120
		90,660
Extraordinary expenses (honoraiums, indemnities, &c., for robbery) ..		2,400
Lamb-skin tax (Alioff's dues)		7,400
Marine service		3,400
Refund of robberies (Imperial Bank of Persia and Nazarguloff) ..		3,200
Other expenses (transfer of funds, &c.)		4,640
		111,700

Annex VIII.—Grants to Financial Agencies.

	£	£	£
Provincial—			
Azerbaijan		1,860	
Ispahan		2,380	
Kerman		2,230	
Kermanshah		5,560	
Meshed		2,130	
Shiraz (940*l.*) and five other provinces		1,480	
			15,590
Tehran—			
Treasury-General (central)		14,190	
Opium		1,340	
Royal gardens		460	
Stamps		753	
Lamb-skin tax, offal tax, inspections		310	
Government grain stores—			
Cereals	55,150		
Flour	69,540		
Transport, commission, &c	1,870		
		126,560	
			143,610
			159,200

Annex IX.—Audit of Accounts Current.

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Toumaniantz frères—						
Amount due, March 21, 1912				20,733	4	3
" " 21, 1913				18,115	1	7
Paid				2,618	2	8
Djehanian—						
Amount due March 21, 1912	3,910	14	0			
" " 20, 1913	1,688	9	8			
				2,222	4	4
				4,840	7	0

Annex X.—Payments on account of Arbab Jamshid against the Government Drafts and Requisitions not yet in order.

	£
Payments to the Banque d'Escompte	14,785
" Ismail Khan..	185
" Imperial Bank of Persia for interest due on the account of Arbab Jamshid (I.B.P. account, 180,000 tomans equals 33,333*l.*)	1,330
	16,300

[34711]

No. 129.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, July 28.)

(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 8 (21) *juillet*, 1913.

LE Gouvernement suédois s'est adressé à nous pour demander si nous avions des objections à la nouvelle requête du Gouvernement persan concernant l'envoi dans le sud de la Perse de dix-sept officiers suédois, y compris des médecins, vétérinaires, &c. Dans le cas où le Cabinet de Londres y consentirait, nous ferions de même.

Veuillez, pourtant, attirer l'attention de Sir Edward Grey, au cours de vos pourparlers à ce sujet, sur le fait qu'une constante augmentation du nombre des officiers suédois en Perse aura pour résultat la formation d'un noyau fort considérable d'employés appartenant à une nationalité gravitant vers l'Allemagne, peut-être insuffisamment soucieux des intérêts anglais et russes.

Quoique destinés pour le sud de la Perse, où nos intérêts sont inférieurs à ceux de l'Angleterre, nous ne saurions, pourtant, envisager avec indifférence une pareille tendance.

[34793]

No. 130.

Viscount Errington to Foreign Office.—(Received July 28.)

Sir, *8, Bishopsgate, London, July* 25, 1913.

SOCIÉTÉ internationale d'Études du Chemin de Fer transpersan.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant relative to the Trans-Persian Railway project.

In reply, I take this opportunity of expressing the satisfaction with which the British group of the Société d'Études have learnt the approval of His Majesty's Government to the terms which were submitted of (1) an intergroup agreement and (2) a declaration asked for by the French group of this Société, as referred to in the above letter.

As regards (3), the British group will readily adopt the wording suggested by His Majesty's Government in modification of article 9 of the protocol, and they will take an early opportunity of inviting the adherence of their French and Russian colleagues to the suggested text in the form of the accompanying French translation of the enclosure in your letter now under reply.

While noting that the distribution of interests as proposed in this protocol appears satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, the attention of the British group has been duly arrested by the stipulations laid down by the Russian Government in their memorandum of the 14th May in regard to absolute equality between the three parties in the neutral zone. Until, however, the British group are advised that His Majesty's Government have assented in principle to the Russian stipulations, they propose in negotiating with their foreign associates to be guided, as far as possible, by the principle laid down by the Foreign Office in their letters of the 4th and 24th February, namely, "that British control must predominate in the southern or Gulf section of any trans-Persian line or of the branches which may be made, and that this control shall not be invalidated by any arrangement which may be made in regard to the percentage of other (*i.e.*, non-British) participation in the undertaking."

With reference to the question of the procedure to be adopted in the matter of approaching the Persian Government, with a view to obtaining an option for the construction of a trans-Persian railway, in pursuance of the objects for which the

Société d'Études was formed, the British group welcome the steps proposed by His Majesty's Government, and they will much appreciate the opportunity to be offered them of expressing their views as to the precise language in which application to the Persian Government for this option is to be made.

It is observed that your letter under reply makes no mention of the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the points at issue as regards alignment south of Tehran, but it is assumed by the British group of the Société that when His Majesty's Government have satisfied themselves by closer examination of the principle and details of this question, they will indicate to the Société d'Études an alignment clear of any engagements to third parties or other encumbrances, so that, should the option be taken up at a future time by the prospective concession holders, these last would not find their activities circumscribed or negatived by the necessity of having to enter into negotiations with other parties.

I have, &c.
ERRINGTON.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Redraft of Article 9.

(Traduction.)

LES travaux de constructions ayant été terminés, les sociétés filiales constituées dans ce but subsisteront en qualité de sociétés d'exploitation, ou elles seront remplacées par des sociétés d'exploitation constituées de la même façon. Les contrats à passer entre les sociétés filiales et la Société d'Études assureront à celle-ci tels droits d'intervention et de contrôle, pour ce qui regarde le trafic en transit, qui seront jugés nécessaires pour la sauvegarde de ses intérêts dans l'entreprise, ainsi que pour garantir une unité de procédure qui est nécessaire pour répondre à son objet principal, c'est-à-dire la création d'une grande voie de communication.

[34810] No. 131.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 271.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, July* 28, 1913.

CUSTOMS receipts for first three months Persian year show increase of 41,247*l.*, or 20 per cent. over those for same period last financial year.

Increases are Northern Customs, 31,550*l.*, Tehran, 410*l.*, and Southern Customs, 9,287*l.*

[34862] No. 132.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July* 28, 1913.

MY telegram No. 279 of 26th July: Option for Trans-Persian Railway.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether we were to understand from his *aide-mémoire* that Russian Chargé d'Affaires would not be instructed to ask for option until question of composition of joint commission had been settled. His Excellency replied in affirmative, but said that if we wished that option should be applied for at once he would consult Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

[34527] No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1913.

I THINK that for tactical reasons it would be a mistake to communicate to Persian Government text of declaration referred to in my telegram No. 550 of 23rd July to St. Petersburgh, about the Mohammerah frontier, and I wish that signature should be kept confidential for the present.

You should discuss with your Russian colleague the exact description of the frontier to be communicated and recommended to the Persian Government, informing me of text as soon as possible.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 557, and Tehran, No. 327.)

[34544] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 558.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1913.

SHATT-EL-ARAB: Riverain Commission.

Please express to Russian Government my thanks for communication reported in your telegram No. 280 of 26th July respecting Turco-Persian frontier.

Your Excellency should point out, however, that we have only been able to induce Turkey to agree to the commission on the understanding that it should be Ottoman and not international, and that the only reason we are asked to participate, without in any way detracting from the Ottoman character of the commission, is that we have rendered services to navigation for centuries in the river. But full provision would be made for consuls to have direct relations with commission on all matters affecting their shipping, and the draft convention contains full guarantees for equality of treatment of ships of all nations and for no dues to be imposed by the mere fact of navigation, but merely for services rendered; reports of the proceedings and expenditure of commission will be regularly communicated to foreign consuls and to Ottoman Government, and it is only proposed to impose dues on ocean-going steamers; but if the suggestion as to freedom from dues made in last paragraph of your telegram were carried out, practically no ships would be subject to dues which can now pass the bar. As British ships represent about 75 per cent. of the steam tonnage entered at present at Basra, I trust Russian Government will not press this objection, which would render nugatory and impossible the work of the commission. (End of R.)

I propose to sign the draft convention about the Shatt-el-Arab on 29th July; you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of this, and ask him to treat the matter as confidential for the present. You should add that I shall do my best to meet him as far as practicable in regard to the last paragraph of your telegram, but explain that the admission of Russian subjects to serve on the commission would, I fear, alter the entire character of that body and make it international. I earnestly trust, therefore, that he will not press it.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 358, and Tehran, No. 329.)

[34543] No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 559.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 278 of 26th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

I agree with views of Russian Government.

Your Excellency should inform them of last paragraph of my telegram No. 356 of to-day to Mr. Marling respecting communication to be made to Persian Government.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 331, and Constantinople, No. 360.)

[32777] No. 136.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant forwarding a copy of a despatch from the Government of India regarding the appointment of a Turkish consul at Lingah.

Sir E. Grey shares Lord Crewe's opinion that the withdrawal of the Turkish consul from Lingah is more important than the exaction of an apology from the Turkish Government for the discourtesy shown to the British vice-consul.

His Majesty's Government have at present no valid reason for asking the Porte to withdraw their consul, but he will be prepared to do so if the new consul should show any disposition to repeat the tactics of Mobil Fia Pasha.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[35047] No. 137.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 29.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 28, 1913.

IN continuation of my letter of the 5th March, 1913, as to the reconstruction of the Arabistan telegraph lines, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of reports by the director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, on the financial aspect of the question.

I am to explain that the sum mentioned in the earlier report, viz., 23,060*l.*, represents the total initial expenditure which the Indo-European Telegraph Department has, in fact, to provide on behalf of the Persian Government, but that the Secretary of State in Council does not, of course, propose to ask the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to undertake final responsibility, in respect of the cost of reconstruction and maintenance, for any charges beyond a moiety of those now accepted by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, viz., 5,000*l.* initial and 300*l.* per annum, recurring during the period for which the Arabistan lines remain under British control, *i.e.*, to the 1st January, 1915. He trusts, however, that in the circumstances their Lordships will be willing to assist the Indo-European Telegraph Department in meeting the immediate demand for 23,060*l.* pending recovery from the Persian Government, and I am to suggest that one-half of all expenditure on this account should be refunded to this Office, one-half of all sums received by the Department from the Persian Government being credited to the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 137.

Report by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated the 18th March, 1913.

WITH reference to the accompanying papers from the Political and Secret Department on the subject of the reconstruction of the telegraph lines in Arabistan for the Persian Government, an estimate has now been prepared of the cost of carrying out the work, and I attach an abstract showing that it amounts to 2,36,500 rupees for stores and 1,09,500 rupees for cash—a total cost of 3,46,000 rupees (23,060*l.*).

An indent has also been prepared for the stores it is necessary to supply from this country. The cost of these stores is estimated at 14,333*l.*, and freight at 1,400*l.*, or a total cost of 15,733*l.* Only 4,000*l.* for stores and 1,333*l.* for cash have been provided in the Departmental Budget Estimate for 1913–14, but, if approved, a further provision will be made in the Revised Budget Estimate.

It is submitted that this work, as detailed in the accompanying abstract, may be sanctioned at the estimated cost of 23,060*l.*, and that sanction may also be given to the supply of the stores included in the attached indent, which, with freight, will amount to about 15,733*l.*

R. C. BARKER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 137.

Report by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated the 9th May, 1913.

WHEN the Treasury in their letter of the 13th August, 1908, agreed in principle to the contribution of a moiety of the cost of the control of the Arabistan telegraph lines the figures they had before them were those given in Sir Henry Kirk's note of the

[35064] No. 137*.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Mr. Parker.—(Received July 29.)

Mr. Parker, *July* 29, 1913.

I WOULD suggest that the following action be taken to start the ball rolling:—

Russian Government to be informed that—

1. I have been appointed principal commissioner.

2. Captain Wilson has been appointed deputy commissioner, and instructed to proceed at once to Constantinople (and St. Petersburgh, if necessary) to put himself in touch with Russian authorities with a view to settling as far as possible the necessary preliminaries, and the staff and programme of the commission.

3. That in view of difficulty of getting Turks and Persians together, and in order to start the commission under favourable auspices (*i.e.*, from a point on the frontier where complete agreement has been reached), we suggest Mohammerah be selected as a rendezvous, and that the date of assembly be the 1st December. This should allow ample time for the commission to reach Zohab before the hot weather begins. To ensure the arrival of the Turks and Persians an even earlier date might be communicated to them.

I am, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

7th February, 1908. The use of iron standards which we have since engaged ourselves to use was not then contemplated, and it was intended to rebuild the line to its original specification, that is, with wooden poles procured locally, light insulators, and the old wire. Since then a period of five years has elapsed, during which the project has more than once been reconsidered, and it was eventually taken up in conjunction with the renewal of the departmental concessions in Persia. This ultimately resulted in the agreement with the Persian Government signed on the 6th January last.

The Treasury sanctioned an initial expenditure of 650*l.* and a recurrent expenditure of 300*l.* a-year for so long as the Arabistan lines are under British control. We have agreed to undertake this obligation up to the 1st January, 1945, a period of thirty-two years, but we are now committed to a much larger initial expenditure than was then contemplated, while our recurrent expenditure is nominally limited to 300*l.* instead of 600*l.* a-year, as originally contemplated.

The question for consideration now is whether the Treasury shall be asked for their original contribution or for a modified contribution, more in accordance with the terms of the final agreement.

In practice we have now to find an initial expenditure of 23,060*l.* plus the cost of the permanent establishment employed on the reconstruction, estimated at 1,600*l.*, and we shall also have to find the cost of maintenance annually in the first instance. We have agreed to contribute 5,000*l.* and 300*l.* a-year for thirty-two years towards the initial and recurrent expenses respectively, anything in excess of this contribution being a debit to the Persian Government. How this excess is to be recovered has been left for future negotiation.

R. C. BARKER.

[35336] No. 138.

Déclaration.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, ayant examiné la question de la frontière qui sépare les territoires ottoman et persan depuis la région de Haouizé jusqu'à la mer, déclare que la ligne frontière doit être fixée comme suit:

La ligne frontière part de l'endroit nommé Oumm-Chir, où le Khor-el-Douvel se sépare du Khor-el-Azem. Oumm-Chir est situé à l'est de la jonction du Khor-el-Muhaisin avec le Khor-el-Azem à 9 milles au nord-ouest de Bissaitin, endroit qui se trouve à la latitude 31° 43′ 29″. A partir d'Oumm-Chir la ligne se dirige vers le sud-ouest et atteint la longitude 45° à l'extrémité méridionale d'un petit lac, connu aussi par le nom d'Azem et situé dans le Khor-el-Azem à quelque distance au nord-ouest de Chouaïb. De ce point la ligne continue vers le sud le long du marécage jusqu'à la latitude 31°, qu'elle suit directement vers l'est jusqu'à un point au nord-est de Kouchk-i-Basra, de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire ottoman. De ce point la ligne va au sud jusqu'au canal de Khaiyin à un point qui se trouve entre le Nahr-Diaïdji et le Nahr-Abou-'l-Arabid; elle suit le *medium filum aquæ* du canal Khaiyin jusqu'au point où celui-ci rejoint le Chatt-el-Arab, à l'embouchure du Nahr-Nazaïlé. De ce point la frontière suit le cours du Chatt-el-Arab jusqu'à la mer en laissant sous la souveraineté ottomane le fleuve et toutes les îles qui s'y trouvent aux conditions et avec les exceptions suivantes:

(*a.*) Appartiennent à la Perse: (1) l'île de Mouhalla et les deux îles qui se trouvent entre celle-ci et la rive gauche du Chatt-el-Arab (rive persane d'Abadan); (2) les quatre îles entre Chetaït et Maaouiyé et les deux îles devant Mankouhi qui sont toutes des dépendances de l'île d'Abadan; (3) tout îlot actuellement existant ou inexistant qui pourrait se former et qui serait relié par les eaux basses à l'île d'Abadan ou à la terre ferme persane en aval du Nahr-Nazaïlé.

(*b.*) Le port moderne et l'ancrage de Mouhammera, en amont et en aval de la jonction du fleuve Karoun avec le Chatt-el-Arab, continueront à se trouver sous la juridiction persane en conformité du traité d'Erzeroum, sans que cela puisse infirmer le droit d'usage ottoman de cette partie du fleuve et sans que la juridiction persane puisse s'étendre aux parties du fleuve restant en dehors de l'ancrage.

(*c.*) Aucune atteinte ne sera portée aux droits, us et coutumes existants en ce qui concerne la pêche sur le rivage persan du Chatt-el-Arab, le mot "rivage" comprenant aussi les terres réunies à la côte par les eaux basses.

(*d.*) La juridiction ottomane ne pourra pas s'étendre sur les parties de la côte persane qui pourront être temporairement couvertes d'eau par la marée ou par d'autres causes accidentelles. La juridiction persane de son côté ne pourra pas s'exercer sur des terres qui seront temporairement et accidentellement découvertes en excédant le niveau normal des eaux basses.

(*e.*) Le cheikh de Mouhammera continuera à jouir en conformité des lois ottomanes de ses droits de propriété existant en territoire ottoman.

La ligne frontière établie dans cette déclaration est indiquée en rouge sur la carte ci-annexée.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'engage à inviter le Gouvernement Impérial persan à agréer, comme tracé définitif de ses frontières méridionales avec le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman la ligne indiquée ci-dessus et sur la carte annexée.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se charge également d'inviter le Gouvernement Impérial persan à se mettre d'accord avec le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman pour nommer dans le plus bref délai des commissaires qui auront à appliquer sur le terrain les limites établies par cette déclaration. Si au cours de la délimitation il est constaté par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman que les territoires sur le canal de Khaïyin ci-dessus indiqués étaient effectivement occupés et administrés par les autorités ottomanes à la date du 1er janvier écoulé (nouveau style), le tracé pourra être rectifié.

En foi de quoi les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé la présente Déclaration.

Fait à Londres, en double original, le 29 juillet, 1913.

(L.S.) I. HAKKY.
(L.S.) E. GREY.

[34891] No. 139.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a letter which he has caused to be addressed to Mr. Wratislaw, His Majesty's consul-general at Canea, offering him the post of principal British delegate on the proposed commission which is to demarcate the Turco-Persian frontier.*

Sir E. Grey considers that Mr. Wratislaw, owing to his experience both at Tabriz and Basra, and on the Turco-Persian frontier, and to his great diplomatic ability, is eminently suited to fill that responsible post.

If Mr. Wratislaw accepts the appointment, Sir E. Grey would be glad if the Secretary of State for India would allow Captain Wilson, of the Indian army, to act as deputy commissioner.

A further communication will be made to you on the receipt of Mr. Wratislaw's reply.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[35049] No. 140.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that Mr. Wratislaw has accepted the post of principal British commissioner on the proposed Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Sir E. Grey would be glad if the Secretary of State for India would consent to the appointment of Captain Wilson as deputy British commissioner. He considers that Captain Wilson is specially qualified to undertake this work by reason of his experience

* Not printed.

MAP No. I


SKETCH MAP
SHOWING
TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIER
WEST AND SOUTH OF HAWIZEH
Scale 1/250,000
Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20 Miles
30'
45'
48'
15'
30'
45'
30'
15'
31'
Ghor el Mouseyeine
Ghor ed Douvil
Ghor el Azem
Azem
Imam Sahib Zaman or Abu Dthiab
Zain-ul Abidin
Nahr Lawi
Shatt i Nissan
Sidreh Tree
Imam Ali Abu Ibra
SHUAIB
BENI SALEH
Tents
Tree
Huts
Hamza
HAWIZEH
Khizr Mohamad
Ali Musa Raza
Ali Ibn Hussein
Imam Ibrahim Khalil
Imam Khizr
Imam Ali
Imam Fadthl or Amir ul Mouminin
Cultivation
Hajreh Saad
Nahr Doub
River Kerkheh (?) From Kute Nahr Hasham
Tents of Beni Sakain
Imam Abu Aggar or Sahib Zaman
Arab Huts
PLAIN
To Hawizeh
Arab Camp
THAKKAB
Cultivated in patches
Bush
End of Cultivation
KAROOQ
HOR
OR
MARSH
Tents of Beni Sakain
YAFAIR OR JEFAIR
Camels and Tents of Beni Sakain
SHALWEH
From Nashweh
Cultivation
UMMUT-TUMAIR
Cultivation
KISHK-I-HAWIZEH
Tents of Bini Sakain
Tents
QURNA
KISHK-I-BASRI
AROON RIVER


OR
MARSH
From Nashweh
HALWEH
Cultivation
Cultivation
YAFAIR OR JEFAIR
Camels and
Tents of Beni Sakain
Cultivation
Tents of
Beni Sakain
Tents
KISHK-I-HAWIZEH
KISHK-I-BASRI
KAROON RIVER
KAROON RIVER
QURNA
Swaib
Nashweh
From Kataiban
From Basra
KATAIBAN
BASRA
DJAIJI
MOHAMMERAH
31°
31°
45'
45'
30'
30'
30'
45
48'
15'
30'
(Sº)E. GREY
(Sº)I. HAKKY
War Office. July 1912
G.S.G.S. Nº 2641



(Sᵈ) E. GREY
(Sᵈ) I. HAKKY

G.S.G.S. Nº 2635


TCH MAP
of
AMMAREH
D INDICATE THE
RSIAN BOUNDARY
Scale 2" to 1 Mile
MAP Nº 2
MANDÚWÁN
Garden
Stable
MUFTIYEH
ABÚDIYEH
KÚT NAWASIR
(Ruined, name obsolete)
Ruins
Nahr Arairh
Nahr Abú Jidiyeh
SARHÁNIYEH
To Ahwáz (Single line)
A Karguzars house
1 Telegraph Office
2 Post Office
3 Lynch Brother's Office
4 Haji Rais's house
5 Wheat Market
7 Consulate
8 Dwelling house
9 Lynch Brother's warehouse
10 Custom's Office
11 Quarantine Station
12 Guest house (Persian Gov.t)
13 Quarantine M. Os' house
KHUMAISEH
Nahr Yúsuf
Nahr Yúsuf or Ibn Rashid
Nahr Jadid
Nahr Shakhúra
Nahr Machhari
Nahr Hurzalieh
N. Kamaleyeh
KHAIYIN
ISÚREH
FAILIYEH
QASR KHAZALIYEH
Aqáwát
(Waqf property, cultivators tribesmen of Shaikh)
Turkish Police Station
Shamshamiyeh
(Private property of Shaikh Khaz'al)
Umm-ul-Khassásíf
(Private property of Shaikh Khaz'al)
Rumailah
Naufli
(Khaz'al owner)
Umm-ul-Ibabi
DABBEH
(Name obsolete)
BALYANIYEH
Basreh
Mir Abul Hasanain
BAITHÁJIO
GULFIDÁN
Zain
Property of Shaikh Khaz'al
Property of Shaikh Mubarák
Umm-ur-Rassás
(Property of Shaikh Khaz'al)
MUHAMMAREH
PORT
SHATT-AL-ARAB
DURRBAND
Brick kiln
BRIDGE
Nahr al Khazáliyeh (1907)
Telephone (Single)
Nahr Hurzbanda
Nahr Abbúdiyeh
Nahr Abbúd
Nahr Hamzá
N. Waskhir
Nahr Hámid
N. Mamuri
Nahr Milkhan
Nahr Jábiriyeh
Christian Cemetery
HIZAN
MUHAMMAREH
ANCHORAGE
KÚT-I-SHAIKH
KHUMBEH
MUHAMMAREH
Karun River
MANIKH
PÚZEH
MAHAIRZI
Tuwaiját
War Office June 1912

MAP No 3



G.S.G.S. No 2640

War Office, July 1912

MAP Nº 4


Sheet No. II
MAP OF
SHATT-AL-'ARAB & BAHMANSHÎR.
INCLUDING MUHAMMAREH & 'ABBÂDÂN I.
Compiled under supervision of Lieut. A. T. Wilson I. A. from plane table surveys by Surveyors Ali Ahmad, Survey of India Dept. & Muhd. Zamân Khân 94th Poona Horse. June-August 1909.
Furlongs
Miles
Conventional signs:—
Limit of date groves
Limit of cultivation
Telegraph Line
Muhammarah (Consulate flagstaff.) Lat. 30° 29' 27" Long. 48° 10' 30" Naval determination. (Beauchamp 1905)
Magnetic Var. (mean of day) 1° 27' E. acc. to Mr. J. C. Pearson, Carnegie Research Institute, Dept. of Terrestrial Magnetism (March 1906)
TADDA GHIYEH
DUREH
MANTCHI
MUAMREH
GUSBEH MUAMREH
SHATT AL 'ARAB
PERSIAN GULF
BAHMANSHÎR R.
N
(Sd) E. GREY
(Sd) I. HAKKY
G.S.G.S. Nº 2840e
War Office, July 1912

on parts of the frontier, his intimate knowledge of the past history of the question and his exceptional ability.

In the event of the Marquess of Crewe assenting to the appointment, Sir E. Grey would propose to the Russian Government that Captain Wilson should proceed either to Constantinople or St. Petersburgh, or to both places, in the course of next month so as to arrange the necessary details with the Russian authorities.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[34259] No. 141.

Foreign Office to Persian Railways Syndicate.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, requesting information regarding the possible prolongation of the railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, to a point beyond the latter place.

In reply, I am to transmit to you, herewith, for your information, four copies of a report by Captain A. T. Wilson on the subject.*

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[35063] No. 142.

Minute by Mr. Wratislaw.

Mr. Parker,

I HAVE discussed matters with Wilson, and we have agreed as to the following preliminary action to put the status of the commission on an official basis :—

1. Commissions to issue to Captain Wilson as well as to myself.

2. Captain Wilson to be instructed to submit detailed proposals concerning the constitution of staff, financial arrangements, &c., to the Foreign Office for preliminary approval.

3. As soon as Foreign Office have examined and generally approved of proposals made, Captain Wilson to be instructed to proceed to Constantinople and St. Petersburgh if necessary to settle final composition of staff, and the programme of the commission in consultation with the British and Russian Embassies.

4. Captain Wilson to be commissioned, when details are finally settled in relation to the immediately preceding telegraph, to address the Government of India direct with proposals for giving effect to the arrangements made, informing the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the principal commissioner of his action.

A. C. WRATISLAW.

July 29, 1913.

[35157] No. 143.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to acknowledge the receipt of his letter (Very Confidential), dated the 4th July, regarding a wish, expressed by the German Government through the German Ambassador, to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and China by means of a land line across Turkey, and by a cable which should be linked to it at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and regarding a request by the German Government for a declaration from His Majesty's Government that they will not oppose in principle the landing of a cable at such a point. Secretary Sir E. Grey enquires :—

1. Whether, from the military point of view, there are objections to the proposal made by the German Government.

* Not printed.

2. In the event of the landing of a German cable at some point on the shores of the Persian Gulf being agreed to in principle, whether it should be landed in Turkish or in Persian territory.

3. In the event of the proposed cable being opposed in principle, Sir E. Grey asks for any suggestions which Brigadier-General Wilson can make as to the reply that should be returned to the German Ambassador.

Brigadier-General Wilson, in reply, begs to state as follows :—

The General Staff are unable to trace their having been consulted previously on the report which reached Sir E. Grey in 1908 of a scheme in contemplation for the construction, with German capital, of a telegraph cable to connect Pulo Wey with Basra by way of Goa. Brigadier-General Wilson has therefore no further intimation of the objections to the scheme then entertained beyond what is given in Sir E. Grey's memorandum now under consideration. He is, however, in agreement with Sir E. Grey that the object of the request of the German Government is political rather than commercial, and that any objections to this scheme entertained in 1909 not only still hold good but are in no way lessened. He is of opinion that the advent of Germany into the sphere of the Persian Gulf would introduce an element likely to lead to serious difficulties in the future in the settlement of questions affecting that region; that a direct German line of communication to the East would be as disadvantageous strategically to Great Britain as it would be advantageous strategically to Germany; and that the scheme would involve difficulties of censorship which might prove very prejudicial in time of war to the safety of India. Brigadier-General Wilson considers, therefore, that the request of the German Government should be strongly opposed.

This being the case, the necessity of an answer to Sir E. Grey's second query does not arise.

In reply to Sir E. Grey's third query, Brigadier-General Wilson regrets that he is unable to make any useful suggestion as to the reply which should be returned to the German Ambassador.

War Office, Whitehall, July 29, 1913.

[35250] No. 144.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 272.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 30, 1913.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 281 of 28th July: Trans-Persian Railway.

I have good reason to believe that an application for an option for the Trans-Persian Railway would be met by an answer that the Persian Government always understood that application for the railway would coincide with the settlement of the question of a large loan.

I would venture to call your attention to the fact that the construction of a railway to the frontier of the Russian zone before we were ready to link up with it by a railway from the south would give Russian trade a start in central Persia, which it would be difficult to recover. I am developing this view in a despatch which will go to you by next bag.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[35064] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 560.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 278 of 26th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Mr. Wratislaw will be appointed principal British Commissioner for the Turco-Persian frontier, and Captain Wilson, who has an intimate knowledge of all the correspondence, Deputy Commissioner.

Please inform Russian Government, and say that if they concur I will instruct Captain Wilson to proceed next month to St. Petersburgh or Constantinople to discuss with Russian authorities all details as to staff, programme, and other arrangements.

[35225] No. 143*.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street,
London, July 29, 1913.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 26th instant regarding our negotiations for a mining concession in Kerman.

In reply to your enquiry, I beg to state that the advance of 100,000*l.*, which my syndicate agreed to make to the Persian Government, would not be affected if our offer to admit the Société d'Études to a participation of one-third of the part of the concession situated in the neutral sphere were accepted, but the Société would be required to provide a portion of this loan proportionate to their participation in the concession.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY.

It is suggested that Mohammerah be selected as a rendezvous, and that date of assembly be November or 1st December (N.S.). This should allow ample time for the commission to reach Zohab before the hot weather; but to ensure punctual arrival of Persians and Turks an earlier date might be communicated to them

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 363; and Tehran, No. 333.)

[35421] No. 146.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1913.

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* received from the Russian Government with regard to the appointment of the commission for the delimitation of the Turco-Persian frontier.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 146.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

LES négociations avec la Porte au sujet de la délimitation turco-persane arrivent à leur fin, et le Gouvernement Impérial pense qu'il faut profiter des dispositions conciliantes des Ministres ottomans pour procéder sans délai à la délimitation même, ne fût-ce que sur une partie de la frontière, en créant ainsi un fait accompli et en prévenant de nouveaux rétards qui pourraient se produire si la Porte venait à susciter de nouvelles difficultés, comme elle l'a invariablement fait dans le courant des dernières années. Dans ce but, le Gouvernement russe propose de communiquer officiellement au Gouvernement persan le résultat auquel ont abouti les négociations et, dès que son adhésion aura été obtenue, proposer aux Cabinets de Constantinople et de Téhéran de former sur-le-champ une commission mixte de délimitation, composée des délégués turcs, persans, anglais et russes, qui se rendrait sur les lieux vers la fin de l'été et procéderait, durant la belle saison encore, à la délimitation de fait. L'idée de constituer deux commissions, l'une pour le nord de la frontière et l'autre pour le sud, devra probablement être abandonnée, vu qu'elles ne pourraient pas travailler simultanément; en effet, c'est vers la fin d'octobre que les neiges rendent les routes du nord impraticable, et ces neiges ne fondent que vers mars, et plus tard encore dans les montagnes, tandis qu'au sud en avril déjà les chaleurs ne permettraient plus à la commission de travailler. En ces conditions, il paraitrait qu'une seule commission suffit pour la délimitation de toute la frontière.

Le Gouvernement russe est d'avis que les délégués principaux anglais et russes dans la commission devraient appartenir au Service diplomatique ou consulaire et être choisis parmi les employés qui se sont spécialement occupés de la question frontière; en conséquence, c'est M. Minorsky, secrétaire de l'Ambassade de Russie à Constantinople, que le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères compte nommer en qualité de commissaire russe. Il va de soi que des officiers de l'état-major général et du Corps topographique devront être adjoints à la commission pour s'occuper de tracer en réalité la ligne frontière. Le Gouvernement russe serait désireux de savoir l'opinion de Sir Edward Grey au sujet du présent aide-mémoire et le nom du délégué principal anglais dans la commission.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 13 (26) *juillet*, 1913.

[35422] No. 147.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 233.)

Sir,

St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1913.

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* received from the Russian

Government with regard to the Turco-Persian frontier between Hawizeh and the Persian Gulf and the proposed Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 147.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ne soulève pas d'objections à la conclusion d'un arrangement par rapport à la frontière turco-persane depuis Hawizeh jusqu'au Golfe Persique, tel que cet arrangement est prévu dans la déclaration signée à Londres *ad referendum* le 6 mai, 1913.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est également favorable à la constitution d'une Commission mixte de Navigation sur le Chatt-el-Arab qui garantirait la liberté pleine et entière de la navigation sur ce fleuve, et s'occuperait d'y introduire toutes les améliorations capables d'activer le mouvement des vaisseaux de commerce. Le commerce maritime russe dans ces parages étant assez considérable, le Gouvernement russe désirerait—surtout si dans un avenir rapproché ce commerce continue à se développer—participer aux travaux de cette commission. Le Gouvernement Impérial voudrait que des sujets russes soient invités à occuper quelques-uns des postes responsables dans l'administration de la commission, surtout dans le cas où des sujets d'autres Puissances y seraient employés.

En ce moment quand la commission n'est pas encore instituée, il serait intempestif de débattre les détails de sa compétence et de ses attributions, mais le Gouvernement russe croit pouvoir dès à présent désigner quelques amendements qu'il voudrait proposer au projet d'institution de la commission, tels que : droit des consuls d'avoir des relations directes avec la commission ; communication aux consuls et aux autorités du vilayet des comptes rendus sur l'activité de la commission et ses dépenses ; en cas de relations directes entre les capitaines des vaisseaux et la commission, ainsi qu'entre les propriétaires fonciers sur les deux rives du fleuve et cette dernière, application de mesures coercitives aux sujets étrangers seulement par l'intermédiaire des consuls respectifs ; mise en vigueur des règlements touchant aux navires étrangers, et surtout des taxes et tarifs, exclusivement après un accord préalable avec les consuls ; libération de tous droits des navires de petit tonnage, pour lesquels la barre ne forme actuellement pas d'empêchement et qui, par conséquent, ne sont pas intéressés aux travaux d'approfondissement, &c.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 13 (26) *juillet*, 1913.

[35383] No. 148.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 31.)

Sir,

India Office, July 29, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the Arabistan telegraph lines, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, to be laid before Secretary Sir E. Grey, copies of papers in which the reconstruction of these lines is discussed in connection with the question of the projected Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway and its telegraphic requirements.

The Marquess of Crewe concurs with the Government of India that the ultimate amalgamation of the railway telegraph with that now under the control of the Indo-European Telegraph Department is desirable, but, as the alignment of the railway is not yet fixed, while work on the reconstruction of the existing telegraph line will, it is expected, be in progress within two months, he is of opinion that it would be more suitable in all the circumstances for this line to be reconstructed in a substantial manner, as was originally intended, and not, as Sir P. Cox suggests in his telegram of the 13th May, merely strengthened to last for a year or two longer, *vide* the penultimate paragraph of the note of the 21st July by the director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department.

His Lordship would, however, suggest that if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, the Persian Railway Syndicate might be approached tentatively on the question of the

surrender to the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the telegraph concession contained in clause 12 of their agreement with the Persian Government, with a view to their becoming the lessee of the department for the wires they may require to work their railway, as is suggested in Mr. Barker's note of the 3rd April.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 148.

Note by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated April 3, 1913.

WHEN a railway is built more or less parallel to an existing line of telegraph in India, the telegraph line is usually dismantled and re-erected along the railway and provision is made at the same time to carry any wires required for working the railway. These wires are maintained by the telegraph department, and the railway pays a monthly rent per mile of wire for their use. The rules regulating the amount of this rental, as well as for the rental of instruments supplied, for the carriage of telegraph stores by the railway, and for the grant of free passes to telegraph servants are detailed in chapter J of the Indian Telegraph Code of Regulations. The system outlined could, with possible modifications, be adapted for the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

It is, however, necessary to keep in mind that the Indo-European Telegraph Department has only obtained the control of the Arabistan telegraph lines in return for the renewal of its other concessions, they are not the property of the department to dispose of as they please, and it will be necessary to obtain the consent of the Persian Government to the removal of their telegraph line from its prospective route to the railway alignment and to its adaptation to the purpose required. When the obvious advantages of doing so are pointed out to them I imagine they will accept the principle without difficulty, but the terms on which they are prepared to give their consent may give rise to some discussion. There should, however, be no great difficulty in arranging these. It seems necessary, therefore, first of all for the railway company to transfer their telegraph concessions to the department, the latter can then arrange with the Persian Government to modify its existing agreement or to come to a fresh agreement.

As regards paragraph 6 of the Resident's letter, when a railway alignment passes a town of some importance, such as Shushtar, at a distance, it is usual to run a loop telegraph line of two or more wires from a convenient point on the railway to the town, thus :—



hence the telegraph and railway routes can easily be made to coincide should they not do so in the first instance.

R. C. BARKER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 148.

Note by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated July 21, 1913.

A COPY of the despatch might be sent to the Foreign Office to communicate the views of the Government of India, if they agree with them, to the Persian Railways Syndicate. The syndicate might be asked what their requirements in the way of telegraphs are likely to be in the near as well as in the more distant future.

In India the ordinary procedure is for the Indian Telegraph Department to run up a temporary telegraph line, with a single wire along the tracé of the railway, for the use of the engineers during construction. When the railway is in a fairly advanced

stage and nearly ready to be opened, the telegraph line is permanently built and a second wire, also for the use of the railway, is added, and if the line exceeds two hundred miles in length a third wire is required. The opportunity is then usually taken of shifting any wires on a telegraph line running parallel with the railway on to the railway telegraph system. The three wires are commonly known as the train, intermediate, and through wires. The train wire connects station to station and controls the movements of the rolling stock. The intermediate wire is taken into every third office and is used for administrative purposes, and the through wire is only taken into important and engine-changing stations. The train wire sections average 8 to 10 miles, the intermediate wire sections 24 to 30 miles, and the through wire sections 90 to 120 miles in length. If a block system of working is installed in the first instance more wires than three would be required; the number depends on the system adopted.

It will thus be seen that a telegraph line along the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway will at no very distant date in all probability be required to carry three wires for the railway, a wire for the Persian Government, and a wire for international traffic, five in all. Now the poles that are being sent out for the reconstruction of the Arabistan telegraph system are designed to carry two wires when planted sixteen to the mile. They might possibly carry five wires when planted thirty to the mile, but they are unnecessarily elongated for use inside a railway fence, and a shorter and stouter pole planted twenty to twenty-four to the mile would be more suitable for the purpose and be more economical.

In my note of the 3rd April I pointed out that the Arabistan telegraph lines are not the property of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to dispose of as they please, and that it will be necessary to obtain the consent of the Persian Government to the removal of their line to the railway, a proposal which might give rise to some discussion and would certainly occupy much time. I am, therefore, of opinion that it will be better to keep the projects separate for the present. When both have been established and are working alongside one another we can suggest to the Persian Government their amalgamation into one system. We can point out that if this is done the poles on their line, which are not suitable for the railway, can be dismantled and used again elsewhere for some new line or for the improvement of an old one. The dismantled material, with both water and railway carriage in the vicinity, will be in an advantageous position for collection and removal. For the above reasons I deprecate the proposal made in Sir P. Cox's telegram of 13th May to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the existing Persian line shall be kept in working order for only a year or two longer, and propose to rebuild the line without waiting to learn the result of the negotiations for the railway.

It will be to the advantage of the Persian Government and the railway that the railway telegraph shall be open to the public as well as for railway use, and the Indian system of exchange of telegraph traffic between the railway and the State systems, whereby each retains the charges it collects, would probably be the simplest to adopt.

R. C. BARKER.

[35366] No. 149.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 31.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, July 30, 1913.

Sir,

LEASE of land at Abadan to Indian Government.

We have the honour to inform you that we yesterday received a call from the Imperial commissioner of this company, Sadigh-es-Sultaneh, who has heard from the Persian Embassy that this company is erecting buildings for the use of the Indian Government on our land at Abadan, and has been asked by them to ascertain for what use they are intended, and in particular whether British officers are to be stationed there.

We have as yet given him no information beyond stating that a building is being erected on our land to be used as a shed for the storing of buoys, chains, and other materials in connection with the lighting of the Persian Gulf by the Indian Government, but as he is pressing us for fuller particulars we shall be glad to know to what extent he may be informed of the nature of the arrangement as entered into by you with us in terms of your letter of the 19th October, 1912.

We understand from him that the Persian Embassy will approach you on the matter, as any such lease is considered as *ultra vires* our concession, and further, that the sanction of the Persian Government should have been first obtained.

I have, &c.

F. MACINDOE, *Secretary.*

[33833] No. 150.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 31, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant in regard to the instructions respecting the Trans-Persian Railway sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 543 of the 19th instant, in which you suggest that Sir G. Buchanan should be instructed not to commit His Majesty's Government to an alignment of the southern section of the railway until reports have been received from the Imperial General Staff and the Committee of Imperial Defence.

I am to point out in reply that His Majesty's Government being, as the Marquess of Crewe is aware, committed to asking the Persian Government for an option for the construction of the railway, it was not thought necessary again to consult your Department before despatching the telegram in question.

Sir E. Grey proposes to draw up and submit to Lord Crewe for his concurrence the instructions to be sent to Sir G. Buchanan in regard to the appointment of an Anglo-Russian Commission to report on the best alignment for the southern section of the railway.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has never had any intention of admitting that the recommendations of the commission should be accepted by the two Governments without further discussion.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[35540] No. 151.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 1.)

Sir,

India Office, July 30, 1913.

AS stated in my letter of the 3rd instant, the Secretary of State for India had intended to defer his reply to your letter of the 26th June until he should be in possession of the views of the Board of Trade on the commercial aspect of the Muin-ut-Tujjar's attempt to obtain a concession on other islands of the Persian Gulf besides Hormuz. In view, however, of Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 270 of the 25th instant, he thinks it better to delay no longer. Moreover, the commercial aspects of the question must, in his opinion, be subordinated to strategical considerations.

These considerations require that the islands in question, which are the key to the Persian Gulf, should in no circumstances be allowed to pass under influence directly or indirectly hostile to this country; indeed, the exclusion from them of influence other than British seems indispensable if effective British control of the Persian Gulf is to be maintained.

The Marquess of Crewe therefore finds himself in complete agreement with the Admiralty and the Government of India, copy of whose telegram of the 16th instant was sent to you on the following day. As regards the Muin-ut-Tujjar's attitude towards British interests, I am to enclose copy of a memorandum furnished by Captain A. T. Wilson. Some of the statements in this memorandum are based upon local information which is not in the possession of this Office, but heads 1, 2, 4, 5, and 12 are fully substantiated by correspondence with which your Department is familiar, and lead to the conclusions that the influence of the Muin would certainly be exercised against British interests, and that no undertaking, written or other, given by him would afford any safeguard.

Lord Crewe therefore trusts that Sir W. Townley may be instructed to oppose the Muin's attempt by all possible means; for he is strongly of opinion that, whatever other risks His Majesty's Government may be content to run in Persia, the one risk

which they are bound in defence of vital Indian interests not to run is that of losing control of the entrance to the Persian Gulf. In addition, therefore, to blocking the Muin's application, it would seem desirable, if possible, to arrive at some kind of friendly understanding as to these islands; but, unless an attempt to do so is likely to be successful, his Lordship would not advise that it should be made.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 151.

Memorandum by Captain Wilson regarding the Muin-ut-Tujjar.

THE chief cases which were probably collectively in Sir P. Cox's mind when he made his reference to "the infinite trouble" given by the Muin to us whenever we come into contact with him in the Gulf are summarised to the best of my ability below. I write without reference to records, and have no doubt that there is no record at the Foreign Office or India Office of some of the incidents quoted, though His Majesty's Legation have no doubt been kept informed of the various incidents at the time:—

1. *The Nasiri Company* (1889–95).—This company, of which the Muin is the moving spirit, and now, I understand, the sole shareholder, was a source of perpetual trouble to us. It hampered the early steps of our commerce on the Karun so seriously as almost to strangle it. Lynch had to pay about 30*l.* a-month rent for a small mat hut, and it was years before the Muin could be induced to make any sort of terms with him. Mr. Lynch's subsequent career must not blind us to the fact that his early efforts were praiseworthy, and were, through no fault of his own, grievously hampered by the Muin.

2. *Ahwaz Tramway Monopoly.*—The Muin, in spite of frequent assurances given at Tehran, has steadily used this to hamper Lynch on the Upper Karun and to penalise British shipping on the Lower Karun.

3. *Oil Company's Tramway Extension.*—When in 1910 the oil company found it essential to have an extension of the Muin's tramway made, the Muin proved very recalcitrant, and made use of his monopoly to impose most exorbitant terms on the company.

4. *Shalili Shed Question* (1905–09).—This was a matter in which the Muin's unfriendly and, indeed, hostile attitude caused infinite trouble to His Majesty's Legation as well as to local consular officers. Finding that Lynch was about to erect a shed 5 miles below Shushtar on the Upper Karun, and that he had leased land for the purpose from Sheikh Murteza, the owner, the Muin, who had done his best to oppose the idea from the beginning by influencing the Central Government at Tehran, took prompt steps to dispute the ownership of the lands. His claim was not even colourable; his attitude, moreover, was offensive throughout. He endeavoured to obtain a settlement in his own favour by offering to refer the matter to a religious court, taking steps simultaneously to secure by corrupt means that the court's decision should be in his favour.

5. *Lower Karun Navigation.*—Messrs. Lynch Brothers complained bitterly in 1907 of the unfair methods used by the Muin to obtain cargoes for his own vessels by bringing extraneous pressure to bear on merchants. Some discussion took place as to the possibility of Lynch and the Muin coming to an arrangement, but Lynch rightly declined to pursue this matter further, as the Muin could not in any way be relied on to adhere to any agreement which he might make.

6. *Muin as Agent to Sheikh of Mohammerah.*—In this capacity the Muin is not without his uses, as his unique experience of bribery and corruption enables him to gauge correctly the feelings which actuate Persian Ministers in worrying the Sheikh at any given moment, and the minimum sum which will satisfy them. But the Sheikh has repeatedly said that he does not trust the Muin, and has never allowed him to act as his agent in any important matter.

7. *Arabistan Irrigation.*—In 1907–09 the Muin had a shadowy connection with the projects then being discussed in this connection at Tehran. The Sheikh promptly disavowed him altogether.

8. *Bushire Custom-house.*—The Muin has in this matter persistently flouted the local Government, the Customs, and the Treasury, and has succeeded by the exercise of corrupt influence in delaying the construction of this urgently-needed building.

9. *Persian Transport Company.*—About 1908 the Muin suggested to this company that whilst nationalist feeling precluded the successful working of existing concessions, and made it difficult to obtain extensions or renewals thereof, the company might surrender some of their concessions to the Muin (notably the Luristan road), which he would work, and extensions of which he would be able to secure. He would in return give Lynch some interest in the new company! The offer was not entertained.

10. *Kharran Lands: Arabistan.*—When the oil company were engaged in laying their pipe line in 1910 the Muin claimed heavy compensation on account of alleged (and quite imaginary) damages to lands which he stated to be his by Royal firman. He declined to adduce proofs, but telegraphed constantly to his local agents to obstruct the oil company until they should have paid him "some thousands." He also induced the Central Government to send similar orders to the local Foreign Office agent, though the latter reported unfavourably on the Muin's claims. Eventually it turned out that the Muin had a claim (not fully established) to one-sixth part of the lands in question, and he was obliged to take about 30*l.* in full settlement.

11. *Darreh Khazineh Shed. Oil Company.*—In this matter also the Muin maintained a similar attitude of obstruction, and endeavoured to browbeat the oil company into paying him large sums of money, invoking, as usual, the assistance of the Central Government.

12. *Oil Company's Barges and Launches on the Upper Karun.*—Government are familiar with the history of this question. It is sufficient to say that the Muin, whilst refusing to hire his own barges or ship for the oil company's use, and refusing to put an extra ship on the river except at a preposterous figure, moved heaven and earth to prevent the oil company from exercising their right under their concession to have facilities for transport on the Upper Karun. He has since been continually pressing the Central Government to interfere, and I have myself seen his instructions to his local representatives urging forcible action against the company.

13. *Ahwaz Vice-Consulate. Site for.*—On hearing that Government were in treaty with the Sheikh of Mohammerah for a site at Ahwaz for a vice-consulate, the Muin promptly laid claim to the suggested site, and, as usual, invoked the Central Government, though not successfully. It turned out that his claim was baseless, and the Sheikh eventually decided toignore it altogether, but the Muin contrived to cause unpleasantness and difficulty in this matter as in all others in which he is involved.

14. *Railway Matters.*—The Muin's agent at Ahwaz has announced that, as soon as the alignment of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway has been settled, the Muin will lay claim to large areas at Ahwaz on one bank or the other as being the property of the Nasiri Company. Such a claim would, as a matter of fact, be without any legal authority, the Nasiri Company's lands being well known and restricted to a limited area near the tramway (10,000 zars).

15. *Germans on the Karun.*—Extremely circumstantial rumours were current in 1908–09 in shipping circles in London that the Muin was in negotiation with Wönckhaus to transfer his shipping interest in the Nasiri Company to them on terms which would give them the running of the steamers on the Karun. This rmuour was afterwards denied, and the Muin promised that he would give us information if at any time he proposed to part with his rights, but it was so circumstantial and on such good authority that there is some reason to think that it was a matter of fact founded on fact.

16. *Local Government in Bushire and the Gulf (Persian side) generally.*—The cumulative effect of the above cases, which are individually of small importance, would seem to be to demonstrate that the Muin is hostile to British interests generally, and little inclined to be amenable to persuasion, but it is not primarily of these cases, I am inclined to believe, that Sir P. Cox is thinking.

The Muin-ut-Tujjar has, at all events for the past decade, steadily used his influence with the Central Government to secure the appointment in the Gulf as Governors and Deputy Governors of men who will be amenable to his wishes and will not interfere with his various schemes for fleecing his tenants, squeezing larger merchants out of profitable enterprises in which he deigns to take an interest, &c.

The very large profits he makes out of Hormuz oxide (from 10,000*l.* to 20,000*l.* a-year, I believe, but the amount is on record somewhere) make it well worth his while to spend several thousands a-year on bribery and corruption at Tehran. I have seen telegrams sent by him to the Governor of the Gulf ports containing the scarcely veiled threat that, unless the said Governor mends his ways and does what the Muin wants, the latter's support will be withdrawn and the Central Government induced to send a more pliant man.

The disturbance of June 1912 at Bunder Abbas, when several hundred men took refuge at the British consulate, was directly due to the Muin's intrigues. The inhabitants of Minab had been working under customs on Hormuz Island, and had been fairly paid and fairly treated. On hearing that the Muin was to be placed again in possession of the mine they made the strongest possible protests, his reputation as an employer of labour and a landowner (he has the fief of one or two large districts, including the populous district of Minab, east of Bundar Abbas) being very bad.

The Muin's agents, whether at Bushire or at Bunder Abbas, become the focus of the malcontents of the town, and a perennial source of difficulty to the local Government.

A. T. WILSON,
Captain, Indian Army.

July 20, 1913.

[35649] No. 152.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tehran, August* 1, 1913.

ON occasion of birthday Salaam to-day Shah announced it was proposed to hold elections for new Medjliss. Immediately provincial Governors have been advised of this intention I will report further upon issue of proclamation, which is announced for to-night.

[35792] No. 153.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 2.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 1, 1913.

IN reply to your letters of the 29th instant I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he is glad to place the services of Captain A. T. Wilson at the disposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for appointment as deputy British commissioner on the proposed Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, with power to act in the event of the temporary absence or incapacity of the principal British commissioner.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[32625] No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 371. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1913.

I SHALL be glad to know when I may expect maps indicated in my telegram No. 338 of 17th July. Has any action yet been taken in pursuance of proposal made in your telegram No. 337 of 14th July? I should like to know present position of frontier question, and to know exactly what steps you have taken to safeguard interests of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to whom a communication should be made before long.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 569, and Tehran, No. 337.)

[32855] No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 568. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1913.

I SHOULD be glad to receive reply to enquiry contained in my telegram No. 537 of 17th July respecting technical staff to be attached to Russian Commissioner. I do

not expect to have full details, but I should like to have a general indication of what is intended.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 370, and Tehran, No. 336.)

[35063] No. 156.

Foreign Office to Mr. Wratislaw.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum dated the 29th July respecting the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

I am to state that commissions will be issued to you as principal commissioner and to Captain Wilson as deputy commissioner.

As to paragraph 2, Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposal, but he wishes the recommendations to be submitted by you, after full discussion with Captain Wilson, in an official letter addressed to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office. All your further communications while in this country should be addressed in this manner and on your proceeding to the frontier further instructions will be issued to you on this subject.

As to paragraph 3, Sir E. Grey has enquired the views of the Russian Government respecting the visit of Captain Wilson to St. Petersburgh or Constantinople, and a further communication will be made to you as soon as a reply is received. If Captain Wilson does proceed to either place, he should address his reports to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh or to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, for transmission to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by despatch or by telegraph, as circumstances may require. He would further act in accordance with the directions of His Majesty's representative.

Subject to any observations the Secretary of State for India may desire to make, Sir E. Grey is prepared to agree to paragraph 4.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[35839] No. 157.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 3, 1913.

FOLLOWING from Tabriz, No. 51 of 2nd August:—

"Fighting is going on in Mergawar* between Russian troops and Kurds. Operations seem to be of an important character, large force of Russian troops being in the field. One Russian officer and several soldiers have been killed.

"My Russian colleague says that, several Russian soldiers having been fired on and wounded by Kurds in outskirts of Urmia, surrender of culprits was demanded from responsible chief, who refused to deliver them up. Expedition was therefore sent against him.

"My information tends to show that Russians are provoking these hostilities by partisanship of one Kurdish chief against another."

A reference to my telegram No. 257 of 7th July will show that Russian Chargé d'Affaires considers that the policy of entrusting the care of area to certain chiefs has proved a failure.

[36082] No. 158.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 5.)

Sir, *War Office, August* 2, 1913.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 16th and 25th July with reference to the appointment of commissioners for the

* About 40 miles south-west of Urmia, on the frontier

delimitation of the Turco-Persian frontier, and of copies of correspondence with the India Office, in which it is stated that Mr. Wratislaw and Captain Wilson have been appointed British commissioners.

2. It is understood that what is known as the "identic map," which has been the basis of negotiations in the past, is intended to be the map on which the boundary as finally settled shall be laid down. I am to point out that this map, besides being very old and out of date, was not originally prepared on any scientific method of survey. It was not based on a system of triangulation, without which accuracy is impossible, and all the reports which have been received from travellers from time to time have thrown grave doubts on its accuracy. In the opinion of the Army Council it will be impossible to show the new boundary and boundary pillars on this map.

3. It would appear to be a mistake to leave any loophole for future dissension owing to the lack of an accurate map. If the map cannot be trusted, it will be necessary to say whether the pillars on the ground or the map are to be taken as deciding the boundary in any future disputes which may arise. It is usual to name the map as the decisive authority, for pillars can be moved, but to do this an accurate map is essential. It will in any case be necessary to take a survey party to survey new detail, to prepare new maps on larger scales of important areas, and to correct the old map as far as possible, and the Army Council desire to express the opinion that this party should be of sufficient strength to carry out a triangulation throughout the whole length of the boundary, and to prepare an accurate map based on this triangulation. The scale of this map should be $\frac{1}{250000}$, but special maps on larger scales would no doubt be required of certain areas.

4. If the survey party were found at home the Army Council would recommend a strength of three officers and four topographers. It would, however, be far better that the work should be carried out by the Survey of India, who are more accustomed to the conditions which prevail in this area, and whose surveyors would be able to talk Persian. The Survey of India would also be able to provide the necessary instruments, camp equipment, &c., and would generally complete the work more economically than would be possible from England. If the work is done by the Survey of India it will be for them to decide on the strength necessary to do the work without unduly delaying the commission.

5. The field season for survey parties in India commences in October. Now that there is to be only one commission it will almost certainly commence from the southern end. It is desirable that the survey work should be started as soon as possible, and if possible in advance of the commission, and it would be convenient from every point of view for the survey party to start work at Mohammerah in October, which is the best time of the year for working in that place. If this is to be done it will be necessary for the Survey of India to be informed as early as possible.

6. I am to add that, quite apart from the work of the commission, it would be unfortunate if such a unique opportunity of acquiring accurate geographical information about a little known area should be lost.

I am, &c.
B. B. CUBITT.

[36093] No. 159.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 5, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 381 of 4th August, following from consular officer at Basra, dated 4th August:—

"My telegram No. 63.
"The 'Pionier' has returned to Basra."

[36221] No. 160.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 389.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 5, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 371 of 2nd August.

There has been a little delay owing to circumstances described in my telegram

No. 363 of 25th July, but the line is now being traced and I think that we need anticipate no difficulties on the part of the Turks. But it is difficult to say with any precision when maps can be sent.

Grand Vizier informs me that he accepts draft article safeguarding oil company's interests.

[34528] No. 161.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1913.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 18th June last relative to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of further telegraphic correspondence exchanged with His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh regarding the manner in which the application for an option for the construction of the line should be made to the Persian Government.†

I am also to transmit copy of a letter from the British group of the Société d'Études,‡ enclosing copies of a letter addressed to their president by the president of the Société, and of a letter from the Société to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, applying for the necessary option which it is proposed that His Majesty's and the Russian representatives should present to his Excellency. The terms of this letter have been modified with a view to meet the objection raised in the letter of the 4th February last from this Office to the British group. (The reference in the last paragraph of this letter to "the three Governments," and the similar allusion in the penultimate paragraph of M. Raindre's letter to Sir W. Garstin are made in error, since it has never been suggested that the French representative at Tehran should join the British and Russian representatives in applying for the option.)

It appears to Sir E. Grey that as it has now been decided that the application should be made by the two representatives, and not by the Société, direct to the Persian Government, the presentation of such a letter becomes superfluous, and that it would equally serve the purpose in view if the demand were embodied by the representatives in identic notes, the terms of which might, however, be based on those of the letter.

I am accordingly to transmit to you herewith, for the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe and for any observations which his Lordship may wish to offer, the draft of such a note which Sir E. Grey would propose, with the consent of the British group, to submit to the Russian Government.

It will be observed that the terms of the actual application have been made as wide as possible, so as to afford the greatest possible amount of latitude in settling the eventual alignment of the railway, the number and direction of the branch lines to be constructed, and the position of the port when the line is to reach the sea.

I am to add, with reference to Sir G. Buchanan's two telegrams, that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any suggestions which Lord Crewe may have to offer as to the numbers, composition, and remuneration of the British portion of the proposed Anglo-Russian commission which is to be appointed for the purpose of examining and reporting on the alignment of the southern part of the railway.

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that this commission should start its work with as little delay as possible, in order that, when an agreement is reached by the two Governments as to the line of route, construction may be begun from the south at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, it is begun from the north.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY

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* Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*.

† Nos. 81, 112, and 182.

‡ Sir W. Garstin, May 27, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 161.

Draft of Note for communication by British and Russian Representatives at Tehran to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre,

LA Société internationale d'Études du Chemin de Fer transpersan, qui s'est créée avec le concours des principaux établissements financiers français et russes, et avec celui d'une des plus grandes maisons de Londres et de ses coparticipants, a notifié sa fondation à son Excellence M. le Ministre de Perse à Paris, en le priant d'en faire part à son Gouvernement.

La réponse transmise par son Excellence Samad Khan Momtaz-os-Saltaneh permettant de présumer un favorable accueil de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Schah, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de m'adresser à votre Excellence pour obtenir les autorisations, facilités et titres qui seront nécessaires à la société afin de mener à bien l'entreprise définie par ses statuts.

Cette œuvre sera, dès le début, avantageuse à l'Empire de Perse en développant, au profit de ses populations, de son industrie, de son commerce, de son sol et de son administration elle-même, les ressources de toute nature que l'absence de grandes voies de communication laisse aujourd'hui inutilisées.

A cet effet, je prie votre Excellence de faire accorder à la société :

1. Les autorisations nécessaires pour les études et les travaux préparatoires pour la construction d'un chemin de fer traversant la Perse du nord-ouest vers le sud-est, en passant par Téhéran, dont le tracé au delà de cette capitale sera ultérieurement déterminé d'accord avec le Gouvernement persan.

2. Une option au profit de la société pour la concession de cette ligne, dans une forme susceptible de garantir les intérêts engagés.

Il serait également nécessaire d'assurer à la société la possibilité de s'entendre ultérieurement avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Schah sur le point du littoral méridional de la Perse où la ligne projetée atteindrait éventuellement la mer et sur les embranchements qui, après élaboration du tracé conformément aux études et travaux susmentionnés, seraient jugés indispensables au bon fonctionnement de la ligne et au développement économique des régions traversées. Les embranchements pourraient être définis d'une façon plus précise au fur et à mesure de l'achèvement des études.

[32699] No. 162.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo, regarding your negotiations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah for permission to bore for oil in his territory.

I am to inform you in reply that, in accordance with your wish, Sir E. Grey is willing to defer the consideration of the question of making any deductions from the royalty payable to the Persian Government until such time as your company are making profits, on the clear understanding that His Majesty's Government are in no way committed by such delay to any definite line of action in the matter.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[35255] No. 163.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 29th ultimo regarding your negotiations for a mining concession in Kerman, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to enquire, with reference to your statement that the Société d'Etudes would be required

to provide a proportionate part of your loan of 100,000*l.* to the Persian Government, what security you would propose should be given to the société for their share of the advance.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[36252] No. 164.

General Post Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 6.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *General Post Office, August* 5, 1913.

WITH reference to your Confidential letter of the 4th ~~instant~~ ultimo relative to the proposals of the German Government for establishing telegraphic communication through Turkey with German East Africa and China, I am directed by the Postmaster-General to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Post Office had heard through the Eastern Telegraph Company prior to 1908 of the probability that Germany would wish to connect the mother-country with the German-Dutch telegraph system by means of a line through Asiatic Turkey and cables from the Persian Gulf viâ Dar-es-Salaam. An alternative proposal was that mentioned in the enclosure to Sir N. R. O'Conor's despatch of the 24th July, 1906 (forwarded to this Office with a communication from the Foreign Office dated the 6th August, 1906), under which the line through Asia Minor would have been extended viâ Gaza and Akaba to Jeddah, and thence by cable to Dar-es-Salaam. Cables from Fao or Jeddah to Dar-es-Salaam, and from Dar-es-Salaam to Sumatra, would be of abnormal length—probably somewhat longer than the longest section of the Pacific cable, which is believed to be the longest section of cable hitherto laid—but it is probable that such cables could be laid and worked.

It is not unnatural that Germany should wish to secure a route to her German East African and Pacific possessions other than that of the Eastern Telegraph Company, and British assent to the establishment of such a route seems to the Postmaster-General to be conditional on large political considerations rather than on those in which the Post Office is particularly concerned. In any case, there would remain the alternative route by the Red Sea, to which reference has already been made.

As regards the preferential rights of the Eastern Telegraph Company in Turkey, the Secretary of State is probably aware that the company's concession from the Turkish Government for cables between Constantinople, Tenedos, and Salonica—which is included in the print of cable concessions dated October 1905—contains a proviso that, before granting a concession to any other company for cables landing in Turkish territory, the Turkish Government will inform the Eastern Company of the nature of the proposed undertaking and give them preference if they are willing to carry it out on the same conditions.

In all the circumstances it was thought well, after the Foreign Office and the India Office had been consulted by telephone, that a representative of the Post Office should see Sir John Denison Pender, managing director of the Eastern Telegraph Company, on the subject. It was suggested to him that it might be worth while for the Eastern and Eastern Extension Companies to consider whether they could not negotiate with Germany with a view to their companies laying the cables on behalf of the German Government; and that, to avoid excessive length, the cables might perhaps be allowed to land at intermediate points on British territory. The cables would belong to the German Government, except for the sections within British territorial waters, which would belong to the companies. Sir John Denison Pender was disposed to regard the suggestion favourably, and a letter (copy enclosed) has since been received from him stating that the companies would be prepared to meet representatives of the German Government with a view to determining whether a basis of agreement could be found.

It was of course made clear to Sir John Pender that, in the event of his companies pursuing the matter, the proposal would need consideration by the Post Office and the other Departments concerned.

If the Secretary of State should consider that the German Government might be disposed to agree to this suggestion, and that a solution of the problem might be found in this direction, it is perhaps desirable that, before further steps are taken, a

conference of representatives of the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Post Office should be held in order to consider details.

I am to add that a copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
E. CRABB.

Enclosure in No. 164.

Sir J. Pender to Mr. Farnall.

Electra House, Finsbury Pavement,
London, July 24, 1913.

Dear Mr. Farnall,

REFERRING to our interview on Friday last, the question of the German scheme for laying cables between Fao and Tsingtau, viâ Dar-es-Salaam and Batavia, has been considered by the boards of the Eastern and Eastern Extension Companies, and I may say that the associated companies would be prepared to hear further from or meet the representatives of the German administration, in order to obtain information as to the exact scheme proposed, so as to enable the associated companies to decide whether a basis could be found for final negotiations.

As I informed you, any German cable laid westward of Java would have to credit our existing Dutch Indies joint purse with the whole of its revenue up to the 31st December, 1915, after which date, and up to and including the 27th April, 1924, any German cable would have to credit 50 per cent. of its receipts to the Dutch Indies joint purse.

Yours faithfully,
J. DENISON PENDER.

[36338] No. 165.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 6.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, August 5, 1913.

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 4th ultimo, relative to the landing of a German cable in the Persian Gulf, and I am commanded, in reply, to request that you will lay before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the following observations:—

2. Germany is entirely dependent upon British cables for communicating with German East Africa, but can use alternative lines for communicating with China.

3. From a war point of view, the telegraphic isolation of German colonies, where practicable, is a matter of some importance, and it can be effected without any difficulty as regards German East Africa under present conditions. But if a German cable were laid from the Persian Gulf, as proposed, it would need to be cut to attain this object at a time when it might not be convenient to detail a ship for the purpose.

4. As regards the proposed connection with China, no war considerations of material importance are affected.

5. My Lords assume that, if it were decided in principle not to oppose the German proposal, care would be taken that the landing place of the German cable was so chosen as not to cause interference with any British naval base near the entrance to the Gulf which it might be desired to acquire in future. Moreover, it should be in such a position, to be eventually agreed to, as to be readily seized or to admit of the cable being easily cut, and such as to afford no pretext for Germany to maintain any armed force there to protect it.

6. The political objection to granting Germany a further *locus standi* in Persian Gulf questions is rather a matter for Sir E. Grey's consideration than for their Lordships', but the following general remarks may be offered:—

7. The concession would be a valuable one, and should not be given without a *quid pro quo*. Assuming that it is treated independently of the Bagdad Railway negotiations, and that the landing place granted is in Persian territory, it might be well to use the opportunity to obtain more definite rights as to cables and other means of communication on the islands in the Gulf near Bunder Abbas than we appear to possess at the present time.

8. My Lords are, however, on the whole, disposed to think that there would be less objection to the cable being landed in Turkish than in Persian territory. In that case, the existing rights of the Eastern Telegraph Company would be affected, and it may therefore be desirable to refer the matter also to the Cables Landing Rights Committee.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[36372] No. 166.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 393. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 6, 1913.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 348 of 24th July and 372 of 2nd August: Shatt-el-Arab Convention.

I have had three inconclusive conversations with Russian Ambassador, who seemed to know little about the observations of his Government, and I suspect that they were inspired privately by M. Minorsky. Finally his Excellency sent Minorsky to me this morning to explain his views. He said that Russian Embassy had pointed out to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that convention would formally modify in favour of Great Britain political status at head of Persian Gulf, while final declaration concerning Sheikh of Mohammerah was not far short of recognition of sheikh's independence of Persia. Sheikh's territory was, moreover, in neutral zone in Persia. Embassy had not recommended that objections should be raised to convention, but had merely pointed out that, if Russia agreed to it, she would be entitled, if the occasion arose, to claim similar complaisance on our part.

As regards substance of convention, he said that now that it was understood that convention would be applied without derogation to Capitulations Russian Embassy had no objections to make, but embassy had insisted, with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on desirability of having Russian subject appointed to commission in some technical capacity. I said you could not agree to this, as it would lead to internationalisation of the commission. M. Minorsky said it could be arranged by an exchange of secret notes, and agreement need not come into force immediately.

Point raised in last section of your telegram No. 372 being too complicated to be dealt with by telegraph, I sent a despatch by post yesterday. It should reach you on 8th August.

[35064] No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 574.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 6, 1913.

MY telegram No. 560 of 30th July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Captain Wilson proposes to leave London for Tehran on 12th August, and I should be glad to know whether Russian Government approve proposal that he should confer *en route* with Russian authorities at Constantinople or St. Petersburgh, or both, respecting arrangements for frontier commission?

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 339, and Constantinople, No. 379.)

[36221] No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 380.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 6, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 389 of 5th August.

Please send home copy of draft article in exact form in which it was proposed.

[35047] No. 169.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 6, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copy of a letter which has been received from the India Office forwarding reports from the director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the financial aspect of the question of the reconstruction of telegraph lines in Arabistan.*

It will be within their Lordships' recollection that they agreed, in their letter of the 13th August, 1908, to pay an initial sum of 650*l.* and a recurrent sum of 300*l.* for 32 years. The Secretary of State for India now expresses the hope that they will see their way to accept liability for 2,500*l.* initial and 150*l.* recurrent expenditure for 32 years, and in addition that temporary assistance will be rendered to the Telegraph Department to provide the sum of 23,060*l.* on behalf of the Persian Government.

I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, it is a matter of the greatest political importance that the support which the Secretary of State for India solicits on behalf of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be conceded, and I am to invite their Lordships' attention to the letter from this Office of the 11th August, 1908, in which the serious reasons for the retention of the control of the line are set forth at length.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[36355] No. 170.

Memorandum by Mr. Wratislaw.

I CALLED on Colonel Hedley to-day at the War Office, accompanied by Captain Wilson, to talk over the question of the surveying party to be attached to the British delegation on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

Colonel Hedley was unaware, until informed by Captain Wilson, of the existence at the Foreign Office of the record of triangulation done by Colonel Williams' commission, which will be available for the forthcoming commission. He expressed agreement with our view that two officers of the Survey of India, with the appropriate native staff, would be sufficient in order to check and bring the identic map up to date and to effect detailed surveys of the more important districts on the frontier, and he said that his opinion always had been that in any case the Survey of India and not the War Office should supply the surveying staff. He added that one officer, working by himself, would be comparatively helpless, with which opinion we agree.

A. C. WRATISLAW.

London, August 6, 1913.

[36500] No. 171.

Mr. Wratislaw to Foreign Office.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit below, as instructed, my preliminary recommendations regarding the British technical, military, medical, and clerical staff whom the Government of India may be asked to depute.

These recommendations are necessarily tentative, as the composition and numbers of the British delegation will, to some extent, depend on the composition of the Russian delegation, and until the question has been fully discussed between Captain Wilson and the Russian authorities, it is not possible to put forward final suggestions.

I would ask, however, that these proposals may receive preliminary examination, and that, if they are approved in principle, Captain Wilson may be informed accordingly, and instructed to make them the basis of his discussion with the Russians.

I have already suggested that in order to avoid delay Captain Wilson may be authorised to address the Government of India direct (from Constantinople or

* No. 137.

St. Petersburgh, or wherever he may be) with proposals for giving effect to the arrangements suggested below in so far as they may have been approved, and subject to such modifications as may have been found necessary after discussion with the Russian authorities.

The Government of India might perhaps be informed in advance of the general nature of the staff, as approved by the Foreign Office, which they are to be invited to depute to the Commission, and might be requested to take the necessary action on receipt from Captain Wilson of detailed proposals.

Technical Staff.

Having regard to the existence of the identic map prepared by Colonel Williams's Commission, and in view of the detailed topographical work which has subsequently been done from the neighbourhood of Fao to beyond Hawizeh, it would appear unnecessary to carry out a detailed triangulation along this portion of the frontier, particularly as the original maps and triangulation records of the first commission are available at the Foreign Office, and will, I understand, be loaned for the use of the survey party.

Only a small portion of the Pusht-i-Kuh frontier appears likely to cause any serious difficulty south of Zohab.

All that seems necessary is to have a sufficient topographical staff to check and bring up to date the identic map and locate the boundary pillars thereon, and to make a larger scale (1 mile = 1 ″) survey of such localities (*e.g.*, Seyyid Hassan lands of Pusht-i-Kuh) as are likely to give rise to acute difficulty in future, or where, as in the case of the Zohab district, important British interests are involved.

I am therefore of opinion that two British survey officers of the Survey of India, with four fully trained and competent Indian surveyors (not sub-surveyors), should suffice.

It may be possible for Captain Wilson to arrange with the Russians that the bulk of topographical work north of latitude 36° (or thereabouts) should be undertaken by them, a similar obligation being undertaken by the British party south of that line. In this case one British survey officer might be spared from the commission after Zohab has been passed, and could devote himself to the preparation of the finished maps of the southern part of the frontier for signature by the commissioners.

I should mention that I to-day discussed the above proposals for technical staff with Colonel Hedley at the War Office, and found him to agree with them.

Military Staff.

In the Russian Government's *aide-mémoire* of the 13th (26th) July, 1913, forwarded in Sir G. Buchanan's despatch No. 231 of the 26th July, it is stated that, "Il va de soi que des officiers de l'État-Major général et du Corps topographique devront être adjoints à la commission pour s'occuper de tracer en réalité la ligne frontière." I presume that the "officers of the General Staff" in question will simply be surveying officers, and that it is unnecessary to attach to our Commission other officers than the two mentioned under the heading "Technical Staff." Should this view prove mistaken, measures might perhaps be taken subsequently, if considered advisable, to appoint similar British functionaries.

It seems necessary, however, from all points of view, to have an adequate British escort, under a specially selected British officer, who could do some General Staff work in addition to his other duties. I would suggest, therefore, an escort of thirty Indian cavalry under a British officer.

It would, of course, be convenient and economical if Captain Wilson could come to an understanding with the Russians whereby the latter would provide the bulk of escort in the north, and have only a small force, say of ten men, along the southern section of the frontier, the British force being similarly reduced in the north. Apart from the question of expense, it is inconvenient, and on the whole undesirable, to take a large Indian escort on to the northern part of the frontier, and I therefore trust that some such arrangement may be found feasible and may be approved.

In view of the state of insecurity on the frontier I do not see how it is possible to dispense with an escort.

Medical Staff.

The size of the British Commission and the character of the country to be traversed make adequate provision for medical attendance very necessary, and under ordinary

circumstances, and in view of the fact that in addition to Captain Wilson and myself there will be at least three British officers deputed by the Government of India, I should not have hesitated to ask for a British officer of the Indian Medical Service. In the interests of economy, however, and as I understand that the Government of India might find it difficult to spare the services of such an officer, I would ask for an Indian sub-assistant surgeon of some seniority, with previous service in the Gulf or in Persia if possible, and a selected compounder to assist him. It is essential that this medical officer should be a competent man in whom the British members of the mission can have confidence.

But I would ask that the British Resident in the Persian Gulf may be invited to authorise the consular surgeon at Mohammerah to accompany the Commission for some portion of their journey along the southern frontier, if in the Resident's opinion he can be spared temporarily from Mohammerah.

I trust that, should I find the presence of a British medical officer essential owing to the state of health of the party or of any member thereof, favourable consideration may be accorded to any proposals I may subsequently have to submit in this matter.

Clerical Staff.

This item is not dependent on the result of Captain Wilson's discussions with the Russian authorities, and if the provision suggested below is approved, I would beg that Captain Wilson may be authorised to address the Indian authorities on the subject forthwith.

The British Commission will require one fully-trained Indian clerk competent to keep accounts and records and to type letters, copies of protocols, &c. For vernacular work a Persian mirza with some knowledge of Arabic will be needed. He should be competent to make, under supervision, accurate translations from Persian into English, and English into Persian.

North of Zohab it will be necessary to add a mirza with a similar knowledge of Azerbaijan Turkish to act as interpreter to the party, none of which, excepting myself, will have any knowledge of this dialect, which is current along the northern frontier. He could be procured through His Majesty's consulate at Tabriz.

Should the Turkish commissioners, or most of them, prove ignorant of French, it may be advisable to attach to the Commission some person knowing Osmanli Turkish well. But for the moment it seems unnecessary to do more than mention a need which may not eventuate.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[36502] No. 172.

Mr. Wratislaw to Foreign Office.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 3.)

Sir, *August* 6, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit for consideration the following preliminary estimate of the probable amount of initial and non-recurring expenditure likely to be incurred on account of British delegation on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

The composition of the delegation not having been settled, I am not in a position to submit any estimate of recurring items such as wages, and other current expenditure, and therefore confine myself at present to stating approximately the expenditure necessary to provide personal and official outfits for the delegation, as well as tents, horses, mules, medical equipment, and travelling expenses as far as Mohammerah, and the conveyance of tents, horses, outfits, &c., to Mohammerah :—

	£
Outfits—	
To principal Commissioner, to cover personal outfit expenses (excluding horses, tents, office equipment, and camp furniture)	200
Ditto for Deputy Commissioner	150
Ditto for each British officer attached to Commissioner, say 3, at 1,000 rupees (see Resolution of Government of India in Foreign Department No. 2389 E.A. of the 9th June, 1906)	200
Ditto, native staff, say	60
	610

	£
Equipment—	
Office equipment (including stationery, trucks for ditto, tables, chairs, lamps, typewriters, stationery books, &c.)	100
Camp furniture, for reception of guests, and furnishing reception tent, and for official use generally	140
Cost of surveying equipment from India	200
Cost of tents from India	300
	740
Travelling expenses—	
For Principal Commissioner to Mohammerah	120
„ Deputy ditto, including visit to Constantinople, and for St. Petersburgh, thence to Tehran	100
„ survey staff from India to Mohammerah	100
„ escort from India to Mohammerah, with horses, &c.	200
„ native staff to Mohammerah	60
	580
Medical equipment	100
Purchase of horses and mules	1,000
Cost of presentation articles	400
Miscellaneous, say	100

There will, of course, be a considerable amount realised under some of the above heads, *e.g.*, horses and mules, when the Commission has finished its task.

I venture to request that the above expenditure may receive very early sanction, as it will take some time to make the necessary purchases in England and India and to despatch the various items of equipment to Mohammerah ; and I am anxious that Captain Wilson should be in a position to submit the necessary indents for tents and other articles to the Government of India before he leaves England, and, so far as possible, assist me in purchasing the other articles required.

I anticipate that most of the equipment can advantageously be obtained from the Government of India on indent, the cost being subsequently adjusted by book debit, and I would ask that the Government of India be requested to comply with indents submitted to them in this connection by Captain Wilson.

I need not add that the strictest economy will be exercised in expending the sums herein asked for, and to effect, if possible, some reduction in the above estimates. The latter have been prepared on the assumption that at least five British officers (including the two Commissioners) will be joined to the Commission.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[36518] No. 173.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 7.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 6, 1913.

WITH reference to the letter from the Board of Trade to your Department dated the 28th April last regarding German competition in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter that has been received from the Government of India on the subject.

The Marquess of Crewe concurs in the conclusions of that Government, especially in the general statement of policy contained in the latter part of paragraph 4 of their letter. It is almost unnecessary to add that the disadvantage to India of increased foreign competition in the Persian Gulf and of the existing confusion in Persia itself cannot be measured by the statistics of Indian trade alone. The political interests of India in those regions in large measure depend on British commercial supremacy, and anything that weakens that supremacy weakens also the position and security which India has hitherto enjoyed.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Board of Trade.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 173.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Secret.)

My Lord Marquess, *Simla, July* 3, 1913.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 7th April, 1913, we have the honour to communicate the following observations as to the effect of German competition on Indian trade and shipping and as to the political aspect of the situation described in Mr. Chick's report on the operations of the Hamburg-America line of steamers in the Persian Gulf for the year ending October 1911.

2. In the first instance, we would remark that, from the purely commercial standpoint, we can find little indication in Mr. Chick's report that the trade competition to which he draws attention has, up to the present, had any adverse effect on British Indian trade and shipping. As examples of the directions in which German competition is being felt most acutely, Mr. Chick illustrates the sugar import and grain export trade but in neither of these is India directly concerned although, indirectly, her shipping may suffer to some degree if such competition results in a diminution of consignments of British goods to Indian ports for transhipment to the Gulf.

We have subjected the statistics of the import and export trade from India to the Gulf to the most careful examination and, though it is true that there has been some decline in the value of exports of Indian merchandise to the Gulf in the past five years, the decrease can in most instances definitely be ascribed to the general insecurity of the trade routes or to other well ascertained reasons quite distinct from the sailings of the steamers of the Hamburg-America line, and it would be unsafe to assert on the statistics before us that these sailings have so far had any seriously prejudicial effect.

3. But, though from a purely commercial point of view Indian interests do not appear to be gravely threatened by German competition, in its political aspect the position described by Mr. Chick appears to us to merit serious attention. It is evident that the attempts of German traders to undermine the ascendency of trade and interests which the British Empire has maintained for so many years in the Persian Gulf have met with no small measure of success. If it were purely commercial enterprise which prompted these manifestations of German activity, there would be no ground for anxiety, but we agree with the views expressed by the Board of Trade that German policy will not bear this interpretation and that it is directed not so much to commercial profit or loss as to the marking out of political claims. To this policy the prospect of the completion of the Bagdad Railway has no doubt given a fresh impetus. It is not easy to determine the direction in which action can best be taken to safeguard British interests against these political features in German enterprise.

Certain suggestions on this subject are made in a letter, which we have recently received from Sir P. Cox, a copy of which we enclose for your Lordship's information.

As regards Nos. 1 and 2 of these suggestions, it appears from their memorandum, dated the 28th April, 1913, that the Board of Trade have already taken such action as is possible. The objects at which proposals Nos. 4 and 5 aim will be sufficiently achieved with the conclusion of the agreements which are now under consideration between His Majesty's Government and the Porte regarding the Euphrates-Tigris navigation and the Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission.

As regards No. 3, we accept the opinion of the Board of Trade that the grant of subsidies is undesirable and likely to stimulate German traders to fresh activity. In the circumstances we are not prepared to advocate any form of State intervention.

4. Assuming then that no considerable improvement in the situation is likely to be effected by any measures which it is feasible to take on commercial lines, it remains to consider whether any remedy is to be found in political action. We observe that the firms interested in the Gulf trade are confident that the position of British commerce can be maintained if the safety of the trade routes can be secured. This is an object which has long engaged the attention of His Majesty's Government. It is clear that, so far as the Bushire-Shiraz route is concerned, nothing further can be done until experience has shown whether the gendarmerie force now employed under Swedish officers is or is not capable of re-establishing order. As regards the Bunder Abbas-Kerman route, we trust that the proposal to raise a force of gendarmerie under British officers, which we have supported in our telegram of the 7th June, 1913, may be pressed upon the Persian Government. At the same time we desire to record the opinion that the surest guarantee for the permanent restoration of order in Southern Persia and our

most efficacious safeguard against German competition in the Gulf and the attempts of Russia to capture the trade of Central Persia lie in the construction of railways from the Gulf ports into the interior. Some time must necessarily elapse before these projects materialise, but we would express a hope that His Majesty's Government will endeavour, by all means in their power, to promote at any rate the early construction of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad line.

We have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.
O'M. CREAGH.
HARCOURT BUTLER.
SAIYID ALI IMAM.
W. H. CLARK.
R. H. CRADDOCK.
E. D. MACLAGAN.
W. S. MEYER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 173.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, May* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Foreign Department telegram dated the 10th April, 1913, in which I was desired to submit any further observations which might suggest themselves to me in regard to the effect which the German competition, discussed in my letter, dated the 21st November, 1912, and enclosures, and had, particularly on Indian trade, and as to the political effect of it generally. I regret that there has been some delay in the submission of my views, but when the Foreign Department communication was received I was much burdened with local work, and my commercial adviser, whom I was anxious to consult, was absent on tour.

2. I note that my previous communication and enclosures above mentioned did not separately comment upon the effect which German competition was having upon Indian trade and shipping with the Gulf. The fact is that though India is affected both commercially and politically by the competition, it is affected in the first connection rather in its rôle as a medium for trade in European goods, and in the second connection mainly as a component part of the Imperial whole. Thus, Indian trade with the Persian Gulf consists principally of goods of European origin resold in India or transhipped viâ Bombay, and this trade is yearly being more and more displaced by direct Gulf shipments from Europe.

Figures for all Gulf ports are not immediately available, but taking Bushire as an example—it is still the second port of importance in the Gulf—imports during March 1912–13 by the three British companies trading between India and the Gulf amounted to 109,826 packages. Of this only the following can be said to be of purely Indian origin :—

	Packages.
Rice	20,269
Tea	6,819
Spices	4,869
Other raw food-stuffs	3,873
Cotton yarns and thread	154
Gunnies and twist	803
Total	36,887

The balance was chiefly composed of—

Sugar (continental origin)	27,071
Piece-goods (largely of English weavings)	4,454
Candles (partly continental)	4,032
Miscellaneous (greater part provisions, haberdashery, hardware, European)	35,607

Shipments of sugar viâ India in British bottoms have greatly decreased of late years, and, as been observed in the previous report, there seems every likelihood of German shipping eventually wresting from us the whole of the import of Sugar from Europe.

Of Indian products proper indigo has been almost entirely driven out of the market by the competition of the German synthetic dye; but there is no doubt that where Indian

borne trade has been mostly affected has been in the increased extent to which goods are now ordered direct from Europe. For example, in Bunder Abbas, the Hindu and Persian merchants now obtain their loaf sugar, matches, candles, and steel beams direct from Germany or Belgium in German vessels. Again, a variety of articles of haberdashery and hardware, seen in most Gulf bazaars, come now direct from the continent, whereas they used to be imported to the Gulf from India, *i.e.*, earthenware, glassware, nails, needles, sewing machines, and cloths. Woollens and velvets also are increasingly imported from Germany to the Persian Gulf; and German cottons and yarns to a lesser degree.

3. But the danger in the present outlook lies not so much in this increase of imports from the continent as in the powerful position into which the German Shipping Line is working itself at the expense of our shipping, not only that from England, but also that from India.

Since the advent of the Hamburg-America Line in 1906 the whole position of British shipping, both Anglo-Gulf and Indo-Gulf, has undergone a change for the worse. At the juncture in question, whilst the Anglo-Algerian, Bucknall, and West Hartlepool Lines, in the former category, were forming a combine, and exports from Belgium, especially Belgian sugar, were under their control; in the latter the Bombay-Persia Steam Navigation Company then had a regular service from India as well as the British India Steam Navigation Company.

But the German steamship company, as has been fully set forth in previous reports, at once laid itself out to break up the combine in 1908 by a policy of intimidation, and, in due course, succeeded in depriving them of the trade with Belgium, and in detaching the West Hartlepool Company from the other British lines.

In the past year the last-mentioned line did not land as much as 300 packages at Bushire, while the Bucknall Lines have long since been absorbed by Messrs. Ellermen, and the management of such of their vessels as still voyage to the Gulf has been confided by the latter to Messrs. Strick (as the Anglo-Algerian Company).

Meanwhile, on the Indian side, the Bombay-Persia Steam Navigation Company having, as the result of native management, allowed their steamers to go to ruin, and lost the confidence of the public, have become a negligible factor in the shipping returns of the Gulf, and their steamers are now seldom seen. The Arab Steamers (Limited)—a new creation without any substantial backing, which made somewhat of a splash at first—now only dabbles with the trade as far as the Persian ports are concerned.

There remains the British India Steam Navigation Company, and even with them the position is by no means satisfactory, powerful though the company undoubtedly is; for the German line has succeeded in obtaining a considerable slice of their operations in sugar; and, on the other hand, not only Arab and Persian but also British firms are most dissatisfied with the treatment received from the company and its agents. Native merchants are, of course, obliged to use the line at present, because to-day it provides the sole, regular, and reliable means of shipping to and from India; but were any other strong shipping organisation to run steamers in opposition to the British India Steam Navigation Company, between India and the Gulf, the British India Steam Navigation Company would be forsaken by all except those under unexpired contracts to ship by their vessels.

Meanwhile, the Hamburg-America Line has succeeded in achieving a very strong position, and now that the Bagdad Railway is within measureable distance of completion, we must not be surprised at any time to see a German steamship company or a combine embarking on a German service between Indian ports and the Gulf. They are already seen to be exerting themselves to obtain control of the carrying trade up the Tigris.

4. Turning now to the political aspect of the competition, this residency has been more or less the *vox clamantis* on the subject for the past four years, and it is difficult to say much now that has not already been said before. It seems to me that so far each element concerned has continued to deal with the problem on the watertight compartment principle; each has recognised that the position is unsatisfactory, but dismissed the subject with the comforting thought that there is nothing particular which it can itself do to ameliorate it; that the remedy is up to somebody else.

I submit that we knew all along that the Germans had come to the Gulf to create commercial interests of their own for political motives, and that their trading, shipping, and political elements were working in cohesion to that end.

So far we have made no attempt to offer any solid opposition or organise any constructive policy to counteract it, and by neglecting to do so we have continued to make leeway. It is for us to consider whether the position is worth fighting for or not; in any case there are surely no points in letting it go by default.

5. The present juncture is a most critical one. We see the preliminary understanding for the construction of the Bagdad-Basra section assuming definite shape, and the German element in the meanwhile doing its utmost to get a predominant position in the control of the river traffic and lightering of cargo.

Then we have the Mohammerah-Khoremabad route in prospect, and here, unless special measures are devised, we seem likely to create a wheat export for the benefit of Messrs. Wönckhaus.

I can only suggest, as I have done before, that His Majesty's Government should call an expert committee among those officially and commercially interested, and endeavour to arrive at some definite decision as to what is needed and a constructive programme for carrying it out.

6. I venture to make the following suggestions as to the direction in which action seems necessary and possible at the present juncture:—

(1.) That a definite understanding should be sought amongst all British lines, with a view to combating German competition.

(2.) That an organised attempt should be made to prevent the sugar trade from falling irrevocably into German hands, and that the British lines should be encouraged to call at Antwerp.

(3.) That some form of State help should be devised calculated to counteract rebates on exports, held to be enjoyed by the German firm when shipping by German vessels.

(4.) That a British lighterage company to undertake the loading of ships at Basra, Mohammerah, and at the bar, should be formed.

(5.) That a means should be sought of converting Messrs. Lynch's concession on the Tigris into a British company, in which Gulf firms should be encouraged to participate.

[36543]

No. 174.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 7, 1913.

A SOMEWHAT serious affray occurred to-day in Tehran between Bahktiari and gendarmes, which has resulted in death of five or six gendarmes. Losses of Bahktiaris are not known. Their own chiefs say fifteen or twenty men were killed. Trouble commenced between police and Bahktiari, and gendarmes took action under the orders of Minister of the Interior. I am of the opinion that time has now come when this force should be disbanded, or that at least they should not be allowed to carry arms unless employed on active service. I am suggesting to my Russian colleague that we should take joint action in this direction. This affray is more serious than the last; if action is delayed we may before long find ourselves confronted by a very serious situation that may furnish an excuse for despatch of Russian troops to Tehran.

On this occasion life of Swedish officer in command was probably only saved by intervention of Bahktiari khan, to whose house he had gone very courageously to endeavour to reach a settlement.

[36541]

No. 175.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 289.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburgh, August 7, 1913.

MY telegram No. 286 of 3rd August: Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission.

Aide-mémoire from Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that, in view of explanations given, Imperial Government raise no objection to participation of His Majesty's Government on Commission, and would only like to have right to recommend Russian subjects for some of the responsible posts in Administration should subjects of any of the other Powers be employed on it.

Imperial Government note with satisfaction statement that Anglo-Turkish Convention guarantees equality of treatment to ships of all nations, but would like to know what is meant by phrase "no dues will be imposed by mere fact of navigation, but merely for services rendered."

Imperial Government raise no objection to imposition of dues prescribed by convention in conformity with stipulations of the said convention, and will not insist on freedom from all dues of ships of small tonnage of all nations.

[34711] No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and, with reference to the telegram from M. Sazonof, respecting the suggested extension of the numbers of the Swedish officers of gendarmerie in Persia, which his Excellency was so good as to communicate to Sir E. Grey on the 28th ultimo, has the honour to inform him that under the circumstances the increase seems to His Majesty's Government unobjectionable, but that if at any future time it should appear that the presence of Swedish officers were politically injurious to British or Russian interests, His Majesty's Government would exchange views with the Russian Government on the subject.

Foreign Office, August 7, 1913.

[36647] No. 177.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 7, 1913.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th July on the subject of the proposed telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas, and to say that he concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should be instructed to include in the draft agreement, to which the assent of the Persian Government is to be sought, a proviso of the nature suggested in the letter from the Treasury of the 4th July, but the Marquess of Crewe is doubtful whether this proviso should be pressed, if insistence upon it involves the abandonment of the proposal.

I am further to suggest that if acceptance by the Persian Government of the whole of the clauses of the proposed agreement is found to be impracticable, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran might be informed that His Majesty's Government would agree to the omission of clause 4, if the assent of the Persian Government to the other clauses could thereby be obtained. At the same time, Lord Crewe is of opinion that no reduction in the share of the Indo-European Telegraph Department proposed in the clause numbered 10 in the enclosure to my letter of the 4th June last should be agreed to.

With regard to the numbering of the clauses in that enclosure, I am to request that the numbers 8, 9, and 10, should be substituted for 9, 10, and 11, respectively.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[36716] No. 178.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 276.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 8, 1913.

MY telegram No. 250 of 27th June.

A few days ago twelve gendarmes deserted at Shiraz. They were mujahids* who had joined the gendarmerie after the mujahids were disarmed at Tehran. Before escaping they broke into the arsenal and carried away several thousand rounds of ammunition as well as their rifles. They have taken refuge with Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, who has been the chief instigator of all the troubles on the Bushire road. He refuses to surrender fugitives. As already reported, it is intended to conduct serious operations against this brigand in the autumn. It is clear that there will be no peace until he is wiped out. The occasion will be a good one to test Soulet's repeated assurances of loyal good-will.

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* Armed men.

[36717] No. 179.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 8, 1913.

THE British consul at Shiraz asks for permission to make tour, starting early in September, in province of Fars. He would be absent about a month, and estimates the cost of the journey at about 80*l*. His movements would be arranged in consultation with the Governor-General and Kawam, who considers the risk insignificant.

I think much good may result from such a journey, and beg to recommend the British consul's request to your favourable consideration.

[36748] No. 180.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 342.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 8, 1913.

STOCKHOLM telegram No. 19 of 11th December last.

Swedish Legation enquire whether His Majesty's Government have any objection to employment of three (or perhaps four) additional Swedish officials for Tehran police. I suppose there is no objection? Will your Russian colleague agree?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 581.)

[36372] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 579.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 8, 1913.

SHATT-EL-ARAB.

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of Mr. Marling's telegram No. 393 of 6th August, omitting first sentence. You should add that I cannot accept reasoning advanced by M. Minorsky, since, so far from situation on Shatt-el-Arab being modified in our favour, we are actually surrendering to Turkey participation in conservancy rights which we have hitherto exercised alone for a very long time. It seems to me that M. Minorsky is inclined to overrate the importance of this matter altogether: the duties of the commission are limited to a small geographical area and are strictly defined so as to ensure equality of treatment for ships of all nations, and, as the Sheikh of Mohammerah has certain *de facto* interests on the river (of which the whole waterway is Turkish), it seems absolutely necessary to provide for them in such a way as is done in the declaration annexed to the convention, but, if the Russian Government prefer, we need not publish the declaration about Mohammerah.

I do not think it can be urged that our action would formally modify the political status at the head of the Persian Gulf in our favour, since, far from making any claim to treat Mesopotamia as a British sphere, we are giving up all claim to control over any part of the Bagdad Railway. Such being the case, the only way in which we can now safeguard our great interests in Mesopotamia is by making without delay (and before the completion of the Bagdad Railway, which is now inevitable) a settlement recognising our *de facto* position in the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-el-Arab.

I regard it as quite impracticable to obtain admission of Russian subject in some technical capacity on the commission: even Germany, whose shipping is six times as great as that of Russia, has not made such a claim, and it would be impossible to overcome Turkish objections; but I will endeavour to meet Russian wishes by arranging that consuls shall have right of addressing representations and advice direct to the commission on all matters affecting foreign shipping. (End of R.)

Following arguments are for your guidance and for such use as you can advantageously make of them. As we are not securing any control over the Bagdad Railway, which is to traverse a region where British commercial interests have long been paramount, public opinion will not be satisfied unless we obtain recognition of the *status quo* in the Shatt-el-Arab and Persian Gulf, and on latter point please refer to my published despatch of 29th August, 1907, to Sir A. Nicolson. I consider it very

important that it should be seen that Russian Government is at one with us in a matter so greatly affecting our interests, and I earnestly trust that they will express their concurrence at an early date. I am anxious to avoid admitting contention of Russian Embassy at Constantinople that if Russia agrees to this arrangement it will entitle her to "similar complaisance on our part" in other regions. It would be as well, however, to avoid anything which might lead to an argument on this subject, and confine yourself to pointing out the self-denying character of our agreement.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 388.)

[36502] No. 182.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 8, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, that an agreement has now been reached, through the mediation of Great Britain and Russia, respecting the general line of the Turco-Persian frontier, and that it is proposed to appoint a Boundary Commission, consisting of British, Russian, Turkish, and Persian delegates, to demarcate the whole line of frontier between Mount Ararat and the Persian Gulf, a distance of some 700 miles.

As the Lords Commissioners are aware, Great Britain and Russia have participated in previous commissions concerned with this question at various dates since 1843; and while the importance of the question was always considered great from the point of view of British interests, that importance has now been greatly enhanced owing to the large increase of British trade in the regions in question, and owing to the necessity to reach a final settlement respecting the frontier before the various railway projects now planned in Mesopotamia and Persia are carried into effect.

It is, moreover, clear from previous experience that, without the assistance of British and Russian delegates, the work would never be carried to a satisfactory completion.

The expenditure involved in previous commissions was, so far as the British portion of the work was concerned, entirely defrayed from Imperial funds; in view, however, of recent developments, Sir E. Grey proposes to request the Government of India to bear half the expenditure now involved.

The southern portion of the boundary will be dealt with in the first instance, and an escort of thirty Indian cavalry with a British officer will be required; it is hoped that a smaller escort will be sufficient when the northern section is undertaken.

Sir E. Grey has selected Mr. Wratislaw, His Majesty's consul-general in Crete, who has served both in Persia and Turkey, as the principal British Commissioner; his present salary at Canea is 1,000*l.* a-year, with local allowance of 100*l.*; and it is considered that he should, while employed on the Boundary Commission, receive 1,500*l.* a-year salary, in view of the important and very arduous nature of the work, and an outfit allowance of 200*l.* His post in Crete will not be filled up.

The deputy Commissioner will be Captain Wilson, an officer of the Indian army of considerable local experience. He will have power to act in the event of Mr. Wratislaw's absence through illness or any other cause; and, with reference to his appointment, I am to enclose a copy of a telegram addressed to the Government of India on the 1st instant by the Secretary of State for India.

The Government of India will be requested to furnish the surveyors and escort, and a suitable medical officer, as well as the equipment and supplies. They will be consulted with regard to the allowances, which should include a liberal provision for the cost of entertaining in the form of a sumptuary allowance to the principal Commissioner; they will be invited to share the cost of all these items.

I am to request that you will move the Lords Commissioners to sanction the necessary expenditure, of which further details will be furnished as soon as possible, and I am to state that the Imperial share of the expenses would be a charge on the sub-head "Special Missions" in the diplomatic and consular vote.

Copies of two letters from Mr. Wratislaw are enclosed for the information of the Lords Commissioners.*

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

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* Nos. 171 and 172.

[36924] No. 183.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 9, 1913.

I WAS misinformed as to one point in my telegram No. 275 of 7th August, Swedish officers did not take action under the orders of the Minister of the Interior, and His Highness was not even informed that they were about to take action. This error on the part of the Swedish officer commanding during the colonel's illness has made the question more difficult because it has given the Persian Government fresh excuse to complain that they are ignored by Swedes. Police called upon gendarmes to come to their assistance, and they were of course justified in doing so. It was agreed between the officer commanding the gendarmerie and the khans on Thursday that all Bakhtiaris should deposit their arms with their khans, and that after last night no Bakhtiari should be seen in the streets with arms, and that if so seen his arms should be taken from him. We shall know to-day if this agreement has been kept. Swedish colonel has also demanded that ten Bakhtiari sowars who restarted the fighting on Thursday afternoon should be shot. They are now prisoners in the hands of gendarmes.

Two legations have jointly informed the Persian Government and Bakhtiari khans that we are of opinion that Bakhtiari force in Tehran should be reduced in numbers, and that men should not be allowed to carry arms except on duty, but we are of opinion that demand for execution of the ten men is not reasonable, and that such a step might have disastrous effects in other parts of Persia, and might even result in retaliatory measures which would endanger lives of foreigners.

The khans are wild with anger, and have been indulging in somewhat extravagant threats about leaving Tehran with all their men, retiring to their own country, and committing excesses at Ispahan and elsewhere at the head of 10,000 men. This of course is all bluff; all their money and comforts, which they love more than life, are here, but I am of opinion that it would be politic not to deal too hardly with them, though Swedes must be supported, and Bakhtiaris taught that they must behave like civilised beings.

The occasion will also be utilised to explain to Swedes that they do not comprise an *imperium in imperio*, and that they must observe outward forms of respect for the Persian Government. Their disregard for superior authority threatens to create serious difficulties in Fars as well as here.

Their attitude on this occasion, and Persian dislike of a force under foreign officers, coupled with fears engendered by the Bakhtiari threats, have combined to make the Persian Government side with the Bakhtiari. Ain-ed-Dowleh, of course, at once resigned, but withdrew his resignation when the dragomans of the two legations explained to the Council of Ministers last night our attitude and steps we had taken to make the same known to the khans. I am to see the Prime Minister this afternoon, as also the Swedish colonel and Bakhtiari khans, and will report further.

Lynch's agent here has sent most misleading account of what occurred, I believe, to the "Near East." Its publication should be stopped if possible, as it is calculated to cause much mischief.

[36922] No. 184.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 9, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs said yesterday that he wished to speak to me on the subject of steps taken by the Persian Government for the convocation of a Medjliss. In the conversations he had had with the Regent during latter's stay at St. Petersburgh, he had stipulated for and received positive assurance that before any such steps were taken the two legations were to be consulted. As this had not been done, he thought that our two representatives ought to be instructed to concert together as to a communication to be addressed to Persian Government warning them that in acting as they were doing they were violating a promise given by the Regent. Their attention might at the same time be called to the fact that the local Anjuman

were trying to get control of elections and to get their nominees returned, with the result that the new Medjliss would like the last be composed of worst element in Persia.

[36923] No. 185.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 574 of 6th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs told me on the 7th August that he was in consultation with military authorities, and would let me know as soon as possible their views as to advisability of Captain Wilson coming to St. Petersburgh. I have written to him again on the subject, but cannot obtain an answer till Monday afternoon.

[36543] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 345.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1913.

YOU are authorised to act as indicated in my telegram No. 585 of to-day to St. Petersburgh.

[37200] No. 187.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 392.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1913.

I UNDERSTAND from Captain Wilson that the most suitable part of the Turco-Persian frontier to make any eventual further concessions to Turkey would probably be between Mendali and Hawizeh, in the region of Pusht-i-Kuh. It would be well, therefore, to allow for this by indicating that the line on the map as regards that part is only to be taken as the basis of the final demarcation, unless you see objection.

As regards frontier generally, it seems advisable to get the Turks and Persians to accept the line on the map before the work on the frontier begins, and to sign the maps. That line will then be decisive subject only to such slight modifications as are shown to be expedient in the course of the demarcation, and much subsequent delay will be avoided.

It is very desirable to secure to Russian and British commissioners right of arbitration, as distinct from mediation, in regard to any difficulties which may arise.

Inform Russian Ambassador that Captain Wilson will arrive at Constantinople on 19th August to confer with M. Minorsky respecting preliminary arrangements for commission. He can afterwards go to St. Petersburgh, if necessary, but must be at Resht by 16th September.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 587, and Tehran, No. 346.)

[36541] No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 583.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 289 of 7th August: Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission.

Please convey my thanks to Minister for Foreign Affairs. In view of Russian reply I leave it to your discretion how far you act upon my telegram No. 579 of yesterday. It will perhaps be better to say nothing.

The phrase "no dues will be imposed by mere fact of navigation but merely for services rendered" is intended to limit amount of dues to actual disbursements of commission upon such works as dredging, buoying, lighting, landing facilities, and administrative expenditure, but to preclude any toll consequent upon mere navigation

of the river and in excess of expenditure actually incurred by and upon commission. Our wish was to guard against any attempt on the part of Turkey to impose dues in excess of such expenditure, thereby securing a fresh source of revenue to the detriment of foreign shipping.

With regard to first paragraph of your telegram, if by "other Powers" is meant "Powers other than Great Britain," there is no objection so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, but you need not mention this unless Minister for Foreign Affairs recurs to the point.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 391.)

[36543] No. 189.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 585.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 275 of 7th August: Bakhtiari

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am authorising Sir W. Townley to take joint action in the sense proposed as soon as Russian chargé d'affaires is similarly instructed.

I hope that his Excellency will send similar instructions to Tehran.

(Repeated to Tehran, No 344.)

[36502] No. 190.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of 6th August, enclosing a telegram, dated 1st August, to the Government of India, and to my letters of 8th and 9th August, enclosing letters from Mr. Wratislaw respecting the preliminary arrangements for the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, and a letter to the Treasury on the same subject, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to enquire if the Government of India are prepared to bear half the expenditure involved, and to ask what amount should be granted to the two British commissioners, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for India, in respect of the several allowances specified by Mr. Wratislaw, more especially that for the cost of entertaining.

I am also to state that Captain Wilson proposes to arrive at Constantinople on or about 19th August, in order to confer with M. Minorsky, the Russian commissioner, respecting the preliminary arrangements; and I am to request that, if the Marquess of Crewe sees no objection, the Government of India may be asked to comply with the indents to be submitted by that officer.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[36925] No. 191.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 10, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 9th August, last paragraph.

Letter was addressed to Lynch's company in London. Their Tehran agent has promised to stop its publication by telegraph.

[36926] No. 192.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 10, 1913.

MY telegram No. 279 of 9th August.

Prime Minister showed considerable nervousness yesterday and expressed fears

that Bakhtiari Khans would carry out their threat of leaving Tehran and creating disturbances. I represented to his Highness that he need fear nothing of the sort; that the khans would never leave luxurious ease of the capital for discomforts of their old mountain life. I added that all would pass off quietly if the Persian Government remained firm; that gendarmes must be supported or all their work would be ruined, and that after the threats uttered by khans the Persian Government would be justified in refusing to allow sowars to depart with their arms, and in expelling senior khans from the country if they remained truculent. Ala-es-Sultaneh said he was to have seen khans yesterday but would now wait to see them until after he had heard the result of my visit.

I subsequently saw colonel of the gendarmerie, and impressed on him that he had acted wrongly in not informing Minister of the Interior that he was about to march his men into Tehran. I said that we could only hope to make the gendarmerie a success if it was recognised that they are servants of the Persian Government.

My visit to the khans passed off most satisfactorily. They endeavoured, of course, to prove that fault had been entirely on the side of the gendarmes, but I showed them that if there had been any faults on both sides, balance was overwhelmingly against them, and that their men had wilfully shot at and killed representatives of public order. There was considerable bitterness at first, but finally they said that they left decision as to what should be done entirely in my hands.

I answered that Bakhtiari sowars had proved once more that they cannot be trusted with arms, that all but the carriage escorts of the khans must be disarmed, that khans will be held responsible for safe custody of the arms, that only small force of sowars must remain at Tehran, that these men must live in barracks outside the town, that they must be properly disciplined, that they can only use their arms when being drilled, and that prisoners taken red-handed must be severely punished, but not shot. It was agreed that Persian Government shall fix number of men to be retained at Tehran, we mentioned 200, but they should not be more than 300 at present. Their numbers can be increased later if necessary, and if the men who remain are of good behaviour under military discipline. Khans expressed readiness to accept foreign instructor selected by Persian Government.

My Russian colleague and I are taking advantage of the opportunity to impress on Government that it is dangerous to allow anybody to go about armed when off duty, and that a stop must be put to this practice.

[37139]

No. 192.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, July 16, 1913.

WITH reference to despatch No. 6 dated the 5th May to my address, on the subject of the alleged pollution of the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab owing to the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I have the honour to submit a report (with enclosure) addressed to me by His Majesty's consul, Mohammerah. I agree with the views expressed by Major Haworth. I have not heard the slightest complaint regarding the water from others, and may add that I and my household habitually use the river water for drinking purposes and have not detected the slightest deterioration or taint in it. Some very temporary inconvenience may have been caused by the sinking of the oil barge described in the report of the manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; but apart from that the Turkish complaint seems to be devoid of any material justification.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 192.*

Major Haworth to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(No. 102.)

July 11, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 4th June, 1913, on the subject of alleged pollution of the Shatt-el-Arab by the works of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

In reply, I have the honour to state that I can find no trace of any such pollution, and when I visited the oil company's refinery the works manager showed me the measures taken to ensure that there was no escape of any of the waste product of the oil.

I attach, herewith, a copy of the report made by the manager of the company to explain how the complaint possibly arose, but I should think that it was quite as possible that it was due to the fact that when the rains commence in the early winter it often occurs that deposits of oil, which collect during the summer in the valleys of the Upper Karun, are washed down the stream in large quantities. I have frequently noticed this myself and have seen the deposits on the banks of the river during floods. This is a condition of affairs which must always have existed and has no connection with the oil company's works.

There is absolutely no pollution of the water, which is used by all ships, and I have never heard of any complaint on the subject.

Should the Turkish Government wish to pursue the matter further it is, I would suggest, a question which can well be left to the new commission for the conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab to deal with.

Enclosure 2 in No. 192.*

Report on the alleged Pollution of the Shatt-el-Arab Waters by Petroleum from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Refinery at Abadan.

ON the 20th February, 1913, His Britannic Majesty's consul, Basra, transmitted to us through His Britannic Majesty's consul, Mohammerah, a letter dated three days earlier, addressed to the former by his Excellency the Vali of Basra, complaining that "naptha" emanating from this company's refinery situated at Braim on the Shatt-el-Arab was polluting the waters of this river (more especially between the villages of Dowasir and Seihan) to such an extent that the population were "practically drinking naptha instead of water in those parts."

We at once instituted enquiries and were informed by the manager of our refinery at Braim (Abadan Island) that every outlet from the company's oil works to the river was fitted with special oil separators and there was, therefore, no possible means whereby even waste oil could find its way into the Shatt-el-Arab.

It should be stated, however, that a short time previous to the receipt of his Excellency the Vali's complaint, an accident occurred at the company's refinery, an oil barge built for the conveyance of oil in bulk to the Shatt-el-Arab bar foundering, as the result thereof.

This barge, which, at the time of the accident, had been loaded with some 60,000 gallons of petroleum, was lying in the Shatt-el-Arab opposite the company's works at Braim, and we have no doubt that the pollution complained of through his Excellency the Vali of Basra was due to this oil escaping from the sunken barge, whence it would be conveyed by the tides upwards and downwards with the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab.

No further complaints have been received by us from any source since that above referred to and this to our minds proves conclusively that the manner in which we have accounted for the pollution of the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab is the correct explanation.

Should any further proof be required in support of our explanation, we should say that all the employés of the company (both European, Indian, and Arab) draw their entire supplies of drinking water from the Shatt-el-Arab River at Braim and that they have never, except during the period succeeding the accident above described, made any complaint whatsoever in this respect.

[37061] No. 193.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 162.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 21, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 117 of the 17th May, forwarding a complaint from the Persian Government respecting the alleged non-fulfilment by Messrs. Strick of article 12 of their contract for the purchase of oxide, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a letter dated the 17th May, 1912, which that firm have addressed to the Persian Minister in London.

Messrs. Strick's Tehran agent informs me that his principals consider that this letter clearly sets forth the position which they have taken up in regard to the Weir-Ellinger claims, and that they have nothing to add to it.

I have the honour to report that on receipt of your telegram No. 296 of the 1st July I addressed a note to the Persian Government in reply to their two communications informing them that I had referred the question to His Majesty's Government, and that I was awaiting your views.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 193.

Messrs. Strick and Co. to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

Sir,

May 17, 1912.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 16th ultimo, in which you inform us that your Government has instructed you to request us to settle Messrs. Ellinger and Co.'s claim against the Muin-ut-Tujjar, and to notify us that we are to send no more ships to load oxide at Ormuz until the matter is settled.

In reply, we can only confirm our letter to your Excellency dated the 28th July last, when we pointed out that, in face of the supplemental agreement dated the 4th December, 1908, between the Muin-ut-Tujjar and Messrs. Ellinger and Co., of the one part, and Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., of the other part, any claim these firms might make on him in respect of their contract with him of same date for supplies of Ormuz red oxide must fail; and that the Muin-ut-Tujjar could establish no claim on your Excellency's Government in respect of his liability to Messrs. Weir and/or Ellinger, because he was under no such liability.

We also pointed out that, in our contract with your Excellency's Government, we only undertook responsibility for any lawful—we repeat lawful—claim that Messrs. Weir and/or Ellinger might have on the Muin-ut-Tujjar or the Government. In view of the supplemental contract, neither of these firms have a lawful claim either against your Excellency's Government or against the Muin-ut-Tujjar, and, consequently, the question of our having to do anything does not arise.

We are much surprised that your Excellency's Government should suggest that anything has occurred which will in any way relieve them from their responsibility to make shipment upon vessels which we may send for red oxide in accordance with the contract. We would respectfully point out that, if they do, then they will be committing a very serious and most unjustifiable breach of their contract with us. Our agreement with your Excellency's Government we are, and always have been, ready to carry out to the letter, and, even if the view we take of the contract is wrong—which, of course, we do not for one moment admit—that is a question for adjustment in the proper way between us, and does not permit of your Excellency's Government committing a breach of contract on their own part in refusing to load our steamers. The consequences of such a breach would be very serious.

We must, of course, look to your Excellency's Government to strictly carry out their obligations under the contract with us, and they may rely upon our carrying out all our obligations to them.

We have, &c.
(For Frank C. Strick and Co., Limited),
FRANK C. STRICK.

[37064] No. 194.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 33. Commercial.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 28, 1913.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 271 of to-day's date, the customs receipts for the first three months of the Persian year show an increase of 41,247*l.*, or 20 per cent. over those for the corresponding period last year.

In the short statement, herewith enclosed, of the receipts of the various provinces, I would beg leave to call your attention to the very considerable increase in the Kermanshah figures; a satisfactory state of things, doubtless due to the fact that during the period in question the province enjoyed a lull from the rebellion which had done so much to hamper trade in North Persia.

It is especially satisfactory in view of the fact that a large volume of British trade enters Persia through that province.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 194.

Statement of Persian Customs Receipts.

	First 3 months of last year.	First 3 months of this year.	Increase
	£	£	£
Azerbaijan	36,111	43,920	7,809
Astara	8,779	9,624	845
Gilan..	45,022	50,252	5,230
Mazanderan	13,056	13,252	196
Astrabad	8,500	9,137	637
Khorassan	19,646	23,908	4,262
Kermanshah	12,736	25,307	12,571
Total ..	..	..	31,550
Bushire	24,088	26,197	2,109
Arabistan	14,367	18,071	3,704
Abbassi	5,936	9,410	3,474
Total ..	..	..	9,287
Tehran	2,122	2,532	410
Grand Total ..	..	..	41,247

[36397] No. 195.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 163.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 27, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith paraphrase of a telegram which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire respecting the possible alignments for the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway between Dizful, Mohammerah, and Khor Musa.

I have no suggestion to offer upon a question with which Sir P. Cox is so much more competent to deal than myself.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 195.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, July* 24, 1913.

THE surveying party sent out by the railway syndicate, having finished their examination of possible alignments between Dizful and Mohammerah and Khor Musa, have now returned to Europe to report and to make preparations for another expedition in the autumn to survey the Dizful-Khoremabad section. I understand that when they get home the question of alignment between Mohammerah and Dizful and possible connections with Khor Musa will be considered, and I have recently received a private letter from Mr. Greenway asking for an expression of my views on the question as to which bank should be adopted.

I have not felt myself in a position to answer his enquiries without reference to higher authority. Up till now a line on the west of the Karun, either drawn straight from Mohammerah to Dizful or calling at Aminiyeh, has, in the light of such maps and information as have been available, seemed clearly indicated as much cheaper in construction and commercially not less attractive than any other possible alternative, by which the construction of several bridges would be involved (please refer to Foreign Office enclosure to me, No. 2642, to India, and No. 68/2683 to His Majesty's Legation, October, 1910). I am, however, surprised to learn from a recent private discussion of the question with the chief engineer of the surveying party that, in his opinion, there is little to choose financially between any of the alternatives on either bank. The syndicate will, therefore, doubtless be inclined to decide the question according to advice of His Majesty's Government, as they will presumably have no preference themselves for any particular alignment. From the point of view of present political interests alone it would seem to me that, in the sheikh's interests and our own, the best alignment would be the west bank route touching at Aminiyeh, leaving the town of Shuster to connect with the railway by water at Aminiyeh, and leaving Khor Musa to be connected up later, if necessary, by a bridge at Marid or Bahmanshir junction over the Karun. In this selection, however, no account is taken of strategical aspect of the question. We should be able to control with a greater measure of security an alignment crossing to the east bank at Marid, and thus not depending for the connection with Khor Musa on a destructible bridge, than an alignment on the west bank. But the question of whether future agression is likely to come from the east or the west must, also to some extent be taken into account. In any case, it will be presumably worth while taking the line viâ Bandikir and Shuster if the railway goes by the east bank by Marid onward.

I would respectfully urge that your Excellency and the Government of India communicate your views as soon as possible to His Majesty's Government, and, should you see no objection, I will inform Mr. Greenway that I have submitted my ideas to higher authority.

[37062]

No. 196.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 164.)

Sir, *Tehran, July* 29, 1913.

IN reply to your despatch No. 92 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. George Anderson has now made a sworn statement to the British vice-consul at Sultanabad concerning the recent attack on him in much the same sense as set forth in the enclosure to your despatch under reply.

Mr. Anderson states that on the 3rd June he and his servant travelled from Hamadan to Sultanabad by carriage, picking up the post and postman *en route*. About 2 miles out of Kerdakhond, about 10 P.M., several shots were fired at the side of the road and Mr. Anderson made the carriage stop. The carriage was then surrounded by men with rifles, and Mr. Anderson was forced to get out and kneel; his pockets were rifled, his coat taken, and the carriage ransacked. When he attempted to speak he was struck. Some fifteen minutes later the robbers left and Mr. Anderson was able to proceed. He did not see all the robbers himself, but his servant and the postman state that they were twelve in number, ten on foot and two mounted.

As soon as the incident occurred the British vice-consul at Sultanabad made the necessary prompt representations to the local authorities, who would appear to have

shown considerable zeal in endeavouring to recover the cash and effects which had been stolen, and the value of which has been sworn at 91*l.* 6*s.*

My latest advices are that Mr. Moir hopes to get the claim settled in a few days' time.

I would propose, subject to your approval, to present to the Persian Government a special claim for 100*l.* as personal compensation for the wanton attack on Mr. Anderson, thus following the precedent set in numerous other cases of a similar nature.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[37167]

No. 197.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 345 of 9th August: Gendarmes—Bakhtiari.

I much regret that it was impossible to await your instructions. Immediate action was imperative to save Cabinet crisis and prevent the Persian Government taking action which would have seriously endangered existence of the gendarmerie. All the Cabinet, except the Minister of the Interior, were terrified at Bakhtiari threats, and situation was only saved by knowledge that they had the full support of the two legations. All is rapidly returning to normal state, and there seems every reason to hope that satisfactory arrangement will be reached of a nature to prevent recurrence of disorders.

[37182]

No. 198.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 298.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 585 of 9th August: Gendarmes and Bakhtiari.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed doubtful whether the Persian Government would agree to disband the Bakhtiari, but said he would instruct the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to consult with Sir W. Townley as to joint action.

[36924]

No. 199.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 351.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 279 and 281 of 10th August: Bakhtiari.

Action entirely approved.

The ten Bakhtiari should not be shot.

[36912]

No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 352.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1913.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 296 of 10th August: Medjliss.

Please telegraph your observations.

Can you ascertain whether the Shah's announcement was made without communication with the Regent?

[35540] No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 347.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 270 of 25th July: Muin-ut-Tujjar's concessions.

Admiralty think it important that no influence likely to be antagonistic to British interests should be exerted over Kishm and Henjam, Hormuz being of less importance.

India Office concur, adding that from information in their possession, much of which is known to us also, influence of Muin would certainly be exerted against British interests, and no undertaking given by him would afford safeguard. They consider no risk should be run of losing control of entrance to the Persian Gulf—therefore in addition to blocking Muin's application they would desire, if possible, to arrive at some friendly understanding with Persian Government with regard to these islands with a view to secure that concessions there should not be held by others than British subjects.

Do you think it would be possible to arrive at arrangement with Muin which would meet objections of India Office and Admiralty, or to induce Persian Government to give concessions to British subjects?

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[34573] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 269. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 394 of the 6th May, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* in regard to the recent action of certain of the Russian consuls in Persia towards the Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency should bring the matter to the notice of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in whatever manner you may think most opportune, but you should be careful not to let M. Sazonof suspect that the information came from M. Sabline, whose views, as you will observe, were given to Sir W. Townley in confidence.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[34286] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1913.

WITH reference to the memoranda left here by you on the 10th June and 3rd July, in which the hope was expressed that His Majesty's Government would not support the claim of the Imperial Bank of Persia to their minting contract with the Persian Government, and the need was mentioned of the Banque d'Escompte obtaining the contract as an equivalent for the privilege of issuing bank-notes enjoyed by the Imperial Bank of Persia, I have the honour to bring the following facts to the notice of your Excellency:—

In the former of those two documents it is contended that the contract of the Imperial Bank was invalid on the ground that it was never ratified either by the Medjliss or by the Persian Government, and in support of that contention it is alleged that the Medjliss on the other hand granted a concession for the supply of a certain quantity of silver to two Persian subjects.

It must, however, be borne in mind that no reason has yet been put forward for holding that the Imperial Bank's agreement either required ratification or was otherwise invalid. On the contrary, the Medjliss only conferred the above-mentioned concession on the two Persian subjects, if such concession did not contravene the Government's

* No. 118.

existing arrangements with the Imperial Bank; and as that concession did actually contravene the arrangements in question it was quashed, and the two natives have never imported any silver. This cancellation of their concession amounted to a recognition of the Imperial Bank's minting agreement.

Turning now to the desire expressed by M. Sazonof in the second memorandum under reference that the Banque d'Escompte should receive the contract in question, I would call your Excellency's attention to the fact that the grant to the Imperial Bank of the monopoly of a note issue, coupled as it is with a provision for prohibiting the circulation of the notes as soon as payment on a single note is refused, and with the obligation to pay the whole of the notes forthwith, and also to keep one-third of the reserve in cash, involves an implied grant of at least the right to import for minting purposes sufficient silver to make possible the fulfilment of the obligation necessary to secure the continued enjoyment of the monopoly of the note issue.

The grant, therefore, of a monopoly of minting silver to any other bank or firm would manifestly prevent the Imperial Bank from being able to fulfil their obligations and would thus be a violation of that bank's concession.

Moreover, even if the Imperial Bank had not, under the concession, any implied grant of a right to import silver for minting, but such right remained exclusively in the hands of the Persian Government, the latter could not divest themselves of the right in favour of any third party to such an extent as would put it out of their power to permit the Imperial Bank to import for minting purposes sufficient silver to enable them to perform their concessionary obligations.

In view, however, of the sincere desire of His Majesty's Government to act, whenever possible, in complete accord with the Russian Government, I have been in correspondence with the Imperial Bank of Persia, whose directors have, at my request, expressed their willingness to accept the following arrangement:—

That the right to import for minting purposes enough silver for the fulfilment of the Imperial Bank's concessionary obligation be assured to the Imperial Bank, and that, subject to that right, the privilege of importing silver for coinage should be shared by the Imperial Bank and the Banque de Prêts et d'Escompte.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[35383] No. 204.

Foreign Office to Persian Railway Syndicate.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to bring to your notice certain considerations connected with the construction of railways and telegraph lines in Persia. By clause 1 of the contract concluded by you with the Persian Government, copy of which was forwarded to this Department on the 15th June, 1912, you have obtained a concession to construct a railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, and by clause 12 of the same contract the concession to construct a telegraph line along the line of railway has also been granted to your syndicate.

I am to state that, by an agreement with the Persian Government of the 4th January last, the Indo-European Telegraph Department have undertaken to reconstruct the Mohammerah–Ahwaz–Dizful telegraph line, and I am to observe that the above concurrent and apparently conflicting telegraphic privileges would suggest that the relations between the Railway Administration and the Indo-European Telegraph Department might with advantage receive careful consideration.

It seems clear the Railway Administration must have telegraphic facilities along the line of railway; yet it seems equally clear that if the Railway and Indo-European Telegraph Department maintain concurrent and independent systems there will be considerable reduplication of staff involving unnecessary expenditure, as the railway telegraph line could only be used for railway messages, would not be open to the public, and would thus be earning no revenue.

In India, when a railway is constructed more or less parallel to an existing line of telegraph, the latter is usually dismantled and re-erected along the railway, and provision is made at the same time to carry the wires necessary for working the railway; it would seem possible that a similar arrangement might prove of advantage both to your Syndicate and to the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the present case.

I am, however, to observe that the Arabistan lines are not the property of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to dispose of as they please, and if a scheme, such as is usually followed in India, should be adopted, it will be necessary to obtain the consent of the Persian Government to the removal of their line from its prospective route to the railway alignment, and to its adaptation to the purpose required.

Before, however, any step can be taken in this sense, the opinion of your Syndicate must, of course, be obtained. In the event of their being prepared to give favourable consideration to the scheme suggested above, it would seem necessary in the first place that they should first of all transfer their telegraph concession contained in clause 12 of the agreement with the Persian Government to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, so that the latter could then arrange with the Persian Government to modify its existing agreement, or to come to a fresh agreement.

Sir E. Grey would therefore be glad to receive the observations of your Syndicate on the question.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[37213]

No. 205.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 245.)

Sir,

St. Petersburgh, August 8, 1913.

IN the course of a conversation to-day, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Count Benckendorff had been instructed to speak to you with regard to the desire of the Russian Banque d'Escompte to obtain the monopoly of supplying the silver required by the Persian Mint. His Excellency at the same time handed to me privately the enclosed paper, which he said was not to be regarded as an *aide-mémoire*, in which he had noted down the views of the Russian Government on the subject, adding that he would be grateful if I would impress on you how great an interest they took in this question.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 205.

Paper privately communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

LA Banque russe d'Escompte et de Prêts de Perse voudrait obtenir un droit exclusif de fournir l'argent nécessaire pour la frappe à l'Administration persane de la Monnaie.

Ce droit, ayant été octroyé à la Banque Impériale de Perse en vertu d'un arrangement conclu entre cette banque et Mr. Shuster-Morgan en 1911, arrangement qui du reste ne fut pas dûment sanctionné par les autorités compétentes, le Gouvernement Impérial a cru nécessaire d'entrer par l'entremise de l'Ambassade de Russie à Londres en relations avec le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne afin d'obtenir son concours pour la solution de cette affaire dans un sens favorable aux intérêts de la Banque russe. Aucune réponse n'a été encore reçue à ce sujet.

Le Gouvernement croit devoir attirer l'attention bienveillante de l'Ambassade britannique sur ce fait que la Banque Impériale de Perse jouit d'un privilège très serieux notamment du droit exclusif de l'émission des "bank notes."

En considération de quoi, le Gouvernement britannique ne verrait peut-être pas d'objections si le privilège de fournir l'argent à l'Administration persane de la Monnaie était octroyé à la Banque russe d'Escompte et de Prêts.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 25 juillet (7 août), 1913.

[37288]

No. 206.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 12.)

Sir,

India Office, August 11, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 5th instant on the subject of the Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will suffice if the application for an option is made by the Ministers of the two Powers, and that he concurs in the terms of the draft note. It is, however, perhaps worth considering whether the application is not more likely to be favourably received if the French Minister were associated with it, so as to emphasise the genuinely international character of the undertaking.

The Marquess of Crewe is addressing the Government of India regarding the composition, &c., of the commission, and will communicate with you again on receipt of their reply.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[37281]

No. 207.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office—(Received August 12.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street,
London, August 11, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th instant, I beg to state that the security that would be offered to the Société d'Études would be bonds of the Persian Government for the amount of their share of the advance.

The proposal made by the Persian Government to Mr. Preece in October 1910, upon which the proposed loan of 100,000*l.* is based, was:—

"That we should lend the Imperial Persian Government a sum of 100,000*l.* at par, bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for sixty years, the same to be redeemable at the option of the Government at the end of any year on three months' notice, and the loan to be secured by the shares held by the Persian Government in the First Exploitation Company (Limited) and by the Royalties payable under the D'Arcy concession of the 28th May, 1901."

The intention at the time was that the Persian Government should issue bonds for the amount of the loan, which bonds would require to state the nature of the security and the conditions under which it was to be hypothecated. This procedure would still require to be adopted, although we have had no recent discussion with the Persian Government on the point.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY.

[37336]

No. 208.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburgh, August 12, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 392 of 9th August to Constantinople, last paragraph.

I am informed that M. Minorsky is leaving Constantinople for St. Petersburgh, and will not be at former place when Captain Wilson arrives.

[34570]

No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 278. Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 12, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in regard to the endeavours which

are being made by Russian officials in Northern Persia to strangle the Indian tea trade by bringing pressure to bear on the importers of tea or their agents at Resht.*

You will observe from section 3 of the despatch enclosed that, without mentioning names, Sir W. Townley has drawn M. Sabline's attention to the complaints which are reaching him of the obstacles placed by the Russian authorities in the way of importers of Indian tea.

Your Excellency should speak seriously to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the same sense, but in doing so you should also abstain from mentioning names, since otherwise your action may have an effect contrary to that which it is desired to produce.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36717] No. 210.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran forwarding and supporting the application of His Majesty's consul at Shiraz for leave to make a tour in Fars of a month's duration, starting early in September.†

Sir E. Grey proposes, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, to reply that, if operations are undertaken against Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli as soon as practicable in the autumn, it might be well that Major O'Connor should be at his post at Shiraz, but that if, after considering that point, Sir W. Townley remains of his present opinion, Sir E. Grey is content to leave the matter to his decision.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[37355] No. 211.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 710.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 8, 1913.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 380 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the draft article, relative to the question of the maintenance of the rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company under the D'Arcy Concession on the territories to be transferred from Persia to Turkey under the frontier arrangements now under negotiation.

This draft article is in the exact form in which it was proposed to his Highness the Grand Vizier on the 10th ultimo, and accepted by him as reported to you in my telegram No. 389 of the 6th instant.

The only substantive alteration in the wording from that of the enclosure to my despatch No. 567 of the 27th June last occurs at the end of article (*f*), where, in accordance with the approval contained in your telegram No. 307 of the 7th ultimo, the words "aussitôt que possible après la signature du présent traité" were substituted for the words "dans un délai de six mois à partir de la date du présent traité."

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 211.

Draft Article.

LES hautes parties contractantes étant d'accord que la concession octroyée par la convention du mois de mai 1901 par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah

* No. 116. † No. 179.

de Perse à William Knox D'Arcy et actuellement exploitée, en conformité des dispositions de l'article 9 de ladite convention, par l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), ayant son siège principal à Winchester House, Londres (convention ci-après désignée "la convention" et dont copie est ci-annexée), reste en pleine force et vigueur dans toute l'étendue des territoires transférés par la Perse à la Turquie en vertu des dispositions du présent traité (ci-après désignés "les territoires transférés"); et désireux ainsi de pourvoir au maintien et à l'exécution intégrale dans lesdits territoires des divers droits et obligations créés par la convention, sont convenues ainsi qu'il suit :—

(*a.*) [La Turquie] déclare reconnaître la concession comme maintenue en pleine force et validité dans les territoires transférés et que la concession, accordée par l'article 1er de la convention constitue un monopole absolu et exclusif dans la limite des droits acquis par la concession dans toute l'étendue des territoires transférés; aucune concession de même nature propre à léser ou porter préjudice aux droits et privilèges de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), ne sera octroyée à quelque individu, société ou association que ce soit.

(*b.*) Tous les droits, privilèges, franchises et autres avantages accordés à l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) par [la Perse] en vertu de la convention ou dont celle-ci jouit actuellement lui seront respectés et maintenus par [la Turquie] dans les territoires transférés en stricte conformité des dispositions de la convention.

(*c.*) Sauf les cas prévus aux alinéas (*d*) et (*e*) du présent article, [la Turquie] jouira dans les territoires transférés en stricte conformité des dispositions de la convention de tous les droits, privilèges et avantages réservés ou acquis à [la Perse] en vertu de la convention.

(*d.*) L'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), ayant versé à [la Perse], conformément à l'article 10 de la convention, les deux sommes y mentionnées, à savoir 20,000*l.* en espèces et 20,000*l.* en actions entièrement libérées, [La Turquie] ne pourra rien réclamer à l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), de ce chef.

(*e.*) La Perse n'aura droit à aucun versement de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), en vertu de la dernière phrase de l'article 10 de la convention du chef des bénéfices résultant de l'exploitation de la concession dans les territoires transférés. La redevance à payer en vertu de cette phrase du chef de cette exploitation sera versée par la compagnie à [la Turquie], et [la Perse] n'aura rien à réclamer à la compagnie ou à la Turquie du chef de ces bénéfices.

(*f.*) Afin d'assurer l'exécution effective des articles de la convention relatifs à l'installation des "pipe lines," la Turquie reconnaît que ces articles assurent à l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) le droit d'exécuter cette installation de façon à relier les gisements pétrolifères dans les territoires transférés avec un point proprement situé pour faciliter l'exportation par le Golfe Persique des produits de la compagnie. Ce point sera déterminé par un accord à intervenir entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) aussitôt que possible après la signature du présent traité.

(*g.*) [La Turquie] reconnaît que les dispositions de l'article 9 de la convention comportent la formation facultative, en conformité des stipulations de cet article, d'une nouvelle société pour l'exploitation de la concession dans les territoires transférés, et que dans le cas de la création éventuelle de pareille société celle-ci sera chargée de toutes les obligations et jouira de tous les droits et privilèges de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), à laquelle elle se trouvera ainsi pleinement et entièrement substituée.

(*h.*) Tout différend ou question, de quelque nature que ce soit, qui pourrait surgir entre [la Turquie] et l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) sera soumis à deux arbitres à Constantinople, dont l'un sera nommé par chacune des parties, et à un tiers arbitre, qui sera désigné par les arbitres avant de procéder à l'arbitrage. La décision des arbitres, ou, dans le cas où ces derniers ne tomberaient pas d'accord, celle du tiers arbitre, sera concluante.

(*i.*) [La Perse] se charge d'obtenir l'adhésion de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) aux dispositions de cet article. Le moyen de signifier cette adhésion à [la Turquie] sera arrêté ultérieurement de commun accord.

[37493] No. 212.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 285.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 13, 1913.

MY despatch No. 163 of 27th July.

Following from His Majesty's representative at Bushire, 8th August:—

"Consul at Mohammerah reports that Muin-ut-Tujjar intends to build a tramway from Sheleli to Shuster, and is collecting material. This seems to affect the question of need or absence of need for railway alignment to pass Shuster."

Muin-ut-Tujjar says he has engaged English engineer to survey the line from Sheleli to Shuster with a view to building steam tramway, for which he has got concession from the Persian Government. He says he has not yet made any definite plans, and will do nothing without consulting this legation.

[37499] No. 213.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 286.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 13, 1913

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 296 of 9th August and your telegram No. 352 of 11th August.

The Regent was certainly communicated with, because he refused to sign new decree which was submitted to him, but sent instructions that an old decree drawn up more than fifteen months ago should be published. The ways of the Regent are strange, but presumably he hopes by taking this action to excuse himself for any non-fulfilment of an assurance given at St. Petersburgh. It would not appear from St. Petersburgh telegram No. 233 of 27th June that the Regent gave any formal assurance respecting the convocation of the Medjliss as is now claimed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. It would be most unlike his Highness to commit himself in such a manner. I am not aware that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has made any communication to the Persian Government of a nature to request that the two legations should be consulted before the election proclamation was made. That this was to be done on the Shah's birthday was kept secret and created surprise.

On the receipt of a report of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation with the Regent I told the Prime Minister of the gist of what had been said. When I came to the part about the Medjliss, his Highness exclaimed that the Regent would never return to Persia if he had been made to commit himself to an assurance that the two legations would be consulted before the election proclamation was issued. He asked what answer the Regent had made. I replied that the nature of his answer did not appear in the report of the conversation which had reached me.

I gather that the Regent did not report to the Persian Government fully his conversations at St. Petersburgh, merely saying that all had passed off most satisfactorily. Under these circumstances they can hardly be said to have broken a promise of which they knew nothing. I am aware that Russian consul at Tabriz has reported that anjumans are being formed under Mr. Smart's auspices. This, of course, is a gross perversion of the truth. Smart reports that he has heard nothing of the formation of anjumans, and there is no sign of anything here or elsewhere that I know of. The Cabinet has been repeatedly warned that no effort must be spared to secure return of more suitable representatives than on former occasions.

[37500] No. 214.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 13, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 12th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

The Russian Government do not consider Captain Wilson need come to St. Petersburgh.

They suggest that he should proceed from Constantinople direct to Tehran, and return thence to Constantinople by the second week of September. The Russian Commission will then be there, and the Russian Government suggest they should then proceed with Mr. Wratislaw and the British Commission to Mohammerah.

The Russian Government promise reply respecting the composition of technical staff shortly.

[37336] No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 397.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Has M. Minorsky left yet for St. Petersburgh? If not, when does he go? Wilson will go direct to St. Petersburgh if M. Minorsky is there, but please report definitely by to-morrow.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 590.)

[37336] No. 216.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 398.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I am disturbed at the delay which is taking place in frontier negotiations at Constantinople, especially in view of M. Minorsky's departure, as, pending their conclusion, no communication can be made to the Persian Government, and it is therefore doubtful if commission can start work at Mohammerah on 1st December—a point to which I attach great importance, as I wish work to be completed up to Mendali before hot weather begins. Please report exact cause of difficulty and delay, and do all in your power to expedite negotiations.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 591, and Tehran, No. 353.)

[37062] No. 217.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 114.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 164 of the 29th ultimo, regarding the assault on Mr. G. Anderson near Sultanabad on the 3rd June last.

I approve your proposal to present to the Central Government a special claim of 100*l.* for personal compensation to Mr. Anderson on account of the wanton attack made on him.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37604] No. 218.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 404.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 13, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

My telegram No. 389 of 5th August.

Draft identic note prepared at the Russian Embassy, and containing provisions suggested by me, was discussed by the Russian Ambassador and myself with the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War to-day. We showed them the line of the frontier in the Zohab district on the map, and arrived at virtual agreement as to its accuracy except at one point, which is to be discussed again. The Grand Vizier promised to inform us by the 16th August whether he could accept the note as final settlement on which the commission could work, and we have good reason to believe that his reply will be satisfactory.

The frontier line is described in the draft note with considerable detail from Ararat to Mendeli, and sketch map illustrating it is to be attached to the note.

Neither we nor the Turks have sufficient information respecting the *status quo* frontier between Mendeli and Hawizeh to enable us to lay it down on the map, as recommended in your telegram No. 392 of 9th August, and it was agreed that demarcation shall be left to the commissioners on the basis of the *status quo*, subject to such modifications as are required by geographical and tribal considerations.

I think that the passages intended to preserve the oil company's rights, &c., will prove adequate. They contest the Turkish assertion that the proposed line south of the Kuretu and Elvend Rivers is the *status quo* frontier, and speak [?] of cession of territory in the latter district. The acceptation by the Grand Vizier of the draft article maintaining and explaining the company's rights is also placed on record (see my telegram No. 389 of 5th August).

I should be glad to receive authority to send the note in when the Russian Ambassador does so, provided, of course, that the Grand Vizier requires no essential modification.

There is no time to prepare copies before the messenger leaves to-morrow, but I shall forward them by post. (End of R.)

(Very Confidential.)

The Russian Ambassador is very insistent on the necessity for presenting the note at once, and from hints he has dropped I suspect his anxiety for despatch arises from the belief that he may be withdrawn very shortly in order to bring pressure to bear on Turkey in connection with the Adrianople question.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 594, and Tehran, No. 356.)

[37639] No. 219.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 405.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 397 of 13th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Russian Embassy has not yet received official notification of M. Minorsky's appointment, and he will not leave Constantinople for five or six days.

I should be glad if Captain Wilson could come here as originally suggested (see your telegram No. 379 of 13th August).

[37636] No. 220.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 288.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Tehran, August* 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 351 of 11th August: Gendarmerie—Bakhtiari.

Arrangement has been reached: 300 Bakhtiaris are to remain here in the service of the Persian Government; they are to live in barracks outside the town; no arms are to be carried except when the men are on duty; the remaining Bakhtiaris here are to return to their own country in batches of thirty per diem under the command of the two junior khans; the khans guarantee the good behaviour of their men on the road. No decision was reached about the ten prisoners, but I propose to urge the colonel to pardon them and to allow them to leave with the last detachment as an act of grace, which will do much to restore good relations.

The khans have swallowed a very bitter pill like men, and have cordially co-operated in reaching the arrangement made after they accepted my suggestions last Saturday.

[37604] No. 221.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 404 of 13th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

I sanction action you propose. The maps should be signed by representative of Ottoman Government when the note is accepted by them.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 593, and Tehran, No. 355.)

[37500] No. 222.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 14, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to refer to a telegram, No. 301 of the 13th instant, from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh respecting the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey attaches great importance to the presence of Captain Wilson during the whole operations of the frontier commission, an opinion in which Mr. Consul-General Wratislaw, the principal British commissioner, concurs. He further considers that it is essential to the proper discharge of his duties on the commission that Captain Wilson should have some time to study the voluminous correspondence with which in all details he is not yet familiar, and it is also of great importance that Captain Wilson should make all preliminary arrangements for the transport of the British commission's *impedimenta* and for the survey party.

In these circumstances, Sir E. Grey has learnt with some surprise that Captain Wilson has been selected, or that it is proposed that he should be selected, to serve as political officer to a mission which, he is privately informed, it is proposed should be sent by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to investigate certain questions connected with the Arabistan oilfields.

Sir E. Grey will doubtless be consulted by the Lords Commissioners with reference to the despatch of this mission to a foreign country, but he desires me to intimate forthwith that he is strongly opposed to the appointment of Captain Wilson to serve on the mission if it should be sent, and he considers that other officers could fulfil the duty in question if necessary.

Sir E. Grey is very doubtful whether Captain Wilson can perform the work which it was proposed he should undertake in connection with the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway survey, but he is not disposed to object to this if Captain Wilson can definitely arrange (a point as to which that officer is himself now doubtful) to be at Mohammerah by the 31st October at the latest for service with the frontier commission, and if by that date all preliminary arrangements for transport can be made by him.

I am to express the hope that the Secretary of State for India will concur in this letter, and that an early reply may, if possible, be furnished.

In the circumstances which have arisen, Sir E. Grey considers that, unless the Russian Government think otherwise, no useful purpose would be served by either Mr. Wratislaw or Captain Wilson meeting the Russian commission in Constantinople, and he is disposed to suggest that the several missions should meet at Mohammerah on the 31st October.

If, however, any officer has to go to Constantinople, Sir E. Grey would recommend that Captain Wilson should go there.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[35366] No. 223.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 14, 1913.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 23rd October last regarding the lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a letter from the Anglo-Persian Company,* stating that the Imperial commissioner of the company has made enquiries on the subject.

Sir E. Grey has caused Mr. Greenway to be informed orally that, if the matter is raised again, it would be well to refer all enquiries to this Office, and Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to Lord Crewe's concurrence, to reply to any questions in the following sense:—

The navigation of the Persian Gulf has always been a matter of concern to His Majesty's Government, who have been quite frank in telling the Persian Government

* No. 149.

of the arrangements that they have of late been obliged to make, in the interests of Persian no less than of international commerce, for the improvement of the lighting and buoying of the Gulf. At Abadan advantage has been taken of the facilities offered, by the presence there of a British firm, to carry out the new arrangements, and this procedure seemed so natural and harmless that it appeared quite unnecessary to make any communication to the Persian Government on the subject. If, however, that Government will depute some official to proceed to the island and visit the depôt, His Majesty's Government will have no objection whatever to such a course.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations that Lord Crewe may desire to offer on this subject.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[37740] No. 224.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 15.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 13, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th July and to the letter of the 5th August from the General Post Office to your address (of which a copy was communicated direct to this Office) regarding the proposals of the German Government for the establishment of telegraphic communication through Turkey with German East Africa and China, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he concurs in the proposal that before further action is taken an Inter-Departmental Conference should be held for the consideration of details.

In the meantime his Lordship has, in the telegram of which copy is annexed, consulted the Government of India on the question, and would suggest that their reply should be awaited before the conference is actually convened.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 224.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 11, 1913.

PLEASE refer to papers forwarded by my Political Secretary on the 18th ultimo respecting the proposed German cable in the Persian Gulf.

Development of Dutch naval strength in East Indies makes the question one of particular strategical importance. Probably, although attempt might be made to modify the scheme, or prevent its execution, we will not be able to object to it in principle. As a modification, suggestion is put forward that the Eastern Telegraph Company should make offer to German Government to lay the cables for it, landing them on British territory at intermediate points. The sections in British waters would be property of the company; the rest would be property of German Government. I shall be glad to learn by telegraph at earliest possible date how the general question and the above proposal are viewed by you.

[37636] No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 357.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 288 of 14th August: Bakhtiari.

I congratulate you on successful result of your efforts.

[37639] No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 405.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1913.

I HAVE some difficulty in making definite plans for Mr. Wratislaw and Captain Wilson, partly because I am uncertain of the Russian plans.

I assume that the date of meeting for the several missions, or at any rate the British and Russian ones, should be fixed as 18th (31st) October at Mohammerah.

Mr. Wratislaw has to return to Crete to conclude private arrangements, and proposes to proceed direct from there to Mohammerah by sea, as it would be inconvenient for him to go to Constantinople.

Captain Wilson wishes to spend ten days in Tehran, for business connected with the Mohammerah-Khorremmabad Railway, some time in latter half of September. He would propose to go there viâ Constantinople, which he would have to leave not later than 5th September (N.S.). You could therefore see him, as you desire, at any time between now and 5th September most convenient to you, and date of his departure from London depends on your reply. He cannot return from Tehran to see Russian Mission, and must proceed direct from Tehran to Mohammerah. If, therefore, M. Minorsky wishes to see Captain Wilson in Constantinople, the only convenient time will be between now and 5th September. Please discuss whole matter with Russian Ambassador and telegraph result. You should warn his Excellency of difficulty of securing steamer accommodation for mission in the autumn. I suggest date of meeting to be 31st October instead of 1st December, as first suggested, because I understand the Russian Mission will be at Constantinople by second week in September, and that therefore they will be able to reach Mohammerah by 31st October.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 596, and Tehran, No. 359.)

[36518] No. 227.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th April last, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a letter has been received from the India Office forwarding copy of a despatch from the Government of India (No. 62, Secret, of the 3rd July) in regard to German competition with British trade in the Persian Gulf.

It is understood that a copy of this letter has been sent to your department by the India Office, and I am to enquire whether the Board have any further observations to offer on the subject in the light of this fresh communication.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[37787] No. 228.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

Sir, *Treasury, August* 15, 1913.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 8th instant, in regard to the proposed appointment of a boundary commission to demarcate the Turko-Persian frontier between Mount Ararat and the Persian Gulf.

In reply, I am to request you to inform the Secretary of State that my Lords authorise the payment of salary at the rate of 1,500*l.* per annum, together with outfit allowance of 200*l.* per annum to Mr. Wratislaw, His Majesty's consul-general in Crete, as principal British commissioner, on the understanding that his existing post in Crete is not to be filled up.

Their Lordships further give their general sanction for the arrangements proposed for carrying out the British portion of the work of the commission, on the understanding that the Government of India will bear one-half of the total expenditure involved.

Their Lordships will no doubt be afforded a further opportunity of criticising in detail the various items of expenditure to be incurred; and, in the meantime, I am to convey their sanction to the charge of the Imperial share of the expenses to the sub-head "Special Missions" in the diplomatic and consular vote.

I am, &c.
T. L. HEATH.

[37876] No. 229.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 11th August, 1913, regarding the Trans-Persian Railway.

India Office, August 15, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 229.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *India Office, August* 11, 1913

TRANS-PERSIAN Railway.

It is proposed now to apply in general terms for option for railway traversing Persia from north-west towards south-east, and to proceed at once with appointment of joint commission to study alignment of section beyond Tehran. What would you propose regarding numbers, personnel, and pay of British half?

[37830] No. 230.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 408.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 15, 1913

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 400 of 14th August.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that it is unnecessary to obtain Turkish signature to the map, as it is to be attached to the note by way of illustration of the line agreed on. The Turks might also raise objections, and we think that the situation would be met by inducing them to initial all maps as "copies conformes."

Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 301 of 13th August.

The Russian Embassy enquires when we may expect Captain Wilson, as M. Minorsky's movements depend on his arrival.

[37830] No. 231.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 406.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 408 of 15th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Maps need not be signed. I shall be glad to know if you are making arrangement with Turkey which will give Russian and British commissioners power to arbitrate (not merely to mediate) in any difficulties which may arise in course of delimitation.

Captain Wilson will arrive at Constantinople on 23rd August, leaving London by first express opportunity.

You might prepare, with your Russian colleague, suitable communication for presentation to Persian Government by two legations, and Captain Wilson can take this with him to Tehran, providing Sir W. Townley and his Russian colleague with any further information they may require. As regards Mohammerah region, stress should be laid in this communication upon fact that settlement now in view is far more satisfactory than that accepted by Persia in 1851 (see printed correspondence). I attach importance to identic instructions being issued to Russian and British commissioners, and you should seek to arrange this with your Russian colleague after discussion with Captain Wilson, who is fully acquainted with my views as to details. I should be glad if Russian Embassy were in a position to furnish Captain Wilson with details as to Russian technical staff, &c.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 362, and St. Petersburgh, No. 599.)

[37786] No. 229.*

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 16.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 15, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he has, with the concurrence of the Government of India, placed the services of Captain A. T. Wilson at the disposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with effect from the 14th instant. Captain Wilson will take his orders from your Department, and it will be his duty to comply with whatever wishes Sir E. Grey may express as to his movements and the employment of his time.

Lord Crewe notes that Sir E. Grey is disposed to suggest that the several missions should meet at Mohammera on the 31st October, but that in his telegram No. 398 of the 13th instant to Mr. Marling he expresses the doubt if the commission can begin work at Mohammera on the 1st December. Whether or not Captain Wilson can undertake work in connection with the railway survey depends upon which of these dates is finally selected, and I am to request that his Lordship may be informed of the decision as soon as possible, since local arrangements are affected by it.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[37956]

No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and has the honour to inform his Highness, for the confidential information of the Ottoman Government, that His Majesty's Government propose to nominate Mr. A. C. Wratislaw, C.B., C.M.G., as principal British Commissioner, and Captain Wilson, C.M.G., as Deputy British Commissioner, to serve on the Commission for the demarcation of the Turco-Persian frontier.

Mr. Wratislaw has served as His Majesty's consul at Basra and as His Majesty's consul-general at Tabriz. He now holds the post of His Majesty's consul-general for the island of Crete. Mr. Wratislaw is already acquainted with the Turco-Persian frontier in the vicinity of Urmia.

Captain Wilson was for some time His Majesty's acting consul at Mohammerah, and is intimately acquainted with the frontier between Mohammerah and Hawizeh. It is proposed to confer upon him power to act in the event of Mr. Wratislaw's absence through illness or any other cause, and thus to avoid a possible source of delay.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn as soon as possible who the Ottoman Commissioners will be.

Foreign Office, August 16, 1913.

[37975]

No. 233.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 290.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 349 of 11th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

There is a map here which appears to be the one in question. It is in thirteen sheets, and dated 1870, and signed by representatives of Great Britain and Russia. It is in good condition. There is, however, no one here who can say for certain whether it is the one used by Shipley-Minorsky Commission.

[37966]

No. 234.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, August 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 400 of 14th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

We understand that Turks will accept note with trifling alterations, all of which, I believe, concern frontier north of Zohab.

Russian Embassy intends to agree to most of these modifications and leave Turks to make reserves in their reply.

Russian Ambassador's extreme anxiety to reach form of agreement seems to denote apprehensions of strained relations in connection with Balkan question.

[37967]

No. 235.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, August 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 406 of 16th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

M. Minorsky is obliged to leave St. Petersburgh 25th August at latest, as he has to make arrangements for Russian technical staff, &c. He will have, therefore, barely two days with Wilson. Could not Wilson come earlier?

As it will be very difficult for him to get together all necessary camp equipment, &c., in St. Petersburgh and despatch it by Russian ship leaving for Basra about 6th October, M. Minorsky asks whether Government of India would supply at expense of

Russian Government set of camp equipment exactly similar to that of British commissioner and send it to Basra.

Russian Ambassador points out that it is improbable that Persian Commission, with necessary staff, escort, &c., could reach Mohammerah by 31st October.

[37968] No. 236.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 17, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 406 of 16th August: Communication to be made to Persian Government.

Russian Ambassador thinks that requirements of case will be best met by presenting to Persian Government copy of identic note which we are about to send to the Porte and copy of Anglo-Turkish declaration of 29th July, as well as copies of previous notes exchanged by the two Powers with Turkey.

We presume it will be necessary to place on record agreement arrived at between Turkey and Persia for demarcation of frontier, with assistance of mediating Powers. This might be done by final protocol of Turco-Persian Commission, which has not yet been formally dissolved. Necessary instructions would have to be sent to Persian Ambassador here.

Instructions will then have to be prepared for Demarcation Commission, as well as "règlement" to govern its procedure.

Smooth and speedy working of commission will depend very largely on this latter, and Russian Ambassador thinks British and Russian delegates should undertake its preparation, and urges that Mr. Wratislaw should meet M. Minorsky here for the purpose about 1st October.

[37499] No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 600.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 17, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 286 of 13th August: Medjliss.

In view of first two sentences of last paragraph of above telegram, I should be inclined to defer representations mentioned in your telegram No. 296 of 10th August pending arrival of Regent at Tehran.

Please telegraph views of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, after informing his Excellency of the above.

You should also inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of truth about Mr. Smart.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 364.)

[38153] No. 238.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 12. Commercial. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, July* 27, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6, Commercial, dated the 13th February, I have the honour to state that I have been informed by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that further proposals for more extensive modifications of the existing customs tariff than those commented on in my despatch mentioned above have been recently made by the Treasurer-General of Persia.

It seemed advisable to place His Majesty's Government in possession at the earliest possible moment of local information as to modifications in the present schedule, which would be welcome to British merchants and residents under any readjustment scheme.

I have therefore ventured, without waiting to be acquainted with details of M. Mornard's proposals, to submit a memorandum on various aspects of the question

which has been compiled by Mr. H. G. Chick.* The statistics therein given will, it is hoped, be useful at the present time.

The percentages of existing duties were worked out from local enquiries by Mr. Chick without any reference being made to the figures given in Mr. Maclean's report of 1903, though the results tally very closely in most cases.

I would in particular support the suggestions made for reduction of the present duties on Indian tea and other articles now smuggled, and on European provisions, &c., which weigh heavily on European residents. As regards tea, His Majesty's Government have had the question of a reduction before them since 1910, and there can be no question as to the desirability, in British interests, of such a step.

The light rates of duty now paid by kerosene, metals, matches, and those articles chiefly imported by Russia appear in considerable relief in the statistics appended.

A copy of this memorandum has simultaneously been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[38052] No. 239.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No 700. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 2, 1913.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 211, Very Confidential, of the 4th ultimo, I have the honour to report that in reply to a private enquiry the Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey, states that he has no knowledge of a proposal by the German Government to land a cable on Ottoman soil in the Basra vilayet.

I learn also that nothing is known at the Ministry of Telegraphs of any recent application by the Germans for landing rights on the Turkish shores of the Persian Gulf, nor are there any at present in existence.

I would add, however, that a German company would probably not approach the Ministry of Telegraphs, but would cause the application to be made through the embassy to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[38099] No. 240.

Captain Wilson to Foreign Office.—(Received August 18.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1913.

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence regarding the Turco-Persian frontier, I have the honour to point out that as the date for the assembly of the Commission at Mohammerah has been changed from the 1st December to the 31st October, I shall, to my great regret, be unable to proceed to Luristan to undertake my duties there in connection with the railway survey.

2. I am informing Mr. Greenway accordingly and asking him to instruct Mr. Soane, whom he has deputed on behalf of the Persian Railway Syndicate to accompany the surveyors, to make the best arrangements he can for their safe conduct. On arrival at Tehran I will do what I can to facilitate their journey by addressing communications to various chiefs and notables of Luristan.

3. The officer whom the Government of India will depute to take my place at Dizful will be unable to proceed to his post in time to accompany the survey party. I therefore suggest that he be instructed by the Government of India to be at Mohammerah by the 15th October and to take over from me there.

4. Numerous details as to the staff of the British delegation on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission cannot be finally settled until we are aware of the composition of the Russian technical staff, and will involve further communication with the Government of India.

* Not printed.

I would ask that the Government of India may be informed that I am authorised (as suggested in Mr. Wratislaw's letter of the 5th October) to communicate with them direct, and that they may be invited to act on my requisitions so far as possible.

5. I understand that His Majesty's Foreign Office are of opinion that the accounts of the Commission (with the exception of the salary of Mr. Wratislaw) should be submitted periodically to the Government of India, *i.e.*, to the Comptroller, India Treasuries, and that the Commission should finance itself by drawing supply bills upon the Government of India. Mr. Wratislaw has expressed his concurrence with this view, and I would ask that, in communicating to the Government of India a copy of Treasury letter of the 15th August, they may be informed as above, and requested to authorise me (in the absence in England of Mr. Wratislaw), and Mr. Wratislaw himself, to issue supply bills on the Bombay Treasury, and to submit a monthly cash account in the usual way to the Comptroller, India Treasuries.

6. As regards my present expenses, I have received an advance of 100*l.* from the India Office on account of travelling expenses, and I propose to account for this amount direct to the Comptroller, India Treasuries.

Mr. Wratislaw will no doubt be authorised to draw on the Foreign Office for such sums as he may require at once for the purchase of equipment in England for the use of the Commission.

I have, &c.
A. T. WILSON,
Captain, Indian Army, on Special Duty.

[38263]

No. 241.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 18, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 406 of 16th August to Mr. Marling.

It is by no means unlikely that the Persian Government may resent not having been consulted about the last details of Turco-Persian frontier, and that we may experience some difficulty in securing their concurrence. In spite of the fact that they are most anxious that question may be settled as soon as possible because they fear Turkish aggression in future, they are apt to be touchy and obstinate when they think that their national *amour-propre* has been wounded. If we delay in making any communication until the arrival here of Captain Wilson it will hardly be possible to get a Persian Commissioner and staff sent to Mohammerah by 30th November.

I do not know how much Persian Ambassador at Constantinople has been kept informed, but hear complete ignorance of what is taking place is affected.

[38261]

No. 242.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburgh, August 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 600 of 17th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had no objection to postponing representations as you proposed if it was really true that no Anjumans were being formed. He took a note of what I told him on the subject.

[37975]

No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 368.)
(Telegraphic.) *Code.*

Foreign Office, August 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 290 of 17th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

This is the map in question. Please have a tin-lined box, which can be easily opened and closed, made for it now, and Captain Wilson will pick it up.

[37967]

No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 408.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 18, 1913.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 416 and 417 of 17th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Captain Wilson leaves to-morrow, and I trust M. Minorsky will delay his departure from Constantinople for a few days, as, but for delay in Russian reply, Captain Wilson would have been in Constantinople by now. This is the more desirable as Captain Wilson has full knowledge of my views regarding procedure of Demarcation Commission, which he could discuss now with M. Minorsky, thus obviating necessity for visit of Mr. Wratislaw.

I think there will be no difficulty in supplying camp equipment from India for Russian Mission, but Captain Wilson will discuss point fully with M. Minorsky, and meanwhile Government of India will be consulted. Will there be a deputy as well as a principal Russian Commissioner?

I agree to procedure you suggest for communication to Persian Government, and for placing on record agreement arrived at, but, in view of the importance of expediting arrival of Persian Mission at Mohammerah, some preliminary communication should be made at Tehran urging immediate preparations.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 367, and St. Petersburgh, No. 603.)

[37967]

No. 245.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 604.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 18, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Please communicate to Russian Government Mr. Marling's telegrams Nos. 416 and 417 of 17th August, and my reply to him No. 408 of to-day.

[37281]

No. 246.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 18, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant regarding the security to be offered to the Société d'Études for the amount of their share of your advance of 100,000*l.* to the Persian Government.

As regards your suggestion that that Government should issue bonds for the amount of the loan, I am to state that in Sir E. Grey's opinion it would seem undesirable that such bonds should set forth the nature of the security in question, which it would clearly be to British interests not to divulge.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[38458]

No. 247.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 292.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 19, 1913.

DIFFERENCES of opinion which have been evident in the Cabinet for some time have at last culminated in crisis, Ain-ed-Dowleh declaring that he can no longer work with Kawam-es-Sultaneh, Minister of Finance and brother of Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

Intrigue against the Minister of the Interior has been long prepared, and the mind of the Russian Government has been poisoned against the Prince by reports which have represented him as friendly to the democrats, as having brought back to Persia certain revolutionary elements from the Caucasus, and as being connected with Anjumans. It is easy to trace these intrigues to the two brothers above mentioned,

and, I am sorry to say, to the Regent, who is evidently at his old tricks even before he returns to Persia.

It is ridiculous to associate Ain-ed-Dowleh with the advanced elements, and those who do so must be well aware that they are endeavouring to mislead the Russian Government. The two brothers are as untruthful as they are corrupt. The President of the Council, who does not know which side to take, though in his heart he favours Ain-ed-Dowleh, has sought my advice, as also that of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. I have informed his Highness that I consider Ain-ed-Dowleh the only possible Minister of the Interior under the present circumstances. He is most necessary to us both in Fars and Seistan. I added that I have not the slightest confidence in Kawam as Minister of the Interior, and that if he were named it would be my duty to advise His Majesty's Government to prepare for troubles in both provinces, as I am convinced that the policy of a Minister who would only seek to enrich himself must lead to disturbances. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires entirely shares my views.

Trouble is Vossuk. If the one brother goes, the other will go also, and the Russian Government hold much to Vossuk. Russian Chargé d'Affaires has represented to St. Petersburgh that it might be better for Russian interests that he should not return as Minister for Foreign Affairs just at present. He is credited with being a Russian tool, and could only re-establish himself in public opinion by adopting an anti-Russian attitude. If he went, Ala-es-Sultaneh would take the Foreign Office.

Effort will be made to patch up the quarrel, but I do not think that it will succeed. Russian fears of Ain-ed-Dowleh in connection with the election might be assuaged if an assurance was given that we would assist in endeavouring to secure the return of good candidates and immediate formation of a Senate. I impressed necessity for this on Ala-es-Sultaneh very strongly to-day. I think Ain-ed-Dowleh better able than anyone to make sure of suitable persons being elected. Anjumans or election committees form part of the system under which elections are conducted.

I am afraid that it is quite clear that the Regent is playing a double game, both in the matter of election proclamation and of the Cabinet. If he is coming back to resume his pernicious habits of intrigue, he had better remain away.

[38263] No. 248.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 291 of 18th August has crossed my telegram No. 408 of 18th August to you.

I am anxious to secure arrival of all missions at Mohammerah by 31st October if possible, as there will be, according to Captain Wilson, considerable preliminary work to be done there, and it is doubtful if commissions could even then start work from Dizaji northwards much before 1st January, which they should if southern part of frontier is to be completed before hot weather.

In view of Sir W. Townley's telegram, would it be possible to telegraph to him sufficient detail for preliminary identic communication from British and Russian Legations to Persian Government? Great pressure should be exercised, if necessary, at Tehran to secure early and favourable reply, and arrival of Persian commissioners at Mohammerah by 31st October, but even if they cannot arrive till a few days later British and Russian missions will have plenty of preliminary work to occupy them there.

It would also be well for you and your Russian colleague to tell the Persian members of the commission at Constantinople of the solution arrived at, and induce them to recommend its acceptance at once at Tehran.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 607, and Tehran, No. 371.)

[36647] No. 249.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 120.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence relative to a proposal to construct an overland telegraph line from Lingah to Bunder Abbas,* the project to

* India Office, March 5; to Treasury, March 18; Treasury, April 9; India Office, June 4; to Treasury, June 19; Treasury, July 4; to India Office, July 11; India Office, August 7, 1913.

be financed, in the event of the Persian Government being unable to find the money, by an arrangement on the lines of the Henjam–Bunder Abbas connection, and the cost divided between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.

In accordance with the decision arrived at by the three departments concerned, I have to request you to enter into negotiations with the Persian Government for an agreement regarding the construction of the line on the basis of the draft which forms sub-enclosure 1 of enclosure 4 in this despatch; but, before submitting that document to the Persian Government for their acceptance, you should add a proviso, as desired by the Treasury in their letter of the 4th July (enclosure 6), to the effect that pending the repayment by the Persian Government of the capital expenditure incurred, the share of the receipts which would normally accrue to it should go to the credit of British and Indian revenues in repayment of the money advanced and in respect of interest thereon.

If, however, insistence by you on this clause would threaten to wreck the proposed construction of the line, you are authorised not to maintain it.

In your negotiations with the Persian Government you should be guided by the considerations set forth in the India Office letter of the 8th instant (enclosure 8), and you are authorised to agree to the omission of clause 4, as well as of the new clause mentioned above, if the consent of the Persian Government to the other clauses cannot otherwise be obtained.

You should not, however, agree to any reduction in the share of the Indo-European Telegraph Department as regards the Persian terminal rate on messages originating and terminating at Lingah which the Department should share in equal proportions with the Persian Telegraph Administration.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

38099] No. 250.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you a copy of a letter from Captain Wilson* respecting (*a*) the arrangements for the survey of the Mohammerah–Khoremmabad Railway; and (*b*) the arrangements for the initial payment of expenses connected with the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission.

With regard to (*a*), I am to enclose a copy of a letter which Sir E. Grey has caused to be addressed to the Persian Railways Syndicate.† He would be glad to know if the Secretary of State for India confirms Captain Wilson's view that the officer who is to replace him cannot proceed to his post at Dizful in time to accompany the survey party, and if so, should take over from Captain Wilson at Mohammerah on the 15th October.

With regard to (*b*), I am to refer to paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Captain Wilson's letter, and I am to state that, in view of the nature of the service and in order to simplify accounts, it is considered advisable that all expenses, apart from Mr. Wratislaw's salary and outfit allowance of 200*l*., should be met in the first instance from Indian funds, accounts being rendered as proposed by Captain Wilson to the Comptroller, India Treasuries, to be subsequently adjusted after audit in India.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[38099] No. 251.

Foreign Office to Persian Railways Syndicate.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to express to you his great regret that, in the following circumstances, it will not be possible for Captain Wilson to undertake his proposed duties in connection with the survey of the Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway.

* No. 240.

† No. 251.

I am to state, for your strictly confidential information, that arrangements have now been made for the definite demarcation of the Turco-Persian frontier by a commission consisting of British, Russian, Turkish, and Persian delegates. Apart from the urgent international considerations of this question, it is a matter of great importance to British interests (which it is unnecessary for me to specify more particularly) that the work of this commission should not be carried out without the presence of a British officer who is intimately acquainted with those interests and with local conditions, and Sir E. Grey is of opinion that Captain Wilson possesses the necessary qualifications in a marked degree, and, in fact, that his presence on the commission is indispensable for the adequate protection of those interests.

He is, however, making arrangements for Captain Wilson to spend some weeks in Tehran in the latter half of September, and he will there be able, by telegraphic and telephonic communication, and by addressing communications to various chiefs and notables of Luristan, to do a great deal to facilitate the journey of the surveyors working for the Persian Railways Syndicate.

Sir E. Grey understands that Mr. Soane will accompany the surveyors, and he feels confident that that gentleman will, with the assistance of Captain Wilson, be able to make adequate arrangements for their safe conduct.

The officer whom the Government of India will depute to take Captain Wilson's place at Dizful will apparently be unable to proceed to his post in time to accompany the survey party, though on this point Sir E. Grey is still in communication with the Secretary of State for India. Captain Wilson suggests that he should be instructed to be at Mohammerah by the 15th October in order to take over from him there.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[36397] No. 252.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith for your confidential information, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran regarding the possible alignments of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway between Dizful, Mohammerah, and Khor Musa.*

I am further to state that on the 8th instant Sir W. Townley repeated to Sir E. Grey a telegram from Sir P. Cox to the following effect :—

Major Haworth reports from Mohammerah that Muin-ut-Tujjar intends to construct a tramway from Sheleli to Shuster and is collecting material. This fact seems to affect the question of the need or absence of need for the railway alignment to pass Shuster.

Sir W. Townley added that he learnt from Muin-ut-Tujjar that he had engaged an English engineer to survey the line from Sheleli to Shuster with a view to build a steam tramway for which he had, so he said, obtained a concession from the Persian Government. He stated, however, that he had as yet made no definite plans and would do nothing without consulting His Majesty's Legation.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[38476] No. 253.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 720 A.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 404 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the draft identic note and annexes on the subject of the Turco-Persian frontier, which the Russian Ambassador and I discussed yesterday with the Grand Vizier and Minister of War.

You will remember that the Turkish reply under date of the 12th July to Sir G. Lowther's note of the 3rd May was merely a copy of the similar note dated two days

* See enclosure in No. 195.

earlier to the Russian Embassy here, and that it contained references to various conservations between the Russian Ambassador and the Grand Vizier which were quite out of place in a note addressed to this embassy, and that in particular there were one or two expressions employed in it which were calculated to affect the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and to which, therefore, it was desirable to take exception. After sounding the Grand Vizier I suggested to you that I should endeavour to get the Grand Vizier to modify the note both in form and substance so as to obviate these objections, but on my informing the Russian Ambassador of our proposed course he expressed himself as averse from it on the grounds chiefly of loss of time, and urged that our material objections could be easily and more effectively enforced in a final identic communication which we should make in reply to the Turkish notes of the 9th and 12th July respectively. M. de Giers also promised that he would insert in the note anything that I required to safeguard the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's position.

The actual drafting of the note was naturally entrusted to M. Minorsky: firstly, because he is the only member of the two embassies who possesses a really intimate and accurate knowledge of the whole question; and secondly, because a large part of the frontier covered in the note interests Russia alone. It was thus inevitable that the draft should be prepared from a Russian standpoint, and that as a whole, when I had made the alterations and insertions that I considered necessary to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's interests, it should have assumed a very anomalous shape, and, indeed, properly to understand some of the references it must read as though, during the preparation of it, the British and Russian Embassies possessed a common chancery and archives. As it was, both the Russian Ambassador and I would have gladly put the communication into a better shape, but our interview with the Grand Vizier had already been unavoidably postponed once, and we decided that it was better to avoid further delay.

I have thought necessary to give this explanation of the anomalous form which our note has assumed. I venture to hope, however, that, unusual as its form is, the substance will be found satisfactory. The line which it lays down is described as accurately as circumstances will permit, and with the assistance of the map will, I trust, prove adequate to guide the Commission in the actual work of demarcation. As regards the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's rights, I venture to think also that by placing on record the Grand Vizier's acceptance of the draft article to be inserted for that purpose in the definite frontier agreement the necessities of the case appear to me to be adequately met so far as the recognition of their rights in territories explicitly recognised as ceded to Turkey are concerned.

As to the districts south of the Kuretu River, reports from M. Orlof, the Russian consul-general in Bagdad, but recently received by M. de Giers, were by no means unfavourable to the Turkish contention that the frontier as now agreed on is practically identical with the present frontier; but south of the Elvend his observations tend to the opposite conclusion except as regards the small tongue of land just south of Kani Biz, marked in the reduction of the identic map as Descht-i-dourvue, Nazar Ali Beg, and also the oil-well at Naft Meidan, which he considers to be unquestionably Turkish. As I had no means of controlling the accuracy of M. Orlof's reports, I should have been glad to omit all mention of both places, and, as you will see, the name of the former district does not appear in the note. As regards Naft Meidan, however, it was impossible to pass over the question in silence, as the place is mentioned in the Turkish note of the 12th July. On the other hand, to have disputed its ownership would have given rise to a long discussion with the Turks, who have invariably insisted that it lies within Ottoman territory. I therefore thought it best to accept the rather vague wording, "les puits de naphte connus sous le nom de Naft Meidan seront laissés du côté ottoman," which may possibly leave a loophole for submitting the question to future arbitration. Except for this point, I think that the wording of the note sufficiently establishes that in our view cessions of territory are being made under the frontier treaty to the west of the new line south of the Kuretu and Elvend Rivers.

In discussing the frontier as far as Mendeli the Grand Vizier and Minister of War showed a most conciliatory disposition, and the only point on which any serious divergence of opinion arose was the identity of the Neft Sou (or Ab-i-Neft), which the Turkish Minister for War pretended is the stream marked in the War Office map of October 1906 (sheet 9) as the Zelezerd River, instead of the more westerly stream flowing into the Zelezerd from the north. It was agreed that M. Minorsky should, if necessary, discuss the question with the Minister of War.

The provisions made for the demarcation of the frontier from Mandeli to Shuaib

will, I trust, be considered satisfactory. They are necessarily vague, as we have very little information as to the *status quo* in 1849 or to-day. The mention of it in the Turkish note is merely confusing, as the names of the mountain ranges are inaccurately given. This was pointed out by us to the Grand Vizier and Minister for War, and after a short discussion it was agreed to accept the formula of our note on the understanding that the actual demarcation would be liable to such modifications as tribal and geographical conditions might require. The Turkish Ministers showed a strong desire to obtain our assent to the principle that the frontier in this region should follow the main watershed, but we declined to agree to this proposal. On the other hand, they fully agreed on the necessity of not adopting a line calculated to cause friction with the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh.

The Russian Ambassador pressed the Turkish Ministers strongly to signify their acceptance of the note within twenty-four hours, but finally had to content himself with a promise that the answer would be forthcoming by the 16th.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 253.

Draft of Note to be communicated to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre,

PAR ses notes en date du 18 (31) mars et 12 juillet, 1913, la Sublime Porte a bien voulu notifier à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre son adhésion aux propositions russes concernant la frontière turco-persane, exposées dans les documents suivants : La note du 9 (22) août, 1912, *sub* No. 364 (avec un mémorandum y annexé) ; la note du 28 mars (10 avril), 1913, *sub* No. 78 ; la note du 20 avril (3 mai), 1913, *sub* No. 96 (avec un mémorandum y annexé) ; et l'aide-mémoire du 6 (19) juin, 1913.

Je n'ai pas manqué de porter la décision du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement, qui a appris avec satisfaction le règlement en principe de cette question restée en suspens depuis 1843.

Le Gouvernement Royal partage entièrement l'avis de la Sublime Porte sur la nécessité de tracer sans délai la ligne frontière sur les lieux afin de prévenir le retour à l'avenir d'incidents de frontière. Se réservant de communiquer ultérieurement à la Sublime Porte les noms des membres russes et anglais qui feront partie de la Commission technique, ainsi qu'il a été prévu par la note de votre Altesse en date du 12 juillet, 1913, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, tient à récapituler les principes de délimitation établis dans la correspondance susmentionnée au sujet de la frontière.

1. L'interprétation de l'article 3 du Traité d'Ezeroum étant pleinement établie dans le sens du maintien du *statu quo*, ce principe doit être appliqué dans tous les cas où il n'y aurait pas d'autres dispositions dans le traité de 1848 ou dans les accords récents.

2. Se référant à la note russe du 9 août, 1912, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a cru utile de récapituler dans le mémorandum ci-annexé d'une façon plus détaillée la ligne depuis l'Ararat jusqu'à Bané. Elle se fait un devoir de relever tout spécialement une omission dans la note ottomane du 9 juillet concernant la région de Kazli-göl, dont l'appartenance à la Perse a été expressément reconnue par la Sublime Porte dans la note du 18 mars *sub* No. 130469/47. Ayant déféré au désir du Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne la vallée d'Egri-Tchaï, sise au sud de Kazli-göl, l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie a précisément stipulé dans sa note du 28 mars *sub* No. 78, que les villages "de Nado, Bellasor (Kyzyl-Kaya) et Nifto, faisant partie du khanat d'Avadjik restent à la Perse." Or, la note responsive de votre Altesse ne mentionne que les villages "de Nado et Nakatou" (évidemment erreur au lieu de Nifto)." L'ambassade tient à rappeler à la Sublime Porte que le Gouvernement persan a de tout temps protesté contre l'occupation turque de Bellasor (Kyzyl-Kaya), qui a eu lieu peu d'années avant 1905. Bien que Kazli-gol et Egri-Tchaï appartiennent au système des eaux du khanat d'Avadjik, le village de Bellasor se trouve sur le versant est des collines qui contournent la vallée de Kazli-göl, reconnue, ainsi qu'il a été dit, comme propriété persane. Seule la frontière laissant Bellasor en Perse assurera la paix et la tranquillité de cette région, d'autant plus que les intérêts ottomans restent sauvegardés par le fait de la possession turque du grand chemin de Van à Bayazid passant par le col de Tapariz à l'ouest de

Kazli-göl. Il est évident que la Commission technique pourra rectifier les inexactitudes involontaires dans la description de la frontière, résultant des défauts éventuels du matériel cartographique ou du manque de renseignements détaillés pour certaines localités.

3. Des renseignements détaillés sur la partie de la frontière entre Bané et le Sirvan (nord du Zohab) étant dernièrement parvenus à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre elle, a jugé nécessaire de les exposer dans le Mémorandum (B) ci-annexé, en les mettant en concordance avec les principes exposés plus haut *sub* 1.

4. Pour ce qui est de la région entre le Sirvan et Mendéli, la ligne décrite dans la note anglaise du 3 mai et acceptée par la Sublime Porte dans sa note du 12 juillet sera adoptée. Au nord du Zohab la ligne partira d'un point se trouvant sur la rivière de Sirvan, au nord de la montagne de Beizel et aboutira au sud à la montagne de Kéli-Schouvan (Gourka-Doula). Se déclarant prête à adopter la ligne au sud de Kouretou, telle qu'elle a été établie au cours des pourparlers avec feu Mahmoud Chevket Pacha, l'Ambassade Royale n'a nullement en vue de se départir de sa manière de voir exprimée dans lesdits entretiens, c'est-à-dire qu'elle considère la ligne en question comme une modification du *statu quo*. Il en est de même en ce qui concerne la frontière au sud de la rivière Elvend. En effet, des renseignements récemment parvenus à l'ambassade contestent la possession effective par la Turquie des territoires sis au sud de cette rivière. Toutefois, se conformant à l'accord établi avec feu le Maréchal Mahmoud Chevket Pacha et avec votre Altesse quant à la cession de ces régions à la Turquie, l'ambassade propose que la ligne sommairement indiquée dans la note de votre Altesse en date du 12 juillet soit maintenue. La Commission technique pour la délimitation de la frontière aura qualité d'apporter à cette ligne les rectifications qui seraient dictées par les conditions naturelles du terrain. Les puits de naphte connus sous le nom de Naft-Meidan, situés sur la rive droite de l'Abi-Naft, à la longitude approximative de 45° 33′, seront laissés du côté ottoman. L'indication 46° 40′ de la note ottomane doit être considérée comme un malentendu, ce point géographique se trouvant en dehors de la zone comprise dans la carte identique. Une carte du tracé de la frontière entre le Sirvan et Mendéli est annexé ci-près ; il est, toutefois, évident qu'elle ne peut servir que d'illustration, surtout dans les endroits marqués en ligne brisée.

Tout en prenant acte de l'assurance contenue dans la note de votre Altesse du 9 juillet (chapitre 2, alinéa 6) au sujet des droits et privilèges de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company, je dois faire remarquer à votre Altesse que la concession octroyée à cette compagnie par le Gouvernement persan n'est pas limitée à la région de Tchaï Saurkh. Cependant, votre Altesse conviendra, que tout malentendu possible à ce sujet a été écarté par le projet d'article à insérer dans l'acte définitif à conclure au sujet de la délimitation prévue par la note de Sir Gerard Lowther en date du 3 mai, 1913, projet que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse le 10 juillet, et dont elle a bien voulu me notifier l'acceptation de la Sublime Porte le 5 août.

5. La partie de la frontière entre Mendéli et le point nord de l'acte britannique (Shuaib) n'ayant pas encore fait l'objet d'une délibération détaillée, l'Ambassade Royale fait des réserves relatives à l'indication sommaire de la ligne au sud de Keleschaun contenue dans la note de votre Altesse du 9 juillet. L'Ambassade Royale ne manquera pas de communiquer aussitôt que possible à la Sublime Porte les détails qui pourraient lui parvenir sur cette partie de la frontière et pour le moment elle croit suffisant d'établir comme principe que c'est la Commission technique qui devra examiner la frontière entre Shuaib et Mendéli et la fixer sur les lieux en conformité avec le *statu quo*.

Je me plais à espérer que votre Altesse, animée comme d'habitude des sentiments de justice et de conciliation, voudra bien admettre le bien-fondé des propositions susénoncées et me communiquera sa réponse aussitôt que possible.

Annex 1.

Memorandum (A) respecting Ararat–Bané Frontier.

1. La frontière au nord partira du bornage No. XXXVII de la frontière turco-russe, se trouvant près de Serder-Boulak, sur la crête entre le Grand et le Petit Ararat. Elle descendra ensuite vers le sud par les crêtes, laissant du côté persan la vallée de Dambat et le système des eaux de Yarym-Kaya prenant leur source au sud de la montagne d'Ayoubeg. La frontière laisse ensuite à la Perse la localité de Boulak-bachi et suit toujours la plus haute crête dont l'extrémité sud se trouve à peu près à

62° 1′ longitude et 39° 28′ latitude. Puis contournant du côté ouest le marais qui s'étend à l'ouest de Yarym-Kaya, la frontière traverse le courant de Sary-Sou, passe entre les villages Guirdé-baran (turc) et Bazyrgan (persan) et montant sur la crête à l'ouest de Bazyrgan, suit le partage des eaux marqué par les crêtes de Saranli, Zendouli, Guir-Kélimé, Kanly-baba, Guédoki-Khaziné, Bere-souré et Dévédji. De là la ligne traversera la vallée d'Egri-Tchaï à l'endroit qui sera désigné par la Commission technique en conformité du *statu quo* et remontera sur les crêtes du partage des eaux : Kyzyl-Ziaret, Halil-beg, Sary-tchimène, Doumanlu, Kara-Bourga, colline entre les bassins d'Ayry-Tchaï (persan) et de Djelli-göl (turc), Avdal-daschi, Reschkan, colline entre Akhourek et Tavra, Bavra-begzadan, Guevri-Nahine, Khydyr-baba, Avristan.

2. Pour le Kotour le protocole du 15 (27) juillet, 1880, dit de Sary-Kamiche, sera appliqué de la sorte que le village de Kevlik restera à la Turquie et les villages de Biledjik, Razi, Charatil (Haratil), les deux Djellik et Panamérik resteront à la Perse. La frontière suivant les crêtes de Mir-Omar montera sur la montagne de Sourava et, laissant Khanyga du côté turc, passera par le partage des eaux formé par le col de Bourouch-Khouran, la montagne de Haravil, Béléko, Schinetal, Saraoul, Goulambi, Kepper, Sourian, Bergabend, Peri-Khan, Iskender, Avène et Kotoul. La vallée de Bajirga reste à la Turquie, les villages de Sartyk et Séro à la Perse, et la frontière passe de l'extrémité méridionale de Kotoul sur la crête s'élevant à l'ouest du village persan de Béhik et suivant les sommets de Seri-Baydost rejoint la crête du mont Zont.

3. A partir du mont Zont, la frontière suit tout le temps le partage des eaux entre les districts persans de Tergever, Decht et Mergever et le sandjak turc de Hekkiari, notamment les crêtes de Shive-Schischali, Tchil-Tchovri, Tchel-Berdir, Kouna Koter, Kazi-beg, Avoukh, Mai-Hélané, les montagnes à l'ouest de Binar et Dalamper; puis laissant du côté persan le bassin des eaux se déversant par Ouchnou au lac d'Ourmiah, elle aboutit au col de Kélé-Chine.

4. Au sud de Kélé-Chine la frontière laisse du côté persan le bassin de Lavène et du côté turc les eaux de Révandouz, et passe par les sommets et les cols suivants: Siahkouh, Zerdé-Guel, Boz, Barzine, Serschiva, Kevi-Khodja-Ibrahim. De là la frontière continue à suivre vers le sud la chaîne magistrale de Kandil, laissant du côté persan les bassins des affluents de Kialou du côté droit; les ruisseaux de Pourdanan, Khydyrava et Talkhatan. Étant arrivée au sommet de Séri-Kélé-Kéline la ligne passe sur Zinvi-Djasousan et le col de Bamine, traverse la rivière de Vezné près du pont de Pourde-Berdan et, laissant le village de Schénié du côté persan, monte sur les chaînes de Foka-baba-kyr, Berde-spian, Berde-Aboul-Fath et le col de Kani-resch. Elle suit ensuite le partage des eaux formé par Lagav-ghird, Donléri, le col de Khan-Ahmed et l'extrémité sud de Tépé-Salos. Ainsi, la frontière passe entre les villages de Kandol (turc) et Keschkeschiva et Mazyn-ava (persans), et atteint le courant de la rivière de Kialou (le Petit Zab).

5. Ayant rejoint le courant de Kialou, la frontière le suit en amont, laissant du côté persan la rive droite (l'Alani Adjem) et du côté turc la rive gauche de cette rivière. Arrivée à l'embouchure de la rivière de Khilé-resch (affluent de Kialou du côté gauche), la frontière remonte en amont le courant de cette eau, laissant du côté persan les villages d'Alot, Kivéro, &c., et du côté turc le district d'Alani-Mavout. A l'extrémité sud-ouest du mont Balou la frontière quitte le courant de Khilé-resch et montant sur l'extrémité nord-ouest de la chaîne de Soukew s'étendant au sud de la rivière de Khilé-resch passe par les crêtes de Sourkew, laissant du côté turc les districts de Siwel et de Schivé-kel.

Arrivé au point astronomique de Sourkew presqu'à la hauteur de 35° 59′ latitude, la frontière laisse du côté persan le village de Tchampar-aw (voir § 41 du rapport officiel de Derviche Pacha) et le village de Siah-guvèze—du côté turc. La ligne monte ensuite sur la chaîne des montagnes qui forment la frontière entre le district persan de Bané et le district turc de Kyzyldja, Galasch, Berdi-Ketchel, Pouchte-Haugajal, Dou-béra, Parajal et Spi-kani, après quoi elle atteint le col de Now-Khouvan. De là, en suivant toujours le partage des eaux la frontière tourne vers le sud et puis à l'ouest passant par les sommets de Voul-gouza, Pouchi-Schéhidan, Hazar-mal, Bali-Keder, Kélé-Mélaik et Kouhi-Kocé-rescha, séparant le district turc de Térétoul du district persan de Mérivan.

Annex 2.

Memorandum (B) respecting Mérivan–Avroman Frontier.

Les districts persans de Mérivan et Avroman n'ayant pas été spécialement mentionnés dans le Traité d'Erzeroum, leur frontière doit être tracée sur la base des dispositions générales de l'article 3 dudit traité, c'est-à-dire en conformité avec le *statu quo* 1848.

Comme il a été établi dans le mémorandum (A), la ligne de frontière au sud de Kyzyldja aboutit à la chaîne de Kouhi-Kocé-rescha. De là, d'après les données officielles de Derviche Pacha (§ 41 de son rapport), la frontière suit en aval le courant du ruisseau de Khalil-abad jusqu'à sa confluence avec Tchami-Kyzyldja, puis suit en amont cette dernière rivière jusqu'à l'embouchure de son affluent gauche coulant du village de Bnava-souta, remonte ce ruisseau de Bnava-souta et par les cols de Keli-navé-sar et Kéli-Piran atteint le col de Sourène, connu, à ce qu'il paraît, sous le nom de Tchigan ou (Tchakan).

La grande chaîne d'Avroman s'étendant dans la direction nord-ouest à sud-est forme ensuite la frontière entre la Perse et le district ottoman de Schéhrizor. Arrivée au pic de Kémadjar (sud-est de Kala-Zelm et nord-ouest de Schéhri-Avroman) la frontière continue à suivre la Crête magistrale jusqu'à sa ramification du côté ouest, s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Déré-Vouli et, laissant du côté persan le village de Khan-Guerméla et seize autres villages appartenant au district persan de Nowsoud (ou Avromani-Louhon), rejoint la rivière de Sirvan près de l'embouchure de Tcahami-Zinkan au nord du mont Beyzel.

Il importe en cette occurrence de rappeler les déclarations à ce sujet de Derviche Pacha faites dans les §§ 39 et 40 de son rapport officiel. Le Commissaire Impérial ottoman confirme catégoriquement que lesdits dix-sept villages situés sur le versant ouest de la chaîne principale d'Avroman se trouvaient de son temps en possession persane. Ayant établi le manque d'informations documentaires quant à l'appartenance de ces villages, Derviche Pacha constate que tous ses interlocuteurs ont de tout temps vu et entendu que ces villages étaient en possession de la Perse. Il expose ensuite les moyens secrets qu'il avait toutefois employés pour obtenir un "dekhalet" des habitants de ces villages qui n'étaient pas d'abord disposés à le lui livrer. Quoique le document en question fût ensuite envoyé à Derviche Pacha par le Caïmakan de Suleïmanié, les villages en question sont restés en possession persane. Pendant le ramazan de l'année dernière (1328 (1912)) un nouveau "dekhalet" a été obtenu par les autorités ottomanes de Djafer-Sultan, propriétaire de ces villages. Un détachement du 116ᵉ régiment des troupes Impériales ottomanes a ensuite occupé le village de Khan-Guerméla et Djafer-Sultan a été informé par le Mutessarif de Suleïmanié de la décision du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, prise le 10 kianouni-evvel, 1328 (23 décembre, 1912), concernant :

1. La formation d'une nouvelle nahié turque sous le nom de Avromani-Louhon ; et
2. La nomination de Djafer-Sultan, en qualité de son mudir avec les appointements de 500 piastres par mois.

Au printemps de 1913 Djafer-Sultan a notifié au Caïmakan d'Alebtché qu'il retirait son "dekhalet" et ainsi son district est redevenu indépendant de la Turquie. Le village de Khan-Guerméla et cinq autres situés dans son voisinage—occupés, comme il a été dit, pendant que la commission turco-persane pour la délimitation des frontières siégeait à Constantinople—n'ont pas cependant été évacués par les troupes ottomanes et la 27ᵉ compagnie de frontière s'y trouve encore cantonnée.

Vu ce qui précède et en vertu du principe général de *statu quo* (article 3 du Traité d'Erzeroum), il est incontestable que les dix-sept villages susnommés doivent appartenir à la Perse et que, parmi ce nombre, les six villages occupés dernièrement par la Turquie doivent être évacués par les troupes ottomanes.

Quant au tracé de la ligne-frontière dans ces parages, l'Ambassade Royale croit pour le moment suffisant d'établir en principe l'appartenance des dix-sept villages à la Perse. Quoique des renseignements assez précis sur la frontière de la partie sud d'Avroman soient contenus dans le rapport officiel de Derviche Pacha, d'après lequel la frontière passe par les sommets de Schindirva, Guzindar, Schelvardar et Kémadjar, il serait préférable de laisser à la Commission technique le soin de tracer en détail sur les lieux cette partie de la frontière.

[38553]

No. 254.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

Sir,

India Office, August 19, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 14th August, 1913, regarding the lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island, I am directed to inform you that the Marquess of Crewe concurs generally in the terms in which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to reply to any enquiries that the Persian Government may make on the subject.

With regard, however, to the suggestion that a Persian official should be invited to visit the depôt, his Lordship considers that such a visit, if it is permitted to take place, should be purely one of inspection, for the purpose of reporting the facts for the information of the Persian Government, and that the official deputed should not be invested with authority to interfere with the arrangements at the depôt or to question the propriety of any operations that may be in progress there. It would be desirable, in Lord Crewe's opinion, to arrive at a clear understanding on this point before an official of the Persian Government is allowed to proceed to Abadan.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[38590]

No. 255.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

Sir,

Board of Trade, August 19, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th August transmitting certain documents with reference to the proposed trans-Persian railway, and in reply I am to offer the following observations for the consideration of Sir E. Grey:—

1. The Board agree that in the circumstances referred to in your letter the application for the proposed concession should be presented to the Persian Government by His Majesty's and the Russian representatives at Tehran, and that accordingly the letter which the Société d'Études propose to address to the Persian Government direct should not be sent.

2. The Board regret that they are unable to offer any useful suggestions as to the composition or remuneration of the British proportion of the proposed Anglo-Russian Commission for examining and reporting on the alignment of the southern part of the railway. They can only suggest that the Indian Government and the War Office might possibly be in a position to lend practical advice and assistance in this matter.

3. The Board concur, in general, in the terms of the proposed joint note to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

GEO. J. STANLEY.

38552]

No. 256.

Persian Railways Syndicate to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

Sir,

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, August 19, 1913.

WE learn that Captain Wilson's services have been withdrawn from the survey party, who had made all arrangements to complete the survey of the portion of the proposed line between Dizful and Khoremabad between October and April next.

We are extremely disappointed at this change, as, under the terms of the option obtained from the Persian Government, it is absolutely necessary that the survey should be completed within the above time.

It has been arranged that the various members of the survey party should meet at various points of the route at the end of next month, in order that no time may be lost, and, as it is very inadvisable for them to travel through Luristan unless accompanied by a political officer possessing a good knowledge of the language and of the tribes, we shall be glad to know what steps His Majesty's Government intend taking to fill up the vacancy caused by Captain Wilson's withdrawal.

It is needless to point out that the syndicate is already committed to a considerable amount of expenditure in connection with the survey, and that, as it is the wish of both His Majesty's Government and of the Persian Government that the expenses should be kept as low as possible, it is necessary that such fresh arrangements as may be necessary in consequence of Captain Wilson's withdrawal should be completed as soon as possible.

We would point out, moreover, that the Persian Government have appointed a staff of engineers, under M. de Brucq, to co-operate with our survey party, and that these gentlemen are also due to arrive at Mohammerah at the end of September.

We are, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Chairman.*

Enclosure in No. 256.

Messrs. Pearson and Son to the Persian Railways Syndicate.

Dear Sirs,

10, *Victoria Street, London, August* 13, 1913.

OUR engineer, Mr. Whitelaw, has had the advantage recently of interviews with Captain Wilson and Mr. Preece. At first we were given to understand that Captain Wilson would not be able to accompany our engineer, Mr. Douglas, from Hamadan to Dizful. We are glad to learn to-day, however, that Captain Wilson has got permission to make the journey.

We are anxious to impress upon you that, in our judgment, it is essential that someone representing the British Government should accompany the survey party throughout the whole time that they are north of Dizful. We understand that Captain Wilson's official successor in Persia will hold the post of vice-consul at Dizful, and will accompany the party. We trust that this arrangement will be carried out, and, further, we hope that Captain Wilson's successor will be a gentleman who has personal knowledge of the district, as, however suitable his successor may be from other points of view, unless he actually knows the country, there is considerable probability that time will be lost, as naturally some time must elapse before the new vice-consul will be able to exercise the same influence over the tribes as Captain Wilson appears to have had.

The object of this letter is to impress upon the syndicate the need for official assistance being continuously at hand if the survey party is to get through quickly and to do its work in reasonable security.

Yours faithfully,

(For S. Pearson and Son (Limited)),

C. G. HYDE, *Director.*

[38592]

No. 257.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 14th August, 1913, regarding the Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway.

It is requested that, if the Foreign Office have the telegrams of the 24th July and the 8th August referred to therein, copies may be supplied to the India Office.

India Office, August 20, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 257.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P.

August 14, 1913.

PLEASE see telegrams of the 24th ultimo and the 8th instant from Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley regarding Mohammerah–Khoremabad Railway.

As far as strategical considerations are concerned, danger from west is most probable contingency in view of nearness of Turkish frontier. If danger threatens from north, it does not seem to matter which side of Karun River railway follows, while we need not consider the very remote contingency of danger from east. Strategically, therefore, it would be best to keep railway northwards from Marid on further side of river from Turkish frontier, and the best alignment would be from Mohammerah to Dizful viâ Marid, Ahmed, and Shustar. But we think that so little importance attaches to strategical considerations that alignment which commercially and from engineering point of view is most advantageous is the one which it would be advisable to select.

[38493] No. 258.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 19, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Grand Vizier assures me identic note will be accepted practically without alteration. Russian Ambassador sent it in last night and I am doing so to-day.

His Highness is quite agreeable to procedure approved in your telegram No. 408 of 18th August and to giving British and Russian delegates on Delimitation Commission powers of arbitration.

[38493] No. 259.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 412.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1913.

YOUR telegram of No. 421 of 19th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Attitude of Grand Vizier about arbitration is most satisfactory. You should aim at getting Turkish assent to exercise of such powers placed formally on record, perhaps in a clause to which both Turkey and Persia would agree.

Captain Wilson suggests, as a means of avoiding delay in regard to those portions of the line where the frontier is doubtful, and cannot be established without further research, that two lines might be laid down on map for such localities, and the commission might then proceed with the rest of the frontier, leaving the doubtful portions for final settlement at the end. You should discuss this proposal with him and M. Minorsky, but it should only be carried out in cases where delay would otherwise be serious, *e.g.*, perhaps in Pusht-i-Kuh.

I am sending you extra copies of the reduced identic map, as I wish to have one showing the proposed new line as soon as possible.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 373, and St. Petersburgh, No. 611.)

[38726] No. 260.

Persian Railways Syndicate to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, August 20, 1913.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge yours of the 19th instant, which crossed mine of same date, on the subject of Captain Wilson's withdrawal from the railway survey party.

I note the urgent reasons for his withdrawal, and that His Majesty's Government are in communication with the Government of India on the subject of the appointment of an officer to take Captain Wilson's place at Dizful, but that it is doubtful if this officer will be able to proceed to his post in time to accompany the survey party.

In this connection I beg to refer to my letter of yesterday, and its enclosure, on the subject of the extreme necessity that exists for the presence of someone representing the British Government with the survey party possessing a thorough knowledge of the language and of the local tribal customs throughout the whole time they are carrying out their work north of Dizful.

In the event of the Government of India being unable to depute an officer possessed of the requisite knowledge in time to accompany the party, *i.e.*, so as to be at Mohammerah not later than the 15th October, I beg to suggest, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, that it might be advisable to appoint Mr. Soane to the post, and to give him such powers and escort as may be necessary to enable him to fittingly act as the representative of the British Government in the negotiations with the local tribes.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY, *Chairman.*

[38719] No. 261.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office.—(Received August 21.)

Sir, *Winchester House, London, August* 20, 1913.

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, advising that the Secretary of State is of opinion that it is undesirable that the bonds which it is proposed to ask the Persian Government to issue in connection with the proposed loan of 100,000*l.* should set forth the nature of the security to be obtained.

In reply, I beg to state that I am in full accord with Sir Edward Grey's views on this point, should it be decided that the Société d'Études are to provide any portion of the proposed loan.

In that case the best course, I venture to suggest, would be that the bonds should be issued in the form usual for Government loans where the loan is not charged on any specific security, and the proposed security be hypothecated by a separate letter to trustees, to be later on nominated by the British members of the group.

Should the Société d'Études be admitted to a participation in the Persian Mining Syndicate, it will probably be necessary, as suggested by Sir Edward Grey, to form two syndicates, one to work the portion of the concession included in the British sphere, and the other to work that portion situated in the neutral sphere. In this event the former could conveniently be appointed the trustees to whom the above hypothecation is made.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY.

[38742] No. 262.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 424.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 21, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 291 of 18th August.

Persian Embassy and commissioners have been kept generally informed of progress of the negotiations and of the result now attained. They are very satisfied with it, and have already sent detailed and favourable report on the Turkish note of 12th July, as offering advantageous solution.

We would urge that Ittila-ul-Mulk, one of the Persian delegates on the Turco-Persian Commission at Constantinople, should be appointed Persian delegate on the Delimitation Commission.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[38743] No. 263.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 425.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 21, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Persian delegates on Turco-Persian Frontier Commission have received no pay for some time past, and this suggests advisability of taking steps at Tehran to ensure that money be forthcoming for their expenses on Delimitation Commission.

[38843] No. 264.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 293.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 22, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 374 of 21st August.

I have only to-day managed to extract from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that the request for extra police officers was approved by the Persian Government. There has clearly been another attempt to evade the undertaking to consult the two Governments before engaging foreigners. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs did mention more police officers when the application for additional gendarmerie officers was made, but he specified no number, and the number of officers demanded for the gendarmerie tallied with the number he mentioned on that occasion, leaving none for the police.

I see no objection to the request, and I understand from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that the Russian Government have consented.

[38743] No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 377.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1913.

MY telegram No. 620 of to-day to Sir G. Buchanan.

You may act accordingly, when your Russian colleague is so instructed.

[38743] No. 266.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 418.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1913.

IN order to save time you are authorised to communicate direct with Sir W. Townley about details of all arrangements about Persian Commission, keeping me informed.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 378.)

[38977] No. 267.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 419.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1913.

MR. WRATISLAW has had private letter from M. Minorsky in which latter, without definitely saying so, rather kicks at idea of beginning demarcation from south. We attach importance to this, as, apart from other reasons, it will be impossible to begin work in Azerbaijan region before spring, and it will facilitate transport, &c., if work is begun at Mohammerah.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 622, and Tehran, No. 379.)

[38743] No. 268.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 620.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1913.

PLEASE communicate to Russian Government Mr. Marling's telegrams Nos. 424 and 425 of 21st August, and ask that Russian Minister at Tehran may, if the Russian Government approve such a course, be authorised to recommend appointment of Persian delegate mentioned to serve on the Demarcation Commission.

Suggest also that British and Russian Ministers at Tehran should take forthwith such steps as may be expedient to ensure that money will be provided for Persian expenses on commission.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 376, and Constantinople, No. 417.)

[38458] No. 269.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 623.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 292 of 19th August: Cabinet crisis.

In all the circumstances I regard Ain-ed-Dowleh's retention in office as of the utmost importance. I am of course prepared to co operate as regards the elections, if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs desires a Senate to be convoked soon.

Retention of Vossuk in office appears useless, and Ala-es-Sultaneh might prove suitable Minister for Foreign Affairs.

You can inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of this and of Sir W. Townley's opinion, if he refers to the matter with you.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 380.)

[38920] No. 270.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received August 23.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, August* 22, 1913.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 6th instant with enclosures from the India Office relative to a proposal that the British Exchequer should bear or advance half of the capital sum, viz., 23,060*l.*, and half of the recurrent charges, viz., 300*l.* per annum, which will be incurred in connection with the reconstruction of telegraph lines in Arabistan.

In reply, I am to request you to acquaint Secretary Sir E. Grey that their Lordships have not been furnished with sufficient information to enable them to judge as to the propriety of sharing equally with India in this expenditure, and I am to request that a copy of the agreement dated the 6th January last with the Persian Government, referred to in Mr. Barker's report which was forwarded with the letter under reply, may be transmitted to them.

Their Lordships would also wish to be informed what conditions it is proposed to make with the Persian Government for the repayment of the sum of 18,060*l.*, being that part of the total expenditure of 23,060*l.* which they understand it is intended merely to advance to Persia, and also how it is proposed to deal with the profits accruing from the working of the line.

I am, &c.
T. L. HEATH

[39004] No. 271.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 419 of 22nd August.

Captain Wilson and M. Minorsky are making arrangements to commence in the south.

[39005] No. 272.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 429.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 23, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

My telegram No. 428 of 23rd August and your telegram No. 419 of 22nd August.

Following is upshot of Captain Wilson's conversations with M. Minorsky :—

1 It is impossible for M. Minorsky to go to Mohammerah with his staff before 15th December, and he desires 1st January to be the date of commencement. Russian Embassy, however, point out greater importance of demarcation in the north, so as to remove pretext for Turkish encroachments and possibility

of frontier incidents (it would also admit of reduction of Russian detachments there). They therefore desire that it shall be understood that commission is free to arrange for commencement of demarcation north of Zohab as soon as the weather and other conditions permit.

2. Subject to approval of Russian Government, Russian delegation will be composed as follows: Commissioner, deputy commissioner, secretary, two cartographers, doctor, and escort of, in south, six men and officer, to be increased later in the north.

3. Captain Wilson's proposals for reciprocal arrangement in the matter of cartographical work and escort in the north and south portions are accepted.

4. Captain Wilson will obtain tents and camp equipment for Russians from India.

5. Draft for "règlement" of commission is being prepared here by the two embassies, which they hope to get accepted by Grand Vizier and annexed to the final protocol of present Turco-Persian Convention.

6. M. Minorsky leaves for St. Petersburgh to-morrow. He begs that two copies of each of following documents may be sent thither for him: Reduced identical map; Mr. Parker's memorandum of 7th December, 1907; translation of extracts from Dervish Pasha's book; Constantinople despatch No. 520 of 1912.

Captain Wilson leaves for Tehran as soon as possible.
(Sent to Tehran.)

[39007] No. 273.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 311.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 623 of 22nd August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me to-day of intrigues being conducted in Persian Government against Vossuk, and I therefore told him that, in your opinion, his retention in office was useless, as he was known to be untruthful and corrupt. On the other hand, you considered retention of Ain-ed-Dowleh of the utmost importance.

His Excellency replied that he had not the slightest objection to the latter remaining in office. He did not care whether Kawam-es-Sultaneh went or remained, except for fact that, if he went, Vossuk would also go. Latter was a very good Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he desired to retain him. I could not induce him to give way on this point. As regards elections, his Excellency said that he certainly thought we ought to do all we can to secure return of good candidates, and that, as constitution of Senate was one of the conditions attached to convocation of Medjliss, we ought to press simultaneously for its immediate formation.

[38914] No. 274.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 381.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1913.

GERMAN Minister in Tehran has reported that Persian Carpet Company, in which German capital is largely interested, desires consular protection in Kerman.

German Government desire British consul to afford such protection.

Please instruct His Majesty's consul accordingly.

[39008] No. 275.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 312.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 24, 1913.

YOUR despatch No. 230 of 18th June.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me yesterday *aide-mémoire* of which following is substance:—

Paragraph 1. Russian Ambassador in London has forwarded to Russian Government text of convention respecting the Shatt-el-Arab, and of declaration on subject of

right of Sheikh of Mohammerah to charge one of the members of the commission to look after Persian trade and navigation interests.

Paragraph 2. Having studied these documents, Russian Government desire to point out that text of the convention differs from the convention previously communicated to Russian Government in that two articles, Nos. 7 and 8, respecting imposition of fines and rights of police have been inserted.

Paragraph 3. Russian Government, in referring to *aide-mémoire* enclosed in my despatch No. 233, express hope that provisions of these articles will not infringe in any way rights reserved to Russia under treaties in force between her and Turkey as regards privileges of Russian subjects in Ottoman territory.

Paragraph 4. As regards declaration, Russian Government wishes to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to fact that Sheikh of Mohammerah, being a Persian subject and possessing none of the privileges of autonomy, cannot be considered as entitled to entrust to anyone protection of Persian commercial and maritime interests, such right belonging exclusively to Persian Government itself.

In reading to me first paragraph of above, Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that he did not wish to quarrel with us about the convention, but on coming to paragraphs 3 and 4 he adopted a rather serious tone. It seemed, he said, to be our intention to place Russian subjects under jurisdiction of a commission in which we were represented and in which Russia was not, and to treat Mohammerah like Koweit. Independent position we were claiming for sheikh was hardly consistent with principle of Persian integrity.

I said that I must look up the papers before discussing matter with him, and that meanwhile I would forward *aide-mémoire* to you by telegram.

[39517] No. 276.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 313.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 24, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 608 of 19th August.

In *aide-mémoire* received to-day Russian Government express entire concurrence view of His Majesty's Government in regard to desirability of communicating as soon as possible to Persian Government result of negotiations respecting Turco-Persian frontier, and of obtaining their adhesion to arrangements made and to despatch of Persian Demarcation Commission to Mohammerah without delay.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs have forwarded to Tehran by messenger on 22nd August all the documents to be communicated to the Persian Government, and have instructed Russian Chargé d'Affaires to concert with Sir W. Townley as to proposed communication. Russian Government have impressed upon Russian Chargé d'Affaires necessity of inducing Persian Government to make a formal declaration similar to that made by Turkish Government of its wish that representatives of the two mediating Powers should take part in work of delimitation.

Russian Government hope that His Majesty's Government will lose no time in sending similar instructions to Sir W. Townley.

[39074] No. 277.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 166. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 1, 1913.

IN a memorandum dated the 20th May last His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh alluded to a desire that had been expressed by M. Sazonof for more elbow-room in North Persia. As reported in his telegram No. 216, Very Confidential, of the 15th June, Sir George Buchanan told the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the previous day that he had informed you, Sir, of this desire, although he had found it difficult to explain exactly what was meant by the words used. M. Sazonof replied that he thought that we ought each to have a free hand in our respective spheres without interference from the other, and disclaimed all desire on Russia's part to annex North Persia.

M. Sazonof was no doubt sincere in his statement that Russia had no desire to annex North Persia. It is quite conceivable that Russia really has no desire to increase her already very large responsibilities by further territorial expansion, but that the gradual absorption of North Persia is considered by Russian consuls to come within the scope of their political programme can, I think, be clearly shown, not in the case of one only, but of all the officials at present stationed in the more northern districts of what is known as the Russian zone. There are, moreover, indications that this spirit of peaceful penetration is progressing somewhat rapidly southwards.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a private letter lately received from Mr. Smart, at present acting consul at Tabriz. A perusal of this most interesting letter, written in all frankness, will show the impression of the present state of affairs in Azerbaijan made upon the mind of an intelligent and careful observer upon his return to Tabriz after an absence of four years. The letter shows no trace, in my opinion, of animus or bias, and is merely the honest expression of a mind astonished at the change that has come about. Mr. Smart's letter is too lucid to need comment, but I would venture to call your attention, Sir, to the fact that, in his statement that "no effort is being made to build up local powers capable of governing the province if the Russian troops were withdrawn," he shows that either it was never intended that the instructions issued to the consuls by M. Sabline, at M. Sazonof's orders, to take such steps should be read seriously, or that the consuls wilfully ignore instructions issued to them from St. Petersburgh through the legation at Tehran. In this connection, I would beg to call your attention to my despatch No. 142 of the 29th June.

Discussing the financial resources of Persia with my Russian colleague the other day, we came to speak about the exemption of foreign subjects from the payment of the land tax. M. Sabline told me that he had submitted this question to his Government, because he considered it unjust to Persia that she should be deprived of this important source of revenue in the case of lands held by foreigners or persons under foreign protection. He added, "we have made much progress in Azerbaijan, where a third of the province is in Russian hands, or farmed under Russian supervision. We have also made some progress in Ghilan, less in Mazandoran, but a good deal in Khorassan." To explain his argument, he went on to show me what damage could be done to the revenues of Persia by the action of foreign-protected persons. In order to do this, he cited the case of the Russian agent at Bender Gez, who has bought a village that commands the water supply of a village belonging to the Crown, as also of a village the property of a private person. First, the Russian agent, though a Persian, does not pay taxes, then he can divert the water so as to destroy the fertility of both the other villages, and so deprive the Exchequer of revenue from the one and of the taxes from the other, since the owner would naturally plead inability to pay taxes in consequence of his water supply having been cut off.

Another instance of the equivocal attitude of Russian consuls has been afforded in a letter recently written by Salar-ed-Dowleh to the Russian officers commanding the Persian Cossacks sent against him into Kurdistan. In this letter the Prince expresses his bewilderment at the fact that troops under Russian officers should really fire upon him, and asks if there is not some mistake. He adds that Prince Dabija in Khorassan co-operated most cordially with him, as also did the Russian consuls at Asterabad and Resht, and that he is at a loss to understand this sudden change of policy. He has also telegraphed to the Russian consul at Kermanshah in much the same sense, asking for an explanation of Russia's changed attitude towards him, which he attributes to some misunderstanding that he cannot explain. I am indebted to my Russian colleague for this information.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports to me privately that the celebrated M. Necrassof has signalised his last days at Resht by attempting one or two deeds approaching to violence. He ordered the Governor-General, under menace of instant dismissal, to sign certain land transfers in favour of a Russian lumber company, as also a declaration that the Persian Government owe a certain disreputable Russian protégé, the former chief of police, a large sum of money. Although an avowed Russian creature, the Governor-General refused to do so, in spite of the violence of Necrassof's threats. His Excellency probably counted upon M. Sabline's known spirit of justice, as also upon the fact that the erstwhile tyrant of Resht's days are numbered.

From the above it would appear probable that M. Sazonof's request for more elbow-room meant that we should shut our eyes to what is going on in North Persia, despite the fact that the independence and integrity of Persia, to the maintenance of which both Governments are committed, is seriously threatened by the action of the Russian consular agents. Still more recently than the facts reported above, M. Sabline has

informed me that Mr. Smart has been accused by the Russian consul-general at Tabriz of fostering a scheme intended to bring about the formation of new Anjumans, and to secure the despatch of deputies to the proposed Medjlis. The Russian consul-general asserted, when interrogated by Mr. Smart, that his report had been actuated by Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who had expressed a fear that the British consulate would be thrown open to persons seeking sanctuary when he refused to allow the elections to be held. Whether Shuja ever really said this or not is immaterial; in any case, he must be well aware that the British consulate would not be lent for such a purpose, but it will be interesting to see whether he will allow the elections to proceed. His Excellency is now on good terms with the Government of Tehran, and, if he impedes the elections, it will be clear that he does so at the instigation of the Russian consul. Mr. Smart assures me that there is not a shadow of foundation for the charge made against him, and that he has carefully abstained from talking about the Constitution. He expresses a conviction that Shuja-ed-Dowleh never used the language attributed to him, and believes M. Vidensky, the consulate dragoman, who knew him in former days, to be responsible for the story. He attributes this Russian attack upon him to a curious belief that the Russians have that he has some sort of secret influence over the population. He says that he is aware that the Russians do not like his being in Tabriz, presumably because they want to absorb Azerbaijan unhindered and unwatched, whilst they pay him what he considers to be the undeserved compliment of believing him to be capable of thwarting them.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 277.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

Dear Sir Walter, *Tabriz, July* 20, 1913.

I HAVE not written any official despatches as yet, because there have been really no events important enough to be reported singly, except the few reported by telegraph, and I do not want to write officially on the general situation until I have had more time to examine it.

The change at Tabriz since my last sojourn here is very impressive. The situation four years ago was doubtless abnormal, illogical, in view of the Anglo-Russian agreement. We had then a population and the local authorities entirely complaisant to us and either violently or discreetly obstructive to the Russians. England was recognised by the Tabrizis as the Power holding back the Russians from Azerbaijan. The result was that the Russians actually required our help locally. I remember Miller often coming to me for support in his discussions with the Persian authorities Hence the Russian consul-general was compelled to keep in close touch with his British colleague, to keep him informed of Russian action to a certain extent, to consult him often before taking steps even in matters affecting particular Russian interests. And the British consul was able to interfere with his Russian colleague's policy to an extraordinary degree, protesting against movements of Russian troops, against violations of Persian sovereignty, &c.

Now all is changed. We could not keep the Russians out of Azerbaijan. They have killed or put to flight the active spirits among their Persian opponents. They have replaced the anti-Russian local authorities by Russian puppets. The Azerbaijanis generally have lost the hope they had in England; they regard the Russian domination as accomplished, irretrievable. The result is a general surrender. Russia no longer has any serious opposition to encounter. She has no need of British support locally, and gradually her representatives appear to have discontinued the close relations which existed in Miller's time between the two consulates. Preobrajensky is always ready to talk when I pose him questions, but he rarely volunteers information.

Of course this state of affairs is quite natural, as the former situation was unnatural. When formerly I used to protest to Miller against Russian action I often used to wonder what Cox, for instance, would have said if his Russian colleague at Bushire, which is not even in the British sphere, had protested in a similar manner against British action there! We have presumably no right to expect that the Russians should consult us regarding, or keep us informed of, details of their local activity in a province entirely in their sphere and on their own frontier. The decline

of our influence in Azerbaijan was inevitable after the destruction by the Russians of the national forces in the province. We should, indeed, be gratefully surprised at the influence we still retain. That influence is due not so much to our power, which is hardly visible here, as to the confidence which Persians have in our loyalty. They know we have no personal policies, will not betray their confidences, will not encourage them in dangerous paths, will not promise more than we can do. Even Shuja, the creation of Russia, will, in spite of his fear of Russian surveillance, make to me communications of disconcerting frankness.

But leaving us out of the question and examining the situation in Azerbaijan as between Persians and Russians, the change since four years ago is enormous. Russia is now supreme throughout the province. Her troops encircle the lake of Urmi, stretch almost all along the Turco-Azerbaijan frontier, hold the road running from Tabriz to the northern frontier and to the Caspian viâ Ardobil, whence they hold the direct road to the northern frontier. Her native tools, Kurds, Shahsevens, Persians, dominate, under the Russian ægis, the whole province. A conspiracy of silence prevents the Persian Government from getting any but the barest news of what is happening in the outlying districts: Karguzars, Governors, under Russian orders, give no reports to Tehran, with the exception of the unfortunate Karguzar at Tabriz, who is likely to be sacked for his loyalty. Russian troops move hither and thither without question, espousing the quarrel of one chief against another, of one Persian against another. Opposition to Russia brings, sooner or later, disaster on the opponent. Day by day the Russian hold is tightening on the province, and, unless they bungle the Kurd question by premature action, their penetration should meet no serious native obstacles. This penetration is taking the form of weakening all connections between Azerbaijan and Tehran and of making the local powers absolutely dependent on armed Russian support. No attempt is made to build up local powers capable of governing the province if the Russian troops were withdrawn. On the contrary, the presence of Russian troops, with the present Russian local policy, is destroying any chances which may exist in Azerbaijan of the formation of a native administration strong enough to maintain order in the province without the support of foreign troops.

I was much interested to hear from you that M. Sabline thinks it would do Shuja no harm to feel a little insecure. Preobrajensby is of the same opinion; he told me that Shuja was much more amenable before he was recognised by the Persian Government, and while he felt very insecure. The fact is that Shuja has come to the end of his concessions to the Russians. He is not without religious fanaticism and, though he dislikes the Nationalists, he has little love for the Russians. He would like now to resist their pretensions, to be reconciled and work loyally with Tehran. The Russians have realised this; hence their coolness to Shuja. This coolness began with the sword incident. Sultan Ahmed Shah, as a result of advice given by the Karguzar to the Persian Government, conferred a sword of honour on Shuja, who accepted it with incautious demonstrations of flattered loyalty. Since then the Russians have been browbeating Shuja, trying to make him sever his loyal connection with Ain-ed-Dowleh. Do not the Russian relations with Shuja furnish an eloquent commentary on Russian policy here? A Persian official is supported with all the might of Russia as long as he is disloyal to his own Government. As soon as he becomes loyal to his own Government he falls into Russian disfavour. Poor Shuja is between the devil and the deep sea. He knows that the Persians will never forgive him for all the harm he has done them. And he fears that if Russia abandons him he will be in grave danger. This quandary may drive him to heel again. If not, I suspect the Russians have a candidate for his succession, namely, Sardar Reshid, who, having no reputation or self-respect, is considered to be capable of unbounded servility.

The sight presented to-day by Russian agents in Azerbaijan is not very edifying. The extraordinary system by which the consuls at Shaoujboulak, Urmi, Khoi, Ardebil, are independent of Tabriz must inevitably produce some incoherence. But when Miller was here he exercised a great influence over the consuls in the districts, and his policy, though contrary to the official policy of his Government, was yet coherent, and he held all the threads in his hands, controlled his subordinates, checked corruption. One felt, at any rate, in dealing with Miller that he was a responsible, competent authority. Now the anarchy and corruption among Russian agents in Azerbaijan is extreme. The consuls in the districts notoriously disregard the wishes of Preobrajensky. His own staff at Tabriz notoriously act independently of him. Videnskiy, the dragoman, formerly Miller's office boy, whom no one noticed, but now the ruler of Azerbaijan, exercises an incredible amount of power quite independently of his chief. And the

corruption is too wide-spread and notorious to excite any more suprise. Some Russian officials must be making fortunes out of Azerbaijan.

Yours sincerely,
W. A. SMART.

[39076]

No. 278.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 168.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 2, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the occasion of his birthday His Majesty the Shah held a reception of the Corps Diplomatique yesterday at his summer residence of Sahib Keranieh.

Owing to illness, I was unfortunately unable to be present, but the staff of His Majesty's Legation attended the ceremony in uniform and also the banquet given in the evening by the Prime Minister.

In his reply to the doyen's speech of congratulation in the morning, His Imperial Majesty alluded to the general improvement in the condition of Persia during the past year and drew attention to the remarkable increase in foreign trade as shown by the customs figures for the first three months of the year.

After stating that neither he nor his Government would spare any efforts in the direction of progress with a view to bringing about the regeneration of Persia on Constitutional lines, His Majesty announced that it was proposed to hold elections for a new Medjliss immediately.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39077]

No. 279.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 169.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 4, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 279.

Monthly Summary of Events in Persia.

Tehran.

Diplomatic Movements.—Sadr-ed-Din Bey, the new Turkish Ambassador, arrived at Tehran on the 15th of July and presented his credentials to the Shah on the following day.

Shah's Birthday.—The Shah's sixteenth birthday was celebrated on the 1st August in the usual manner.

General Elections.—A proclamation was issued by the Government on the Shah's birthday announcing a general election for the Medjliss and foreshadowing the opening of a Senate as well. The elections are to begin shortly after the 4th September at Tehran.

The Cabinet.—Prince Arfa'-ed-Dowleh has arrived at Tehran, but the question of his post in the Cabinet is still in suspense.

The Russian Government have conferred decorations on practically every member of the Government, including a very high order for Prince Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Treasurer-General.—M. Mornard has received the order of St. Stanislas from the Russian Government. He proposes to go to Europe on short leave, but has not fixed the date of his departure as yet.

G. P. CHURCHILL, *Oriental Secretary.*

Resht.

M. Ossinko, formerly Russian consul at Kazvin, has been appointed Russian consul-general at Resht in the place of M. Necrassof.

Owing to M. Necrassof's pending departure, the Sheriat Medar, a *persona grata* at the Russian consulate since the troubles in December 1911, has left with his family for Russia; also Muffaher-ul-Mulk, who has been the Rais-el-Nazmieh for the past twenty months, has resigned his appointment, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants. Muffaher-ul-Mulk was appointed Russian consular agent for Talish, but, as he was given so hostile a reception at Kerganrud while on his way to take up his post, he returned to Enzeli.

During the period 4th to 19th July there has been a constant *va-et-vient* of small parties of Russian troops between Baku and Kazvin, with the nett result that the garrison at Kazvin has been increased by some 400 men.

Meshed.

The Turkomans, who for some time past have been in possession of the road between Shahrud and Abbasabad, have withdrawn across the border, and some of the Amir-i-Azam's sowars have taken over this portion of the road, ostensibly as road-guards. These men are unpaid, and are said to be demanding "rahdari" at extraordinary high rates.

In spite of Colonel Khakandokof's successful action against Juju and his following, as reported in last month's summary, the Kuchan and Sabzewar districts are apparently again beset by parties of robbers.

The Russian Bank has entered into negotiations with the present holder of the concession for the Meshed–Askhabad road, with a view to buying him out and constructing a new road from Meshed to Kuchan, and thence viâ Darragez to Artik on the Central Asian Railway.

The Adil-ud-Dowleh, who was found to have been implicated in various robberies in the neighbourhood of Turbat, has been dismissed from the Governorship of that place.

No fresh cases of supposed plague have been reported from Karez since the 28th June.

Ispahan.

The condition of the town remains much the same as reported in last month's summary, but that of the environs is apparently becoming worse owing to the notorious Seichani gang. Although the band lost two of their ringleaders in an engagement with some of the Governor's sowars on the 28th June, a week later they robbed a caravan only six miles from Ispahan and carried off 5,000 krans and some merchandise. The Governor-General has sent out parties of sowars to round up the robbers, but so far without success.

Owing to the general insecurity prevailing in the environs and to the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Julfa, His Majesty's consul-general is urging the removal of the present "Zabit" of Seichan and Julfa, as he is not only incapable of maintaining order in the district under his jurisdiction, but is also in league with the robbers.

The majority of the roads in the province itself appear to be secure, with the exception of the roads in the vicinity of Sultanabad and the road between Kumisheh and Mahyar.

Three local Persian firms started an issue of bank-notes some three or four weeks ago. As this was an infringement of the concession granted to the Imperial Bank of Persia, His Majesty's consul-general brought the matter to the notice of the authorities and demanded the withdrawal of the notes. Although no orders have as yet been issued, the Governor-General has informed His Majesty's consul privately that he is about to send out notices forbidding the circulation of the notes.

The unsatisfactory state of affairs in Sultanabad and in the outlying district still continues, but as the Government gendarmerie has lately established a post in the town an improvement in the situation may be expected.

The people of Kashan are very much distressed on account of the treatment they receive at the hands of Naib Hussain and his followers, and especially at the latest act of aggression committed by Naib Hussain's son, namely, the kidnapping of one Agha Ali, a mullah, whose whereabouts are still unknown. There appears to be little doubt that Naib Hussain is receiving encouragement from the Russian consul at Ispahan.

Shiraz.

The Kawam-ul-Mulk returned to Shiraz on the 3rd August after a very successful expedition against the Arab tribes who, for some time past, have been the chief factors in promoting anarchy in the province.

The roads to Bushire and Ispahan are open, and, in the opinion of His Majesty's consul, the present state of Fars generally is as satisfactory as could reasonably be expected.

On the 24th June an incident occurred showing that Sowlet-ed-Dowleh's assurances regarding the handing over of the men implicated in the attack on the Central India Horse are not to be taken too seriously. Two of the men who took part in the attack, and whose surrender had been demanded, were brought to the gate of the consulate by some of Sowlet-ed-Dowleh's sowars. His Majesty's consul refused to admit them as he feared they would demand "bast," but telephoned to the Governor-General and asked him to take the necessary steps to apprehend them. The Governor-General sent his ferrashes to the consulate to seize the two men. In the meanwhile, however, one Kaferidun, a man of some importance, rode away with the assent and connivance of Sowlat's sowars. The other man remained behind and was taken into custody by the ferrashes.

On the night of the 31st July twelve gendarmes deserted, taking with them their rifles, horses, and several rounds of ammunition. A party has been sent out in pursuit, but has not yet been able to locate the whereabouts of the deserters.

Seistan.

As it has transpired that Hissam-ed-Dowleh and his son, Hishmat-ul-Mulk, are the instigators of the Baluch raids and other acts of aggression in Seistan and in the Kainat, His Majesty's Legation is pressing the Central Government to expel them from the district. They are at present residing at Birjand with Shaukat-ul-Mulk, the Governor of the Kainat. The Minister of the Interior, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister, has summoned all three to Tehran, but, as they have so far not obeyed these instructions, further pressure is being brought to bear upon them.

Kerman.

The Amir-i-Mufakham, the Governor-General, has returned to Kerman on completion of his tour through the province. He apparently has come to some understanding with several former recalcitrant chiefs, and has succeeded in collecting a certain amount of arrears of revenue.

Etemad-ul-Mulk, whose appointment as Deputy-Governor of Kerman was cancelled (*vide* last month's summary), reached Kerman, in spite of orders from the Minister of the Interior to return to Tehran. On hearing that Etemad-ul-Mulk was actually on his way to Kerman, His Majesty's consul proposed that one Amir-i-Hashmat should be appointed Deputy-Governor. The Governor-General agreed, and the Central Government confirmed the appointment.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh surrendered on 17th July to the Russian officer commanding the force of Persian Cossacks, which the Central Government despatched against him from Tehran. Two or three days later Salar asked the Russian officer for permission to visit his camp on parole. The permission was granted, and Salar broke his parole and escaped.

The prince's present whereabouts are not known, neither is there any information at hand as to whether the force of Cossacks is pursuing him or not.

Bakhtiari Country.

The two Bakhtiari khans sent from Tehran to Sardar Jang, to reason with him and to try and induce him not to resign his appointment as Governor of Bakhtiari, were successful in their mission.

W. M. FORDHAM, *Major,*
Military Attaché.

[39078] No. 280.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 170.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 4, 1913.

THE proclamation regarding a general election, announced by the Shah in his speech to the Diplomatic Body on the 1st instant, as reported in my despatch No. 168 of the 2nd instant, has now been published.

It is prefaced by two firmans dated the 23rd December, 1911, one in the name of the Shah and the other signed by the Regent. A translation of the latter firman was enclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 2 of the 6th January, 1912.

The proclamation, which is dated the 1st August, 1913, and is signed by his Highness Ain-ed-Dowleh, the Minister of the Interior, refers to the necessity of the deputies of the Medjliss being given a mandate by the country for the revision of the Constitution. I have the honour to refer, in this respect, to Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 167 of the 5th September, 1911, as well to his No. 2 of the 6th January, 1912. To talk of a referendum, under existing conditions in this country, is of course absurd. There is as yet no machinery by which it would be possible to gauge the preponderating balance of public opinion for or against the proposal to modify the fundamental laws, which were originally framed for the purpose of clipping the wings of a despotic and much hated sovereign. I refer, of course, to Mohamed Ali, the ex-Shah. At any rate, this proclamation, preceded as it was by the Ministerial programme, which received the sanction of the Medjliss on the 2nd September, 1911, and by the Regent's firman of the 23rd December, 1911, will empower the next Medjliss to proceed to the much-needed modification of the fundamental laws.

The present proclamation goes on to foreshadow the convocation of a Senate, the regulations for which will, it is announced, be prepared beforehand and presented to the Medjliss for ratification as soon as the Assembly meets.

The elections will be conducted on the basis of the last electoral law, a translation of which was enclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 224 of the 22nd November, 1911.

The proclamation finally announces that the committee for the supervision of the elections will be formed in Tehran on the 4th September, and in the provinces a month after the receipt of the necessary instructions and documents.

It may be presumed, therefore, that the election should be in full swing towards the end of September, and that in October or early in November there should be a quorum in Tehran which would permit of the opening of the Medjliss to be followed by the Senate.

But it should be remembered that the present electoral law provides for only 15 members for Tehran, while Azerbaijan is given 19, Khorassan 15, Mazanderan 5, and Ghilan 6, or a total of 45 for the extremely doubtful northern provinces, while the rest is made up chiefly of deputies who have come from outlying places, such as Fars, Arabistan, Kerman, &c.

It seems, therefore, justifiable to be somewhat sceptical as to the possibility of a quorum of sixty-nine members being able to meet at the capital before the end of the year, unless resort is had to a former practice of choosing the majority of the deputies from among the professional politicians of Tehran, of whom there are always a great number available.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39079] No. 281.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 171. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 5, 1913.

THE news from Fars is somewhat conflicting in nature, although the sum total of it would appear to show a steadily maintained improvement on a more satisfactory scale than one had dared to anticipate. The roads are stated to be safe on both sides of Shiraz, whilst there has been a noteworthy diminution in the exaction of illegal tolls. Major O'Connor reports that the provincial revenues are coming in quite satisfactorily,

so much so that he anticipates that the Administration will be able to support itself on its own funds. He also states that the Governor-General has made an arrangement with certain headmen on the road south of Kazerun, under which "rahdari" is to be abolished, in return for a monthly stipend paid to the Khan, and the enrolment of a certain number of his men as road-guards. The scheme entails an expenditure of about 150*l.* a month, or rather less than it was estimated would have to be paid for similar services under a scheme drawn up by the gendarmerie. The Mukhber's plan will not interfere in any way with the eventual occupation of the road by gendarmes. It had been intended to carry this out this summer, but the excessive heat has rendered it undesirable to do so until later on in the year when the nights get longer, but it is important that the road should be occupied in considerable force before the autumn tribal migration south.

There have been some rumours of tribal dissensions among the Kashgai, but pressure has been brought to bear on certain disaffected chiefs who appear to have now accepted the situation. A fact of no small significance is the visit that Sowlet-ed-Dowleh is about to pay to Sardar Jang, Ilkhani of the Bakhtiaris at Chikakhor. Sardar Jang has been instructed by the senior khans in Tehran to show Sowlet all suitable honour, and make him understand that the Bakhtiaris have no quarrel with him. Sardar Ehtesham, Sowlet's half-brother and rival for the Ilkhaniship, is strongly supported by the Bakhtiaris, and this bid on Sowlet's part for their friendship shows that he too has realised the value of their powerful support. As the Bakhtiaris are also very friendly with Kavam-ul-Mulk, there is no reason to suppose that Sowlet's action is directed against him, but it is rather to be hoped that it may mean that all the rival local factors in Fars are desirous of living at peace with one another under the administration of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh.

Major O'Connor reports that after much parleying Sowlet-ed Dowleh recently sent two of the culprits of the attack on Mr. Smart in December 1911 into Shiraz. These men arrived one day at the consulate, but Major O'Connor, fearing that they meant to take bast, rightly refused them admittance. The sanctity of sanctuary is observed very strictly in Persia, and had these men been received within the limits of the consulate, it it might have been held an infringement of sanctuary to have consented to their punishment. Major O'Connor advised the Governor-General of what had occurred, and his Excellency at once sent horsemen to capture the two men. The most important of the two, with the evident connivance of Sowlet's sowars, made his escape as soon as he saw that the gates of the consulate would not be opened. The man of lesser rank allowed himself to be arrested and imprisoned by the Governor's men. Both men's names appear upon the list of culprits who should be handed over, but neither is a culprit of much importance. The man who escaped has since been captured. Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has told Major O'Connor that he does not wish the culprits to be handed over in this way, and has advised Sowlet-ed-Dowleh that it is now too late to make conditions in connection with the handing over of the guilty persons. At the same time it appears to me to be a good sign that there is a disposition to surrender the culprits. Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's plan is to make an attack in force in the autumn, with the assistance of the gendarmerie, on the stronghold of Mohammed Ali Khan Kashguli at Shahpur, and wipe out that turbulent brigand, who was probably the moving spirit both in the attack upon British troops when Mr. Smart was wounded, and in that in which Captain Eckford so unfortunately lost his life.

It appears to me desirable that the Governor-General should be left to work out his own scheme, as I believe him to have the punishment of the men guilty of the above outrages very much at heart, whilst Major O'Connor can be relied upon to keep his Excellency up to the execution of his promises. I have just heard from Major Siefvert, who has lately returned from Shiraz, where he commanded the gendarmerie, that Major O'Connor has made his strong personality felt by Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, and that it is he who virtually directs the administration of the province.

During the last few months Kavam-ul-Mulk has been busy restoring order among the Arab tribes. He first of all proceeded to Fasa and Darab, where he inflicted a defeat upon those who had beaten the Government forces there some four years ago. It is still rather doubtful whether he made much impression upon the unruly Baharlu tribes who acknowledge no master, and who are a constant source of unrest in the south-eastern districts of the province, where it is extremely hard to conduct military operations on an extensive scale, but it is more or less clear that he executed some repressive mesures, and, it is said, collected some revenue. Kavam-ul-Mulk, during his expedition, having reason to distrust the loyalty of a certain Shaybani Arab chieftain, named Asgher Khan, arrested him and sent him to Shiraz. He had to fight to do this,

and his victory gained him no small prestige. Kavam's suspicions were confirmed by the fact that Asgher Khan's relations, Zohrab Khan and Mohammed Kuli Khan, revolted at Shiraz at the same time as the former was arrested. Zohab Khan was shot fighting in Shiraz itself, but Mohammed Kuli Khan escaped from the city; thanks, Major O'Connor reported, to culpable weakness and indecision on the part of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, who would not appear to be at his best at moments when a strong part has to be played.

This brings us to a somewhat unfortunate episode, in which the gendarmerie played an inglorious part. It is probable that the Governor-General hoped they would do so, in order that he might have an opportunity of showing them up as a useless force to the Central Government, an opportunity of which he has not failed to avail himself to the full in telegrams addressed to the Minister of the Interior, all of which have come into my hands. His Excellency, after consultation with Major O'Connor and Major Siefvert, arranged that a detachment of gendarmes, then on its way to Shiraz, should halt at Sivend until they were joined by Major Siefvert with a smaller force from Shiraz. The combined force was then to attack the Shaybani Arabs under Mohammed Kuli Khan, and kill or capture the leader. The movement was duly carried out, and it was reported at first with perfect success, several villages being restored to their rightful owners and much stolen booty recovered. Later advices showed that, though the success had been general, less stolen property had been recovered than was stated at first, and the main object of the expedition, the capture of Mohammed Kuli Khan, had not been achieved. Then ugly stories began to be whispered about that the gendarmes had looted and ravished like any Bakhtiaris, and that Siefvert himself had accepted horses and carpets from Mohammed Kuli Khan who had promised to surrender at Shiraz within three days, a promise which he was of course careful not to fulfil.

Siefvert then returned to Shiraz, and on Mohammed Kuli Khan not putting in an appearance a second Swedish officer was sent out to complete his task. This second effort ended also in failure, Mohammed Kuli being allowed to escape with all his family, although the Swedes had five hundred men to put against him. To crown the misfortunes, Kavam-ul-Mulk appeared upon the scene a few days after the gendarmes had been withdrawn, attacked, captured, and hanged the Shaybani chief in twenty-four hours.

The Swedish officers deny that there is the smallest foundation for the accusation of looting made against the gendarmes, but the chance was too good a one for the general Persian public to miss, and I understand that the story has been so sedulously circulated at Shiraz that it will be hard to persuade people that it is not true. At heart, all Persians are opposed to the gendarmes, and I fear that the Siakh affair last August and the present badly bungled business at Kafrak will do much harm to their prestige in the south. They will require to be very circumspect in their action in future and more venturesome, even at the risk of a check, to win a good name for themselves. For the reasons which appear above, and because he was on bad terms with Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, I advised Colonel Hjalmarson to recall Major Siefvert to Tehran. The colonel agreed to do so at once, although he expressed his regret that Major Siefvert could not remain to put the men out on the road, and so carry out the first part of the programme with which he had been connected since its inception. It would appear difficult to excuse Major Siefvert's two military blunders. Allowances should be made for his inability to get on with the local authorities, on the score that his nerves may well have been highly tried. He had to carry through all the initial work of establishing the gendarmerie at Shiraz, in the face of the almost open opposition of Kavam-ul-Mulk, who was strongly supported secretly in this opposition by all the leading Bakhtiari Khans at Tehran, including Samsam-es-Sultaneh, at that moment Prime Minister.

The latest telegraphic news from Shiraz is to the effect that twelves gendarmes have deserted, taking their rifles and a considerable amount of ammunition. I am assured by the Swedish officers here that the amount of ammunition carried off cannot have been very considerable because even had the deserters been detailed for immediate active service they would not have had more than 150 rounds per man with them. It will thus be seen that all is not quite satisfactory as far as the gendarmerie is concerned, but I hope there will be marked improvement with a change of commanding officer. Major Uggla, who is now in command has the reputation of being a very competent officer, and there is reason to hope that he will be able to work more amicably with the Governor-General than could Major Siefvert.

Whilst the gendarmes may be said to be temporarily under a cloud, good progress in the general pacification of the province should have been made by the execution of the

two Shaybani chieftains, Asgher Khan and Mohammed Kuli Khan, who have been notorious evil-doers. Another firebrand has also disappeared in the person of Sheikh Zakharieh, who was recently murdered by his own people. This brigand was responsible for many of the raids into Kerman from the lawless south-eastern districts of Fars. Thus have three of the most turbulent factors of the disturbed situation been removed from the scene, and Kavam-ul-Mulk's prestige greatly increased.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh sent in his resignation to the Minister of the Interior a short time ago and left Shiraz, establishing himself in a garden outside the city. Persian officials often select this method for calling attention to themselves, and, whether Mukhber-es-Sultaneh was serious or not in his desire to resign, he was soon persuaded to return to Shiraz, and resume his duties. I saw Ain-ed-Dowleh upon the subject, and after a long talk, his Highness said that he had been very pleased to discuss the situation with me academically because he took great interest in it, but that as he himself had resigned his post (as he does about once a week) he could give no official opinion. It transpired from his subsequent conversation that he had no real intention of resigning, and it is probable that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh resigned for somewhat similar reasons to those which actuated Ain-ed-Dowleh, namely, to have an opportunity for blowing his own trumpet and airing his grievances, in the hope that the threat of his resignation would cause some relaxation of the foreign interference of which his Excellency complains bitterly. The vanity of Persians is stupendous, but had I not read Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's telegram I could hardly have believed that any man could have made himself as ridiculous, as he would have done anywhere but in Persia, by his bombastic self-glorification.

The Governor-General's chief grievance is that he is not master in his own house, and that neither the financial agent nor the officer commanding the gendarmerie consult him, or pay attention to his orders. The recent incident at Kafrak, which is reported above, is made full use of to show what blunders foreign officers can make if the instructions of the Governor-General are not carried out. Although Mukhber-es-Sultaneh was made fully aware before he went to Shiraz that the financial agent and the gendarmes would have to be given considerable latitude, I have wondered more than once in the course of the past year that his vain nature has not rebelled before against the system of tutelage to which he is subjected. It must be peculiarly irksome to a proud man who hates foreigners and all their works, whilst considering them quite unsuited to cope with the difficulties of the Persian situation. It is probable that his Excellency now feels himself less dependent upon foreign support, with local revenue coming in satisfactorily and his own position being more assured in the province, and that he has judged the present for these reasons a suitable moment for making an effort to secure a measure of emancipation from the yoke of the foreigner.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has done good work during the nine or ten months during which he has held office, and there is, I think, some reason to believe that there is ground for his complaint that he is not shown proper consideration. My theory is that the foreigners employed in the Persian service should always remember that the Governor-General of a province is the representative of the Central Government; that it is bad policy to lower his position in the eyes of the people; that he is theoretically the authority from whom they should take their instructions; and that, therefore, they should always consult with him, follow his wishes as far as may be possible, and, at all events make him believe that it is he who is administering his own province. I have spoken in this sense to M. Mornard and to the officer commanding the gendarmerie, and I hope that things may now move a little more smoothly at Shiraz where Major O'Connor has done a splendid work in continually patching up differences between the Governor-General and the foreign officials. It must have required the exercise of much tact and patience on his part to keep the peace for so long.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's resignation has, however, raised the question of whether or no he is really a satisfactory Governor-General, and if not who would be best fitted to succeed him. I propose to discuss this question in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39081] No. 282.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 173.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the caravan reports from His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz for the month of July:—

		Previous month.
Bushire—		
Mules arriving and leaving Bushire	2,511	*2,039*
Donkeys arriving and leaving via the Shahi road	1,036	*309*
The Borasjun sub-report shows a movement of—		
Mules to Bushire	2,767	*3,056*
Mules from Bushire	2,633	*2,341*
Shiraz—		
Animals arriving by the Bushire road	2,535	*3,141*
Animals left by the Bushire road	1,566	*2,268*
Animals left Shiraz by the Ispahan road	2,120	*2,270*
Arrivals at Shiraz by the same road	594	*900*

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports a robbery of three bales of piece-goods, value 352 tomans (about 75*l.*), belonging to Messrs. Sassoon, on the Dilam Behbehan road in the Zeidun district, the robbers being a well-known band living on the Konar Takhteh Plain.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports no robberies on the main roads, but states that there has been some pilfering of local traffic round Abadeh.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39082] No. 283.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 174.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a table showing the estimated strength of Russian troops in Persia at the present moment.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 283.

TABLE showing the Estimated Strength of Russian Troops in Persia.

Tabriz	3,000
Ardebil	1,000
Marand	1,000
Khoi and Urmia	8,000
Sujbulak	300
Resht and Enzeh	450
Kazvin	1,625
Barfarush	260
Bandar-i-Gez	130
Astrabad	450
Gumbad-i-Kabuz	200
Meshed	250
Kushan	100
Khorassan (on Meshed-Askhabad road)	100
Consular guards	130
Total (in round numbers)	17,000

W. M. FORDHAM, *Major,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, August 4 1913.

[39083] No. 284.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 175.)

Sir, *Tehran, August* 5, 1913.

THE general situation may be said to be satisfactory, though there are the usual number of blackish-looking storm clouds lying low on the horizon. Ain-ed-Dowleh is the moving spirit in the Cabinet councils, and would appear to have now got his own way pretty well since the departure of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh. His Highness has, however, periodical quarrels with Kavam-es-Sultaneh and M. Mornard, and usually sends in his resignation, and sulks in one or other of his gardens in the immediate neighbourhood of Tehran when the dispute has been particularly heated or he has not completely won the day. There is reason to believe that there is a good deal of opposition to the old Prince in ecclesiastical and other quarters. He is accused of being double-dealing—but what Persian is not—and of intriguing with the democrats in order to create future trouble for the Regent, whilst in other quarters it is urged that if his Highness controls the elections the new Medjliss will be entirely composed of reactionaries. It is probable that the Bakhtiaris are at the bottom of the movement against Ain-ed-Dowleh, but not a few people declare themselves to be disappointed with him, and to have expected more from him.

It is more difficult to make up one's mind whether or not it is desirable to maintain Ain-ed-Dowleh in office. There is no gainsaying the fact that since he has been at the Ministry of the Interior there has been a marked general improvement in the condition of the country. It is probable that his influence, rather than that of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, has been responsible for the better state of things prevailing in Fars, and I have had frequent reason to realise that an order issued by the former Sadr Azam of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah is obeyed, whilst his wishes are consulted by all the tribal chieftains and local tyrants from one end of Persia to the other, whereas nobody cared a snap of the fingers for the orders of his predecessors. On the other hand, the old Prince is not only corrupt himself, but he persists in employing men who have been proved to have misappropriated public moneys. There is small reason to doubt that his Highness intrigues against the new European administrations, such as the Treasury Department, the Swedish gendarmerie, and the police. His Highness professes the most earnest desire for the success of these undertakings, but I fear that his actions do not correspond with his words. Still, as everything is known here as soon as it is said or done, not much harm need as yet be feared from the Prince's secret hostility, which can always be checked by a friendly word of warning dropped at an opportune moment and in such a manner as not to give offence.

It is extremely doubtful if there is any real demand for a Medjliss, but the Cabinet have found themselves constrained, by a somewhat fictitious popular movement engineered by the Bakhtiaris, to proceed to new elections. It is made a condition by the party that brought pressure to bear on the Cabinet that the formation of a Senate shall be the first act of the new Assembly, but it will depend largely upon its component elements whether or not an Upper Chamber is created. Considerable anxiety is felt as to whether it will be possible to secure the return of deputies from the provinces under Russian domination, more especially from Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Asterabad, and Khorassan.

There have been several rather unfortunate incidents between the gendarmes and the Bakhtiaris, in which both sides have held the other to blame. There is some reason to suspect Ain-ed-Dowleh has been associated with intrigues intended to create discord between the two. The Bakhtiaris are disposed to hold him responsible, as they say that, in cases where promises given by Swedish officers have not been carried out, it is clear that the Swedes cannot have been at fault, and they suspect that the Persian officers who have disarmed Bakhtiaris, though duly supplied with the necessary permit to carry arms, have done so under direct orders from the Minister of the Interior. The matter will be enquired into, and if it is proved that he has done this I shall speak very frankly to the Prince. I am endeavouring to bring the gendarmes and the Bakhtiaris together, and for the purpose a scheme is being discussed under which some Bakhtiari sowars will enter the gendarmerie.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39084]

No. 285.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 176.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 6, 1913.

IT is stated in a letter from the Foreign Office to the India Office under date of the 18th June last that you had agreed to the request of the Russian Government that a joint application should be made to the Persian Government for an option for the Trans-Persian Railway on condition that, when it reaches the frontier between the Russian and neutral spheres, an Anglo-Russian Technical Commission should be appointed to examine the two alternative routes, viâ Shiraz and Kerman. From subsequent telegraphic correspondence that has reached me, it would appear that the above-quoted decision has been so far amended that the Anglo-Russian Technical Commission is to be appointed simultaneously with the application for the option, and, indeed, that the official request for an option is to be delayed until the component parts of the Commission have been decided upon.

I am not aware from what quarter the pressure has come that has caused the original decision to be altered, but I would venture to express an opinion that, for various reasons, it is highly desirable that the southern and northern sections of the future Trans-Persian Railway should be constructed simultaneously. Were the section that will traverse the Russian sphere to be constructed first, it would give Russian trade in the Russian and neutral zones an overwhelming superiority, such as it would be very hard indeed for British-Indian trade entering Persia from the south, some years behind, to supplant.

It would also, in my opinion, create a most unfortunate impression in this country, where a belief would become engendered that we are leaving the railway development of the country to the Russians. If such a belief were to gain credence, a strong opposition would be created to the scheme.

Moreover, the creation of a Russian railway to Tehran would necessitate the building of a line from Tehran to Khanikin, to the great advantage of both Russian and German trade, since an outlet would be created viâ Alexandretta, and to the great disadvantage of British trade, which, if carried as far as Khoremabad, could get no further except under most unfavourable conditions in comparison with the rail-borne goods of their trade rivals. Although the English group of the Société d'Études and the Persian Railways Syndicate have no common object, and appear, after the manner of British companies, to be antagonistic to each other, I am of opinion that the very unsatisfactory terminus provided by Khoremabad should not be lost sight of, and that, should an occasion offer in the course of the negotiations connected with the southern section of the Trans-Persian Railway, a bargain should be made with the Russian Government for the extension of the Mohammerah line to Hamadan.

I entirely agree with the views expressed by Sir G. Buchanan in his memorandum of the 7th June, in answer to Sir A. Hirtzell's letter to Sir A. Nicolson's letter of the 3rd June, that Anglo-Russian co-operation in railway enterprise in Persia is most essential, and it would appear to me that we shall find ourselves in a somewhat invidious position unless we allow the southern section of the Trans-Persian Railway to traverse the British sphere. It seems scarcely conceivable that with a possible development of railways throughout Persia we shall be able to condemn the large province of Kerman to go for all time without that most essential element of civilisation, trade and development and social progress—the railway. To a layman the military objections raised appear frivolous, whilst it seems hardly in keeping with the historical record of the greatest civilising Power in the world to condemn a large tract of a foreign country that she has specially marked down as her own for purposes of commercial development to the sterility of a land with no more rapid means of communication than camel transport. To this it may be objected that motor roads will be opened up. If such is the intention, all I can say is that the sooner such a scheme is set on foot the better, in order that British trade may not be left hopelessly in the lurch.

From conversations that I have had with the President of the Council and other Persian officials, I have derived the impression that it will be no easy task to get the Persian Government to grant an option for the Trans-Persian Railway unless the application for the same is accompanied by some very definite assurance that a considerable loan will be forthcoming at an early date. It has always been made quite clear that the loan and the railway, although the Société d'Études is to have the two, are quite separate undertakings. It will not be easy to make the Cabinet understand this under present circumstances. They have set their hearts upon a loan,

and will certainly endeavour to make the issue of one a condition of the granting of the option. As far as I can understand, there is no immediate need of money. The Treasurer-General tells me that, unless unforeseen incidents occur, he hopes to be able to carry on till next March. He added that this would only be possible if M. Poklewsky did not return to upset all his arrangements.

Under these circumstances it seems to me foolish of the Cabinet to press for a large loan until they are called upon to meet the heavy foreign claims that will have to be settled some day. It would appear to me wiser to continue the present gradual system of re-establishing order and confirming progress, rather than to seek to rush into the execution of reforms that will be costly, and which can be equally well undertaken in a few years' time when, with luck, Persia will be able to borrow money on more favourable terms. The Cabinet Ministers do not share my view, and declare that the country expect them to proceed at once to certain essential reforms, such as the creation of a small army and the conversion of the pensions. I don't believe that the country cares a fig for either of these projects, but the handling of large sums of money has an irresistible attraction for Persian statesmen.

In any case, nothing can be done now until after the assembling of the new Medjliss and the return of the Regent—if after all these months his Highness can screw up his courage sufficiently to return to Tehran and face the fact, in the midst of the people who elected him the constitutional head of the nation, that he has deserted his trust for more than a year. It is possible that we have got on better without him, but that is not to his credit, and does not alter the fact that he left Persia to her fate at a very critical moment.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39085]

No. 286.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 178.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 8, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 173 of the 5th instant, reporting caravan statistics from His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz for the month of July, I have the honour to report that Major O'Connor now informs me by telegraph that during that month a British-Indian subject travelling to Shiraz from Bushire was robbed at Jaaferjin of all his personal belongings.

It was reported from Abadeh on the 5th August that the postal sowar from Ispahan had been robbed by Shishbulukis 2 miles south of Yezdikhast; the robbers took his horse and post-bags and stripped him of everything.

The Swedish officer in command of the gendarmerie at Shiraz has, in consequence of this incident, sent a small force of about fifty mounted men to Abadeh to patrol the main road in that neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[39110]

No. 287.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 254.)

Sir,

St. Petersburgh, August 19, 1913.

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your despatch No. 278, Secret, of the 12th instant, I spoke to M. Sazonof yesterday on the endeavours being made by Russian officials in Northern Persia to strangle the Indian tea trade, and left with him a short *aide-mémoire*, but without mentioning any names.

His Excellency said that this was the first time that he had heard the matter mentioned, but promised to cause enquiries to be made.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[39111] No. 288.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 255.)

St. Petersburgh, August 19, 1913.

Sir,

I TOOK the opportunity of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday to speak to his Excellency as instructed by your despatch No. 269, Secret, of the 11th instant, on the subject of the attitude adopted by certain Russian consuls in Persia with regard to Salar-ed-Dowleh. I at the same time handed to his Excellency an *aide-mémoire*, of which copy is enclosed, embodying the general purport of my remarks. In doing so I said that I was very sorry to have to revert once more to this subject, but that I thought that, if future misunderstandings were to be averted, it was better to speak quite openly and frankly to his Excellency.

M. Sazonof expressed assent, and said that he was very glad that I had done so. He could not, however, help thinking that there was a good deal of exaggeration in the reports which had reached us with regard to the proceedings of the Russian consuls, and he would like to know the sources whence we drew our information. As regards, moreover, what I had said about the Persian Cossacks, I must remember that they had proved their efficiency by actually capturing Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I replied that I was not questioning their efficiency as a body, but was trying to show that their action for good had been seriously hampered by the moral support given to Salar by M. Ivanof and M. Nécrassof. The information which we had received with regard to their proceedings was in many cases a matter of common knowledge that had been confirmed by the reports sent us by our consular officers. It was by no means exaggerated, and if it was not for the fact that the instructions which you had sent me had only reference to the particular case of Salar-ed-Dowleh, I could tell him of other instances in which they were acting in a spirit contrary to the policy pursued by his Excellency. Speaking personally, however, I would say that some of the consuls seemed to aspire to play the rôle of Governors in a conquered province rather than that of consuls in a friendly and independent country. The basis of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 was the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia, and both the Emperor and the Imperial Government had more than once assured me that Russia would not annex Northern Persia. The policy of the Russian consuls, on the other hand, was to work for its incorporation in the Russian Empire, and I very much feared that if they were allowed to continue to disregard their instructions, the Russian Government would one day find themselves confronted with accomplished facts that would render annexation almost inevitable. In that case British public opinion would lose all confidence in Russian assurances, as it would be impossible to divest the Central Government of responsibility for what had occurred. I therefore trusted that his Excellency would impress on M. Korostovetz, who, as he had told me, was shortly to succeed M. Poklewsky at Tehran, of the necessity of keeping his consuls in order.

M. Sazonof replied that he would do so, and that he would cause enquiries to be made into the conduct of M. Ivanof and M. Nécrassof in the matter of Salar-ed-Dowleh. He begged me, however, to assure you that the policy of the Imperial Government in Persia was directed by himself, and not by the Russian consuls in that country, and that Russia had no intention of adopting a policy of annexation.

I replied that you had absolute confidence in his Excellency's loyal intentions. In speaking, as I had done, as to the possible effects of the action of Russian consuls, I was not speaking by your instructions, but as an ardent advocate of the Anglo-Russian undertaking I had ventured to express the apprehension which I felt as to the course things were taking in North Persia.

Our conversation was throughout of a perfectly friendly character, and I trust that, in somewhat exceeding my instructions I did not go further than you intended me to. My reason for doing so was that I wished if possible to avoid having to revert to the subject again for some time to come. I therefore did not confine my remarks to the particular case of Salar-ed-Dowleh, but discussed the whole question in its general bearings. It is, in my opinion, a mistake to be repeatedly making representations with regard to isolated incidents, as such a proceeding tends to cause irritation without effecting any permanent good, and I am personally in favour of reserving for one really serious conversation all the complaints which we have to bring against Russian consuls in Persia.

I should add that in the course of our conversation I informed M. Sazonof

that there was absolutely no truth in the allegation, made by the Russian consul in Tabriz, that the Anjumans were being organised under the auspices of Vice-Consul Smart for the purpose of manipulating the elections for the Medjliss.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 288.

Aide-mémoire communicated to M. Sazonof by Sir G. Buchanan.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to bring to the notice of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs the recent action of certain of the Russian consuls in Persia towards Salar-ed-Dowleh.

The Russian Legation recently informed the Persian Government that they were free to take such action as they might think fit with regard to Salar, and gave them to understand that the Russian Government would maintain a neutral attitude on the question, and that only in the event of Russian interests being threatened, might they find it necessary to protect those interests by the despatch of a Russian force to the disturbed district.

It was, however, plain from the first that the Russian consul at Asterabad was giving Salar his moral support, and the well-known fact that M. Ivanof looked benevolently on Salar's subversive movement sufficed to stifle all possible opposition to the Prince. It would also appear that Salar's unlucky attempt to take possession of Resht was made with the connivance and approval of M. Ivanof and M. Nécrassof, who were in constant communication with each other, and the fact that it did not succeed was due to a fortuitous circumstance over which they had no control. There can be no doubt that Salar would have been captured at Resht, had not the local authorities realised that such action would not have been agreeable to M. Nécrassof, who had encouraged the Persian Cossacks to side with Salar. Subsequently some sixty of Salar's fugitive followers, returning to Kurdistan from Mazanderan, were captured by Shujah-ed-Dowleh; but the latter had to release them at the instance of the Russian consul, who claimed that they had been accorded a safe passage to their homes, though no such order had been issued by the Persian Government.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Persian Government have lost all hope of ever capturing Salar, and should place but little faith in the genuine intention of the Cossack force under Russian officers that has been sent in pursuit of him, to come up with the Prince, who is now once more among the robber tribes of Kurdistan.

The above facts afford a striking illustration of the inveterate habit of Russian consuls in Persia of adopting and following a policy of their own, that is, in direct contradiction with that prescribed by their own Government. Such action on the part of the consuls naturally tends to engender a feeling of distrust of Russian methods in the Persian mind, and to render nugatory the efforts now being made by the Government of St. Petersburgh to assist the Persian Government in its uphill task.

St. Petersburgh, August 5 (18), 1913.

[39061] No. 289.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 430.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, August 24, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 23rd August.

M. Minorsky insists, and Captain Wilson agrees, on necessity of having secretary attached to both British and Russian delegations.

[39005] No. 290.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 425.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 429 of 23rd August.

I agree to point 1, as Russian delay seems inevitable. I presume Captain Wilson will, in consequence, be free for railway survey.

Please telegraph.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 627, and Tehran, No. 385.)

[38590] No. 291.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 25, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant relative to the Trans-Persian Railway.

I am to inform you, in reply, that, as the result of an informal conversation between representatives of this Office and your Department, Sir E. Grey considers it desirable to safeguard the Société d'Études from interference by the Persian Government in the choice of the alignment of the railway beyond Tehran and of the point where the railway should reach the sea, more effectively than the present text of the draft note to be handed to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's and the Russian representatives at Tehran might be interpreted as allowing.

With this object he would propose to introduce into paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft the two following modifications :—

(*a.*) In paragraph 5, instead of the words "d'accord avec le . . . ." to insert the words "et soumis ensuite à l'approbation du . . . ."

(*b.*) In paragraph 6, instead of the words "de s'entendre ultérieurement avec le . . . ." to insert the words "d'obtenir l'assentiment du . . . ."; instead of the word "sur" (after the words "Sa Majesté le Schah") to insert the words "aux propositions que, par suite des études qu'elle aura faites, elle mettra en avant en vue de déterminer . . . ."; and to delete the word "sur" before the words "les embranchements."

The two paragraphs in question will therefore read as follows :—

"Les autorisations nécessaires pour les études et les travaux préparatoires pour la construction d'un chemin de fer traversant la Perse du nord-ouest vers le sud-est, en passant par Téhéran, dont le tracé au delà de cette capitale sera ultérieurement déterminé et soumis ensuite à l'approbation du Gouvernement persan.

"Une option au profit de la société pour la concession de cette ligne, dans une forme susceptible de garantir les intérêts engagés.

"Il serait également nécessaire d'assurer à la société la possibilité d'obtenir l'assentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Schah aux propositions que, par suite des études qu'elle aura faites, elle mettra en avant en vue de déterminer le point du littoral méridional de la Perse où la ligne projetée atteindrait éventuellement la mer et les embranchements qui, après élaboration du tracé, conformément aux études et travaux susmentionnés, seraient jugés indispensables au bon fonctionnement de la ligne et au développement économique des régions traversées. Les embranchements pourraient être définis d'une façon plus précise au fur et à mesure de l'achèvement des études."

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[39458] No. 292.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 26, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 425 of 25th August.

Captain Wilson will be free to proceed with railway expedition, as previously arranged verbally.

In above circumstances perhaps Mr. Greenway will reconsider his attitude regarding Dr. Young (see your telegram No. 414 of 20th August).

[39464] No. 293.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 26, 1913.

MY telegram No. 417 of 17th August, last paragraph.

M. Minorsky thinks it better to await further developments before coming to decision as to preliminary meeting of commissioners at Constantinople; in view of progress that has been made this may not now be necessary. Captain Wilson of course would not be available.

[38476] No. 294.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 267.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 720A of the 14th instant, enclosing the draft of a note to the Ottoman Government respecting the Turco-Persian frontier.

The enclosures in your despatch apparently contain certain clerical errors, and if this is so it will be necessary to have the printed proof carefully revised. I accordingly enclose two copies in print, and have to request you to cause such corrections as may be necessary to be made.

I gather that the position now is that the Ottoman Government have expressed in writing their concurrence in the Anglo-Russian notes, but I should be glad to know what steps are to be taken to give the arrangement arrived at binding force, and whether it is proposed that a preliminary treaty should be concluded between Turkey and Persia, prior to the demarcation, and a final treaty after the demarcation. If there is to be no preliminary treaty, I presume you and your Russian colleague are satisfied, in spite of past experience as to Turkey's attitude in regard to this question, that the correspondence which has taken place will serve the purpose equally well in practice, though I agree with you that the form of the draft note is somewhat cumbrous and unsatisfactory.

You will no doubt report at an early date upon the form in which you and your Russian colleague recommend that the arrangement arrived at with the Ottoman Government should be brought to the knowledge of the Persian Government, and to what document the latter should be asked to adhere.

I shall also be glad to receive a draft of the instructions which it is proposed to issue to the British and Russian commissioners. Commissions will be issued to Mr. Wratislaw and Captain Wilson, and, subject to any observations you may have to offer, it is proposed that they should be in general terms and contain a statement to the effect that the commissioners should act in accordance with instructions issued to them by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38719] No. 295.

Sir Edward Grey to M. de Etter.

Foreign Office, August 26, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have not failed to give careful consideration to the memorandum which Count Benckendorff was so good as to leave at this Office on the 25th June last on the subject of the negotiations of a British syndicate for a mining concession in Kerman.

With regard to the suggestion made by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should, in concert with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires request the Persian Government to delay the grant of any mining concession for the present, I would call attention to the fact that the British syndicate in question entered upon their negotiations with the Persian Government more than three years ago, at a time when the question of the Trans-Persian Railway had not been broached, and that upon the request of the group His Majesty's Government promised to them their active support.

In view, however, of the close accord existing between the two countries, and with a view to meet as far as possible the wish expressed by M. Sazonof, I communicated to the British syndicate the desire of his Excellency that the Société d'Études should participate in the concession, and I asked them to give it their favourable consideration.

I have been informed in reply that the syndicate are prepared to admit the Société to a participation of one-third of that part of the concession situated in the neutral sphere.

I would add that the British syndicate have undertaken, as a condition of the concession, to make to the Persian Government an advance of 100,000*l.* at par, bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for sixty years, to be redeemable at the option of the Government at the end of any year, on three months' notice, the Persian Government issuing bonds for the amount of the loan. The Société d'Études would thus be required to provide such a part of this loan as would be proportionate to their participation in the concession.

In bringing the foregoing to your notice, I venture to express the earnest hope that this arrangement will be accepted by the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[38592] No. 296.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

(Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 26, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 19th instant regarding the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for your confidential information, that the question of the alignment has been considered by the Government of India from the strategic point of view, and that they are of opinion that the strategical issues at stake are of so little importance that it would be advisable that the choice of an alignment should be governed by engineering and commercial considerations only.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[39480] No. 297.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 733.)

Constantinople, August 21, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 720 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the Russian and British notes on the subject of the Turco-Persian frontier from Mount Ararat to Djebel Guerebi, some miles south-east of Mandeli, together with Sheets 5 and 6 of the reduction of the Identic Map and a small sketch map of the district immediately south of Mount Ararat prepared at the

Russian Embassy, intended to illustrate it. You will see that *mutatis mutandis* the notes are practically identical, the only discrepancy in the text which is perhaps worth calling attention to is in the substitution in paragraph 5 in the English text of "le point nord du tracé indiqué dans la déclaration faite à Londres le 29 juillet" instead of the Russian text of "le point nord du tracé britannique," an alteration made for the sake of clearness, and agreed to by M. Minorsky.

As regards the maps, M. Minorsky informs me that there is a trifling inaccuracy in Sheet 5, where the line in Serkalé is shown as following the heights to the north of the stream, instead of the course of the stream itself as stated in the note. The inaccuracy is a trifling one, but it seems as well to place it on record in case the point should be raised in the course of the work of the Demarcation Commission. M. Minorsky might have corrected the error in the copies of the map he was preparing for this embassy, but as the Russian note with the map containing the error had already been sent into the Porte he thought it better to avoid possible confusion and to allow the error to stand.

The variations between the draft note enclosed in my despatch above mentioned and the note as presented to the Porte have been made at the instance of the Turkish Minister of War in consequence of the interview between him and M. Minorsky, as arranged for when M. de Giers and I met his Excellency and the Grand Vizier on the 13th instant. They affect only that part of the line north of Zohab in which we take no special interest, and do not materially alter the original draft. At this interview the Minister of War did not press his point as to the identity of the Ab-i-Neft with the Zelezerd River, and it was understood that the point will be left to the Demarcation Commission on the spot.

As regards the suggestion made in your telegram No. 411 of the 19th instant, that a statement explanatory of the agreement which has been reached between Turkey on one side and ourselves and the Russians on the other, should be prepared here to enable the two legations at Tehran to obtain the assent of the Persian Government to it, I have had some conversation with M. Minorsky on the subject, and we are agreed that as regards that part of the frontier which has been discussed at Constantinople any such statement could be nothing more than a recapitulation of the arguments used in the various notes which have been exchanged between the two embassies and the Sublime Porte. Copies of all these documents have been sent home, and will no doubt be in the possession of the two legations at Tehran. By far the greater portion of this part of the frontier, *i.e.*, from Ararat to the north part of Zohab, is of special interest to Russia, and the Russian Legation at Tehran will no doubt be in a position to explain and defend against Persian criticism the various arrangements. Defence, however, seems scarcely necessary, as, thanks to Russian influence, Turkey has been induced to recognise the principle of the *status quo* frontier, and to withdraw her troops from the districts west of Lake Urmia, a result which Persia could never have obtained by herself.

As regards the frontier from Hawizeh to the sea, the negotiations which led to the declaration of the 29th July last were conducted in London, and it is to be presumed that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran is as well informed as this Embassy of the manner in which the agreement therein recorded was reached. So far as I am aware, there is not in this case any more than in that of the northern part of the frontier any reason why the Persian Government should be dissatisfied with the proposed line, but rather the contrary. Indeed the view of the two Governments has been that if by their efforts they have succeeded in bringing about in Persia's interests a final settlement of this long-standing question, a settlement, moreover, which is far more favourable to Persia than she could ever have hoped to have reached without their intervention, it is but reasonable that Persia should consent to some sacrifice of territory. It seems to me that there are, therefore, ample grounds to justify the transfer of territories we are agreed should be made by Persia in the Zohab region. It may be pointed out that in this region the only explicit cession is that of the districts north of the Kuretu River, for, although south of that point we maintain in the note of the 18th instant, in order to protect the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the view that the line as now laid down involves an actual cession of territory, it is not impossible that Turkey may, when the Delimitation Commission gets to work, be able in some instances to prove her assertion that the line represents the *status quo* frontier. As I have stated before, the actual reasons advanced for and against the line actually agreed on in this region are all to be found in the notes exchanged with the Sublime Porte.

Even north of the Kuretu River where we are calling on Persia to make a definite cession, the Persian Government may be reminded that in the opinion of the mediating

commissioners a part of the territory to be transferred by the contemplated agreement should, under the Treaty of Erzeroum (which is the basis of the present delimitation), properly belong to Turkey.

The Persian Government will probably make a great point of the loss involved to them by the cession of Tchia Sourkh and the oil-wells now being worked by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. There is, of course, a certain loss, viz., that of the royalties payable to Persia; but it might be pointed out to the Persian Government that so long as Tchia Sourkh could not be connected with the sea by a pipe line—a condition impossible so long as the district remained Persian—any large development of the oil field and consequent increase of the royalties was impracticable; and, further, that if, as seems likely to occur at no distant future, the oil-fields of Bagdad are to be worked, the market for oil from Persian Tchia Sourkh would be closed, and the present royalties, which I imagine do not amount to any large sum, would be correspondingly diminished.

I have ventured to make these few short remarks on the subject of the transfer of territory in the Zohab district in the hope that they may be of some use to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to whom, by the courtesy of the Russian Ambassador, I am sending a copy of this despatch direct, viâ Batoum, to-morrow.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 297.

British Note to Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le* 5 (18) *août*, 1913.

PAR ses notes en date du 18 (31) mars, et du 12 juillet, 1913, la Sublime Porte a bien voulu notifier à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre son adhésion aux propositions russes concernant la frontière turco-persane, exposées dans les documents suivants: la note du 9 (22) août, 1912 (avec un mémorandum y annexé); la note du 28 mars (10 avril), 1913; la note du 20 avril (3 mai), 1913 (avec un mémorandum y annexé); et l'aide-mémoire du 6 (19) juin, 1913.

Je n'ai pas manqué de porter la décision du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement, qui a appris avec satisfaction le règlement en principe de cette question restée en suspens depuis 1843.

Le Gouvernement britannique partage entièrement l'avis de la Sublime Porte sur la nécessité de tracer sans délai la ligne frontière sur les lieux afin de prévenir le retour à l'avenir d'incidents de frontière. Se réservant de communiquer ultérieurement à la Sublime Porte les noms des membres russes et anglais qui feront partie de la Commission technique, ainsi qu'il a été prévu par la note de votre Altesse en date du 12 juillet, 1913, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, tient à récapituler les principes de délimitation établis dans la correspondance susmentionnée au sujet de la frontière.

1. L'interprétation de l'article 3 du Traité d'Erzeroum étant pleinement établie dans le sens du maintien du *statu quo*, ce principe doit être appliqué dans tous les cas où il n'y aurait pas d'autres dispositions dans le traité de 1848 ou dans les accords récents.

2. Se référant à la note russe du 9 août, 1912, l'Ambassade a cru utile de récapituler dans le mémorandum (A) ci-annexé, d'une façon plus détaillée la ligne depuis l'Ararat jusqu'à Bané. Elle se fait un devoir de relever tout spécialement une omission dans la note ottomane du 12 juillet concernant la région de Kazli-göl, dont l'appartenance à la Perse a été expressément reconnue par la Sublime Porte dans la note du 18 mars. Avant déféré au désir du Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne la vallée d'Egri-Téhai, sise au sud de Kazli-göl, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a précisément stipulé dans sa note du 28 mars que les villages "de Nado, Bellasor (Kyzyl-Kaya) et Nifto, faisant partie du khanat d'Avadjik, restent à la Perse." Or la note responsive de votre Altesse ne mentionne que les villages "de Nado et Nakatou" (évidemment erreur au lieu de Nifto). L'Ambassade maintient cette réserve et, conformément à l'accord verbal établi avec votre Altesse, propose que la Commission technique examine sur les lieux de quel côté du partage des eaux se trouve Bellasor, le versant ouest de cette région devant appartenir à la Turquie et le versant est à la Perse. Il est évident que la Commission technique pourra rectifier les inexactitudes involontaires dans la description de la frontière, résultant des défauts éventuels du matériel cartographique ou du manque de renseignements détaillés pour certaines localités.

3. Des renseignements détaillés sur la partie de la frontière entre Bané et le Sirvan (nord du Zohab) étant dernièrement parvenus à l'ambassade, elle a jugé nécessaire de les exposer dans le mémorandum (B) ci-annexé en les mettant en concordance avec les principes exposés plus haut *sub* 1.

4. Pour ce qui est de la région entre le Sirvan et Mendéli, la ligne décrite dans la note anglaise du 3 mai et acceptée par la Sublime Porte dans sa note du 12 juillet sera adoptée. Au nord du Zohab la ligne partira d'un point se trouvant sur la rivière de Sirvan, au nord de la montagne de Beizel et aboutira au sud à la montagne de Kéli-Schouvan (Gourka-Doula). Se déclarant prête à adopter la ligne au sud de Kouretou, telle qu'elle a été établie au cours des pourparlers avec feu Mahmoud Chevket Pacha, l'Ambassade Royale n'a nullement en vue de se départir de sa manière de voir exprimée dans lesdits entretiens, c'est-à-dire qu'elle considère la ligne en question comme une modification du *statu quo*. Il en est de même en ce qui concerne la frontière au sud de la rivière Elvend. En effet, des renseignements récemment parvenus à l'ambassade contestent la possession effective par la Turquie des territoires sis au sud de cette rivière. Toutefois, se conformant à l'accord établi avec feu le Maréchal Mahmoud Chevket Pacha et avec votre Altesse quant à la cession de ces régions à la Turquie, l'ambassade propose que la ligne sommairement indiquée dans la note de votre Altesse en date du 12 juillet soit maintenue. La Commission technique pour la délimitation de la frontière aura qualité d'apporter à cette ligne les rectifications qui seraient dictées par les conditions naturelles du terrain. Les puits de naphte connus sous le nom de Naft-Meidan, situés sur la rive droite de l'Abi-Naft à la longitude approximative de 45° 33′ seront laissés du côté ottoman. L'indication 46° 40′ de la note ottomane doit être considérée comme un malentendu, ce point géographique se trouvant en dehors de la zone comprise dans la carte identique. Une carte du tracé de la frontière entre le Sirvan et Mendéli est annexée ci-après; il est, toutefois, évident qu'elle ne peut servir que d'illustration, surtout dans les endroits marqués en ligne brisée.

Tout en prenant acte de l'assurance contenue dans la note de votre Altesse du 12 juillet (chapitre II, alinéa 6) au sujet des droits et privilèges de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company, je dois faire remarquer à votre Altesse que la concession octroyée à cette compagnie par le Gouvernement persan n'est pas limitée à la région de Tchia Sourkh. Cependant, votre Altesse conviendra que tout malentendu possible à ce sujet a été écarté par le projet de l'article à insérer dans l'acte définitif à conclure au sujet de la délimitation prévu par la note de Sir Gerard Lowther en date du 3 mai, 1913, projet que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse le 10 juillet, et dont elle a bien voulu me notifier l'acception de la Sublime Porte le 5 courant.

5. La partie de la frontière entre Mendéli et le point nord du tracé indiqué dans la déclaration faite à Londres, le 29 juillet (Schuaib) n'ayant pas encore fait l'objet d'une délibération détaillée, l'Ambassade Royale fait des réserves relatives à l'indication sommaire de la ligne au sud de Keleschuan contenue dans la note de votre Altesse du 9 juillet. L'Ambassade Royale ne manquera pas de communiquer aussitôt que possible à la Sublime Porte les détails qui pourraient lui parvenir sur cette partie de la frontière, et pour le moment elle croit suffisant d'établir comme principe que c'est la Commission technique qui devra examiner la frontière entre Schuaib et Mendéli et la fixer sur les lieux en conformité avec le *statu quo*.

Je me plais à espérer que votre Altesse, animée comme d'habitude des sentiments de justice et de conciliation, voudra bien admettre le bien-fondé des propositions susénoncées et me communiquera sa réponse aussitôt que possible.

Veuillez, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Annex.

Mémorandum (A) sur la Frontière entre l'Ararat et Bané.

La frontière au nord partira du bornage No. XXXVII de la frontière turco-russe, se trouvant près de Serdar-Boulak sur la crête entre le Grand et le Petit Ararat. Elle descendra ensuite vers le sud par les crêtes, laissant du côté persan la vallée de Dambat et ce système des eaux de Yarym-Kaya qui prend la source au sud de la montagne d'Ayoubeg. Le frontière laisse ensuite à la Perse la localité de Boulak-bachi et suit toujours la plus haute crête dont l'extrémité sud se trouve à peu près à 62° 1′ longitude, et 39° 28′ latitude. Puis, contournant du côté ouest le marais qui s'étend à l'ouest de Yarym-kaya, la frontière traverse le courant de Sary-Sou, passe entre les villages Guirdé-baran

(turc) et Bazyrgan (persan) et montant sur la crête à l'ouest de Bazyrgan, suit le partage des eaux marqué par les crêtes de Saranli, Zendouli, Guir-Kélime, Kanly-baba, Guédouki-Khaziné et Dévédji. Pour obvier à la confusion résultant du fait que les cartes officielles de la localité au sud de l'Ararat contiennent très peu de noms propres, le croquis ci-annexé est destiné à servir d'illustration à la description de la frontière qui précède.*

Après Dévédji la ligne traversera la vallée d'Egri-tchaï à l'endroit qui sera désigné par la Commission technique en conformité du *statu quo* et remontera sur les crêtes du partage des eaux : Kyzyl-Ziaret, Sary-tchimène, Doumanlu, Karabourga, colline entre les bassins d'Ayry-tchay (persan) et de Djelli-göl (turc), Avdal-daschi, Reschkan, colline entre Akhourek et Tavra, Bevra-begzadan, Guevri-Mahine, Khydr-baba, Avristan.

2. Pour le Kotour le protocole du 15 (27) juillet, 1880, dit de Sary-kamiche, sera appliqué de la sorte que le village de Kevlik restera à la Turquie et les villages de Bilédjik, Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), les deux Djellik et Panamérik resteront à la Perse. La frontière suivant les crêtes de Mir-Omar montera sur la montagne de Sourava et, laissant Khanyga du côté turc, passera par le partage des eaux formé par le col de Borouch-Khouran, la montagne de Haravil, Béléko, Schinetal, Sardoul, Goulambi, Kepper, Bergabend, Peri-khan, Iskender, Avène et Kotoul. La vallée de Bajirga reste à la Turquie, les villages de Sartyk et Séro à la Perse, et la frontière passe de l'extrémité méridionale de Kotoul sur la crête s'élevant à l'ouest du village persan de Bébik et suivant les sommets de Seri-Baydost rejoint la crête du mont Zont.

3. A partir du mont Zont la frontière suit tout le temps le partage des eaux entre les districts persans de Tergever, Decht et Mergever et le sandjak turc de Hekkiari, notamment, les crêtes de Schivé-Schischali, Tchil-tchovri, Tchel-Berdir, Kouna-koter, Kazi-beg, Avoukh, Mai-Hélané, les montagnes à l'ouest de Binar et Dalamper ; puis laissant du côté persan le bassin des eaux se déversant par Ouchnou au lac d'Ourmiah y compris les sources de la rivière de Gadyr dites Abi-Seri-Gadyr (dont la vallée est située au sud de Dalamper et à l'est du mont Guirdé), elle aboutit au col de Kélé-Chine.

4. Au sud de Kélé-Chine la frontière laisse du côté persan le bassin de Lavène y compris la vallée de Tchoumi-guéli (située à l'est de Zerde-Guel et au sud-ouest de Spi-rez) et du côté turc les eaux de Révandouz, et passe par les sommets et les cols suivants : Siah-Kouh, Zerdé-Guel, Boz, Barzine, Ser-Schiva, Kevi-Khodja-Ibrahim. De là la frontière continue à suivre vers le sud la chaîne magistrale de Kandil, laissant du côté persan les bassins des affluents de Kialou du côté droit ; les ruisseaux de Pourdanan, Khydyrava et Talkhatan. Étant arrivée au sommet de Séri-Kélé-Kéline la ligne passe sur Zinvi-Djasousan et le col de Bamine, et traverse la rivière de Vezné près du pont de Pourde-Berdan. La Commission technique aura à se prononcer sur le sort du village de Schénié, sur la base du principe général de *statu quo*.

Après Pourde-Berdan la frontière monte sur les chaînes de Foka-baba-kyr, Berde-spian, Berde-Aboul-Fath, le col de Kani-resch. Elle suit ensuite le partage des eaux formé par Lagav-ghird, Donléri, le col de Khan-Ahmed et l'extrémité sud de Tépé-Salos. Ainsi, la frontière passe entre les villages de Kandol (turc) et Keschkeschiva et Mazynava (persans), et atteint le courant de la rivière de Kialou (le Petit Zab).

5. Ayant rejoint le courant de Kialou, la frontière le suit en amont, laissant du côté persan la rive droite (l'Alani Adjem) et du côté turc la rive gauche de cette rivière. Arrivée à l'embouchure de la rivière de Khilé-resch (affluent de Kialou du côté gauche), la frontière remonte en amont le courant de cette eau, laissant du côté persan les villages d'Alot, Kivéro, &c., et du côté turc le district d'Alani-Mavout. A l'extrémité sud-ouest du mont Balou la frontière quitte le courant de Khilé-resch et montant sur l'extrémité nord-ouest de la chaîne de Sourkew, s'étendant au sud de la rivière de Khilé-resch, passe par les crêtes de Sourkew laissant du côté turc les districts de Siwel et de Schivé-kel.

Arrivé au point astronomique de Sourkew presqu'à la hauteur de 35° 59′ latitude la frontière passe dans la direction du village de Tchampar-aw, dont le sort sera statué par la Commission technique sur la base du principe accepté de *statu quo*. La ligne monte ensuite sur la chaîne des montagnes qui forment la frontière entre le district persan de Bané et le district turc de Kyzyldja : Galasch, Berdi-Ketchel, Pouchte-Hangajal, Dou-béra, Parajal et Spi-kani, après quoi elle atteint le col de Now-khouvan. De là, en suivant toujours le partage des eaux, la frontière tourne vers le sud et puis à l'ouest passant par les sommets de Voul-gouza, Pouchi-Schéhidan, Hazar-mal, Balikeder

* Un croquis de la frontière turco-persane près de l'Ararat, tracé d'après la carte officielle russe (échelle, 5 verstes), est annexé l'original de la note.

Kélé-Mélaik et Kouhi-kocé-rescha, séparant le district turc de Térétoul du district persan de Mérivan.

Mémorandum (B) sur la Frontière de Mérivan et Avroman.

Les districts persans de Merivan et Avroman n'ayant pas été spécialement mentionnés dans le Traité d'Erzeroum, leur frontière doit être tracée sur la base des dispositions générales de l'article 3 dudit traité c'est-à-dire, en conformité avec le *statu quo* 1848.

Comme il a été établi dans le Mémorandum (A), la ligne de frontière au sud de Kyzyldja aboutit à la chaîne de Kouhi-kocé-rescha. De là, d'après les données officielles de Derviche Pacha (§ 41 de son rapport), la frontière suit en aval le courant du ruisseau de Khalil-abad jusqu'à sa confluence avec Tchami-Kyzyldja, puis suit en amont cette dernière rivière jusqu'à l'embouchure de son affluent gauche coulant du village de Bnava-souta, remonte ce ruisseau de Bnava-souta et par les cols de Keli-navé-sar et Keli-Piran atteint le col de Sourène, connu, à ce qui paraît, sous le nom de Tchigan (ou Tchakan).

La grande chaîne d'Avroman s'étendant dans la direction nord-ouest–sud-est forme ensuite la frontière entre la Perse et le district ottoman de Schéhrizor. Arrivée au pic de Kémadjar (sud-est de Kala-Zelm et nord-ouest de Schehri-Avroman) la frontière continue à suivre la crête magistrale jusqu'à sa ramification du côté ouest, s'élevant au nord de la vallée de Déré-Vouli, et laissant du côté persan le village de Khan-Guermela et seize autres villages appartenant au district persan de Nowsoud (ou Avromani-Louhon), rejoint la rivière de Sirvan près de l'embouchure de Tchami-Zimkan au nord du mont Beyzel.

Il importe en cette occurrence de rappeler les déclarations à ce sujet de Derviche Pacha faites dans les §§ 39 et 40 de son rapport officiel. Le commissaire Impérial ottoman confirme catégoriquement que lesdits dix-sept villages situés sur le versant ouest de la chaîne principale d'Avroman se trouvaient de son temps en possession persane. Ayant établi le manque d'information documentaire quant à l'appartenance de ces villages, Derviche Pacha constate que tous ses interlocuteurs ont de tout temps vu et entendu que ces villages étaient en possession de la Perse. Il expose ensuite les moyens secrets qu'il avait, toutefois, employé pour obtenir un "dekhalet" des habitants de ces villages, qui n'étaient pas d'abord disposés à le lui livrer. Quoique le document en question fût ensuite envoyé à Derviche Pacha par le Caïmacan de Souleïmanié, les villages en question ont restés en possession persane. Pendant le ramazan de l'année dernière (1328 (1912)) un nouveau "dekhalet" a été obtenu par les autorités ottomanes de Djafer-Sultan, propriétaire de ces villages. Un détachement du 116ᵉ régiment des troupes Impériales ottomanes a ensuite occupé le village de Khan-Guerméla et Djafer-Sultan a été informé par le Mutessarif de Souleïmanié de la décision du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, prise le 10 kianouni-evvel, 1328 (23 décembre, 1912), concernant (1) la formation d'une nouvelle nahié turque sous le nom de Avromani-Louhon ; et (2) la nomination de Djafer-Sultan, en qualité de son moudir, avec les appointements de 500 piastres par mois.

Au printemps de 1913 Djafer-Sultan a notifié au Caïmakan d'Alebtché qu'il retirait son "dekhalet" et, ainsi, son district est redevenu indépendant de la Turquie. Le village de Khan-guerméla et cinq autres situés dans son voisinage—occupés, comme il a été dit, pendant que la commission turco-persane pour délimitation des frontières siégeait à Constantinople—n'ont pas, cependant, été évacués par les troupes ottomanes et la 27ᵉ compagnie de frontière s'y trouve encore cantonnée.

Vu ce qui précède et en vertu du principe général de *statu quo* (article 3 du Traité d'Erzeroum) il serait juste que les dix-sept villages susmentionnés existant du temps de Derviche Pacha et occupés alors par les Persans, appartiennent à la Perse et que, dans ce nombre, les six villages occupés dernièrement par la Turquie soient sans délai évacués par les troupes ottomanes.

Quant au tracé de la ligne frontière dans ces parages, l'Ambassade Impériale croit pour le moment suffisant d'établir en principe l'appartenance des dix-sept villages à la Perse. Quoique des renseignements assez précis sur la frontière de la partie sud d'Avroman soient contenus dans le rapport officiel de Derviche Pacha (d'après lequel la frontière passe par les sommets de Schindirva, Guzindar, Schelvardar et Kémadjar), il serait préférable de laisser à la Commission technique le soin de tracer en détail sur les lieux cette partie de la frontière.

Enclosure 2 in No. 297.

Russian Note to Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople, le 5 (18) *août*, 1913.

M. le Ministre,

PAR ses notes en date du 18 (31) mars et du 9 juillet, 1913, la Sublime Porte a bien voulu notifier à l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie son adhésion aux propositions russes concernant la frontière turco-persane, exposées dans les documents suivants: la note du 9 (22) août, 1912 (avec un mémorandum y annexé); la note du 28 mars (10 avril), 1913; la note du 20 avril (3 mai), 1913 (avec un mémorandum y annexé); et l'aide-mémoire du 6 (19) juin, 1913.

Je n'ai pas manqué de porter la décision du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement, qui a appris avec satisfaction le règlement en principe de cette question restée en suspens depuis 1843.

Le Gouvernement Impérial partage entièrement l'avis de la Sublime Porte sur la nécessité de tracer sans délai la ligne frontière sur les lieux afin de prévenir le retour à l'avenir d'incidents de frontière. Se réservant de communiquer ultérieurement à la Sublime Porte les noms des membres russes et anglais qui feront partie de la Commission technique, ainsi qu'il a été prévu par la note de votre Altesse en date du 9 juillet, 1913, l'Ambassade Impériale, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, tient à récapituler les principes de délimitation établis dans la correspondance susmentionnée au sujet de la frontière:—

1. L'interprétation de l'article 3 du Traité d'Erzeroum étant pleinement établie dans le sens du maintien du *statu quo*, ce principe doit être appliqué dans tous les cas où il n'y aurait pas d'autres dispositions dans le traité de 1848, ou dans les accords récents.

2. Se référant à sa note du 9 août, 1912, l'Ambassade Impériale a cru utile de récapituler dans le mémorandum (A) ci-annexé d'une façon plus détaillée la ligne depuis l'Ararat jusqu'à Bané. Elle se fait un devoir de relever tout spécialement une omission dans la note ottomane du 9 juillet, concernant la région de Kazli-göl, dont l'appartenance à la Perse a été expressément reconnue par la Sublime Porte dans la note du 18 mars. Ayant déféré au désir du Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne la vallée d'Egri-Tchai, sise au sud de Kazli-göl, l'Ambassade Impériale de Russie a précisément stipulé, dans sa note du 28 mars, que les villages "de Nado, Bellasor (Kyzyl-Kaya) et Nifto, faisant partie du khanat d'Avadjik, restent à la Perse." Or, la note responsive de votre Altesse ne mentionne que les villages "de Nado et Nakatou" (évidemment erreur au lieu de Nifto). L'Ambassade Impériale maintient sa réserve et, conformément à l'accord verbal établi avec votre Altesse, propose que la Commission technique examine sur les lieux de quel côté du partage des eaux se trouve Bellasor, le versant ouest de cette région devant appartenir à la Turquie et le versant est à la Perse. Il est évident que la Commission technique pourra rectifier les inexactitudes involontaires dans la description de la frontière, résultant des défauts éventuels du matériel cartographique ou du manque de renseignements détaillés pour certaines localités.

3. Des renseignements détaillés sur la partie de la frontière entre Bané et le Sirvan (nord du Zohab) étant dernièrement parvenus à l'Ambassade Impériale, elle a jugé nécessaire de les exposer dans le mémorandum (B) ci-annexé en les mettant en concordance avec les principes exposés plus haut *sub* 1.

4. Pour ce qui est de la région entre le Sirvan et Mendéli, la ligne décrite dans la note russe du 20 avril et acceptée par la Sublime Porte dans sa note du 9 juillet sera adoptée. Au nord du Zohab la ligne partira d'un point se trouvant sur la rivière de Sirvan au nord de la montagne de Beizel et aboutira au sud à la montagne de Kéli-Schouvan (Gourka-Doula). Se déclarant prête à adopter la ligne au sud de Kouretou, telle qu'elle a été établie au cours des pourparlers avec feu Mahmoud Chevket Pacha, l'Ambassade Impériale n'a nullement en vue de se départir de sa manière de voir exprimée dans lesdits entretiens, c'est-à-dire qu'elle considère la ligne en question comme une modification du *statu quo*. Il en est de même en ce qui concerne la frontière au sud de la rivière Elvend. En effet, des renseignements récemment parvenus à l'Ambassade contestent la possession effective par la Turquie des territoires sis au sud de cette rivière. Toutefois, se conformant à l'accord établi avec feu le Maréchal Mahmoud Chevket Pacha et avec votre Altesse quant à la cession de ces régions à la Turquie, l'Ambassade propose que la ligne sommairement indiquée dans la note de votre Altesse en date du 9 juillet soit maintenue. La Commission technique pour la délimitation de la frontière aura qualité d'apporter à cette ligne les rectifications qui seraient dictées par les conditions naturelles du terrain. Les puits de naphte connus sous le

nom de Naft-Meidan, situés sur la rive droite de l'Abi-Naft à la longitude approximative de 45° 33′ seront laissés du côté ottoman. L'indication 46° 40′ de la note ottomane doit être considérée comme un malentendu, ce point géographique se trouvent en dehors de la zone comprise dans la carte identique. Une carte du tracé de la frontière entre le Servan et Mendéli est annexée ci-près; il est, toutefois, évident qu'elle ne peut servir que d'illustration, surtout dans les endroits marqués en ligne brisée.

Tout en prenant acte de l'assurance contenue dans la note de votre Altesse du 2 juillet (chapitre II, alinéa 6), au sujet des droits et privilèges de l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company, je dois faire remarquer à votre Altesse que la concession octroyée à cette compagnie par le Gouvernement persan n'est pas limitée à la région de Tchaï Sourkh. Cependant, votre Altesse conviendra que tout malentendu possible à ce sujet a été écarté par le projet d'article à insérer dans l'acte définitif à conclure au sujet de la délimitation prévu par la note de Sir Gerard Lowther en date du 3 mai, 1913, projet que le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre a eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse le 10 juillet, et dont elle a bien voulu lui notifier l'acceptation de la Sublime Porte le 5 courant.

5. La partie de la frontière entre Mendéli et le point nord du projet britannique (Schuaib) n'ayant pas encore fait l'objet d'une délibération détaillée, l'Ambassade Impériale fait des réserves relatives à l'indication sommaire de la ligne au sud de Keleschuan contenus dans la note de votre Altesse du 9 juillet. L'Ambassade Impériale ne manquera pas de communiquer aussitôt que possible à la Sublime Porte les détails qui pourraient lui parvenir sur cette partie de la frontière, et pour le moment elle croit suffisant d'établir comme principe que c'est la Commission technique qui devra examiner la frontière entre Schuaib et Mendéli et la fixer sur les lieux en conformité avec le *statu quo*.

Je me plais à espérer que votre Altesse, animée comme d'habitude des sentiments de justice et de conciliation, voudra bien admettre le bien-fondé des propositions susénoncées et me communiquera sa réponse aussitôt que possible.

Veuillez, &c.

[For Memoranda (A) and (B), see Annex to Enclosure 1.]

[39575] No. 298.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received August 27.)

Sir,

Board of Trade, August 26, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 15th August respecting German competition with British trade in the Persian Gulf, and in reply to state, for Sir E. Grey's information, that the Board have nothing to add to the observations contained in their letter of the 28th April, the memorandum which was enclosed therewith, and earlier communications on the subject.

I am, &c.

GEO. J. STANLEY.

[39652] No. 299.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 27, 1913.

MY telegram No. 277 of 8th August.

On account of uncertainty of the local situation, due to recent unsatisfactory attitude of Soulet and to doubts about the genuineness of the Governor-General's assurances, acting consul at Shiraz has decided to abandon his proposed tour, as he considers that it is desirable that he should be in Shiraz during tribal migration.

I am making representations to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, but regret to have to report that Governor-General's recent attitude has given ground for some complaint, and I am much afraid that we shall have the utmost difficulty in controlling the situation in Fars if we lose strong hand of Ain-ed-Dowleh at the Ministry of the

Interior. His Highness still abstains from attending the Cabinet Councils, and considers himself out of office pending a settlement of the crisis, which is to decide whether he or the two brothers Vossuk and Kawam-es-Sultaneh are to govern Persia.

Arrival of the Regent is now being awaited, and I expect that he will decide against Ain-ed-Dowleh. Should he do so I am strongly of opinion that Mukhber must go and that Kawam-ul-Mulk must be made Governor-General. There is no immediate hurry about this, and I am sending you despatch by next bag giving views upon this question of all competent authorities.

I think that, should the return of Regent lead to formation of a Cabinet having no authority over the provinces, we shall find ourselves obliged to take certain steps to protect British interests in the south, as I much fear that we may look forward to a recrudescence of troubles with which gendarmerie will not be strong enough to cope.

(Repeated to Shiraz and Bushire.)

[39517] No. 300.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 390.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1913.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 313 of 24th August.

You should act in concert with your Russian colleague, and you should make arrangement with Persia, as has been done with Turkey, securing to British and Russian commissioners power to arbitrate (not merely to mediate) in any difficulties which may arise in course of delimitation. I understand that Mr. Marling sent you a copy of a further document communicated to the Ottoman Government, viâ Batoum, on 23rd August.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 631, and Constantinople, No. 433.)

[3415] No. 301.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 128.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1913.

IN your despatch No. 6 of the 9th January last you forwarded to me a copy of a letter from the Persian Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, written with the snaction of the Cabinet, relative to the reorganisation of the Arabistan telegraph lines and the prolongation of the existing telegraph conventions until the year 1945.

In the second paragraph of that letter Mashteshar-ed-Dowleh states that article 3 of the agreement on the subject will not be submitted to the Medjliss.

Hitherto, however, all instruments extending the length of the telegraph concessions have been ratified, and it would therefore appear not unlikely that if the article dealing with the extension of the three former conventions is not brought now to the knowledge of that Assembly trouble may arise at any time when the question of a further extension comes under discussion.

I should therefore be glad to receive your observations on this point, which, though of no importance at present, might become essential on some future occasion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39666] No. 302.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 260.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August* 24, 1913.

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Russian Government respecting the Shatt-el-Arab Convention, and to inform you that a copy of the communication from the Russian Government of the 13th July (o.s.), referred to in the third paragraph of the enclosed *aide-mémoire*, was sent to you in my despatch No. 233 of the 26th July last.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 302.

Memorandum communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

L'AMBASSADEUR Impérial à Londres a transmis au Ministère Impérial un exemplaire de la convention entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Turquie concernant l'établissement d'une commission pour améliorer les conditions de la navigation du Chatt-el-Arab ainsi que la déclaration y jointe, au sujet du droit du Cheikh de Mouhammera de charger un des membres de ladite commission de s'occuper des intérêts du commerce et de la navigation persans, ces deux documents lui ayant été communiqués par le Cabinet de Londres comme parafés *ad referendum* le 11 juin, année courante.

Ayant examiné ces documents, le Ministère Impérial a trouvé que le premier des deux différait du projet de la convention qui lui avait été communiqué antérieurement par l'Ambassade britannique en tant que deux articles se trouvent insérés dans la nouvelle rédaction de la convention, notamment les articles 7 et 8, concernant le droit de la commission d'imposer des amendes en cas de contraventions aux règlements qui seront édictées par elle et qui seront justiciables exclusivement par la commission, ainsi que d'opérer, par le canal de sa police, des arrestations pour toute autre affaire pénale du ressort de la commission.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, pour faire suite à son aide-mémoire du 13 (26) juillet, année courante, aime à croire que ces stipulations ne porteront aucune atteinte aux droits qui lui sont réservés par les traités en vigueur entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte quant aux privilèges des sujets russes en territoire ottoman.

Quant à la déclaration ci-dessus mentionnée le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir attirer l'attention du Cabinet de Londres sur le fait que le Cheikh de Mouhammera étant sujet persan et ne jouissant d'aucune autonomie, il ne saurait être considéré comme qualifié à confier à qui que ce soit la sauvegarde des intérêts du commerce et de la navigation persans, ce droit appartenant exclusivement au Gouvernement du Schah.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 10 (23) *août*, 1913.

[39797] No. 303.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 28, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH has reached Kermanshah, and has taken bast at the Russian consulate.

[39061] No. 304.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 437.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 430 and your private telegram of 24th August.

In view of other requirements of service, it would be very inconvenient to spare diplomatic secretary. Moreover, Mr. Wratislaw, whom I have consulted, agrees with me in thinking that such an appointment would be undesirable on account of expense, &c., and not justifiable by reason of work to be done.

One object in appointing a deputy commissioner as well as a principal commissioner was that he might deal with such confidential work as cannot be done by a native clerk, who will be attached to the commission and possess a knowledge of Persian.

You should therefore inform your Russian colleague that a secretary from the diplomatic service will not be attached to the British delegation.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 634, and Tehran, No. 392.)

[39933] No. 305.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August* 29, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 347 of 11th August.

I had conversation with Muin yesterday, during which I explained to him that the Government of India consider that he has proved himself consistently hostile to British interests and that no undertaking which he could give that he would behave better in the future would suffice as a safeguard.

He begs that he may be informed in what particular he has shown himself hostile to British interests. He owns that in trade questions on the Karun he has had many differences with Messrs. Lynch, but argues that he has always obeyed the injunction of the legation not to interest any but British firms in his enterprises.

Muin is a tricky old gentleman who has an iron in most Persian fires, but I think he could be made to run straight if he realised that it is in his own interests to do so. He declares that he is prepared to make any arrangement that we may wish about participation in his concession.

At the present moment question is at a standstill, and is unlikely to make much progress as long as it is known that it meets with our opposition, but Muin may make himself objectionable in many ways if he sees that his schemes are thwarted by us. Under existing circumstances, it would not be easy to secure concessions for British subjects, but something might be done were a definite request for a concession made.

I am inclined to think that we could reach more satisfactory arrangement in conjunction with Muin than by endeavouring to oust him in favour of British subjects.

[39924] No. 306.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 444.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, August* 29, 1913.

WILSON left for Tehran to-day.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[39932] No. 307.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 446.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 29, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 437 of 28th August.

According to understanding with M. Minorsky, actual delimitation will, to save time, be carried out not by commission only, but by one or more sub-commissions working simultaneously at different points, and I understand from Captain Wilson, who has just left for Tehran, that, considering limited number of each commission, appointment of secretary will much facilitate formation of these sub-commissions, and even that, without secretary, it may be impossible to form more than one. Captain Wilson appeared to attach considerable importance to it. Extra expenditure would be trifling as compared with that incurred by prolongation of work of whole commission for a month or two.

I believe Russian Commissioner would be inclined to bring secretary whether we send one or not.

[38590] No. 308.

Foreign Office to Sir W. Garstin.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 29, 1913.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 31st May, relative to the Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith the draft of a note which he would propose should be presented to the

[40084] No. 308*.

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received August 30.)

(Confidential.)

THE Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with reference to the memorandum circulated to members of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Trans-Persian Railway by the Foreign Office, dated the 13th June, 1913, requests that he may be informed whether any reply has yet been made by Secretary Sir E. Grey to the note of the Russian Government, dated the 14th May, 1913. If no reply to that note has yet been made, Brigadier-General Wilson requests that he may be informed how soon it is proposed to formulate a reply thereto.

War Office, August 30, 1913.

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's and the Russian representatives at Tehran asking that an option for the construction of the line may be granted to the Société d'Etudes.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished with any observations which the British group may have to offer on this draft, and that he proposes, so soon as he has received them, to endeavour to obtain the concurrence of the Russian Government in its terms and to ask them to instruct their representative at Tehran to present the note to the Persian Government in concert with his British colleague.

It will be observed that the text of the note is based on that of the draft, enclosed in your letter of the 27th May, of the communication which, as originally proposed, the Société itself was to address to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

[40091] No. 309.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 30, 1913.

YOUR despatch No. 77 of 29th May.

The Persian Government accept the revised amortisation table.

[39924] No. 310.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 394.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1913.

WHEN Captain Wilson reaches Tehran you should report by telegraph his movements up to end of November, where communications can be sent to him meanwhile, and date of his arrival at Mohammerah for frontier work. This should not be later than the first week in December, in order that he may make such preliminary arrangements as are possible before the arrival of the Russian mission, which I trust will be not later than 15th December (N.S.).

I attach great importance to the work of demarcation from Diaiji northwards starting by 1st January (N.S.), so that the work can be completed as far as Kasr-i-Shirin by the beginning of April, the necessity for returning to the southern portion of the frontier being thus obviated.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 640, and figures by post to Constantinople.)

[39932] No. 311.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 442.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 446 of 29th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

No diplomatic secretary can be spared. If secretary is absolutely necessary a Levant officer or a junior Indian political officer will have to be appointed. Mr. Wratislaw considers Levant officer most suitable, and suggests Hubbard. I am consequently, to save time, telegraphing to Cairo asking whether he could, if necessary, be spared.

[39924] No. 312.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 641.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1913.

PLEASE communicate my telegram No. 394 to Sir W. Townley to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and inform his Excellency that I should be glad if it could be definitely arranged for Russian mission to be at Mohammerah not later than 15th December (N.S.).

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 395, and figures by post to Constantinople.)

* Not printed.

[39932] No. 313.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cheetham.

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1913.

AN Anglo-Persian Commission will be appointed to delimit Turco-Persian frontier. Mr. Wratislaw will be principal British commissioner. It may become necessary to appoint a British secretary to Commission, who should be good Turkish scholar and know French and Arabic. Mr. Hubbard's name has been suggested. We should be glad if you could make arrangements allowing of his being detached for this service if necessary. He would have to start about end of November, and be absent for six months or more.

[40439] No. 314.

Memorandum by Mr. Oliphant respecting Financial Control in Persia.

MR. F. C. HARRISON, the adjoint of the British group of the Société d'Études of the Trans-Persian Railway, called to-day to enquire whether he could be informed of the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the memorandum drawn up in March last by him, M. Bizot, and M. Raffalovitch, on the reorganisation of Persian finances, as there was to be a meeting in Paris on the 5th September.

Mr. Norman and I replied that, though the matter had been carefully considered, a decision had not yet been arrived at, and he decided not to attend Friday's meeting.

The Persian Treasurer-General, M. Mornard, has recently stated that, unless unexpected events necessitate unforeseen expenditure, Persia should be able to struggle along until March next. In view, however, of the importance of the subject, and of the probability that early in the new year all available cash will be directed towards the inevitable demand for money in the Balkans, it is essential that some arrangement should be come to as soon as possible, and I have endeavoured in this memorandum to set forth the main points of the various proposals recently made as regards the necessary financial control of any loan to Persia.

There are two possible ways for Persia to obtain money :—

(*a*.) A loan guaranteed by the British and Russian Governments.

(*b*.) A loan made by some financial group, and in this connection the Société d'Études has been repeatedly mentioned.

As regards (*a*) it may be considered in present circumstances as outside the range of practical politics, and need not be considered further.

Turning to (*b*), the first essential point is that investors may be able to rely on there being sound security for the loan. To obtain this it is only fair that they should demand adequate control and supervision of the assigned revenues—and this has been pointed out by Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons, when he said, on the 25th March, that if the question of a large loan were raised financiers would want to make their own conditions as to control of expenditure and the purposes of the loan, and this should be supported if thereby they could be induced to make a considerable loan.

To this end various schemes have been suggested, as sole supervision by the Belgian Treasurer-General is not regarded as satisfactory.

Mr. Greenway proposed in January 1912 that a board of three—an Englishman, a Russian, and a Persian—should be instituted. Such a scheme, however, would be beyond the competence of three members, and would be open to obvious difficulties.

Mr. Harrison and his French and Russian colleagues drew up in March last, at the request of the Société d'Études, a memorandum setting forth the possible basis of a reorganisation of Persia's finances by means of an agreement between the Persian Government and their financial groups. The salient points were the following :—

1. A committee should be formed of two delegates from each of the British, French, and Russian groups, who should agree to carry out financial operations in Persia. It should sit in Paris, and one of the two French delegates should be chairman.

The committee should represent the interests of the bondholders of the Persian Debt, either by means of studying reports furnished at intervals from Tehran or of

delegates sent to examine matters on the spot. It should deal with all questions of new loans or of taking up options of loans, of new revenues to be ceded to the Debt Administration, of the application of the share of that Administration in the surplus of the ceded revenues, and of changes in the collection of such revenues.

2. A commission should sit at Tehran, called the "Council of Administration of the Ceded Revenues," and composed as follows :—

Two delegates—one Russian, one English—appointed by the above-mentioned committee, a delegate of the Russian Banque d'Escompte, a delegate of the Imperial Bank of Persia, two representatives of the Persian Government, who should sit either as delegates of that Government with a right to vote or as its commissioners with only an advisory voice (*à voix consultative*).

The Treasurer-General of Persia to have only an advisory voice.

All the delegates to be appointed with the concurrence of the Russian and British Governments. The two representatives of the bondholders to be alternately president and vice-president of the council.

3. A list of revenues to be ceded irrevocably to the service of the Debt and managed by the council, who shall either work and collect or encash them as it pleases. Among these revenues may be mentioned the following :—

Customs, with eventual surtax, mint, passports, excise, tobacco, various royalties from petroleum mines, fisheries, &c., telegraphs (royalties and working receipts), stamps, land tax of Tehran and Azerbaijan (maliat), and property in those provinces.

4. The council to have the right to organise either the working or the collection of the said revenues through special offices to be established in the various districts in question.

5. The net receipts derived from the various ceded revenues to be applied firstly to the payment of interest and ordinary sinking fund of the loans controlled by the council, the surplus to be divided as follows :—

Part to be handed to the council either for the more rapid amortisation of the Debt by repurchase in the open market or for a guarantee fund, or for the guarantee of loans, any surplus to be allotted to the expenses of the Persian budget, which shall be drawn up each year in agreement with the council.

6. Every change in the system of duties or taxes, as well as any loan project, even outside the ceded revenues, to be submitted to the council for its opinion.

7. The council to control both outstanding debts and a new loan, the first instalment of which shall be devoted to the re-establishment of order and to the organisation of the finances. Subsequent instalments shall be contemplated, and the committee at Paris shall have the right of option. Previous loans may be converted or consolidated when the council is constituted by means of an exchange of old securities for new ones, to be offered to the original holders at a price to be fixed subsequently.

8. The payment of the various indemnities claimed by the Russian and British Governments, either for these Governments or their nationals, as well as other arrears, to be scaled in agreement with the Governments in question.

9. The British and Russian Governments to declare in a joint note to the Persian Government that they undertake to protect the rights and interests of the Council of the Ceded Revenues, and if necessary will replace the council by an Anglo-Russian commission of control.

This memorandum was also submitted to the Russian Government, and Sir G. Buchanan enquired M. Sazonof's views, and shortly afterwards telegraphed as follows :—

"Memorandum from Russian Government states that they have received similar proposals from Russian group of Société d'Études. Russian Government do not consider that such an arrangement would be accepted by the Persian Government, or that it could be imposed on them, for Persia, having always fulfilled her financial obligations, should not be treated as an insolvent debtor. Russian Government consider, therefore, that a clause might be inserted in the loan agreement stipulating that financial control should be instituted in case the Persian Government should be unable to meet their liabilities.

"Russian Government quite agree that two Governments should not commit themselves without previous agreement, and they await any further communication which you may have to make on the subject."

Mr. Harrison's memorandum was also submitted to the Treasury, and the reply of their Lordships contained the following criticism :—

[21632] Treasury, May 9.

"The scheme as they understand it proposes to set up in Persia a council which will apparently be dominated by the nominees of the financial groups or institutions concerned, and will be subject to little official control, except such as may be exercised by the veto on the appointment of delegates reserved to the Governments of Russia and Great Britain; and further to arm the council with very comprehensive powers, including the right of objecting to any changes of taxation or to the contracting of fresh loans, irrespective of whether the assigned revenues are or are not affected.

"The revenues to be assigned to the council are not specified in detail, but if the whole of those indicated in paragraph 3 of the scheme are to be appropriated, the Persian Government will probably be left with practically no certain sources of revenue independent of foreign control.

"In view of these provisions the scheme appears to their Lordships to be of far too sweeping a character, and they think that no attempt can or should be made to impose it upon Persia in its present form. As is pointed out in the Russian *aide-mémoire*, such a scheme could only be imposed upon an insolvent debtor, and the Persian Government has so far fulfilled its financial obligations.

"The Russian memorandum suggests that, by any contract with reference to the grant of a new loan, power might be reserved to institute such a system in the event of the Persian Government failing hereafter to satisfy its creditors. This suggestion would enable a comprehensive scheme to be established hereafter, if and when Persia made default.

"There is, however, an alternative. The difficulties which Persia is experiencing in finding new loans are so great that it appears probable that any group which was willing to lend might successfully stipulate as a condition precedent to any fresh loan that the revenues to be pledged as security for that loan should be handed over to a council representing the lending body and be collected entirely by them, any surplus not required for the service of their loan being handed to the Persian Government. This would make it possible to institute at once a body (resembling the Council of the Debt at Constantinople) whose functions, though confined at the outset to the service of the particular loan in which it is immediately interested, might hereafter, if opportunity offers, be extended into a more comprehensive control of Persian finances.

"Their Lordships for their part see no objection to a scheme which would involve the collection by the creditors of Persia of certain sources of revenue, provided that definite sources of revenue not too uncertain or unproductive were left, at the outset at any rate, to the Persian Government, and that any arrangements made did not prejudice the security now assigned for the advances made by India and Great Britain.

"In conclusion, their Lordships suggest that it is desirable that the Governments most interested in the welfare of Persia should have some representation on, or some effective means of controlling, any council which may be set up, and particularly so if the council is to undertake the collection of revenues already pledged in security for existing loans, and the services of those loans, or if the object is to obtain a comprehensive control over Persian finance."

[21643]

At the same time the Government of India telegraphed that, while in ignorance of the character or purposes of the three groups of the Société d'Études, they assumed that they must be relied on not to use their position to exploit Persia for other purposes, but would administer the ceded revenues efficiently and equally in Persia's and the bondholders' interests. In that case the proposals, though far-reaching, appeared on the whole satisfactory, as presumably financiers would approve of no scheme which failed to provide a control of finances sufficiently effective for service of her debts.

The telegram continued :—

"If the proposals are rejected on this ground, result must be that the loan which Persia so badly needs will be postponed indefinitely, unless the British and Russian Governments are ready either to provide for loan themselves or to guarantee it jointly. That Persia should negotiate loan in other quarters is clearly not permissible.

"While we recognise that the Persian Government is not likely to consider the terms, as now framed, acceptable, we think it should be pressed to accept them modified in Persia's favour as far as it may be practicable to get the financial groups to agree. The following four modifications might be feasible :—

"(*a.*) Abolition of the Committee of Control in Paris. This seems to be an unnecessary addition to cost of administering the Debt.

"(*b.*) Reduction of number of assigned revenues.

"(*c.*) Provision of a place in the Council of Debt for the Persian Treasurer-General.

"(*d.*) Omission of the condition whereby the committee [*sic*] is given a control of the manner of spending the instalments of the loan.

"We consider that this condition restricts the Persian Government's discretion in a manner less appropriate to a syndicate of financiers than to the Governments which are concerned with Persia."

Meanwhile the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran had elaborated a scheme of which Sir W. Townley telegraphed the substance as follows :—

"The Russian Chargé d'Affaires is of the opinion that, in the event of a large loan being arranged, the first consideration should be elaboration of a programme of reform to be carried out by means of money lent. Scheme to be based upon development of the projects already inaugurated under the auspices of foreigners; such a plan might, he thinks, be drawn up by the two legations in collaboration with the Treasurer-General in the event of the Persian Government being unable to put forward satisfactory proposals in this sense. These reforms could be carried out successively, and the loan advanced in proportion as the time might be ripe for the execution of each measure in its turn. It would, however, in his opinion, be necessary to submit the expenditure of all moneys realised from the loan to the strict supervision of the two legations. [19762] Tehran telegram, No. 176.

"The control could be carried out, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires suggests, by a commission composed of the Treasurer-General or a representative, an under-secretary of the Financial Department, and two members from each of the two legations. Such a body would be less likely, he thinks, to be a cause of friction than would a new European commission representing the lenders, and he deprecates the introduction of any French element in any committee of control.

"Such a commission as the one suggested would combine cheapness with expert knowledge of local conditions, and would obviate constant reference to the two legations with possible consequence of friction, whilst, if the reforms agreed upon were to be carried out successively, there would be no need for special financial knowledge, such as might be required for the manipulation of the entire loan in one sum."

In forwarding this proposal Sir W. Townley said :—

"I agree with M. Sabline that a commission such as that he has sketched would be of the greatest use in ensuring the proper expenditure of the money, but I am inclined to think that it is somewhat unnecessarily severe in its composition towards the Persian administration, and that it would lack a sufficiency of members with enough technical knowledge of finance and the execution of public works to serve in the best manner the interests it is intended to protect. M. Sabline admitted in conversation that the Ministry of Finance might also with fairness be represented on the Commission, which would have the advantage of providing a very cheap Board of Control compared with the expense that would be entailed were a special commission composed of technical experts to be imported from Europe. It is also not improbable that such a commission as the one suggested would be less objectionable to the Persian Government than a more formal Board of Control, whilst, if one of the members representing the legations was the Oriental Secretary, his knowledge of people and things might be of much use. [25143] Despatch No. 115 of May 13.

"M. Sabline is opposed to the introduction of a further foreign element into the affairs of Persia in the shape of a European special commission, and strongly deprecated the presence of a Frenchman on the Board of Control on the ground that his admission would constitute the thin end of the wedge of increased foreign interference in affairs that should concern only Great Britain and Russia, whilst if his presence was accepted on the score that he represented the French bondholders' interests, what guarantee would there be that a sufficiency of the bonds might not some day pass into German hands to justify a demand from the German Government that the interests of German bondholders should be watched over in a similar manner?"

M. Sabline's scheme was brought to the notice of Mr. Harrison, who was invited to express his opinion on it, and at the same time was told that, as regards his own proposals, M. Sazonof regarded them as of too drastic a nature, while Sir E. Grey thought that it would be very difficult to obtain Persia's consent to them.

In reply, Mr. Harrison wrote :—

[23412] May 21. "1. There are, I fear, weighty objections to the plan suggested by M. Sabline. The moneys requisite could not be obtained from the market. Financial houses forecast the employment of their resources very closely. Unlike Governments, they cannot engage to provide considerable sums in driblets at indefinite periods. It may be objected that this is not expected of them, that their position at the moment of a financial operation is that of the midwife, or, at worst, of the monthly nurse. But the public in their turn would not find the money. They would not be attracted by a procession of small loans, each of which would be secured worse than its predecessor. Moreover, the flotation would be more expensive for Persia. The trouble and expense and responsibility of issuing several loans successively is considerably greater than what is involved in one operation undertaken at a moment judged to be favourable.

"These preliminary objections are, I think, fatal. It is, moreover, very desirable to raise at once a considerable sum. There are Russian, English, and French (Creusot's Bill) claims to be satisfied which can only be scaled with advantage if dealt with *en bloc*. Similarly the problem of the pension list has to be faced comprehensively. It is also imperative to pay off and discontinue the present Russian floating debt. At present Persia borrows short loans on usurious terms and immediately starts repaying capital and interest from the customs revenues, which could just as easily (and far more economically) be employed in meeting its expenditure direct.

"So soon as it is recognised that the amount to be borrowed must be considerable, it is also clear that the whole debt should be consolidated. The investing public would very properly attach much importance to the fact that their lien was subject to no prior encumbrance, and extended without reservation to definite Persian revenues. The mention of northern and southern customs houses, Russian, neutral, and British zones, perplex and perturb a market already distrustful. It may be argued that this is all very fine, but why should Russia give up its prior line on the more productive northern customs houses? To this there is an effective rejoinder. The largest part of the Russian debt is not at present a negotiable security. It would immediately become one on consolidation. If this view be not accepted, an unanswerable reply is to discharge the whole of this debt with the proceeds of the new loan.

"2. I would, however, respectfully demur to the ideas underlying M. Sabline's suggestions. You speak in your letter of a scheme 'based upon development of the projects already inaugurated under the auspices of foreigners.' A country living on borrowed money doled out at uncertain intervals cannot build or guarantee railways, or, indeed, progress in any direction except down hill. The only hope for Persia is for it to pay its own way out of the resources of its own people. If Persia is to be preserved, this can only be effected by drastic financial control. I gather that, in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, it would be very difficult to obtain Persia's consent to tight leading-strings. Yet it could be pointed out to its patriots, if they exist, that herein lies Persia's only hope of salvation."

From the above, it is clear that Mr. Harrison, who is well qualified to know the temper of the lending public, is convinced that without more drastic measures than those outlined by M. Sabline, Persia's efforts to obtain money will be foredoomed inevitably to failure.

As regards the contention of the Government of India and the Treasury, that Mr. Harrison's scheme leaves the Persian Government with practically no certain sources of revenue independent of foreign control, it must be borne in mind that the land tax (estimated this year at 690,000*l.*) will be left to them with the exception of that of the Province of Azerbaijan and of Tehran; moreover, he contends that it is to the benefit of the lender to keep the borrower alive, and the smaller the sum that is left uncontrolled for Persia to spend herself, the more will her resources be nursed and the surplus be greater to be returned to her eventually.

The present position of affairs may be summarised thus :—

At the request of the Société d'Études a scheme of control has been drafted by three experts, who may be credited with knowing what will satisfy prospective lenders.

To this draft objection has been taken by Russia and Great Britain on the ground that it is too sweeping.

(But to show that the terms of the Harrison memorandum are not exceptionally heavy, it is only necessary to refer to the conditions which were proposed by Messrs. Seligman in August 1911 for their loan, and of which the chief points are given in the annex to this memorandum.)

M. Sabline has put forward a counter-proposal, regarded by Mr. Harrison as inadequate for reasons which appear sound. Great Britain has as yet made no suggestion.

If any progress is to be made, I venture to submit that His Majesty's Government should regard Mr. Harrison's draft as the necessary basis, and should put forward proposals in the form of that scheme as modified in three points by the Government of India, *i.e.* :—

1. Abolition of the Committee of Control in Paris.
2. Inclusion of Treasurer-General in the Council of the Debt.
3. Omission of the condition which confers on the ? Council the control of ? any further loans.

One other point remains, *i.e.*, the French representation.

M. Sabline's fears of a possible German effort to be represented in certain eventualities do not appear unjustifiable, and to avoid this possibility might we not point out to the French group that the inclusion of their two representatives at Paris might occasion international complications later on if they appeared to represent French bondholders, and that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the scheme drafted by Mr. Harrison and MM. Bizot and Raffalovitch, subject to the above-mentioned modifications, if the French group would be willing to entrust their interests to the Tehran Council of Administration—on which it has never been proposed that Frenchmen should sit—later on.

This possible difficulty might first be mentioned to Mr. Harrison confidentially, for him to discuss with M. Raffalovitch.

Foreign Office, August 30, 1913. L. O.

Annex.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 361.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 26, 1911.

MY telegram No. 357 of the 25th August.

Colonel Beddoes, representing Seligman, has received an application from Shuster for a 5 per cent. loan of 4,000,000*l.* Following are principal conditions of proposed project of contract, which Beddoes has submitted to the Russian Minister and to me :—

Loan is for repayment of Russian Bank's loan, improvement of trade routes, development of commerce and agriculture, reproductive works such as irrigation, and the establishment of effective financial control at Tehran and in the provinces.

Seligmans agree to issue loan at time and price to be fixed by Treasurer-General after consent of Medjliss, but if Seligmans consider price inadvisable they may retire.

Seven and a-half per cent. commission for Seligmans.

Loan must be redeemed in forty years—1 per cent. sinking fund—but may be redeemed any time after 1925 with six months' notice.

Security is revenues from mint, passports, Crown lands and maliat, and the surplus of northern and southern customs after payment of prior charges.

Seligmans to have right, in the event of default, to administer any of these revenues except customs; these revenues shall be kept at such bank as Seligmans and Treasurer-General shall agree upon.

Office of Treasurer-General, who must be an American or European approved by his Government, to be maintained for duration of contract, and his powers as now established must not be diminished without Seligmans' consent.

Provision is made for a Treasurer-General's staff of seven persons, to be selected by him.

During expenditure of loan a representative of Seligmans must be maintained at Tehran. Expenditure will be made, subject to representative's consent, by Treasurer-General, with authorisation of Medjliss.

Seligmans will not conclude unless they have letters from Treasurer-General giving figures satisfactory to them concerning revenue pledged, and unless they are assured of British and Russian support.

[40347] No. 315.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received September 1.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, August* 30, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 11th July, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, with enclosures, relative to certain proposed modifications of the Persian customs tariff, and to offer the following observations on the subject for Sir E. Grey's consideration :—

The Board note that it is estimated that the proposed increase in the customs duties will secure additional revenue to the amount of 207,000*l.*, which is to be applied to the service of a projected loan. The Board are not aware, however, whether it is intended to apply the loan to the same purposes as those originally contemplated, nor is reference made to the conditions which, in the opinion of the Board, as set out in their letters of the 1st March and the 7th April, should attach to the consent of His Majesty's Government to any increase of the customs duties.

As regards the present proposals, it appears from an examination made in this Department that in substance the additional revenue required is to be obtained by additional charges on two articles—cotton goods and sugar—and that to this extent it is a mere repetition of the proposal to which they have already taken exception in their letter of the 7th April.

According to the statements of the Persian Customs themselves, it is hoped to derive 184,000*l.*, out of a total of 207,000*l.*, from these two articles alone, and this by increasing the duty on the former by about 65 per cent. and that on the latter by 100 per cent., instead of the 25 per cent. which His Majesty's Government were originally prepared to admit. Little additional revenue is thus likely to be derived from all the other tariff modifications put forward in the present scheme, and the Board are in some doubt as to the precise purpose with which they were included in it.

While the sugar imported into Persia is mainly of Russian, Belgian, and Austrian origin, it will be remembered that Messrs. Henry Tate and Sons are endeavouring, at the instance of His Majesty's Government, to introduce their crystal sugar into Southern Persia, and I am to refer in this connection to Mr. Chick's memorandum, copy of which was enclosed with your letter of the 28th March. In the Board's opinion, Messrs. Tate's endeavours will to a large extent be frustrated if the present proposal is accepted.

As regards cotton goods, the trade is almost entirely Anglo-Indian and Russian, but there is reason to believe that some at least of the Russian trade is actually in British goods.

As regards the suggested reduction of the existing duty on "white tea," I am to observe that this particular quality of tea is consumed only by the wealthiest classes in Persia—the chiefs, nobles, and richest merchants—and that the proposed reduction is thus of no practical importance.

On the ground, therefore, of its entire lack of impartiality, the scheme now under consideration appears to the Board to be open to grave objection, and I am to suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that His Majesty's Government should adopt the view that any increase of rates, if it is to receive their sanction, must in general be uniform throughout the tariff.

I am to add, with reference to the second paragraph of your letter, that the original enclosures referred to therein have been communicated semi-officially to the India Office. It is understood that a copy has been made by that Department, and in the circumstances the Board presume that the return of these documents will no longer be required.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[39652] No. 316.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 396.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 295 of 27th August: Fars.

I realise that the question is not immediately pressing, but I should like to receive and consider as soon as possible the question dealt with in your despatch referred to, and possible steps to which you allude.

[39480] No. 317.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 444.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1913.

YOUR despatch No. 733 of 21st August.

I have only received two sheets of identic map. Please send sheets showing line from Mount Ararat to Sirvan as soon as possible by registered post.

See second paragraph of your telegram No. 404 of 13th August. I can see no indication in note of 18th August of this intention having been fully carried out.

[38920] No. 318.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th July regarding the reconstruction of the Arabistan telegraph lines, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a letter from the Treasury requesting further information regarding the propriety of accepting, as a charge on Imperial revenues, half the cost of the expenditure in question, and enquiring what conditions it is proposed to make with the Persian Government for the repayment of the sum of 18,060*l.* which is to be advanced to that Government.*

I am to enquire what reply Lord Crewe would wish to be returned to this communication.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[40554] No. 319.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 2, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 444 of the 1st September.

Intention originally was to trace the whole line as far as Mandeli on the map, but eventually want of time made it impossible. I regret that I omitted to explain this in my despatch No. 733.

When M. Minorsky returns in October I could get him to prepare it, or, if it is required earlier, I could telegraph to him at St. Petersburgh.

We communicated to the Porte only sheets 5 and 6.

[39079] No. 320.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 129.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 171 of the 5th ultimo, reporting on the general situation in Fars and the recent attitude of the gendarmerie in that province.

* No. 270.

I have read with much regret your account of the incident at Sivend, and more especially of the accusation to which Major Siefvert has exposed himself.

I approve your action in urging the colonel commandant to recall him to Tehran, and I presume that he will not again be employed in a responsible position.

Should any similar incident occur in the future, it would be impossible for me to justify before Parliament a further contribution from the Imperial Exchequer for the maintenance of the gendarmerie next year.

I have to add that, subject to your concurrence, I propose to communicate your report unofficially to the Swedish Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39933] No. 321.

*Foreign Office to India Office.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th July, relative to the attempt of Muin-ut-Tujjar to recover the concessions which he formerly held for the exploitation of mineral deposits on the coast and islands of the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reporting, with comments, a conversation which he has recently had with Muin on the subject.†

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations which the Marquess of Crewe may wish to offer on Sir W. Townley's telegram, especially as regards the statements reported in the second paragraph to have been made by Muin and the answer which should be returned to them.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[40721] No. 322.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September* 3, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN Boundary Commission.

Your telegrams Nos. 635 of 29th August and 641 of 30th August.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs sent M. Minorsky to see me. Latter states definitely that he will be ready to commence operations on 1st January (N.S.), and that he will arrive at Mohammerah about a fortnight beforehand.

As regards question of secretariat, M. Minorsky explained that he anticipates that deputy commissioners will be employed in work of demarcation while commissioners are otherwise occupied, *e.g.*, in conferences with Turkish and Persian delegates, and he said that it would be very necessary that there should be a secretary capable of drawing up protocols of such conferences, and also of official diaries in French. Clerical work involved in making necessary copies would be considerable. He personally suggested, in last resort, secretary of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be employed, although aware that this might be objected to by Persians. Acting Secretary of State asked whether it would not be possible to employ junior members of British and Russian consular services.

[40811] No. 323.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 4.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 3, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th April, 1913, forwarding a copy of a letter from the Treasury in which the Lords Commissioners demurred to the division between Imperial and Indian funds of the cost of the proposed coaling-station at

* Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis.*

† No. 305.

Henjam, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to state, for the information of Secretary Sir E. Grey, that on further consideration he has decided to accept the whole of the cost of the work, which will be carried out by the Public Works Department of the Government of Bombay, as a charge on Indian revenues.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[40721] No. 324.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.**

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1913.

RUSSIAN commissioner of Boundary Commission will reach Mohammerah about 15th December, and be ready to commence operations 1st January.

[40721] No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 647.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 322 of 3rd September.

My impression was that officers in charge of survey parties could do, under general supervision of commissioners, such demarcation work as commissioners and deputy commissioners cannot personally superintend. With the assistance of native Indian clerk, I think British delegation should cope with correspondence, but if Russian Government are convinced of necessity for secretaries, notwithstanding disadvantage of swelling numbers of commissions, I will consider the proposal in last sentence of your telegram.

[40554] No. 326.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 448.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 450 of 2nd September.

I regret that original intention as to maps was not adhered to. Telegraphic correspondence of the last six weeks should have made it clear that the omission was not in accordance with the procedure I had authorised, and it would have been better if you had previously reported that you contemplated departing from it in this respect. Omission no doubt primarily affects that part of the frontier in which Russia is chiefly interested, but the settlement of the whole frontier north of Hawizeh is more or less interdependent, and, in the light of past experience, there is serious risk in dispensing with any safeguard against subsequent Turkish evasion. Advantage should now be taken of present conciliatory disposition of the Ottoman Government to secure assurance from them that all maps will, as suggested in your telegram No. 408 of 15th August, be initialled as "copies conformes," and that this should be done before the Commission starts work on the frontier, and as soon as maps can be prepared, in order not to delay demarcation.

You should discuss this point and those raised in my despatch No. 267 with your Russian colleague, and report fully. I gather that you anticipate a written reply from the Ottoman Government to the note sent in on 18th August (see your telegram No. 415 of 17th August), but I am not satisfied that arrangement proposed in second paragraph of your telegram No. 417 of 17th August will be satisfactory unless maps are signed and annexed to the final protocol, and even then it might be more prudent to have a preliminary treaty, as suggested in my above-mentioned despatch.

All these arrangements, especially where they depend on concurrence of Persia, will take time, and should, so far as possible, be taken in hand at once, as it would be inexpedient to delay until M. Minorsky's return to Constantinople in October.

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* Also to Mr. Marling (No. 449).

[39083] No. 327.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 131.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 175 of the 8th ultimo reporting on the general political situation and the dissensions in the Cabinet.

I think that when the Regent arrives in Tehran it would be well to give His Highness to understand that His Majesty's Government regard the retention of Ain-ed-Dowleh in office as very desirable.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40937] No. 328.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received September 5.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, September* 4, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to your letter of the 26th June, and subsequent communications, respecting the proposed grant to the Muin-ut-Tujjar of fresh concessions in the Persian Gulf, and to offer the following observations with reference thereto :—

The Board agree with what they understand to be the views entertained by the Lords of the Admiralty and the India Office, that it is of first importance that no influence antagonistic to British interests should be exercised over any portion of the entrance to the Gulf. They further entertain grave doubts whether any arrangements solely with the Muin, however recorded, would constitute an adequate safeguard for the effectual protection of those interests in the event of a new concession being granted to him of mining rights over Kishm, Hormuz, and Henjam.

The Board note from the Foreign Office telegram of the 11th August to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that Sir W. Townley has been asked for his opinion as to whether the objections entertained by the India Office and the Admiralty could be removed by any arrangement with the Muin or whether the Persian Government could be induced to give the concessions in question to British subjects. If the latter of these two courses could be arranged it would naturally be the more satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, but if the former should have to be adopted, the Board are disposed to think that some safeguard might be found by arranging with the Persian Government for the Muin to be definitely bound to a certain line of action by the terms of his concession, which should be explicitly defined in a manner satisfactory to His Majesty's Government. It would be an additional security if the Persian Government could be induced to make a declaration, also in terms satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, as to the intent of the concession.

The Board gather that for the moment the political and strategic considerations advanced by the India Office and the Admiralty outweigh any merely commercial ones, and they have some doubt whether in the circumstances it is requisite to discuss the commercial aspects of the matter at this stage. From a purely commercial point of view, however, the Board would welcome any arrangement by which the red oxide and other minerals produced under any concession affecting the areas in question should be sold to, or handed over for sale on commission by, British firms. They doubt (as a consequence of a communication which they have recently had with Mr. Martin Ellinger) whether it would be practicable for a satisfactory understanding to be arranged between Messrs. Ellinger and Messrs. Strick as to their respective claims to receive any of the products resulting from exploitation under a prospective concession, and, if no arrangement of the sort could in fact be effected, they would prefer to find that Messrs. Ellinger had regained their position as agents for the Muin, by which means some compensation might be afforded them for the losses they have already sustained. On the other hand, they note that Messrs. Strick have a contract with the Persian Government up to March 1915. In the event, therefore, of the latter firm desiring to renew that contract or to enter into a contract with the Muin for the maintenance of their existing position, the Board do not think that His Majesty's Government could properly advocate the claims of Messrs. Ellinger as against those of Messrs. Strick, or *vice versâ*.

[41142] No. 329*.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Foreign Office.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 5.)

Sir, 91, *Victoria Street, London, September* 5, 1913.

IT is possible that the Turkish authorities along the frontier might, if left without instructions, raise objections to the armed escort attached to the British Frontier Commission entering Turkish territory; and as it will be impossible for the Commission to remain continually on the Persian side, and it may even be found convenient for us to make a comparatively lengthy stay at Bagdad or some other Turkish town, I venture to suggest that it might be as well to obtain in advance the consent of the Porte to the free movements of the escort on their side of the frontier.

I do not anticipate that the Persians, who are accustomed to seeing consular escorts, will raise any difficulty.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

Should it eventually be decided to support the Muin's application, subject to compliance on his part with certain conditions to be imposed upon him by the Persian Government, in agreement with His Majesty's Government, it occurs to the Board that a settlement might possibly be arrived at by the concession being given for a period of, say, twenty years from the date of expiry in 1920 of the Muin's present concession, with a prospect of renewal for successive periods of ten years, and covering all the privileges enjoyed by him under the firman of 1904; the Muin on his part engaging to sell oxide only to a British firm or firms nominated by His Majesty's Government. If His Majesty's Government are in a position to block the concession to the Muin, it would seem to be not impossible to impose some such terms upon him as the price of the withdrawal of their opposition.

I am to add that it might be desirable to suggest to the Persian Government that in any concession of the nature in question, which may be granted to any person or company, some clause might be included which will secure that the royalty to be paid to that Government by the concessionnaire shall be proportionate to the profit realised and shall not be such as to preclude the profitable working of the concession or any part of it. In particular the Board understand that it is only with a safeguard of this character that a concessionnaire might be enabled to exploit the sulphur deposits at Bostaneh, which it would appear cannot be profitably developed except by native enterprise.

I am, &c.
ERNEST G. MOGGRIDGE.

[40902] No. 329.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 5.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 4, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 2nd instant regarding the Muin-ut-Tujjar's concession, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to inform you that he is in communication with the Government of India on the subject, and will address you again.

In the meantime, he would suggest that a further reference should be made to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, since he understands that there is reason to believe that oil exists on at least one of the islands.

I am, &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[41138] No. 330.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 6, 1913.

SHAUKAT-UL-MULK, the Governor of Kain, asks whether His Majesty's Government, through their vice-consul or consul, will act as executor of his will for his whole estate and as trustee for a third of landed estate, which he will assign to charity in the form of a hospital and schools. Expenses would be secured by provisions in the will. If it is impossible to give consent in both matters, he hopes that we will agree to give our good offices to ensure his wishes being carried out in the event of the will being disputed.

Shaukat-ul-Mulk has always been friendly to us, and I consider it very desirable that we should give him such assurances as may be possible. He requests early answer, which he trusts may be favourable, as experience has taught him to put little faith in the Persian authorities.

[41101] No. 331.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 456.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 6, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I have discussed various points with the Russian Ambassador, who considers:—

1. As the line in the northern part referring to interests of Russia is described in the identic note with considerable exactness, it is useless and superfluous to trace it on the map, especially as the map is stated in notes to be illustrative, and therefore not possessing authority of written description.

2. For the latter reason signature is also superfluous. In any case signature can obviously not be obtained till we have received reply from the Turks. When the Persian Government's assent to the arrangement has been obtained and formally recorded in the final protocol or otherwise, maps might, if you desire it, be signed.

3. As Great Britain and Russia are invited to take part in the delimitation, they become *pro tanto* parties to it, and can therefore claim that the final protocol be signed by their representatives here. This is convenient and sufficiently binding, and preliminary treaty is therefore superfluous.

Delay in obtaining Turkish reply is partly due to Ramazan and Bairam. We have repeatedly urged expedition on the Grand Vizier, who lays the responsibility for it to the Minister of War. I hope to see the latter to-morrow. At present we see no reason to doubt Grand Vizier's professed desire to reach conclusion quickly.

We have drafted a "règlement intérieur" for the Commission (of which copies will be sent to you by post), but the Russian Ambassador is strongly opposed to preparation of instructions unless our commissioners take part, and hopes that the British commissioner will meet his Russian colleague in Constantinople for the purpose on the latter's return from St. Petersburgh in about three weeks.

As regards point 3 above, I might represent to the Grand Vizier that further copies of the map are required, and obtain from him for the purpose of mechanical reproduction one of the two copies in the possession of the Porte signed by himself, if you consider it indispensable and worth the cost involved.

[41158] No. 332.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 303.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 7, 1913.

MY telegram No. 274 of 3rd August.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires tells me there has been a sharp skirmish at Tergavar in territory on Turco-Persian frontier recently evacuated by Turkey between Turkish regulars, who had crossed frontier, and Russian troops. Kurdish tribal chiefs appear to be at the bottom of the mischief, which Russian Chargé d'Affaires anticipates will easily be arranged, as both Russia and Turkey are ready to withdraw their support from rival brigand chiefs, who have misused the same.

[41101] No. 333.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 650.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1913.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 456 of 6th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

Please inform the Russian Government that I have been carefully considering the Anglo-Russian notes of 5th (18th) August about the Turco-Persian frontier, and the proposal that a final protocol indicating the settlement arrived at should be signed by the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, which has not yet been formally dissolved, and that it should perhaps be countersigned by British and Russian Ambassadors.

In view of the difficulties experienced in the past and the immense expense incurred by Russia and Great Britain upon abortive efforts at delimitation, I should prefer to bind Turkey and Persia by the most formal instrument, and I am therefore

of opinion that a convention should be signed and ratified by both Powers as soon as possible, and that signed maps should be annexed to it. The convention should contain a clause to the effect that (except in the Pusht-i-Kuh district, where the *status quo* is uncertain and where it may be possible to make some concessions to Turkey) the frontier line laid down in the map is to be regarded as final, except that any claims for minor modifications which may appear expedient in the course of demarcation shall be submitted to the arbitration of the British and Russian commissioners, whose decision shall be final.

Unless there is every guarantee that the work of the present Frontier Commission will be regarded as final, I hardly feel justified in sending it.

I accordingly request you to suggest to the Russian Government, and to urge with some insistence, that M. Minorsky should, if possible, come to London in October in order to discuss with Mr. Wratislaw, Mr. Parker, and Legal Adviser the draft of a convention, based on Anglo-Russian notes, which will be prepared here at once in order to save time.

Maps will also be provisionally prepared.

M. Minorsky could at the same time discuss fully the "règlement intérieur" of the Commission.

Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should greatly appreciate it if he were to sanction this proposal; and I think presence of Hakki Pasha would facilitate assent of Turkey to such an arrangement.

(Figures by post to Constantinople.)

[41138] No. 334.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 404.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 302 of 6th September: Shaukat-ul-Mulk.

What assurances do you suggest? Obviously His Majesty's Government cannot become responsible for will as executors or otherwise.

[40084] No. 335.

Foreign Office to Director of Military Operations.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Operations, and is directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of his communication of the 30th ultimo, asking whether a reply has yet been returned to the memorandum of the Russian Government, dated the 14th May, relative to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, and, if not, how soon it is proposed to send one.

Sir A. Nicolson is to observe, in reply, that the main point of difference between the views of His Majesty's Government and those of the Russian Government is that concerning the direction which the southern portion of the line is to follow, and that it is therefore to this question that the most important part of the Russian memorandum refers.

Brigadier-General Wilson is, however, aware that His Majesty's Government have now put forward, and the Russian Government have accepted, a proposal for the appointment of an Anglo-Russian Commission which should examine on the spot the various possible alignments and report to the two Governments on their relative merits, and that Sir E. Grey is in consultation with the Secretary of State for India as to the composition of the British membership of this Commission.

It therefore becomes unnecessary and, indeed, impossible to return any answer at present to the portion of the memorandum which concerns this question.

The memorandum further insists that each of the three groups constituting the Société d'Études should have an equal share of control over the southern portion of the line, thus excluding the claim of His Majesty's Government for the assignment of a preponderating share in favour of the British group.

As regards this point, there is reason to believe that the Russian group, at any rate, have modified their view as to this requirement, and it is reasonable to infer that they have done so with the knowledge and approval of the Russian Government.

Be this as it may, a further meeting of the Société has been arranged and will take place at Paris within the next few days, at which it is anticipated that this question will be discussed, and it would be useless to attempt any reply to this part of the memorandum, at least till the result of the discussion is known.

The part of the memorandum which concerns the enterprises of the Persian Railways Syndicate must also be submitted to further consideration, and it appears preferable, in any case, not to answer it alone.

Sir A. Nicolson is to add that General Wilson will be informed as soon as it is decided to reply to the memorandum.

Foreign Office, September 8, 1913.

[41567] No. 336.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 330.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September* 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 650 of 7th September.

I discussed matter to-day with Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Minorsky, and head of Eastern section.

Russian Government entirely agree with you as to necessity of binding Turkey and Persia to abide by results of work of present Commission. They think, however, that to submit to Turkey a convention such as proposed by you drafted in London would constitute a new phase of the negotiations, and would afford Turkish Government excellent pretext for indefinite delays.

They consider that a final protocol, signed by Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, can be made absolutely binding to the parties.

If necessary, the delegates can be furnished with full powers, and protocol can be ratified by Turkey and Persia besides being countersigned by Russian and British Ambassadors.

Protocol can contain clauses as binding as a convention, but as regards the provision for arbitration of Russian and British commissioners Russian Government think Turks may dislike the term "arbitration." It would be, they think, preferable to provide that in cases of difference between Turkish and Persian commissioners matter shall be finally decided by majority of four commissioners.

As to proposed reference to a frontier line drawn on map as being final, M. Minorsky declares that, until commissioners have been on the ground, any line which they can draw upon a map must have portions dotted as being doubtful (apart altogether from Pusht-i-Kuh district), so that frontier is more exactly described by recapitulating the terms of the last Anglo-Russian note and annexes.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared to hold so strongly to above views that I could but agree to submit them to you.

[41683] No. 337.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 10, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I am not clear from your despatch No. 267 to Constantinople (see your despatch No. 125) whether the Turkish Government have expressed in writing their concurrence in Anglo-Russian notes, and in what terms.

Could you inform me on this point, as the Persian Government are sure to put the question?

[41784] No. 338.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 407.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1913.

RUSSIAN Embassy informs us that you have heard that Hussein Kuli Khan (Nawab) and another prominent Nationalist are returning in the suite of the Regent to Persia, and that you and Russian Chargé d'Affaires consider it unfortunate that such is the case.

If the facts are as stated, have you any suggestions to make?

[41567] No. 339.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 656.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 330 of 9th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

Inform Russian Government that I am prepared to defer to their views provided the final protocol is made absolutely binding. I understood from Mr. Marling that Ottoman Government were prepared to agree to arbitration of British and Russian commissioners, in case of necessity, and all previous British commissioners have attributed failure to reach a settlement largely to absence of such powers. Russian proposal would practically attain same object, and if it is accepted I shall be satisfied.

I presume two embassies at Constantinople will now co-operate in preparation of final protocol, and I trust this may be done without delay, so that protocol may be examined by British and Russian Governments before signature. Embassies will also have to satisfy themselves that Turkish and Persian delegates are furnished with full powers.

Please ascertain precise date of M. Minorsky's return to Constantinople, and whether he considers meeting there with Mr. Wratislaw, and, if so, when, to be really necessary.

(Figures by post to Constantinople.)

[41748] No. 340.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 11.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th July regarding the appointment of a Turkish consul at Lingah, I am directed to say that as there appears to be no immediate prospect of securing the withdrawal of that functionary, the Secretary of State for India is of opinion that the protest suggested by the Government of India should now be made to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[41827] No. 341.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 310.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 407 of 10th September: Nationalists in Regent's suite.

My information referred more especially to Wahid-ul-Mulk, and emanated from his brother. I gather that the Regent has made terms with the more progressive element, represented by the above-mentioned person [? and] Hussein Kuli Khan, whose motives are excellent but methods such as are likely to impede rather than accelerate progress if they become members of the new Medjliss. Their presence in the Assembly cannot but be distasteful to Russia, whose consent to the summoning of a new Medjliss was conditional on an effort being made to exclude persons who had previously made themselves objectionable, although naturally less crude language than this was used, and no names were mentioned.

I learn that President of the Council has telegraphed to the Regent at Vienna that it is not desirable that the expatriated should return. I have not spoken to his Highness on the subject; the idea must be his own unless it has been suggested by the Russian Legation.

[41838] No. 342.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 311.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 11, 1913.

FOLLOWING from Bushire yesterday, No. 366:—

"Your telegram No. 367 and Sir W. Townley's No. 297 to the Foreign Office.

"Having regard to Minister's views and the trend of pourparlers with Muin, and the latter's statement that he is ready to arrange for a British share in the concessions, I would suggest that our support might be given if the following conditions can be secured:—

"1. That, instead of his old concessions being renewed, a fresh concession should be obtained to include Persian littoral and Persian islands of the Gulf, which the Foreign Office letter of 4th December, 1912, to Greenway reserved for 'separate and later negotiation,' and that this concession should be obtained jointly by Muin and either the Ellinger group or the Greenway group, or both combined.

"2. That no non-British elements should be introduced, and no enterprise undertaken on Kishm, Larak, or Henjam without the previous concurrence of the British and Persian Governments. If by any device Henjam could be eliminated, it would of course be better, but I do not quite see how that could be done. Above arrangement will not eliminate though it may mitigate the baleful influence of Muin on the administration of the Gulf ports, but it would seem safe for us as far as the lower islands are concerned, and give us a definite check on Muin. If it were possible that the native syndicate should be British it would be greatly preferable, and Muin might be conceivably tempted by consideration that he would thus become entitled to a measure of British protection.

"(Addressed to Foreign Department, India; repeated to Tehran.)"

I should be glad to learn as soon as convenient if I am authorised to discuss situation with Muin on these lines, and if a British group is likely to be forthcoming to work with Muin on the proposed or any other conditions.

[41683] No. 343.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 408.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 308 of 10th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

Turkish reply not yet received. Mr. Marling will telegraph to you when it is. We are pressing for it.

[41683] No. 344.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 455.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 308 of 10th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

You should support Russian Ambassador in urging Ottoman Government to accept at once in writing frontier specified in notes of 18th August. As soon as you receive reply, inform Sir W. Townley.

[41944] No. 345.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 332.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September* 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 620 of 22nd August.

Russian Government agree as to desirability of appointing Itila-ul-Mulk, but, while quite prepared to suggest his nomination to Persian Government, are of opinion that latter might be regarded on the other hand as of too junior rank to occupy important post of head of Commission. In this case Russian Government suggest that his appointment as "adjoint" to the Persian delegate might be insisted on, and that he might be allotted preponderant rôle directing labours of Commission.

Russian Government do not think that this step could be taken before result of pourparlers between mediating Powers and the Porte has been communicated to Persian Government.

With regard to question of money, Russian Government suggest insisting that Persian Government should immediately find the necessary funds and place them at disposal of Persian commissioners.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran has been instructed to concert with Sir W. Townley in the sense of this latter proposal.

[41101] No. 346.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 456.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 456 of 6th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

What maps do you refer to in last paragraph? Is the whole frontier line shown approximately on them?

The War Office have without difficulty prepared, both on the reduced identic map and on Colonel Maunsell's map, a tracing of the frontier as described in the correspondence, and if M. Minorsky has traced the line it would be useful for War Office to have a copy, and you should send it home at once.

Our maps will be manifolded and sent out to Constantinople within a month. It would be desirable that they should be annexed to final protocol, with a statement that they show the frontier merely approximately by way of illustration.

Colonel Maunsell's map, which contains additional features, will be communicated to Russian Government.

Meridian of Greenwich, and not that of Ferro, was basis of identic map, and should preferably be adopted throughout labours of Commission. Urge this strongly upon your Russian colleague.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 658.)

[41984] No. 347.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 777.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 6, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 456 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the draft "Règlement intérieur" of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, which has been prepared in this embassy on notes furnished by Captain Wilson in consultation with M. Minorsky, and has been agreed to by the Russian Ambassador.

I enclose also a draft article for insertion in the instructions to the commissioners providing for arbitration by the British and Russian commissioners in the event of dispute between their Persian and Ottoman colleagues. This latter article was, according to the agreement between Captain Wilson and M. Minorsky, to have formed part of the "Règlement intérieur," but M. de Giers insists strongly on the importance of its being included in the instructions. To my mind, it matters little in which of these two documents it appears; presumably both will be attached to the "protocole final" or whatever other instrument may be employed to record the general terms of the agreement concerning the frontier and the method of its demarcation by the quadruple commission, and will therefore be equally binding. The question appears to me to be largely a matter of *rédaction*, and may be safely left to be settled when the drafting of the instructions and "Règlement intérieur" comes to be discussed by the commissioners or representatives of the four Powers.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 347.

Draft "Règlement intérieur."

1. QUELQUE soit leur rang personnel, les quatre commissaires principaux seront considérés, en vertu de leur caractère de représentants, sur un pied d'égalité absolue.

Le même principe s'appliquera aux commissaires-adjoints.

2. La carte identique communiquée en 1869–70 aux Gouvernements ottoman et persan servira de base topographique pour la délimitation, et la frontière, telle qu'elle sera finalement arrêtée par la Commission, y sera tracée.

3. En cas de l'absence d'un commissaire pour cause de santé ou d'autres raisons, celui-ci peut se faire remplacer par son adjoint, qui, pour les fins de la Commission, jouira de tous ses pouvoirs.

4. La langue officielle de la Commission sera le français.

5. La Commission se réunira une fois par semaine ou plus souvent en cas de nécessité pour rapporter les travaux de délimitation exécutés sur les lieux.

Le procès-verbal de chaque séance sera rédigé et, après avoir été dûment approuvé, sera signé par les commissaires à la prochaine séance. Dans ces procès-verbaux sera enregistrée la description détaillée de chaque borne ainsi que de la frontière.

La ligne frontière, au fur et à mesure qu'elle sera définitivement arrêtée, sera tracée sur la carte identique sur échelle réduite, qui sera parafée de temps en temps par chacun des commissaires.

6. La Commission fera les arrangements nécessaires pour les travaux de secrétariat et pour la nomination d'un secrétaire choisi parmi les membres de son personnel. Le secrétaire assistera aux réunions de la Commission, et sera chargé de la rédaction des procès-verbaux et de tout autre travail que la Commission trouvera utile de lui confier.

7. Copies des procès-verbaux seront transmises de temps en temps par les commissaires à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

8. Le caractère des bornes à ériger sera arrêté par la Commission; les frais de leur érection seront à la charge, en moitiés égales, des Gouvernements ottoman et persan.

9. Au fur et à mesure de la fixation définitive de la position des bornes, la Commission nommera une Sous-Commission, composée de deux fonctionnaires au moins, soit commissaires, soit membres du personnel technique, pour en surveiller l'érection; cette Sous-Commission soumettra à la Commission un compte rendu détaillé de son travail aussitôt que pourra se faire.

Ce rapport fera partie du protocole de la Commission.

La Sous-Commission peut être permanente.

10. Si le besoin se fait sentir, d'autres Sous-Commissions spéciales pourront être formées dans les conditions susmentionnées à la discrétion des commissaires, et avec la réserve que leur travail sera approuvé et confirmé par les quatre commissaires en séance plénière.

11. Lorsque la Commission aura besoin de gardes, le commissaire ottoman ou persan, selon le cas, se chargera de faire les démarches nécessaires auprès de l'autorité locale. Chaque commissaire aura son escorte personnelle, qui aura libre passage dans la zone de la frontière.

12. La Commission réglera elle-meme ses déplacements de commun accord; mais chaque commissaire choisira l'emplacement de son propre camp à condition, toutefois, en tant que les conditions locales, telles que rareté de provisions, &c., le permettent, que ces déplacements se conforment aux mouvements de la Commission.

13. La Commission aura le droit d'ajourner temporairement la délimitation d'une partie de la frontière pour des raisons de climat ou autres. La décision à cet effet sera prise à la majorité des voix.

Dès qu'une partie de la frontière aura été délimitée, cette partie sera considérée comme définitivement fixée et ne sera susceptible ni d'examen ultérieur, ni de revision.

14. Lorsque les commissaires ottomans et persans seront d'accord sur la position exacte d'un point de la frontière, leur décision sera enregistrée dans le procès-verbal et deviendra *ipso facto* la décision de la Commission, à moins qu'elle ne se trouve clairement en contradiction avec l'accord déjà intervenu entre les deux États en vertu du protocole du auquel ce règlement fait annexe.

15. Aussitôt que possible après l'achèvement final des travaux de la Commission, des copies de la carte mentionnée à l'article 2, signées par tous les commissaires, seront préparées et distribuées comme suit: à chacun des Gouvernements représentés sur la Commission, une copie; à l'Ambassadeur de Perse et aux Ministres de Russie et d'Angleterre à Téhéran, une copie à chacun; aux Ambassadeurs de la Grande-Bretagne, de Perse et de Russie à Constantinople, une copie à chacun.

La Commission prendra, en outre, les mesures nécessaires pour transmettre à chaque Gouvernement le nombre d'exemplaires conformes de la carte (ou de chaque feuille de la carte, selon sa volonté) dont il aura besoin, et invitera les Gouvernements limitrophes à les distribuer parmi leurs fonctionnaires sur les frontières.

16. En fournissant aux quatre Puissances la carte de la frontière susmentionnée, les commissaires soumettront en même temps une déclaration donnant une description détaillée de la frontière; cette description suivra textuellement celles des procès-verbaux de la Commission et portera les signatures des quatre commissaires.

17. En outre, afin d'éviter tout malentendu à l'avenir, des traductions turques et persanes de la déclaration susmentionnée seront préparées pour l'emploi des Gouvernements ottoman et persan et celui des autorités respectives dans les provinces frontières. Ces traductions seront également signées par les quatre commissaires.

Il est, cependant, entendu que seul le texte français fait foi.

Enclosure 2 in No. 347.

Draft Article to be included in Instructions to Commissioners.

DANS le cas où les commissaires ottoman et persan au cours de la discussion ne pourraient pas tomber d'accord sur de certains points de la frontière, ils présenteront chacun dans vingt-quatre heures un exposé par écrit de leurs points de vue aux commissaires britanniques et russes, qui, s'étant réunis en une séance privée, statueront sur le sort des points en litige et communiqueront leur décision à leurs collègues ottomans et persans. Cette décision sera insérée dans le protocole de la séance plénière et sera considérée comme péremptoire.

[41985] No. 348.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 778.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 267 of the 20th ultimo and your telegram No. 448 of the 4th instant, I beg leave to submit that the main steps that have now to be accomplished before the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission can commence its labours are as follows:—

1. To secure a satisfactory reply from the Porte to the British and Russian identic notes of the 18th August.

2. To obtain the assent of the Persian Government to the arrangements reached in virtue of the above correspondence and of the London Declaration of the 29th July last.

3. To place on record the agreement in some form to which not only Turkey and Persia but also Great Britain and Russia shall be parties, and to which shall be attached instructions, &c., to the Delimitation Commissioners of the four Powers providing for arbitration powers being conferred on the British and Russian commissioners.

The agreement itself in whatever form it may be recorded would, I presume, include besides formal and introductory clauses, a description of the frontier taken from the London Declaration and from the notes exchanged by the British and Russian Embassies with the Porte, and an additional article for the maintenance of the rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The stages involving urgency are the two first. As regards 1, I had a not unsatisfactory interview with the Minister for War and Mahmoud Pasha yesterday, but although the Russian Ambassador is confident that we shall get a satisfactory answer in a very few days, I fear that the Turks may raise some objections in connection with the northern part of the frontier, which will cause a little delay before M. de Giers can overcome them.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

[42111] No. 349.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 317.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 13, 1913.

FOLLOWING from Tabriz to-day, No. 59 :—

"Shuja has arrested five fedais who recently returned to Tabriz, and hanged one of them on 10th September. These men appear to have returned simply because their families and possessions are in Tabriz. They do not appear to have been especially prominent formerly, nor now to have had any intention of making mischief here.

"After the execution I called on my Russian colleague, who, in reply to my interrogation, professed ignorance of the event. I therefore sent my mirza to Shuja's secretary to enquire as to the reason for the execution, and whether any of the other four prisoners were to be executed. I said that I asked him for information in order that I might not telegraph an incorrect report.

"The secretary replied that the man had been executed for murders and not for political reasons. He said that none of the other prisoners would be executed.

"To-day I have written to my Russian colleague, who returned to the country yesterday, expressing, in the name of humanity, the hope that his great influence would be exercised to moderate Shuja.

"Such executions, so long after the event, of fedais, probably driven back to their homes by want, create painful impression among Europeans here.

"Of course Shuja would not have dared to execute this man without the permission of the Russian consulate-general, and my Russian colleague was probably affecting the same ignorance as was affected by Miller on the occasion of the execution of Sikat-ul-Islam."

[42125] No. 350.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 319.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 14, 1913.

FOLLOWING from Tabriz yesterday, No. 60 :—

"My immediately preceding telegram.

"I have received very friendly reply from my Russian colleague, who assures me that he will use all his influence to dissuade Shuja from 'useless severities.'

"My Russian colleague's explanations of the execution are in significant contradiction to the statement of Shuja's secretary. According to my Russian colleague's letter fedai was executed for participation in events of December 1911, after which he fled from Tabriz.

"Shuja seems to have been alarmed by my enquiry, for last night he quite gratuitously sent a representative to the consulate to assure me of his affection.

"There is now ground for hope that none of the other prisoners will be executed."

I venture to suggest that Mr. Smart's action be approved.

[42126] No. 351.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 14, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Persian Government propose to enlist services of a Belgian military engineer officer to assist their commission, object being that he should safeguard strategical position when the frontier in Zohab district is delimited.

Captain Wilson is of opinion that one of the Swedish officers now here would be more efficient, as he would have some knowledge of the country, would be better fitted to advise in a mountainous country than a Belgian, and could command Persian escort.

[42127] No. 351*.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 14, 1913.

CAPTAIN WILSON leaves for Hamadan to-morrow. Reports recently received from Burujird show that province of Luristan is in state of great disorder, but Captain Wilson is sanguine that he can get through all right.

I have impressed on him that he should examine situation very carefully on his arrival at Burujird, and that he should not proceed further unless he can satisfy himself that he can do so without running undue risk.

[41142] No. 352*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 293.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Wratislaw,† suggesting that the consent of the Turkish Government should be obtained for the free movement of the escort of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission on the Turkish side of the frontier.

With this view, you should take such action as, after consultation with your Russian colleague, you may deem expedient.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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† No. 329*.

We have not yet made an official communication to Persian Government, as my Russian colleague is seeking explanations on certain points about which he considers his instructions not sufficiently clear, but we have both spoken to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informally. Persian Government are in possession of copies of Anglo-Russian notes of 18th August, and are making necessary preparations. It is proposed to name Ehtesham-es-Sultaneh as first and Itila-ul-Mulk as second commissioner.

I understand from your telegram No. 390 of 27th August that it is desired that we should secure from Persian Government formal declaration similar to that made by Turkish Government of its wish that representatives of the two mediating Powers should take part in work of delimitation. It would assist me to know if the Turkish declaration took any other form than that of the wish expressed in section 7, part 2, of the Turkish note of 9th July.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh.)

[42398] No. 352.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 323.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 15, 1913.

TWO hundred gendarmes, with two Maxims under three Swedish officers, left to-day for Kerman viâ Ispahan and Yezd.

[41683] No. 353.

Sir Edward Grey to Hakki Pasha.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to Hakki Pasha, and has the honour to inform His Highness that His Majesty's Government have learnt with some concern and much regret that the Imperial Ottoman Government have not yet accepted the notes communicated by the British and Russian Embassies at Constantinople on the 5–18th August respecting the Turco-Persian frontier.

Sir E. Grey would earnestly impress upon His Highness the urgency of such a step being taken without delay, inasmuch as it is essential, in the interests of economy and for other reasons, that the commission of demarcation should be in a position to start work at Mohammerah on an early date in December 1913. He accordingly would express the hope that Hakki Pasha would communicate with the Ottoman Government in this sense by telegraph.

Foreign Office, September 15, 1913.

[40937] No. 354.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th instant and previous correspondence relative to Muin-ut-Tujjar's concessions, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Board of Trade conveying their observations on this question from the commercial point of view.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with an expression of the views of the Marquess of Crewe on the considerations set forth in this letter, if his Lordship should have anything to add to the remarks which he has already made on the subject.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

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* No. 328.

[42537] No. 355.

M. de Etter to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres, le 15 septembre, 1913.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

JE n'ai pas manqué de transmettre au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Saint-Pétersbourg la teneur de la note de votre Excellence en date du 11 août dernier et m'empresse aujourd'hui de vous communiquer dans la note ci-jointe les vues du Gouvernement Impérial par rapport à la question d'importation d'argent pour les besoins de la Monnaie à Téhéran.

Votre Excellence y trouvera, de plus, exposées les bases sur lesquelles le Président du Conseil et Ministre des Finances jugerait équitable d'autoriser nos deux banques de procéder à l'échange de vues dans le but d'arriver à un compromis.

C'est avec la plus haute considération que j'ai, &c.

N. ETTER.

Enclosure in No. 355.

Note communicated by M. de Etter.

LE Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté britannique, d'un côté, soutient la thèse que la concession pour la frappe de monnaie (près de 40,000,000 de grammes d'argent) accordée par le Medjliss à Muin-our-Raja et Motemed-out-Toudjarou, a été abrogée parce qu'elle enfreignait les clauses du contrat conclu pour dix ans entre Shuster et la Banque Impériale, et, que par le fait de cette abrogation, le Gouvernement persan avait reconnu la validité de ce dernier contrat.

D'autre part, le Secrétaire d'État maintient que la Banque Impériale a obtenu le privilège pour l'importation d'argent par suite de son droit de monopole pour l'émission de billets de banque garantis par une encaisse effective.

La première assertion du Secrétaire d'État semble être basée sur un malentendu.

Le Ministère des Finances Impérial ne dispose pas du texte de la concession Muin-our-Raja et Motemed-out-Toudjarou, et ignore si mention y est faite que cette concession ne peut abroger les arrangements passés antérieurement avec la Banque Impériale ; cependant, d'après ses renseignements, la concession en question avait été accordée au mois d'août 1911, tandis que le contrat Shuster n'a été signé que le 27 novembre de la même année. Il ne peut, en conséquence, être qualifié d'arrangement antérieur à la concession obtenue par les deux sujets persans susnommés. Il semble, de plus, douteux qu'un acte approuvé par le Medjliss puisse être invalidé par un document investi à l'insu du Medjliss de la signature d'un organe subalterne.

Conformément à des renseignements entièrement dignes de foi, dont dispose le Gouvernement Impérial, le Gouvernement persan, sans jamais avoir aboli la concession Muin-our-Raja et Motemed-out-Toudjarou, l'aurait, au contraire, à plusieurs reprises renouvelé. Cette concession, renouvelable annuellement, reste en vigueur jusqu'au moment de son application, et se trouve, du reste, actuellement prolongée (soit en vigueur) jusqu'au mois de mars 1914.

La circonstance que les concessionnaires se soient jusqu'ici abstenus d'importer de l'argent en Perse ne peut ainsi pas être attribuée au fait qu'ils n'aient pas le droit de le faire. Elle ne peut s'expliquer que par des considérations commerciales.

Quant à la déduction que le Gouvernement persan a cru pouvoir reconnaître le contrat Shuster avec la Banque Impériale par suite de cette abstention provisoire des deux concessionnaires persans—elle ne paraît nullement concluante ou justifiée.

Pour ce qui est du second point : "Privilège de la Banque Impériale pour l'importation d'argent découlant de son droit de monopole pour l'émission de billets de banque avec garantie effective métallique d'un tiers de cette émission," cette considération pourrait être fondée si l'effectif (en krans) ne pouvait être obtenu en Perse par d'autres moyens—par l'encaisse de perceptions intérieures, opérations commerciales, &c.

Il semblerait que si le Gouvernement anglais, en présence de ces conditions, avait voulu faire dépendre l'importation d'argent du droit d'émission de billets de banque, qu'une réserve spéciale à cet effet aurait dû avoir été intercalée dans le contrat.

Le Ministère Impérial des Finances, en conséquence, entrevoit des objections aux arguments énoncés par la Banque Impériale en ce qui concerne son privilège d'importer en Perse l'argent nécessaire pour les besoins de la Monnaie, qui, d'ailleurs, ne répond nullement au principe de "droits et privilèges égaux."

[42597] No. 356*.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 471. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 16, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 15th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

In view of assurances of Grand Vizier that satisfactory reply will be forthcoming in a few days, Russian Ambassador is telegraphing to St. Petersburgh suggesting that Russian Legation at Tehran be instructed to urge Persian Government to send full power to Persian Ambassador here to sign instrument recording final agreement which we are about to draft.

(Sent to Tehran.)

La Banque Impériale a obtenu le monopole d'émission de bank-notes même dans le nord : sphère d'influence russe ; elle a des tendances de vouloir, avec l'assistance de M. Mornard, concentrer entre ses mains les perceptions intérieures dans le nord de la Perse, et d'y obtenir le monopole de la fourniture d'argent pour la Monnaie.

En résultat, les intérêts de la banque russe s'en trouveraient gravement lésés.

Le Ministère des Finances Impérial considère, par conséquent, que la question des fournitures d'argent devrait être résolue dans un esprit d'équité et réglée sur la base de "droits égaux," entre les deux maisons de banque.

C'est en s'inspirant de ces principes qu'il semblerait falloir procéder à l'étude du compromis proposé par le Gouvernement britannique.

Il n'y aurait, en somme, pas à prévoir d'objections principielles à une participation de la Banque Inpériale dans l'importation d'argent, à la condition toutefois que la monopole de cette importation devienne la prérogative spéciale des deux banques, anglaise et russe, et que cette dernière reçoive une compensation au lieu du monopole d'émission de billets de banque dont jouit la Banque Impériale.

C'est sur la base des principes précités que la Banque d'Escompte pourrait être autorisée d'entrer en pourparlers avec la Banque Impériale en vue d'arriver à un arrangement équitable.

[42586] No. 356.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 324.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 16, 1913.

AN unfortunate incident has occurred at Shiraz. A gendarme killed a Seyyid on the night of the 10th. The murderer was arrested by the police, and was condemned to death by the civil court, after a travesty of a trial at which no Swedish officer was invited to be present. Hearing that the man would probably be executed, Captain Lundberg called on the Governor-General and requested that nothing should be done until his Excellency had seen the Swedish officer commanding. This was agreed upon and an hour fixed for interview. Upon Major Uggla's arrival at the time appointed, he learnt that the man had already been executed. Much incensed at this breach of faith, the two Swedish officers marched a body of gendarmerie into the citadel, and one of them with a number of armed Persian officers of the gendarmerie entered the Governor-General's presence and demanded the corpse, which was handed over. For this breach of etiquette the Swedish officer commanding has apologised to the Governor-General in the presence of the acting consul.

Major O'Connor, in reporting the above, states that he has for some time been dissatisfied with the Governor-General's attitude towards the gendarmerie, and considers his action on this occasion to have been a deliberate blow struck at the prestige of the Swedish officers. He thinks that it will be impossible to look for future amicable co-operation between gendarmes and the Governor-General after what has happened, and expresses an opinion that, as the gendarmes are absolutely indispensable for the security of the province and maintenance of order in Southern Persia, and the Governor-General was clearly in the wrong, the latter must go, more especially as he believes that the gendarmerie will succeed in their difficult task under a suitable Governor-General. The acting consul considers the Governor-General's excuse for the execution, namely that his hand was forced by mob, unacceptable, because the gendarmes could quite well have maintained order if called on to do so.

I agree with the acting consul, as I consider the gendarmes deserving of our strong support at a moment when their influence is beginning to make itself felt. Five hundred are on the Resht road to receive the Regent, and 200 have just started post-haste to Sultanabad to repel a threatened Lur attack.

You should by now be in possession of my despatch No. 189 respecting the Governor-Generalship of Fars.

[41838] No. 357.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.†

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 9th July relative to the grant to Muin-ut-Tujjar of concessions in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,‡ repeating a message which sets forth the views of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire setting forth the conditions on which, in the opinion of the latter, the support of His Majesty's Government might properly be given to Muin's application.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may have to offer in addition to those already furnished on the subject.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[42706] No. 357*.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 325.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 17, 1913.

MY despatch No. 190, Confidential.

Financial agent at Tabriz has been transferred, but the situation has been in no way improved thereby. His successor has sought assistance of the Russian consul, who has replied that the matter does not concern him. It is of public notoriety that the Governor-General does nothing without the approval of the Russian consul, who has on previous occasions boasted openly that such is the case. To his door must therefore be laid the blame for the Governor-General's actions. His Excellency has ordered all the subordinate Governors in the province to cease rendering the financial agents any assistance, has imprisoned several minor officials without any good reason, and has had placards concerning illegal sales of Crown lands torn down by the police. The Russian consul has also ordered Russian-protected persons not to pay taxes.

A similar story comes from Khoi, where Belgian financial agent demands to be relieved on account of Russian opposition, and where all the Persian officials of the financial administration have been imprisoned. Treasurer-General has addressed very strong remonstrance to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, and has represented to me that the action of Russian officials constitutes an infringement of the Anglo-Russian Convention, which guaranteed sovereignty and independence of Persia, since, if Russian opposition continues, his service must be suspended, which will result in [group undecypherable] that the Russians will declare themselves obliged to take over the administration of the province.

I must most regretfully express my opinion that the situation in Azerbaijan is the outcome of a systematic scheme for the absorption of the province, which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has described as peaceful penetration under arms.

[42707] No. 358.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 328.)
(Telegraphic.) *Code.* *Tehran, September* 17, 1913.

REGENT reached Enzeli this morning.

[42708] No. 359.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 17, 1913.

PRIME Minister informs me that an arrangement has been made between Persian Government and Russian Legation under which Salar-ed-Dowleh is to receive a

† Also to India Office and Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis.* ‡ No. 342.

[42127] No. 363A.

Foreign Office to Persian Railways Syndicate.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 18, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the despatch of your surveyors to examine the districts likely to be traversed by the railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for your information, that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the effect that Captain Wilson was about to leave the capital on the 15th instant on his way to Hamadan.

Sir W. Townley adds that recent reports from Burujird show the province of Luristan to be in a state of great disorder, but that Captain Wilson was sanguine that he could get through safely.

I am to take this opportunity to inform you, with reference to the letter from this Office of the 20th January, that the Government of India propose to appoint Captain Crosthwaite to replace Captain Wilson as political officer on special service at Dizful.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

pension of 10,000 tomans, about 1,800*l.*, per annum, an outfit allowance of 600*l.*, and is to reside in Switzerland, where his pension will be paid to him through Russian Legation. He forfeits his [group omitted: ? pension] and Russian good-will if he returns to Persia. He has only one large property remaining, which is mortgaged to Russian Bank for a debt of about 50,000*l.* It is further secured on guarantee of a bankrupt Parsee banker whose affairs have been taken over by Persian Government.

I understand that Prince will be deported with Russian assistance if he does not accept the conditions made for him.

[42125] No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 319 of the 14th September: Tabriz.

Acting British consul's action approved.

[42839] No. 361.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 330.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 413 of 17th September.

Colonel commanding the gendarmerie here asserts that Seyyid's death was the result of an accident, and he was not deliberately murdered.

The Prime Minister tells me that members of the Cabinet consider Governor-General's own report of the incident shows him to have acted wrongly.

[42843] No. 362.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 331.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 18, 1913.

MY telegram No. 325 of 17th September: Financial administration in Azerbaijan.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires tells me that, on receiving representations from the Treasurer-General, he has telegraphed to Russian consul at Tabriz that he did wrong in refusing his support to the Belgian financial agent, and that it is not intention of Russian Government to oppose service of financial administration in Azerbaijan.

[40347] No. 363.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 10. Commercial.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 18, 1913.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 29, Commercial, of the 17th June last respecting certain proposed modifications of the Persian customs tariff, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Board of Trade.*

In view of the objections of various kinds to alterations in the existing tariff which have been raised by the Board of Trade and by the Government of India in their telegram of the 25th February last (a copy of which is enclosed for convenience of reference),† and having regard to the present uncertainty of any large loan being negotiated, it would appear to be useless to proceed further with the matter at this moment.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 315.
† Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe (Telegraphic), February 25, 1913 [9246].

[42706] No. 363*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 325 of 17th September: Azerbaijan.

I shall await arrival of your despatch and then take matter up seriously with Russian Government.

[43224] No. 364.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 180.)
Sir, *Tehran, August* 14, 1913.

I AM in receipt of your despatch No. 105, Confidential, of the 21st ultimo, enclosing copy of a despatch addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs by my French colleague here, upon the subject of the influence exercised by the German Legation over the Swedish officers of the gendarmerie. I was aware that the question was greatly exercising M. Lecomte, and the matter had also been brought to my notice by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who appeared to be preoccupied by the fear lest the German Minister should acquire increased importance here through the Swedish officers. I have not reported previously upon the subject because it seemed to me to be one of a trivial nature, whilst I think that the personal equation has played a large part in the attitude assumed by the French Minister, who is evidently jealous of the fact that his charms or the pleasures of his table are held of less account by the Swedes than the same attractions that are offered by the German Minister. M. Sabline's predominant desire is to prevent the increase of any foreign influence, especially German, in Persia other than British or Russian.

To take first of all the question of the presence of German officers with the two detachments of gendarmes that proceeded to Shiraz last spring. M. Lecomte was clearly piqued that he was not the sole honoured guest, but he must have been well aware that at one time the expedition threatened to become an organised "partie de plaisir à la Cook," and that several other Europeans, who cried off in turns, had expressed their intention of accompanying the gendarmes, the chance of seeing something of Persia in safety being considered too good a one to be missed. I made representations at the time about the undesirability of turning a serious military demonstration into a tourist trip, both to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to Colonel Hjalmarson. The latter told me that, as far as Captain Schneider and his wife were concerned, he could not refuse to take them because he had been asked to do so by the French Minister. On my pointing out that there were obvious reasons why the presence of German military officers was undesirable, Colonel Hjalmarson replied that they were personal friends of the Swedish officers, and that he did not see how he could then recall an invitation already issued. He did not say that the German Minister had pressed him to take these members of his legation with him, and Prince Reuss subsequently denied that he had urged the colonel in any way. I pointed out that people would certainly say what M. Lecomte says they have said, but Colonel Hjalmarson replied that he did not care what people said.

I do not think that there was any hidden design in sending the German officers down with the gendarmes. Captain Klein is, it is true, an officer of some experience whose military opinion may be of value. Baron Friesen von Miltitz, who accompanied the second detachment, is a very young officer, and there can, I think, be no doubt that he simply accompanied his Swedish friends for fun. I am aware that M. Lecomte asserts that Captain Klein, who has now left Tehran, told him that he had written to "Die Woche" of Berlin, but Prince Reuss assured me that such was not the case.

It is true that the German Minister does extend a large measure of hospitality to the Swedish officers and their wives, but he entertains everybody that passes, and the fact that some of the Swedish ladies are more attractive than the majority of the female element of Tehran is perhaps not foreign to his desire to see them frequently at his table. Moreover, most of the Swedish officers are more fluent in German than they are in French. Although Prince Reuss has been known to speak of "mes Suédois," I am not of opinion that there is any real intention on his part to exercise any special influence over the Swedish officers.

Since writing his despatch M. Lecomte has been afforded a good opportunity for establishing his official protection of the Swedish officers. At the time of the recent troubles between the gendarmes and the Bakhtiaris Colonel Hjalmarson was ill in bed at the French Legation, which was consequently visited by all Persian and other officials who had occasion to see the colonel on business. I can see no good reason for the jealousy of the German Minister displayed by my French colleague, but it is possible that if it is realised at Stockholm that such a feeling has been created it may be considered expedient to appoint a Swedish Minister here. I have reason to believe that such an idea has been mooted, and there would certainly be more excuse for such a legation than there is for a Spanish, Dutch, Italian, Austrian, or even American Minister. The Swedish community now numbers about fifty people, and is likely to increase, whilst the value of Swedish trade has jumped from 2,617*l.* to 11,358*l.* according to the latest statistics. It is almost certain that a Swedish Minister would be more closely allied with the German than with the French Legation, and the two might even form a combination that would have no little weight.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43225] No. 365.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 181. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Tehran, August* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 166, Very Confidential, of the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter that M. Mornard has addressed to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires upon the subject of the sale of certain State lands by the Governor-General of Azerbaijan to Russian subjects at Tabriz.

This fresh step in the policy of the peaceful absorption of Azerbaijan will probably be followed by other transfers of land to Russian subjects, as His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz has warned me that the absence of a karguzar, or the replacement of Cherif-ed-Dowleh by a more subservient official, would be the signal for the wholesale transfer of lands by Shuja-ed-Dowleh to Russian subjects. Land transfers are not legal unless they are signed by the karguzar (Foreign Office agent), and Cherif-ed-Dowleh's unwillingness to lend himself to these transactions was the chief reason why Shuja-ed-Dowleh, under Russian instigation, has for long been endeavouring to secure his removal from Tabriz. This has recently been done, and the late offending karguzar is now Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior.

Under the circumstances it is quite understandable that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs should ask for "more elbow-room in the Russian sphere," but it would appear doubtful if the greater freedom of action requested is to be turned to carrying out the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in so far as that instrument asserts the intention of the two contracting parties to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia. It is, perhaps, not surprising that Azerbaijan is considered by a large number of Persians as already lost to Persia, whilst they foresee that the provinces of the Caspian littoral and Khorassan are destined gradually to follow suit, since similar acts of land-grabbing under the ægis of the Russian consuls are reported to be of almost daily occurrence. It seems hardly worth while to remind you, Sir, that, under the conditions of the Treaty of Turcomanchai, foreigners cannot hold landed property in Persia except in certain circumstances.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 365.

M Mornard to Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

Cher M. Sabline, *Téhéran, le* 10 *août*, 1913.

AINSI que j'ai l'honneur de vous l'écrire à la date du 6 juillet dernier, j'ai soumis au Conseil des Ministres la demande de M. Préobrajensky tendant à ce que certains terrains du Djabba Khaneh à Tauris soient vendus à des sujets russes. Le 15 du même mois, j'ai télégraphié à M. Ransquin de déclarer nettement au consul général

Impérial qu'un directeur provincial n'avait pas le droit de vendre des terrains domaniaux, et M. Préobrajensky avait bien voulu reconnaître que seul le Gouvernement était compétent pour aliéner Djabba Khaneh.

Or, le bruit ayant couru à Tauris que le Gouverneur général, profitant de l'absence du kargozar, avait vendu ce terrain de sa propre autorité et que des travaux y étaient effectués sous drapeau russe, M. Ransquin a demandé à ce sujet une entrevue au consul général Impérial.

Au cours de cette entrevue, M. Préobrajensky n'a fait aucune difficulté pour reconnaître qu'en effet ce terrain avait été vendu à des sujets russes par son Excellence Chodja-ed-Dovleh pour une somme de 8,000 tomans, soit environ le sixième de sa valeur.

Le consul général Impérial a ajouté qu'il ne se souciait nullement de savoir si cette vente était régulière ou non ; mais que, la considérant comme un fait accompli, il s'opposerait à la restitution de Djabba Khaneh à l'Etat et qu'il ferait continuer les travaux.

Je me permets d'attirer votre bienveillante attention sur l'importance considérable de cette affaire, car en supposant que la procédure de M. Préobrajensky soit admise, son Excellence Chodja-ed-Dovleh ne manquera pas d'aliéner, de la même façon, tous les domaines gouvernementaux de l'Azerbeïdjan à son profit personnel.

MORNARD.

[43226] No. 366.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 182. Very Confidential.)

Tehran, August 21, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 96, Very Confidential, of the 4th ultimo, on the subject of the desire of the German Government to establish direct telegraphic communication between Germany, German East Africa, and the Far East by means of a land line carried across Persian territory, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Director of the Persian section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, to whom I referred your despatch under reply for his observations.

I requested Mr. King-Wood to consider the correspondence as very confidential.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 366.

Director, Indo-European Telegraph Department, to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to state that it was with the object of precluding the Persian Government from employing any but British assistance in constructing telegraph lines in South-Western Persia that article 8 was inserted in the agreement dated the 4th January, 1913, relating to the reconstruction of the Arabistan telegraph lines by this Department.

The translation of the article reads as follows :—

"It is agreed that, up to 1945, should the Persian Government wish to extend the Arabistan telegraph lines to any other points, and in case they should be in need of foreign assistance, that assistance must be requested from the British Government."

Also, in article 7, the Persian Government agree not to employ, without the consent of the British Government, any but Persian subjects, or employés of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the offices of these lines.

2. In virtue of this declaration I venture to state that His Majesty's Government have every reason to regard the construction of any contemplated telegraph line in Arabistan by any foreign Power as an infringement of our agreement with the Persian Government,

3. The only other reference, and a somewhat indirect one, I can find, is in the agreement made by Sir Arthur Hardinge with the Persian Government relating to the

construction of a telegraph line from Henjam to Bunder Abbas, dated Tehran, the 13th May, 1905, paragraph 4 of which starts with the words :—

"The declaration of the Persian Government that it will not employ foreigners, *i.e.*, non-Persian subjects, on the working of the line, &c."

4. I do not venture to express an opinion on the political effect which would result from the establishment of a telegraph line in South-Western Persia, with stations along the Gulf littoral, administered by a foreign Government; but, regarding the question purely from the "telegraphic" point of view, it would mean that the monopoly which the Indo-European Telegraph Department have now enjoyed for half a century would be forfeited, and, with a foreign telegraph line in competition, a very considerable diminution in the traffic receipts of the British telegraphs would be the result.

5. It may not be irrelevant for me to mention here that the convention between Great Britain and Turkey for the establishment of telegraphic communication between India and the Ottoman Empire, signed at Constantinople on the 3rd September, 1864, led to the extension of the Karachi–Bushire submarine cable to Fao, and to the establishment at the last-mentioned place of a combined British and Turkish telegraph office. In those early days much was expected of this direct route connecting England and India, viâ Constantinople; but, unfortunately, the imperfections of the Turkish lines frustrated any attempt to regard them as a reliable artery for international telegraphic correspondence, with the result that they could not compete with the subsequently constructed Indo-European Company's lines through Europe, linked to the Department's system at Tehran.

6. Writing in 1882, the then Director-in-chief of this Department, Colonel Sir J. U. Bateman Champain, states :—

"It seems to me that it is for higher authority than mine to decide whether, considering the paramount importance of telegraph connection with India, the lines which traverse Egypt and the Indo-European Telegraph Company's wires through Russia, should or should not continue to be supplemented by the completely separate route across Asiatic Turkey."

Again, in 1889, Colonel Mallock, the Director-General of Telegraphs in India, wrote as follows :—

" * * * * *

"It will be seen that the Turkish lines, little used so long as the Indo-European route is open, might be of incalculable value to India in the event of that route being closed."

And he submits for consideration :—

"The importance of the Turkish lines as an alternative route to England should be taken into account in connection with the north west defences and the army mobilisation scheme."

7. In quoting from these reports my desire is to give prominence to the fact that if it was considered to be of importance for us to acquire some control over this Turkish line in those early days, how much more important now to prevent any foreign Government from having a direct means of communication over this very route, and through Persia to the Far East.

8. I beg leave to return herewith the enclosure to your letter. A copy has not been taken.

I have, &c.

W. KING-WOOD.

[43228] No. 367.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 185.)

Tehran, August 25, 1913.

Sir,

AS I had the honour to inform you by telegraph, a most unfortunate affray between Bakhtiaris, police, and gendarmes, occurred in Tehran on the 7th instant, with the loss of several lives on each side. I had already advised you in previous

communications of the danger of a serious collision between the gendarmes and Bakhtiaris, because it has been evident for some months past that the presence of this armed force in Tehran claiming to be in the service of the Government would lead to trouble, sooner or later, with the official representatives of public order, who, in the performance of their duties, have on various occasions been brought into conflict with the somewhat undisciplined Bakhtiaris, whom the Government were loth to coerce, in view of the signal services they have rendered the state in the immediate past.

A trivial incident in which some Bakhtiaris sided with a disturber of the public peace on the previous evening brought about the collision. It is not of vital importance as to which side was right and which wrong on that occasion, although the khans are ready, I believe, to admit that their men were in the wrong. The incident occurred, unfortunately, at the beginning of Ramazan when the people, who have fasted all day, are prone to excesses at night. What was significant of the state of tension between the two parties was the rapidity with which recourse was had to the use of fire-arms. Although one or more Bakhtiaris were killed and a policeman wounded, the night affray appeared destined to have no more unfortunate results.

Soon after the day broke it was, however, clear that the news of what had occurred had spread among the Bakhtiaris, and had created a spirit of bitter resentment. The streets became full of armed tribesmen galloping about in great excitement. Policemen and gendarmes were attacked and beaten, public order being so seriously threatened that the Swedish police officers, feeling that their newly-organised levies were unable to cope with the situation, applied to the gendarmes to come to their assistance. Unfortunately they neglected to inform the Minister of the Interior of the step they had taken, and consequently the subsequent demonstration of the gendarmerie was made without the knowledge or approval of the responsible authorities of the Government. Colonel Hjalmarson, who was lying ill in the French Legation in the country, was not in Tehran at the time. His orders were sought by one of the senior Swedish instructors, but he was only able to judge of the gravity of the situation by the report given to him of what was occurring.

It is clear that the Persian authorities were fully alive to the situation, because the Under-Secretary of the Interior and the Governor of the town went to the house of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the chief Bakhtiari khan in Tehran, before noon, and arranged with his Excellency that the Bakhtiari horsemen who were massed in the neighbourhood of his house should be ordered to disperse and return peacefully to their dwellings. Meanwhile, in ignorance of what had occurred at Samsam's house, the Swedish gendarmerie officers had decided that a demonstration must be made with all their force, supported by Maxims. I understand from Colonel Hjalmarson that the intention was to seize certain strategic points in the town, and hold them until order had been completely restored, and that no resistance or attack was anticipated for a moment. To effect this purpose the troops from Bagh-i-Shah entered the town by the western gate, whilst those from the other barracks at Jusefabad entered by a north-western gate. Both parties advanced by an encircling movement on the quarter of the town inhabited by the Bakhtiaris.

As the troops from Bagh-i-Shah marched down to the gun square they were fired upon by Bakhtiaris ensconced in a caravanserai. One or more gendarmes fell dead, and the order was issued to capture the caravanserai. This was done with a loss to the Bakhtiaris of two killed, and ten taken prisoners. As soon as the firing was heard street fighting between the two parties became general, and it is wonderful that the loss of life was not much greater. After unsuccessful pourparlers with Sardar Mohtashem, ex-Minister of War, and Sardar Bahadur, a son of Sardar Assad, who won his spurs under the late Yeprin Khan, who had hurried to town from Shimran on the receipt of news of the disturbance, Major Glimstedt, who was in command of the gendarmes, threatened to bring up the Maxims unless peace was restored, under a condition that all the Bakhtiaris should surrender their arms by a certain hour. As the time approached he proceeded to the house of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whither the other khans had preceded him, causing meanwhile Maxims to be trained on the house, and his men disposed for a general assault on the Bakhtiari quarter.

The conditions were accepted a few minutes before the limit expired, and all the Bakhtiaris present with arms in their possession were disarmed by their own khans, such of them as had pistols, &c., that they had not given up being relieved of the same by the police and gendarmes. A delay of two days was given within which the Bakhtiaris in Tehran should surrender their arms to their chiefs. The fact that guns were actually trained upon the house of the late president of the Council under the very walls of the British Legation, and that when the disturbance was over the gendarmerie band paraded

the main street of the town, in which are the residences of the leading Bakhtiari khans, caused much resentment.

As soon as we heard of what had happened, M. Sabline and I took council together as to what would be the best course to pursue, in order to secure a satisfactory settlement of the incident, and to safeguard against a repetition of a similar one. We decided that Mr. Churchill and M. Lissovsky, the Oriental secretaries of our respective legations, should call upon the Bakhtiari khans the following morning, and represent to them our regret and astonishment that the Bakhtiaris should have come to blows with the representatives of public order. We instructed Mr. Churchill and M. Lissovsky to use forcible language in making this communication to the khans, in order that they might fully understand that the gendarmes had the support of the two legations. They also impressed upon the khans that the conditions imposed by the Swedish instructors must be carried out, and that the khans would be held responsible for any further disturbance that might occur, since it had now been clearly shown that it was most undesirable that armed men, whether in the employment of the Government or not, should continue to parade the streets of Tehran. The Swedish officers were for the most part of opinion that the ten Bakhtiaris who had opened fire upon the gendarmes and had subsequently been taken prisoners should be shot. M. Sabline and I were unable to share this opinion, not because we did not agree that an exemplary example ought to be made, but because we considered that such an act would intensify the bad feeling between the Bakhtiaris and the gendarmes, and might lead to reprisals and further disturbances in other parts of the country.

The khans who were naturally somewhat sore in consequence of the incidents of the previous day, refused to recognise that their men had been to blame, but after some argument, agreed that the conditions made the previous afternoon should be carried out to the letter, and that the final settlement of the question should be left to the Government. There is reason to believe that the khans resented the severity of the language used, but it was a moment for plain speaking, and in the heat of the exciting immediate events the khans themselves failed to realize what a disastrous situation would have been created for Persia had their men defeated the gendarmes. Their thoroughly correct attitude during the subsequent proceedings showed that, in calmer moments, they grasped the extreme gravity of the unfortunate affair.

As it appeared to M. Sabline and to myself that it was our duty to keep the Cabinet advised of the step we had deemed it desirable to take, we instructed Mr. Churchill and M. Lissovsky to call upon the president of the Council and the Minister of the Interior at the Shah's summer palace, where the Cabinet was assembled, to consider what action should be taken. Their visit was well-timed, because the members of the Cabinet were naturally somewhat perplexed as to which course to pursue. On the one side stood the powerful Bakhtiaris, who have recently done so much to establish the constitutional régime in Persia, and whose chieftains have occupied and are still holding some of the most important positions in the State; on the other side stood the Swedish gendarmerie instructors, who have already done such valuable work in restoring order, and thereby enabling the resources of the country to come in. It was most inexpedient, impolitic, and ungrateful to offend the one, whereas not to support the other meant undermining the foundations of the slender edifices on which so much hope has been placed for the future regeneration of Persia. A rebuff to the gendarmerie under the circumstances must have entailed the resignation of all the Swedish officers, and the total loss of all the money that has been spent during the last two years on an administration that gives fair promise of future success.

The Minister of the Interior showed great resentment that he had not been advised on the previous day of what the gendarmes proposed to do, but after considerable hesitation he accepted the explanation that there was no time to inform his Highness of what had occurred after the gendarmes had been fired upon by the Bakhtiaris. Any hesitation at such a moment would have spread dismay in the ranks of the gendarmes, and a disaster with most far-reaching consequences might have resulted. Ain-ed-Dowleh still grumbled about the indifference to their official superiors shown on this and many previous occasions by the Swedish officers, but when his Highness understood that the two legations considered that the gendarmerie must be supported, he changed his attitude, and agreed that this most recent incident had proved conclusively that it constituted a danger to peace and order for armed men to ride and walk about the streets of Tehran, when not on duty. It is perhaps not surprising that the tone of the Cabinet was hostile to the gendarmes, when the two Oriental secretaries reached the palace, but after the opinion of the two legations was known, a more statesmanlike view was taken of the situation.

The Prime Minister called upon me on the following afternoon and expressed himself as extremely apprehensive of what might happen. His Highness appeared much perturbed about threats made by the Bakhtiari khans of leaving Tehran with all their men, one of the most influential of them having declared that he would become a brigand and highway robber. I said that his Highness must not pay too much heed to threats uttered at a moment when the warlike khans must necessarily be very sore at an incident which had resulted in the framing of a condition that no Bakhtiari, when off duty, could any longer carry arms in the streets of Tehran. I pointed out that such a condition, however necessary they might feel it to be, could not be other than galling and humiliating to this proud tribe, but I expressed my conviction that when tempers got cooler the khans would regret words spoken in haste, and that it would be found that they would be quite as ready as before to continue to render valuable service to the State. I added that I had asked them all to meet me at the house of Sardar Assad that very evening, and that I would keep him informed of what passed. Ala-es-Sultaneh replied that he too was due to go there directly after his visit to me, but that, as I was going, he would postpone his visit until the following day.

Occasion had been taken on the previous evening to impress upon the Swedish officers in the presence of the Cabinet that they must not forget that they are servants of the Crown, and that they must observe the outward forms of a proper subserviency to the Minister from whom they depend. I called on Colonel Hjalmarson after seeing Ala-es-Sultaneh, and explained to him that it appeared to me that the only way of ensuring the success of the gendarmerie was for the instructors to consult and concert with the local authorities. The colonel expressed his agreement with this view.

I had previously arranged with M. Sabline that I would call upon the Bakhtiari khans alone, but what I proposed to say to them had his full concurrence. Upon my arrival at Sardar Assad's country house, I found the Sardar himself with Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Sardar Mohtashem, and Sardar Bahadur. The opening stages of the conversation were not easy, because the chieftains were clearly still much incensed about what had occurred, and resented bitterly the humiliation which they felt they were suffering. Each in turn endeavoured to show that the gendarmes, and not the Bakhtiaris had been in the wrong. I explained what had occurred, as it had been reported to me, and made them understand that the question of right or wrong was not the vital one. What was clear was that the Bakhtiaris had opposed the official representatives of order in the execution of their duty, that most regettable loss of life had ensued, and that it appeared to me almost a miracle that more valuable lives had not been sacrificed in a foolish fratricidal affray between Persians. This incident, following upon previous ones, and the generally truculent attitude of their horsemen, which amounted not infrequently to insolence and menace towards foreigners, had made it clear to me that the Bakhtiaris must no longer frequent the streets of the town armed. They had proved that they could not be trusted, and they must be punished. This embargo against carrying arms in the streets should apply to all and everyone, I added, and not to the Bakhtiaris alone.

After a somewhat lengthy, but entirely friendly conversation, Sardar Assad suddenly exclaimed "We will abide by what the British Minister tells us to do."

I at once answered that the matter had already received my serious consideration; that there was no need for me to assure them that, in arriving at the conclusion to which I had come, I had been influenced by my deep feelings of friendship for themselves, tempered by my conviction that the future or Persia depended in no small degree upon the success or failure of the gendarmerie scheme. I reminded them that I had warned them before through Samsam-es-Sultaneh that a repetition of the affrays between gendarmes and Bakhtiaris must inevitably result in the departure of the latter from Tehran. Now, after what has occurred, it seemed to me that they must agree that no Bakhtiaris, when off duty, should be seen armed in the streets; that their numbers in Tehran must be largely reduced; that the actual number should be fixed by the Government, and that it appeared to me immaterial whether they were 200 or 300; that those who remained should be formed into a regular regiment under their own officers, with one or more foreign instructors if considered desirable; that they should live in a barracks or caravanserai outside the town; that their arms should be kept in an armoury when not required for drill or parade; that until such time as the armoury was ready the rifles, &c., should be kept in the houses of the khans themselves, who would be held responsible that they were not used improperly; that each khan should be allowed to have a suitable armed escort to accompany his carriage or himself on horseback; that the Bakhtiaris in Tehran over and above the number fixed by the Government as necessary should return to their own country; that the

manner of their departure should be arranged subsequently, but that they must leave in small parties under the command of responsible khans; that they should be allowed to carry arms on the road since they would otherwise be at the mercy of their many enemies, but that the khans should go guarantee for their good behaviour.

I then said that they were probably aware that the Swedish officers considered that the ten men captured in the caravanserai should be shot as rebels, in accordance with military law. I added that my Russian colleague and I were of opinion—which had been confirmed by my Government—that these men should not be shot, but we considered that they should be suitably punished. On being asked what I considered would be a suitable punishment, I replied that I was not sufficiently conversant with Persian customs to commit myself to an opinion, but that it was a question that would be better settled when the excitement of the moment had settled down.

The khans at once declared their readiness to comply with the suggestions put forward, and sought my good offices to ensure the regular payment of the salaries of the men kept at Tehran. A perusal of the accompanying translation of the conditions finally drawn by the Cabinet, and accepted by the khans and the colonel commanding the gendarmerie, will serve to show that the former loyally abided by the assurances given me. They have been as loyal in the manner in which they carried out the disarmament of their men, and the first detachment of thirty Bakhtiaris duly left Tehran on Monday, the 18th instant, followed by second and third detachments at the intervals agreed upon. No mention is made in the agreement of the housing and payment of the 300 men left, but I understand that the necessary arrangements are being made.

Both the khans and the Cabinet realised how important it was that an agreement should be reached without loss of time. Telegraphic reports received from the provinces showed that no small effervescence had been caused at Ispahan, Yezd, Kerman, and in Bakhtiaristan by the receipt of the news of what had occurred at Tehran. Any delay might have created a most serious situation, as from the telegrams above referred it was evident that preparations were at once set on foot for taking reprisals on the gendarmes, and for despatching considerable bodies of men to Tehran. It may be hoped that all danger of further collisions at Tehran between the gendarmes and the Bakhtiaris has been averted, but there must continue to be some fear that incidents may occur in the provinces, unless the Swedish instructors exercise considerable tact. The Bakhtiari khans have repeatedly assured me how fully they realise the importance that the gendarmerie should succeed. I believe in the genuineness of their assurances, but it is too much to expect that the rank and file will readily forget an incident that has, in their opinion, humiliated a tribe that has of late years made itself all powerful, and furnished the only fighting force upon which the Government could rely.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 367.

Conditions drawn up by Persian Government.

(Traduction.)

A SA séance de la veille du 10 ramazan. 1331, en présence de MM. les Sardars Mohtachem et Bahadour et le Colonel Hjalmarson, le Conseil des Ministres a approuvé les dispositions suivantes:—

1. Cinq cent cinquante cavaliers bakhtiaris de la force actuelle de 850 rentreront dans leurs foyers, et le contingent stationné à Téhéran sera restreint au chiffre de 300.

2. Les détachements de Bakhtiaris quittant la capitale se composeront, chacun, de trente hommes au plus. Le premier groupe se mettra en marche le lundi 27 asad, et chaque unité subséquente de trente hommes partira une fois tous les deux jours, c'est-à-dire le 29 asad, le 31 et ainsi de suite. Ces détachements ne devront pas se concentrer dans une localité quelconque avant d'avoir rejoint leur tribu. Ils seront tenus de quitter Téhéran par la route de Hazraté Abdol Azim, et au moment de franchir la barrière un laisser-passer leur sera remis par les soins de la gendarmerie. Chaque Bakhtiari sortant de la capitale par cette voie portera au moins un fusil; il aura même le droit d'avoir avec lui d'autres armes. Leurs chefs s'engagent, cependant, à veiller à ce que les Bakhtiaris ne troublent pas en route la sécurité publique.

3. L'effectif de la cavalerie bakhtiari à Téhéran ne dépassera pas le chiffre de 300, à

moins que le Conseil des Ministres n'en décide autrement. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement édictait l'augmentation du nombre de ces cavaliers, cette décision devra être signalée, au préalable, par l'entremise du Ministère de l'Intérieur à l'Administration de la Gendarmerie. Les armes et les cartouches des cavaliers bakhtiaris seront déposées et mises sous clef chez leurs Excellences Samsam-es-Saltaneh, Sardaré Mohtachem et Sardaré Bahadour dans un délai expirant le jeudi 23 asad, et leurs Excellences s'engagent personnellement à ne point remettre lesdites armes aux Bakhtiaris ou autres sans l'autorisation du Conseil des Ministres Dans le cas où le Conseil décidait à faire remettre aux Bakhtiaris les armes précitées, cette résolution sera communiquée d'avance par les soins du Ministère de l'Intérieur aux Services de la Gendarmerie et de la Police. Le port d'armes en ville et dehors de la ville est en général interdit, à moins que les Bakhtiaris ne soient envoyés en mission par ordre du Conseil des Ministres, et dans pareille éventualité la mission qui leur serait confiée sera préalablement notifiée à la gendarmerie par le canal du Ministère de l'Intérieur. Les chefs bakhtiaris disposeront en tout de vingt-cinq cavaliers armés, qui leur serviront d'escortes, et chaque khan n'aura pas plus de quatre cavaliers armés à sa suite. La gendarmerie et la police auront le droit de confisquer les armes portées par des Bakhtiaris autres que les escortes susmentionnées.

4. Dans le cas où les agents de police ou les gendarmes, soit en ville, soit en dehors de l'enceinte de la ville, se trouvaient obligés de réprimer un désordre quelconque, les Bakhtiaris n'auront pas à intervenir, même s'il s'agissait de leurs camarades.

5. Si la gendarmerie et la police se procuraient la certitude que les chefs bakhtiaris ou leurs cavaliers agissaient contrairement aux stipulations des articles 1er, 2 et 3 ci-dessus, le service de la gendarmerie aura le droit de contrôler lui-même le dépôt des armes en question.

[43229] No. 368.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 186. Very Confidential.)

Tehran, August 26, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE dealt in a preceding despatch at considerable length with the unfortunate affray between gendarmes and Bakhtiaris that occurred in Tehran on the 7th instant. The incident may, I hope, be considered as closed, but it has served to reveal a spirit among a large majority of the Swedish instructors of the gendarmerie that has seriously shaken my faith in their ability to successfully carry out the task entrusted to them. I do not refer to their military capabilities, since it would appear to be the opinion of military experts that the disposition of their forces was well considered and skilfully executed. I refer to their lack of appreciation of the political exigencies of the situation, exigencies which it is essential that officers placed in their position should constantly bear in mind, if their mission is to be successful.

By not informing the Minister of the Interior they gave a proof, of which, I am sorry to say, previous examples are not wanting, of their disregard for the Persian authorities from whom they should nominally take their orders. One good purpose was served by their action in this manner: it gave a fresh excuse for impressing upon the colonel commanding that success in Persia can only be achieved if at least a pretence is made of concerting with the Persian officials to whom they are answerable. Their neglect to do this gave Ain-ed-Dowleh an excuse for complaining of their want of deference towards himself, and of arguing therefrom that it merely proved once more that foreigners are quite useless in Persia, as they do not understand the country, and blunder into incidents that might have been easily avoided had recourse been had to the proper channel. It is more than probable that this is true, but had the affray of the 7th August not occurred, it would have only meant a postponement, as it had long been clear that a collision at some time or another was unavoidable.

Whilst Ain-ed-Dowleh thus got a grievance against the Swedes, he at the same time was able to outwardly clear himself of any suspicion of having had a hand in the stirring up of ill-feeling between the two parties. His Highness played this advantage up in the Cabinet Council, when he saw that the result of what had occurred must be the reduction of the Bakhtiari forces in Tehran, and resigned rather than be openly a party to an agreement which inflicted a bitter humiliation on his hated enemies. Such action on his part would not appear to have hoodwinked the Bakhtiari khans, as they accuse him of having employed agents in the gendarmerie ranks to stir up

ill-feeling against the Bakhtiaris by disseminating stories of their hostility towards them. From information that has reached me, of which I am endeavouring to obtain confirmation, Ain-ed-Dowleh is credited with having a programme for the elimination of all foreigners from the Persian service, of which the first step was to be the expulsion of the Bakhtiaris from Tehran by means of the gendarmerie.

If the crafty old Prince really entertains any such designs he has succeeded beautifully in his initial move, but he has done so at the cost of raising serious doubts about his own connection with the affair, and of creating a state of friction between the gendarmerie and the powerful Bakhtiari tribe that may result in real danger for the future maintenance of good order.

The Bakhtiari khans assert that they harbour no feelings of resentment towards the Swedish instructors, because they are convinced that the trouble has been caused by the Persian officers hostile to themselves, who have joined the force for the sole purpose of fomenting discord. I am sorry to say that the language and attitude of the Swedish officers is much less reasonable. In spite of having gained a signal moral victory over the only military force in Persia—upon whom conditions of such a humiliating nature have been imposed that one can still hardly credit their acceptance—they are thoughtlessly outspoken in their expressions of annoyance that they were not allowed to what they are pleased to call "wipe out the Bakhtiaris." It is alarming that they do not appear to realise that, if actually stronger in Tehran, they are numerically and physically weaker in other parts of Persia, where the "wiping out" might easily be done by the other side. If they are going to tackle other tribesmen with whom they may find themselves in contact in the same spirit, there is grave doubt about the success of their mission.

It shakes one's confidence in foreign officers who have a most delicate task to perform to hear of them abusing their commanding officer, threatening not to renew their contracts if he remains, and vowing that they would not again march against the Bakhtiaris, if called upon to do so, because they are of opinion that a more severe blow should have been struck at a tribe whose chief was only a few months ago Prime Minister and which is friendly to the Government, providing the only military force upon which it can rely in time of trouble. It is, moreover, by no means certain that, had the affair been unfortunately fought to a finish, the gendarmes would have won. The two parties were about equal in numbers in Tehran, the Bakhtiaris are good marksmen, and the death of four or five Swedish officers would have meant the disappearance of the gendarmerie rank and file like early snow under a hot autumn sun. The situation would have been very different had the khans put themselves at the head of their men.

Colonel Hjalmarson himself showed a very true appreciation of the situation and acted with great firmness in face of the openly expressed opposition of his subordinate, or almost insubordinate, officers. That he was supported by some of the more reasonable ones is probable, but the majority certainly lost their heads and have continued to talk in a wild manner that does not reflect credit upon their common sense nor augur well for a possible future situation when they may find themselves in a minority as will be the case at Kerman should their hasty words have been repeated to the Bakhtiaris.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43231] No. 369.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 188. Secret.)

Tehran, August 30, 1913.

Sir,

SINCE the affray between the gendarmes and the Bakhtiaris that has formed the subject of preceding despatches, the question of British officers to instruct the Bakhtiaris has again been raised. It will be remembered that I reported in my despatch No. 231 of the 7th November, 1912, that Samsam-es-Sultaneh, at that time president of the Council, had expressed to me a wish that His Majesty's Government would furnish a certain number of officers whose duty it would be to organise and train a force of Bakhtiaris which he estimated at 10,000 men. He owns that he spoke on that occasion more particularly in his own name, although he felt confident that in doing so he was voicing the wish of all the khans. He now says that all his relations would welcome the advent of British military instructors in Bakhtiaristan, and would

also much like to see them take charge of the 300 men who are to remain at Tehran, although they realise that it might be difficult to arrange this.

It will be seen from a perusal of a despatch that goes to you, Sir, by this bag that the general political situation in Persia appears to me to be a very critical one, and that there is, unfortunately, some reason to fear a recrudescence of troubles in the south, whilst the recent incident at Tehran can hardly fail to produce no small amount of excitement among Bakhtiaris. There are evident signs that, for various reasons, Russian influence is growing apace at Ispahan, which may be looked upon to-day as a Bakhtiari stronghold. The Bakhtiari Governor-General, Vice-Governor, and their followers are daily made aware of the fact that Russia's word is law in Ispahan, and that the voice of the British consul-general, in strict observance of the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention, is no longer heard in a town in which British influence was predominant three or four years ago. From Ispahan to Ahwaz, viâ the Bakhtiari country, is not a far cry, and it would appear to me that, unless we speedily do something to prove to the Bakhtiaris and the rest of Persia that we are faithful to our ancient friendship for the tribesmen that can furnish the backbone of a strong natural barrier between North Persia and that part of the country in which British interests are still predominant, we shall find the wedge of Russian influence driven down to the Karun by peaceful penetration under arms, as my Russian colleague so aptly described the position in the province of Azerbaijan the other day. No effort is needed on the part of Russia. In scrupulous observance of our convention, we stand aside to-day from all inteference in Ispahan. Under the circumstances, no one can be surprised if the Bakhtiaris, on their return home from Tehran and Ispahan tell their brethren that the Russian is all-powerful in Persia to-day, and that the friendship of Great Britain, as a valuable asset, is a thing of the past.

The placing of the large properties of the Zil-es-Sultan under the management of the director of the Russian bank at Ispahan has doubtless been looked upon as a matter of small importance, and full credence has been given to the assurances of M. Poklewsky and others that the Russian Government took no part in the transaction. Whether this is true or not makes no difference; public opinion in Persia recognises in it a fresh Russian move southwards, and M. von Kaver, who has placed armed men on all the properties, has succeeded in resisting the claims of such an influential man as Samsam-es-Sultaneh to certain villages which he bought for a song from a man who possibly had but a shadowy claim to them. If M. von Kaver had not been a Russian he could not have resisted the claim of the former president of the Council. It is not known at Ispahan that the Russian Government disclaim all connection with the arrangement under which the Zil's lands were placed under Russian protection, but it is known that M. von Kaver is reported to have said that he was acting under the instructions of the legation. Perhaps he never said it; but people in Ispahan believe he did, a fact which speaks for itself.

Were it to be found desirable or feasible to lend the Bakhtiaris a few military officers much would be done, in my opinion, to calm down the ill-feeling towards the gendarmes which is bound to smoulder in the breasts of the Bakhtiaris for some time to come; the safety of the Bakhtiari road would be assured; and the task of the Swedes in Fars would be made easier if the turbulent factors in that province knew that a powerful and well-armed Bakhtiari force under British officers was in the near neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43232] No. 370.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 189.)

Tehran, September 1, 1913.

Sir,

FOR some time past His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz has made it apparent that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has ceased to co-operate energetically in the administration of the province, and has become obstructive in his attitude both towards the gendarmerie and to the financial agent. Major O'Connor would appear to entertain a belief founded upon reliable evidence that the Governor-General is proving himself more anxious to further his own personal interests than to genuinely seek to better the general condition of the province. His Excellency has also on various occasions nwohs lamentable vacillation and weakness, due it would appear in no small measure to a

certain unwillingness to take strong action against district governors who have paid handsomely for their appointments. This habit is so prevalent in Persia that it can scarcely be counted as a political offence on the part of a Governor-General, but when it is exercised in such a manner as to endanger the public order of the province, as has recently been the case at Abadeh, it becomes intolerable.

As long ago as last July Major O'Connor reported to me that the attitude of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh was becoming so unsatisfactory that he anticipated that the time was not far distant when he would be found impossible. I did not report the fact to you, Sir, at the time, partly because I hoped matters might improve, and partly because at the date of the departure of the last messenger I was not in possession of the views of Sir P. Cox upon the suitability of Kavam-ul-Mulk as a successor to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, should it be found desirable that the present Governor-General should no longer be supported. I have now the honour to transmit copies of telegrams dealing with this subject which I have received from Sir P. Cox, Major O'Connor, and Mr. Vice-Consul Smart, whose opinion I have sought, as he appeared to me well qualified from his recent sojourn at Shiraz to give views of no small value. I would also beg to recall your attention to the latter officer's despatch No. 9 of the 23rd May, 1912, that accompanied my despatch to you No. 134 of the 23rd June, 1912.

A perusal of this telegraphic correspondence will show that all the three above-mentioned officers are of opinion that under certain conditions Kavam-ul-Mulk would be the best person to succeed Mukhber-es-Sultaneh should his Excellency send in his resignation or adopt such an attitude as would make it undesirable for him to remain at Shiraz. It is also generally agreed that it is little short of impossible for Kavam to remain in Fars unless he is Governor-General, as his position in the province is such that it would be difficult for the Governor-General and him not to clash. On this point Mr. Smart raises a question that is deserving of careful attention. He points out that with Kavam out of the province there would be no one to assume the reins of Government either temporarily or permanently in the event of the sudden disappearance of the Governor-General. Sir P. Cox draws attention to the hereditary possibility of Kavam dying a violent death.

It would under present conditions be somewhat difficult to find a suitable post for Kavam outside Fars. The Russians would probably not care to have him at Ispahan, from which post it would be extremely difficult, however desirable it might be, to dislodge the Bakhtiari Governor-General. There would be less difficulty in displacing the Bakhtiari at Kerman, the only other post that offers itself, but after what has recently happened in connection with the gendarmerie incident, it would not, I think, be politic on our part to take any action which might be considered unfriendly by the Bakhtiaris. The difference between the two alternative methods of securing Kavam's appointment put forward by Sir P. Cox are more apparent than real, as things stand to-day in Persia, and whether we supported the candidature or not, the mere fact of his getting the appointment would be generally taken to mean that it had our support. Should the vacancy occur, the Persian Government would certainly seek to ascertain who would be agreeable to us. Any hesitation on our part to give an opinion would be taken to signify that we were not in favour of any candidate, and we might consequently find ourselves confronted with the nomination of an unsuitable person.

Further, should Mukhber-us-Sultaneh disappear, I can think of no one among the public men available in Tehran in whom I should have the slightest confidence. I do not think that it would be necessary to make any outward display of supporting the candidature of Kavam, and it would be most desirable that the question should be so handled that the proposal should come from the Persian Government, but in the event of his being appointed it would, I think, be good policy to back him somewhat strongly, in order that he might feel that he could count upon our support during good behaviour and that it might be generally understood in the province that he must rely upon us. Major O'Connor appears to have formed a high opinion of his capabilities, and he has certainly recently done really good work in restoring some show of order among the Arab tribes. Mr. Smart, too, speaks in warm terms of the work that Kavam did during the months in which he acted as Governor-General. It is, perhaps, doubtful whether too much reliance can be placed upon Kavam were he once in power to support the gendarmerie and the financial administration, but he would appear to have satisfied Major O'Connor that he would do so, and that officer is well aware that in the earlier days of the gendarmerie the Swedish instructors bitterly accused Kavam of systematically opposing the scheme. It is, perhaps, not very desirable that any change should be made, unless Mukhber-es-Sultaneh proves himself more intractable than has so far been the case, but should it be found that a change must be made, I am of

opinion that the appointment of Kavam would be preferable to that of any one else. It should be possible to gauge pretty correctly what the situation is likely to become with him as Governor-General, whereas with an untried man from Tehran we should have to wait some months before seeing much result. Moreover, it is far from probable that anyone of any position here would be found to accept the position of semi-tutelage that exists at Shiraz to-day.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 370.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) *Shiraz, July* 24, 1913.

QUESTION of Kavam.

I think that the time is approaching when present Governor-General will become impossible. He is behaving very foolishly and instead of doing his best to assist administration of country he is passively obstructive and is constantly intriguing and trying to make money. Question is who could replace him if he goes, and this question becomes increasingly difficult to answer as Kavam's influence increases. Kavam himself will be back in a few days and it is very desirable that we should try to formulate some definite policy regarding him.

As I have remarked before his position here at present is an anomaly and is incompatible with the principles of proper system of administration; and in view of his greatly enhanced power and prestige this anomaly has become more strongly emphasised than ever. The fact is he is now so powerful that it seems to me to be a question of his being either Governor-General, or nothing. The latter alternative presenting serious difficulties I venture to submit the following reflections on the former alternative for your Excellency's consideration.

Kavam's interests, in contradistinction to those of an ordinary Governor-General from Tehran, are bound up in Fars.

Upon the state of order of the province depend his revenue and security of his vast properties, and also extent of his authority over Khamseh tribes. He knows by long and bitter experience that there is no certainty that order will be preserved under ordinary Governor-General and also that he is not strong enough to govern the country himself and to maintain his position against his numerous powerful enemies and rivals without support. It would seem, therefore, first, that establishment of good and stable government is all in his own interest, and secondly, that if he were made Governor-General he would have to rely upon some support. This support as it seems to me would be afforded, firstly, by our backing, and secondly, by gendarmerie. Restriction of the latter's sphere of operations to the main road would at once afford basis of security whose influence would ramify over the whole province and would at the same time interpose effective barrier between the Khamseh and Kashgai tribes without in any way interfering with Kavam's authority over the rest of the province. This, together with the small regular force under a European officer would, I think, be amply sufficient to afford Kavam necessary material for power and to keep Kashgais quiet.

(More follows).

Enclosure 2 in No. 370.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) *Shiraz, July* 24, 1913.

CONTINUATION of my No. 260.

My personal experience of Kavam is very favourable, and I have formed good opinion of his strength of character and common sense, in which respects he is far superior to present Governor-General. I am convinced that if he once understood that he had our backing he would willingly undertake to support gendarmerie and Stas. Under these circumstances he would, I think, make an excellent Governor-General, and this is the sole solution which I can see which presents any prospects of stability for affairs of Southern Persia and which can settle vexed question of Kavam himself.

There are certain obvious objections—as, indeed, there are to most positive plans of action. First is that Kavam would in course of time become exceedingly powerful, and would be practically irremovable—at any rate, by the Persian Government. Question to consider is whether this state of things would not suit our policy better than the present conditions of change and uncertainty. Strong semi-independent Governor-General in Fars, who was under our influence and owed position to us, would probably prove the best solution of our difficulties here, and would present the strongest natural barrier to encroachments from the north, and should avert indefinitely necessity for our armed intervention.

Second objection is question of rivalry between Khamseh and Kashgais. Kashgais as a tribe entertain no hostility to Kavam, and in any case they are so divided by internal dissensions and feuds that their opposition could not be very serious. Ilkhani, whoever he may be, could not oppose Kavam if the latter was backed by us and the gendarmerie, and he would have to accept the situation whether he liked it or not.

I am not making formal proposal, but am merely submitting these reflections for your Excellency's consideration. Natural development of situation will probably necessitate our adopting some definite line of policy in Fars before long, and it seems advisable to consider beforehand the possible alternatives.

Enclosure 3 in No. 370.

Sir W. Townley to Major O'Connor.

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 25, 1913.

I THINK that you should repeat your telegrams Nos. 260 and 261 to Bushire for the Resident's information, as the question raised therein is one of the greatest importance, since the nomination of Kavam as Governor-General would practically mean the creation of our own strong man in Fars. I am personally favourably disposed to such an arrangement, but before taking any action in the direction of its accomplishment I should like to be in possession of the views of all those who are best able to express an opinion, in order that, in the event of all being agreed upon the desirability of the appointment, I can lay it before Sir E. Grey in an authoritative manner and seek his sanction to press it on the Persian Government.

If you think that Kavam would agree to work with Stas and the gendarmes, he would be, I think, the best man for the post, but I do not wish to give a definite opinion until I have heard the views of other authorities, because to associate ourselves with him in such a manner would be to reverse our former policy, as it has been explained to me, of not committing ourselves to any local leader. The circumstances are, however, peculiar, and if we could rely upon Kavam not playing us false, it might be politic to create a man who would know that he was dependent upon our support.

Please repeat this also to Bushire.

Enclosure 4 in No. 370.

Sir W. Townley to Acting Consul Smart.

(No. 37. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, July* 25, 1913.

O'CONNOR telegraphs that Mukhber is becoming impossible, and is obstructing administration. I am not surprised at this, and only wonder that he has held his hand so long. Mukhber has also sent in his resignation on the ground that the interference of the gendarmerie and the financial agent make it impossible to continue. His resignation has not been accepted, but it is clear that unless we make larger concessions to his so-called *amour-propre* than would suit us, it will be impossible to keep him much longer.

O'Connor, in a long telegram in which he weighs all the pros and cons, finally decides very strongly in favour of Kavam, who by his recent military successes has made himself a very strong position, such as would render his presence at Shiraz almost unbearable for a Governor-General. I am rather taken with the idea, as I think the time has come when we want our own strong man in Fars, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it would be an almost impossible job to displace him once he became Governor-General. I should much value an expression of your views.

Enclosure 5 in No. 370.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tabriz, July 26, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 37.

For some aspects of the Kavam question please see my despatch at end of May, 1912, from Shiraz.

The following further observations are submitted with all the diffidence of one now far from the centre of Persian politics and Fars.

Appointment of Kavam would make him so strong that if he obstructed the gendarmerie or the financial agent, his obstruction would be more formidable than that of ephemeral Governors from Tehran. Local ties must influence his policy, often disadvantageously. We should be accepting grave responsibility *vis-à-vis* Central Government, which would lose prestige in South Persia, and perhaps be helpless against Kavam if we failed to control him. On the other hand, appointment of Kavam has great possibilities. If successful, it would settle Kavami question which has been the perpetual cause of unrest. Kavam has better chance of restoring order than almost any Governor from Tehran. He is not like the Sheikh and most tribal chiefs in Persia, who depend on the fickle support of their own tribesmen. He is not a tribesman, and his influence is deep-rooted among the settled population and all the conflicting tribes. If by our vigorous support he could recover his former power and, as Governor-General, impose it on the whole province, a Kavami Fars and Bakhtiari, between whom an alliance under our auspices should almost naturally follow, might constitute effective barrier against the southward penetration of Russian influence, and consolidate our position in Southern Persia. Such an alliance would also provide, probably, only chance of reducing Kuhgelmi.

Kavam, if treated courteously, is very amenable, and if we gave him assurances, such as indicated in my despatch above mentioned, British consul at Shiraz would have powerful lever, and should be able to keep him in order, for Kavam, in view of his sad experiences in the past, would not lightly risk loss of assured position under our protection.

Appointment of Kavam would cause Sheikh much anxiety, but it should not be impossible to unite both with the Bakhtiari for our establishment in Fars through the Kavam administration would put into our hands the means we do not now possess of coercing the Bakhtiari. I am inclined to think that, if Mukhber is to go, it would be better to risk the Kavam experiment than that of sending another probably ineffectual Governor from Tehran.

Enclosure 6 in No. 370.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 347.)
(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, August 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 198 to Shiraz.

Since receipt my time has been cut up by absence. The suggestion regarding Kavam seems to involve two alternatives of widely different significance.

1. To let Kavam become Governor-General automatically if he can, and just give him the friendly support that we ordinarily give a Governor as long as he is friendly to our interests and can hold his own; as, for instance, the legation at my recommendation have given successively to Darya Begi and Movagger-ed-Dowleh. This support, however, does not extend to interference in the ultimate liberty of action of the Persian Government or ourselves.

The other alternative is to arrange his appointment actively, and in him, to use your Excellency's own words, to create our own strong man in Fars.

In the former case, I do not think any appreciable change of principle on our part would be involved, and we could support Kavam as Governor-General as we have done Mukhber as long as he co-operated with us and endeavoured to rise seriously to his responsibilities. He might do very well for two or three years, and if he then fell out with the Central Government but was satisfactory to us we should have still a free hand to intervene and, if necessary, help him on as our own nominee. I think, however, that we all agree in thinking, once installed as Governor-General he is not

likely to be easily ousted; in fact, as O'Connor suggests, the danger is that he might become so powerful that it would be impossible for the Persian Government to turn him out, or for us to do so without active intervention. Secondly, it is problematical whether his co-operation with Stas and gendarmerie would continue after he was once fairly established.

As regards second alternative, if we do not tie him up with a specific agreement the objections are the same as in the case of first alternative. If we do tie him up, he will naturally expect reciprocal undertakings on our part, such as some guarantee of protection for his property and family. It would be very difficult for us to make good this, and equally difficult for us to enforce to the full his engagements to us. We should have also to be prepared to maintain him in his place in spite of the Persian Government, if necessary. If such a compact were made known to Persia she would doubtless object to it as an encroachment on her sovereignty, and in any case the Russian Government, who would have to be informed, would probably object to it also as being incompatible with our equality of position in the neutral zone.

Incidentally it would appear, having regard to fact that the Kavam's father and brother both died violent deaths in connection with the province of Fars, we cannot altogether dismiss the contingency that the same fate may at any time overtake him. If this should happen and he left no more promising successor than the Nasr-ed-Dowleh our future interests in Fars would be placed in an unfavourable position.

On the whole it seems to me that prospective objections outweigh the present attractions of the suggestion, and that if the province is to maintain itself in its present status as a part of the neutral zone, its hope of salvation seems to lie in discovery of exotic and reasonably amenable Governor-Generals whom we must back with sufficient money and force to make them gradually independent of political factions in the province. I fully agree that if Kavam is not to be appointed Governor-General we must get him out of the province, but in that contingency it could probably be arranged for him, as before, to be appointed to Kerman.

As regards other interests which might be affected by Kavam's appointment as Governor-General of Fars, the measure would, of course, not be welcomed by the Sheikh of Mohammerah in view of his association with Nizam-es-Sultaneh, but I do not regard this as a serious difficulty. The present Governor of Bushire, on the other hand, would, of course, welcome it, and the two might be depended upon to co-operate. The views expressed above are based on supposition that the neutral zone remain unchanged. If the status of the latter were to be altered in our favour as a feature of some such division as that outlined in your despatch No. 64, Confidential, dated 17th March, 1913, to the Foreign Office, and if we thereby should gain full control in the province, then I think that the Kavam's appointment would be an excellent one.

(Repeated to Shiraz and posted to India.)

Enclosure 7 in No. 370.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 290.)
(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, August 17, 1913.

PLEASE refer to Bushire telegram 347.

Crux of the matter, I think, is question whether Kavam can be removed from Fars. Cox expressed his entire agreement with me in thinking that his continued presence in Fars in any other capacity than that of Governor-General is undesirable. But I understand from previous communications from your Excellency that question of providing for him elsewhere presents great difficulties. If then we assume that he remains on in Fars the question of his status must arise sooner or later. Presuming that no change takes place in the general political situation his appointment might be arranged under the conditions outlined in Sir P. Cox's first alternative and situation should present no great difficulties. Should the course of events in Persia lead us eventually to contemplate conditions of the second alternative the question could be considered afresh in the light of altered circumstances. In either case it seems to me that by accepting Kavam as our strong man in Fars we should have laid the basis of policy presenting better prospects of stability and continuity than exist at present. The present danger is that change of Governors might involve appointment of unsuitable man and in that event Fars would speedily relapse into anarchy. Mukhber with all his faults has succeeded in temporarily conciliating hostile factions and is on good terms

with Kavam. But the whole situation is most unstable and it would not take much to upset it. Whereas Kavam with our backing and supported by the gendarmerie could, I think, easily hold his own.

In spite of certain obvious objections therefore I think suggestion is worth careful consideration. Events of the next few months will probably compel decision one way or the other.

(Repeated Bushire.)

[43233] No. 371.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 190. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, September* 2, 1913.

THE Treasurer-General has communicated to me a copy of a request that he has addressed to the Minister of Finance asking for the engagement of eighty-two Belgian officials to complete the staff necessary for the proper execution of the financial administration which has now been established. M. Mornard points out that this is no hurried scheme, and that he has spent more than a year and a half since he assumed the duties of Treasurer-General carefully examining the requirements of the admininstration of which he is the head. He shows that he commenced with the assistance of the customs officials already in Persia, and that the strength of the combined staff has only been increased by fourteen persons during the last year.

M. Mornard represents that with the quite insufficient staff at his disposal the land tax, Crown lands, excise, and various other taxes have produced over 1,000,000*l.* out of financial chaos in the first year, and he argues that each new official will produce an increase of revenue ten times larger than his salary during the first three years of his engagement, and twenty times its value during the second three years, when he will have gained experience. M. Mornard also points out that, although eighty-two new officials, who are to be engaged during the next twelve to fifteen months, may appear a large number, they are not really many when it is taken into consideration that they are to be scattered over a country three times larger than France. The estimated annual cost to the Exchequer on account of the eighty-two new recruits is put at 200,000 tomans (about 36,000*l.*).

There can be no doubt that if the present financial scheme is to meet with any measure of genuine success the Treasury staff must be largely augmented, and one cannot but admire the courage with which M. Mornard boldly sets himself to seek the sanction of this large but very necessary increase of the staff under his orders in face of the thousand and one difficulties that meet him on every side. He is well aware of the open hostility of the Persian officials towards himself, and secretly towards his whole scheme for increasing the financial resources of the country, a scheme which cannot but conflict with the personal interests of every single Minister and official, whose sole object is to make as much money as possible out of the country, without bothering their heads whether such action on their part is calculated to bring about the downfall of the nation or not.

M. Mornard makes light of Persian opposition, and feels confident that he can save the finances of Persia, in spite of the Persians themselves, if he can count upon the support of the British and Russian Governments. Facts force him to ask himself if he can do so, in spite of the official assurances that he has received from time to time. He had reason in the past to complain of the attitude of British officials in the south, who seemed disposed to thwart, rather than to facilitate, his earlier efforts. He would appear to have cause to hope that a better understanding has now been reached in the south between the British and Belgian officials, but such is far from being the case in the north, where his financial agents find themselves in constant collision with the Russian consular authorities, who support the many Russian-protected persons who abound in the northern sphere in their refusal to pay taxes, and in various other ways impede the work of M. Mornard's subordinates. In Meshed and Khorassan alone there has been no cause for complaint of the action of the Russian authorities.

It may be well, without wearying you, Sir, by going into details about the various places in the Russian zone where the Belgian officials and the Russian consuls are at variance, to cite the case of Tabriz. Both Mr. Cowan and Mr. Smart, who have successively been in charge of His Majesty's consulate in the capital of Azerbaijan, have spoken in eulogistic terms of the good work done by the Belgian officials, the latter

officer writing of them as the only servants of the Persian Government who do their duty loyally and conscientiously. The Russian Legation regards the manner in which this work is done so differently that the transfer of the financial agent to some other place has been officially demanded, under orders from St. Petersburgh.

The opposition to M. Mornard's administration is indeed so constant and systematic on the part of Russian officials in North Persia that one reluctantly asks oneself whether it can be possible that the Russian Government does not want to see the finances of the country put in order, or whether the Russian consuls are the most insubordinate lot of officials imaginable. It should not be understood that the consent of the two Governments is as yet being sought for the engagement of the new officials. The proposal is only so far in the nature of a project that has been laid before the Persian Government for its approval, but I am of opinion that it is worthy of our fullest support, even in the face of the fact that the political situation is by no means reassuring at the present moment.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43234] No. 372.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 191.)

Sir, *Tehran, September* 3, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 372.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending September 3, 1913.

Tehran.

Diplomatic Body.—M. de Romero Dusmet, the first Spanish representative at Tehran, who up till now has held the rank of Chargé d'Affaires, presented his credentials as Spanish Minister on the 20th August.

Bakhtiaris and Gendarmerie.—Hostilities broke out at Tehran on the 7th August between the Bakhtiaris and gendarmes, led by their Swedish officers. During the afternoon skirmishing took place in the streets and a number of men were killed and wounded on both sides. Ten Bakhtiaris were taken prisoners by the gendarmes and are still in custody. The British and Russian legations took joint action the next morning, and matters were eventually arranged as reported fully in a separate despatch.

The Cabinet.—On the 16th August, Ain-ed-Dowleh informed the Oriental Secretary that he had definitely resigned the post of Minister of the Interior owing to disagreement with two of his colleagues, namely, Kavam-es-Sultaneh and Mostashar-ed-Dowleh. The resulting situation formed the subject of an exchange of views between His Majesty's Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, but no satisfactory solution of the difficulty has yet been found.

The Regent.—A telegram was received from the Regent on the 27th August saying that he would leave Vienna on the 10th September and arrive at Enzeli on the 15th.

Fire at the Ministry of the Interior.—On the night of the 18th August a fire broke out at the Ministry of the Interior, in the precincts of the Shah's Palace at Tehran. The Swedish officers quickly brought their gendarmes and prevented the spread of the conflagration to the adjoining Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other buildings, but the fire was not completely extinguished until 3 A.M. the next morning, having entirely destroyed one of the most important buildings of the palace and practically all the archives of the Ministry of the Interior. Incendiarism is strongly suspected.

"Times" Correspondent.—The Honourable A. Keppel arrived at Tehran on the 18th August.

Salar-ed-Dowleh.—News of Salar-ed-Dowleh's surrender to the Russian consulate at Kermanshah reached Tehran on the 28th August.

I have, &c.
G. P. CHURCHILL,
Oriental Secretary.

Resht.

M. Ovseenko took over the duties of Russian Consul-General on the 2nd August from M. Necrassof, who left for Russia on the following day.

On the 6th August, on the arrival of Namak Bey, the new Turkish consular representative, the consulate was raised to the status of a consulate-general.

Kazvin.

It is reported that the Russian authorities intend constructing barracks at Kazvin for the accommodation of their troops.

Meshed.

No serious robberies have been reported during the past month on any of the principal roads in Khorassan other than the looting of a valuable caravan on the road between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari at the commencement of last month.

Negotiations between the Russian Bank and the Rais-u-Tujjar, the present holder of the concession for the Meshed–Askhabad road, have resulted in the latter agreeing to give up his concession in return for 15 per cent. of the profits of the new road. Two Russian engineers, who arrived recently from Askhabad, have commenced work on the inspection of the section between Kuchan and Darragaz.

Ispahan.

Although the holding up of small caravans and of travellers still continues, there has been an increase in the traffic on the main caravan routes of late. Also, owing to the action taken by the local authorities against the Seichani gang, the condition of the environs, though still far from satisfactory, has improved.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that there are no signs of any diminution in the number of the "bank notes" issued by the three local firms, as reported in last month's summary. After repeated representations on his part, the local authorities informed him that they could take no action until they received instructions from Tehran, as the Imperial Bank had had the matter referred to the Central Government.

The state of affairs in the Sultanabad and Kashan districts appears to be much the same as reported in last month's summary.

Shiraz.

The general improvement in the condition of the province continues. Revenue is coming in well; the main roads are, as a rule, open to traffic; and trade between Shiraz and the outlying districts in Eastern Fars, which has been at a standstill for so long, is reviving. Traffic on the Ispahan road is comparatively small, owing to the presence of robbers about Abadeh and Yezdikhast; but, as fifty mounted gendarmes have been sent from Shiraz to patrol this section, an improvement may be expected in the near future.

The culprit Kaferidum, who made his escape after having been brought to the gate of the consulate, as reported in last month's summary, has been recaptured by order of Sowlet-ed-Dowleh and handed over to the Governor-General.

The party sent out in pursuit of the twelve men of the gendarmerie who deserted on the night of the 31st July, returned to Shiraz on the 7th August and reported that the deserters had taken refuge with Mohammed Khan Kashkuli, and that he refused to hand them over.

Seistan.

The Sarhad, Seistan, and the Kainat have been overrun by parties of Baluchis for the past month or so. Several of these parties appear to be concentrating in the

Sarhad with a view to making an expedition into Narmashir, while a "lashkar" of about 500 tribesmen, after raiding some villages north of Birjand and carrying off a large number of camels and sheep, is reported to be moving towards Kerman. In addition to these Baluch "lashkars," a party of fifty Afghans, escorting an arms caravan, is reported to have looted a large caravan near Kuh-i-Malik Siah, and to have robbed and ill-treated postal sowars and telegraph gholams.

An incident occurred last month which may possibly lead to the exodus of the Gurgis, a tribe of Sunni Baluchis, into Afghanistan. This tribe, which owns villages in both Afghan and Persian Seistan, owing to a long-standing grievance in connection with the handing over of one of their villages to a Shiah tribe some two years ago, seized the village in question by force and killed the headman and some of the inhabitants. The local authorities sent a force of 700 men against the Gurgis, and in the fight which ensued, the Gurgis, who seemed to have run out of ammunition, fled into Afghanistan after having inflicted some loss on the Government troops.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh came into the town on the 27th August and took bast in the Russian consulate. Negotiations are in progress with a view to bringing the Prince to Tehran in order to settle the questions relating to his property, pension, and future residence.

I have, &c.
W. M. FORDHAM, *Major,*
Military Attaché.

[43235] No. 373.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 192.)

Sir, *Tehran, September 2, 1913.*

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH, as I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 296 of the 28th ultimo, is in "bast" in the Russian consulate at Kermanshah, whither he was escorted with some show by a Russian officer of the Persian Cossacks, a representative of the Russian consul, and a delegate from the Governor-General who was away in camp. There is reason to hope that the question will be now settled once and for all, although it would appear clear that the Russian consul, and possibly the officer commanding the Cossacks, have given assurances that are unacceptable, both to the Persian Government and to the Russian Legation. M. Sabline is of opinion that Salar should be given a pension, have his sequestrated lands restored to him, and go to Europe without coming to Tehran. The Russian consul would appear to have promised him the governorship of a province, but M. Sabline argues that a man who has taken "bast" is no longer in a position to make conditions, and must accept the terms made for him by the country under whose flag he has taken sanctuary.

The Governor-General of Kermanshah has approached me through His Majesty's consul with the evident intention of seeking my support to secure Salar an appointment as Governor of Zenjan. I have replied that the Prince refused our good offices some time ago when they were offered in conjunction with Russia, that the matter is now in the hands of the Russian Legation, and that he will have to accept the conditions made for him.

I understand that the consulate is closely guarded by Cossacks, and that orders have been issued to shoot Salar, should he endeavour to escape.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43236] No. 374.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 193. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tehran, September 2, 1913.*

THE present political situation is such as to cause serious anxiety for what may happen in the future. The Cabinet under the presidency of Ala-es-Sultaneh may be

said to no longer exist. The Cabinet Councils are attended by only one or two Ministers of small importance, and by the Under-Secretaries who represent the several Departments of State. It is needless to add that under such circumstances no work is done. As you are aware, Sir, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and War are away in Europe; there has long been no Minister of Justice or of Public Instruction, whilst Ain-ed-Dowleh, whose resignation of the portfolio of the Interior has not been accepted, considers himself out of office and refuses to attend the Cabinet Councils, where he is represented by Cherif-ed-Dowleh, until recently Foreign Office Agent at Tabriz, where his determined stand against Russian encroachments by means of land purchases which he refused to legalise, has won for him Russian resentment.

Ala-es-Sultaneh is quite unable to fill up the empty places round the Cabinet table, and his hesitation to decide between Ain-ed-Dowleh and Kavam-es-Sultaneh serves to add fuel to the fierce battle of intrigue that is being hotly waged. Ain-ed-Dowleh has declared publicly that he can no longer continue in the same Cabinet with men such as Kavam-es-Sultaneh and Mustashar-ed-Dowleh, whom he stigmatises as "munshis," the humble rank that they occupied in former days when his Highness was Sadr Azam, during the reign of the late Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah. Were the quarrel to concern only Ain-ed-Dowleh and the two Ministers above-mentioned, it could soon be arranged by the disappearance of the two latter, but unfortunately Kavam's withdrawal would also necessitate that of his brother Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs; indeed, Ain-ed-Dowleh has stated that the two brothers are equally objectionable to him. The Russian Government consider Vossugh-ed-Dowleh an especially useful Minister for Foreign Affairs, and are unwilling that he should leave the Cabinet.

Although notoriously corrupt and not renowned for truthfulness, Vossugh-ed-Dowleh is a very clever man, and a most agreeable Minister for Foreign Affairs with whom it is possible to do business pleasantly, but it is very doubtful if it is good policy on Russia's part to insist upon his retention in office at the present moment. Although it is unlikely that Vossugh-ed-Dowleh is at heart such a servant of Russia as is generally believed, circumstances have placed him on various occasions in the position of appearing as a Russian tool, and he has acquired this very unpopular reputation among the general Persian public. His Excellency will certainly have some awkward questions to answer when the Medjliss meets, and it is hard to see how he can risk his political future by doing much more for Russia. The truth is that Vossugh-ed-Dowleh is a somewhat weak man, and finds it much pleasanter to say the nice thing and consent to the requests of foreign representatives rather than to refuse, although he often knows full well that the Cabinet will not sanction the assurance given, and that he will be able to make his colleagues appear responsible for the refusal to carry out a promise, in the giving of which he has acquired a cheap popularity in some legation or other.

I have not been able to ascertain that Ain-ed-Dowleh is bestirring himself much to secure the withdrawal of his opponents from the Cabinet, but proof is not wanting that Kavam-es-Sultaneh and his followers are working hard on their side. Money is being spent freely in the campaign, in order to enlist the clergy against Ain-ed-Dowleh. It is also probable that considerable influence has been brought to bear on the Regent, who is jealous of Ain-ed-Dowleh's name and prestige, to persuade him to oppose the old Prince.

There is in reality much more in the struggle than the mere personal question which it appears on the surface. Ain-ed-Dowleh stands for the old school of politicians who believe that Persia can be best governed by the old system of personal influence, modified so as to suit the modern requirements of the situation. The younger school, as represented by the opposing party, would not appear to have any very definite scheme of government. Past experience seems to show that they are chiefly occupied in filling their own pockets at the country's expense, whilst currying favour with the foreign elements by not opposing the increase of the European administrations. The older school frankly believe that foreigners, be they gendarmerie officers or financial agents, can do no good in Persia; hence no small amount of opposition must be expected from them. But men like Ain-ed-Dowleh are capable of making their influence felt far away from Tehran, and under present conditions they can be coerced by friendly pressure into giving the necessary support in the provinces to the European institutions upon which we must rely for some improvement in the social and financial conditions of the country. Even though in their hearts they may disapprove of the importation of European methods, and may perhaps genuinely believe that Persia would be better governed and more prosperous without them, the old school are not

so blind to the changed circumstances of the country that they do not realise that the foreigner has come to stay, at least until Persia has learned to govern herself according to civilised methods.

The younger party may be genuine in their assurances, which are quite as freely given by the members of the old school, but they are quite unknown outside of Tehran, and are totally devoid of the necessary influence to back up the European administrations. The mere rumour that Ain-ed-Dowleh had resigned sufficed to cause Hashmat-ul-Mulk of Seistan to reconsider his decision to obey the orders of the Central Government and come to Tehran, whilst simultaneously comes news from Shiraz that the attitude of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, over whom Ain-ed-Dowleh has great influence, is becoming unsatisfactory. I am seriously afraid that if we are again to find ourselves with Kavam-es-Sultaneh at the Home Office there will be a general recrudescence of troubles throughout the country.

The most disheartening feature of the situation, and one that makes it almost hopeless to anticipate any genuine improvement, is that the better one learns to know the Persian politicians who are prominent to-day, the more one becomes convinced that, with hardly a single exception, not a public man that is connected with the affairs of his country is genuinely and whole-heartedly anxious to do something to drag his unhappy fatherland out of the morass in which she is fast settling down. The rich men, such as Sipahdar, seek the moral protection of a foreign legation upon which they may rely to avoid the payment of taxes long overdue, whilst Cabinet Ministers, governors-general, karguzars, and other functionaries, in proportion to their positions and the opportunities it may offer, pay for their appointments. That they can afford to do so is proof enough that they intend to make more than their lawful salaries out of their posts. In some cases a monthly remittance is made to Tehran, and enquiries are from time to time made to the two legations with a view to ascertaining whether or no an official in the provinces is well looked upon. This would be alright were the question asked with a view to ascertaining whether affairs are giving satisfaction, and if such and such a functionary is performing his duties properly for the furtherance of the public service. Unfortunately, such a thought is far from the mind of the questioner, who merely wishes to ascertain if the position of the official aimed at is sufficiently assured to allow of a hint that the monthly remittance to Tehran should be increased.

Lately, no small amount of trouble has been caused at Shiraz because Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has not found district governors willing to pay his price, with the result that these much-needed officials have, in not a few cases, not been appointed. There is no concealment about this, and his Excellency argues that it was only on the understanding that he should continue this old-time but pernicious practice, which of course means corruption right down to the smallest Government servant, that he accepted the post.

The Bakhtiaris, who hold the governor-generalship of Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman, have a barefaced system of pooling profits, and are not ashamed to own it when remittances are not made regularly. The fact that such an arrangement is entered into when a new post is taken up presupposes an anticipation of illicit profits which is far from creditable. It is sometimes hard not to throw this in their teeth when Sardar Assad or Samsam-es-Sultaneh perorates in grandiloquent language about all the great deeds performed by the Bakhtiaris in the service of constitutional Persia, which seems to have engendered a brood of rapacious gold-seekers as avaricious, and more numerous than were the old despots and their chosen favourites.

It is with feelings of no small pride that one compares the disinterested hard work of the Belgian customs and financial administrations and of the Swedish gendarmerie instructors with the self-interested labours of the Persian official. The genuine efforts of the foreign officers to carry out the work entrusted to them should eventually prove an invaluable object-lesson to the Persians. They may succeed or they may not in their task, but at least no one can accuse them of shirking their work. German officers are not proverbially lazy soldiers, but the German Minister tells me that the opinion of the officers in his legation is that few German officers would be found ready to work for such long hours as do the Swedish instructors.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43237] No. 375.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 194.)

Tehran, September 3, 1913.

Sir,

THE accompanying extract from a private letter that I have recently received from the British acting consul at Tabriz contains some interesting information about a corner of North-Western Azerbaijan, from which it is very difficult to obtain reliable news.

The Turkish Ambassador has also furnished me lately with a somewhat confused account of recent events in this district, but it contains less than is to be found in Mr. Smart's letter, except that more details are given of the fighting that took place at Mergaver and Tergaver, when the loss of life included at least two Russian officers. The Ambassador holds the Russian consul alone responsible for what happened, and states that the Russians burned their dead on the field of battle in order that the magnitude of their losses might not transpire.

M. Sabline is very reticent about the matter, and it is quite conceivable that he is ignorant of any particulars of what occurred, but he, like M. Poklewsky, is very reserved about questions connected with Azerbaijan, and I consequently refrain from asking for information.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 375.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Extract.)

Tabriz, August 8, 1913.

WITH the conspiracy of silence now existing in Azerbaijan, it is so difficult to get news from the outlying districts. The Russians seem to be trying to create a sort of neutral frontier zone, *i.e.*, a zone neither Turkish nor Persian, but entirely under Russian domination. The Khan of Maku and Ismaïl Khan Shakkak (Simko) hold the northern part of the zone for the Russians. Baiz Agha Mangoor, Haji Ilkhani, Sardar Mikri, present Governor of Soujboulak, and other Kurdish chiefs in the neighbourhood of that place are pro-Russian, largely from fear of the Russian troops now concentrated at Soujboulak. These chiefs hold the southern end of the zone for the Russians. The centre—Mergaver and Tergaver—under Abdullah Beg, his brother, Gurghin Khan (one of the Labari murderers), and others, is giving difficulty. The Russians are trying to put up a certain Seyyid Taha, grandson of the famous Sheikh Obeidullah, of the great Kurdish rebellion of 1881, again, Abdullah Beg and Gurghin Khan. Hence all this fighting, which the Russians are trying to keep quiet. They have now a considerable force along the frontier, not less than 5,000 men at Khoi, 2,000 at Urmia, and 1,000, I think, at Soujboulak. (These figures are of course only approximate.) The Russians informed us last spring that they were sending 300 men to Soujboulak. This was true, but they omitted to inform us of the despatch of reinforcements afterwards. My Russian colleague, in a moment of indiscretion, talked to me of a battalion at Soujboulak, and, though he afterwards tried to correct his blunder by saying that there were only two companies there, all information I receive points to the presence of at least 1,000 men at Soujboulak. My American colleague tells me that the Russians are sending an Orthodox Mission across the frontier into Turkish territory, and the Orthodox Mission in North-Western Persia is an organisation for the advancement of the material rather than the spiritual interests of Russia. I suppose the Russians want to close in around Armenia for possible eventualities. There have long been rumours that the Russians are planning a Kurdish disarmament, but I can hardly think that they will risk such a big enterprise at the present moment. If they go slowly, they should be able gradually to strengthen their position so much as to discourage the Kurds from concerted resistance. I wonder whether the Turks are helping the Kurds in Mergaver and Tergaver against the Russian troops. The Kurds are said to have guns, but these may be the Persian guns captured in the defeat of the Persian army in 1907.

[43384] No. 376.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 277. Secret.)

St. Petersburgh, September 17, 1913.

Sir,

IN the Indian General Staff memorandum of the 6th June last on the subject of the Trans-Persian Railway scheme, it is stated that the General Staff's military recommendations must depend on their estimate of Russia's present intentions towards the Indian Empire as revealed in the negotiations that have taken place concerning the proposed railway; and, on a review of these negotiations, the General Staff arrive at the conclusion that they afford evidence of inimical intentions on the part of Russia which cannot prudently be ignored. As the conclusion here arrived at differs fundamentally from the view of Russian policy held during the last few years by this embassy, I may perhaps be permitted to offer a few observations showing, as I think, that the attitude observed by Russia in the recent negotiations does not bear the construction placed upon it by the Indian military authorities.

When the Trans-Persian railway scheme was revived by the Russian Consortium in 1910, the plan at the Consortium was to build a railway across Persia connecting the Russian and Indian systems. Their main object was to secure the through traffic between Europe and India, and to anticipate in that respect the Bagdad Railway. As stated in the Consortium's memorandum (print section 28970/10) the line's "importance for transit was its very first consideration." Therefore the Consortium proposed the alignment Yezd–Kerman–Nushki as being the shortest, and as touching the nearest point of the Anglo-Indian railway system. This alignment, it may be mentioned, was also favoured by Sir H. MacMahon. The length of rail to be laid from Yezd–Nushki was 810 miles, as compared with 1,341 miles Yezd–Bunder Abbas–Kurrachee. (Report of the Indian Interdepartmental Committee, print section 12,840/11, p. 17). The proposal, so far as the intentions of its promoters are concerned, finds the most complete justification in the words of the Interdepartmental Committee (*ibid.*) "if the object of the proposed railway be taken as the connection of Russia with India by the quickest, cheapest, and easiest route, this alignment seems to be preferable to either of the other two that have been suggested." So much for the original Russian scheme, of which the most prominent supporters were men well known as ardent advocates of a close understanding with Great Britain.

In May 1911 His Majesty's Government notified their assent in principle to the scheme of a through railway to India, but stipulated *inter alia* that it should be brought down to the sea at Bunder Abbas, whence it would run to Kurrachee. Thereupon the Consortium, supported by the Russian Government, proposed the alternative route Yezd–Kerman–Chahbar; and in the Russian preference for Chahbar over Bunder Abbas, as the point at which the railway should touch the sea, the General Staff see strong grounds for suspicion. In reality the Russian promoters, reluctantly abandoning their original plan for the most direct alignment viâ Nushki, fell back on an alignment which, as regards directness, comes intermediate between the Nushki alignment and that viâ Bunder Abbas, and which, on the face of it, seems to possess strong commercial advantages over the Bunder Abbas *tracé*. The new Russian scheme, in which the General Staff see evidence of a strategical *arrière-pensée*, coincides as far as Bampur with that which had been advocated by His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire; from Bampur the Russians proposed to deflect the line southwards to the sea at Chahbar in order, as they supposed, to meet the wishes of the British Government. Of the Yezd–Kerman–Bampur–Kej–Pasni (Sir P. Cox's) alignment, which, from Bampur onwards, runs closer to the Afghan frontier than the Russian *tracé*, the Interdepartmental Committee says (p. 18) "it is obvious in the first place that the political and strategical objections which apply to the Seistan–Nushki alignment do not apply with the same force to either of the routes above mentioned" (the other being the Bunder Abbas route). It must be remembered that by now the scheme was in the hands of the international Société d'Études. The more active members of the Russian group of the Société, M. Raffalovich, M. Goukassof, &c., were certainly more concerned with the commercial aspects of the matter than with any political considerations, and it is exceedingly difficult to imagine that these gentlemen or other influential members of the Russian group, such as M. Homiakof and M. Zvegintsef, took their instructions from the Russian General Staff. The commercial reasons in favour of the Chahbar as against the Bunder Abbas *tracé* (importance of the town of Kerman, richness of the district, inferiority of Bunder Abbas as a port according to British sources of information,

&c.), are stated with obvious sincerity in a letter of the 7th March, 1913, from M. Goukassof to Lord Errington, which was communicated by the group to M. Sazonof with the object evidently of enlisting his support. Finally the Chahbar *tracé* commended itself, presumably on commercial grounds, to the French group of the Société d'Etudes, and was put forward by Sir E. Garstin on behalf of the British group (his letter to the Foreign Office of the 20th December, 1912, print 54973/12).

So much for the two alignments proposed by the Russians. We now come to the statement in the Russian *aide-mémoire* of the 14th May, 1913, to the effect that Russia will meet Great Britain's wishes by refraining from railway construction near the Afghan frontier if Great Britain meets Russia's wishes in regard to the Trans-Persian Railway. The General Staff regard this intimation as a highly significant threat. In order, however, fairly to appreciate its significance it must be borne in mind that it is a reply to a direct request put forward by His Majesty's Government in the embassy note of the 2nd (15th) May, 1911.* In that note the British Government had signified their assent in principle (subject to certain stipulations) to a railway joining the Indian system at Kurrachee viâ Bunder Abbas, and, in return, they had asked "that Russia should pledge herself not to entertain . . . . without coming to an understanding with Great Britain any proposal for a line in the neighbourhood of the Perso-Afghan frontier within the Russian or neutral sphere." But, in the meantime, His Majesty's Government had appreciably changed their attitude. In the embassy *aide-mémoire* of the 1st (14th) February, 1913,† a Foreign Office letter to Sir E. Garstin was communicated to the Russian Government in which it was said that "His Majesty's Government do not think that the time has yet come for a connection between Bunder Abbas and Kurrachee to be made . . . . and the question of branch and local lines should be considered on their merits and their commercial advantages should not be sacrificed to the project of through connection." The Russians considered, and not without reason, that the latest British communication meant the shelving for an indefinite period of the through connection project which was the very basis of the negotiations. Under the circumstances their reply to Great Britain's request for a *quid pro quo* was as favourable as could possibly have been expected. They said that they would give the undertaking asked for when Great Britain met their wishes as regards the original scheme. So far indeed from being in the nature of an ominous threat this intimation constitutes a concession which may, in certain circumstances, be turned to valuable account.

In short, the conduct of the negotiations from the Russian side may be summed up by saying that they sought throughout to secure through railway connection with India by the most direct route and under the most advantageous commercial conditions possible. It happens that the more direct the route the nearer it runs to the Afghan frontier. But that circumstance affords no better ground for ascribing political designs to the Russians than to the French or British groups of the Société d'Études, and I venture to think that on a fuller consideration of the facts the India authorities will readily recognise that Russia must be acquitted of the unfriendly intentions which they attribute to her.

I have, &c.
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[43342] No. 377.

M. Raindre to Sir W. Garstin.—(Communicated by the British Group of the Société d'Études, September 22.)

M. le Président et cher Collègue, *Paris, le* 11 *septembre*, 1913.

LE groupe russe de notre société nous a communiqué, le 5 septembre, le texte, ci-joint en copie, de deux notes échangées entre les Cabinets de Londres et de Saint-Pétersbourg pour constater leur entente en vue "d'inviter le Gouvernement persan à octroyer à cette société une option pour la construction d'un chemin de fer traversant la Perse du nord-ouest au sud-est" (Annexe No. 1‡).

J'ai, d'autre part, recueilli auprès du Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères la bienveillante assurance que l'entremise et l'appui de notre légation à Téhéran seraient acquis à la société pour présenter ses demandes au Gouvernement du Schah, simultanément avec les Légations russe et anglaise, lorsque celles-ci y seraient invités par leur Gouvernement.

* Embodying substance of Foreign Office despatch No. 129 of May 10, 1911.
† " " " " " No. 64 of February 5, 1913.
‡ Not printed.

L'accord est donc établi, en ce qui concerne le fond, entre les trois Gouvernements.

Le Cabinet de Londres nous a, d'ailleurs, fait connaître la forme dans laquelle il lui semblait le plus à propos d'intervenir en notre faveur à Téhéran. Il nous a fait communiquer un projet de dépêche que le Ministre d'Angleterre en Perse adresserait au Gouvernement persan, se chargeant ainsi de formuler lui-même notre requête. Vous en trouverez également le texte sous ce pli (Annexe No. 2*).

Comme, évidemment, la démarche faite à notre profit serait d'autant plus efficace si les trois Gouvernements lui donnaient une forme identique, nous sommes fondés à préjuger qu'ils voudront s'entendre à cette fin. Dans cette pensée, je m'empresse de vous indiquer les vues qui ont été arrêtées au sujet du projet précité dans la séance de notre comité de direction, le 6 de ce mois, afin que vous puissiez les faire connaître, en temps utile, au Foreign Office.

Ainsi que vous pourrez vous en assurer, le texte que le Gouvernement anglais a porté à notre connaissance, évidemment pour provoquer un avis, reproduit, avec quelques variantes qui n'appellent pas d'objections de notre part, le projet de requête que la société avait préparé et soumis aux Gouvernements, dans la pensée qu'elle aurait à le présenter elle-même à Téhéran. Nous ne pourrons donc qu'être reconnaissants à la diplomatie des trois Puissances si celle-ci offre de s'approprier la formule dont il s'agit.

Toutefois, une observation s'impose à ce sujet. Le texte rédigé par la Société internationale comprenait, *in fine*, le paragraphe suivant :

"Il devrait également être assuré à la société, afin de garantir les intérêts du trafic futur, que le Gouvernement persan n'accordera pas sans entente avec celle-ci la concession de ports sur un point quelconque de la ligne principale et des embranchements."

Ce paragraphe a été supprimé dans le projet du Foreign Office, et les explications qui nous ont été données par nos collègues anglais nous font présumer que notre texte a semblé, à Londres, trop ambitieux. A cet égard, nous sommes loin de nous montrer intransigeants. Mais il apparaît clairement que, dans ces régions, une grande entreprise de chemins de fer ne saurait avoir les garanties indispensables à sa prospérité si elle n'est pas certaine que, dans les ports principaux qui doivent lui servir de débouchés, elle ne rencontrera pas l'hostilité de l'administration, ou la prépondérance d'intérêts concurrents, ou des installations défectueuses qui paralyseraient son activité ; en d'autres termes, si elle ne dispose pas, aux points de sortie, d'un droit suffisant de contrôle. Nous considérons donc comme essentiel que la communication qui sera faite au Gouvernement du Schah stipule, au profit du Transpersan, "que lui soient assurés, au point de vue économique et technique, les débouchés maritimes nécessaires," prévoyant ainsi la concession de certains ports.

Le comité de direction a décidé de demander à nos groupes anglais et russe de porter cette revendication à Londres et à Saint-Pétersbourg, et nous vous prions de vouloir bien en saisir, sous la forme que vous jugerez la plus opporune, votre Ministère des Affaires Étrangères au moment où, sans doute, votre Gouvernement va consulter les deux autres Gouvernements coïntéressés en ce qui touche la teneur de son projet de dépêche au Gouvernement persan.

Après avoir établi l'entente entre les deux Gouvernements pour la présentation de la requête tendant à obtenir en notre faveur l'octroi de l'option, les notes anglaise et russe constatent que ces deux Gouvernements sont également d'accord pour envoyer en Perse "une commission anglo-russe destinée à dresser un plan des districts de la Perse qui seront traversés par la section méridionale de la ligne afin de trouver le tracé le plus favorable et d'y obtenir le consentement du Schah."

Les conditions dans lesquelles est entervenu cet échange de notes sont trop connues pour qu'il y ait indiscrétion de notre part à indiquer que les commissaires désignés par les Gouvernements russe et anglais ne pourront pas restreindre leurs préoccupations aux seules questions économiques et techniques, et que, dans certains cas, des considérations d'ordre politique pèseront surtout sur leurs décisions. La société doit avoir le désir que ses intérêts, qui sont précisément d'ordre exclusivement économique et technique, trouvent un défenseur attitré dans la commission. Elle devrait donc demander à y être représentée. Cependant, considérant le caractère international de toute l'affaire, le comité de direction a été frappé, d'abord, de l'opportunité d'y conformer la composition de la commission en y introduisant un représentant désigné par le Gouvernement français au même titre que les délégués des

* Not printed.

deux autres Gouvernements. La société pourrait avoir toute confiance que ses intérêts seraient entièrement sauvegardés par la participation de ce représentant aux études de la commission. Le comité a donc chargé son président de s'exprimer dans ce sens auprès du Ministère français des Affaires Etrangères en lui offrant, d'ailleurs, le concours que ce département jugerait à propos de demander à la société pour la recherche de l'homme compétent (sans doute un ingénieur) et pour les dépenses que comporterait son envoi en Perse.

Je vous prie, au nom du comité, de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance des administrations anglaises compétentes et de vous efforcer d'obtenir qu'elles secondent, sur les points y indiqués, les vues et les intérêts de notre société.

Veuillez, &c.
RAINDRE.

[43409] No. 378.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 333.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 22, 1913.

TOTAL of British claims for losses suffered in province of Fars amount to about 20,000*l*. Recent expedition under Kawam, which could not have taken place had not provincial Administration been assisted by British money, has resulted in confiscation to State of certain villages in neighbourhood of Mervdasht and Kafrak. Acting consul estimates that sale of these villages would suffice to pay off a large portion of British claims, and suggests that Persian Government should be urged to authorise this sale for above-mentioned purpose, or that at least revenue that will be derived from these villages should be earmarked yearly towards gradual liquidation of claims.

I learn from Bushire that no small amount of dissatisfaction is felt; there is small prospect that such losses incurred by British firms will be recovered at an early date. Such a measure as that proposed by acting consul would encourage the latter traders to Southern Persia, who are becoming despondent, should you see fit to instruct me to press it.

(Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to Bushire and Shiraz.)

[43393] No. 379.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, September* 22, 1913.

REGENT has arrived at Tehran.

[41748] No. 380.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 10th instant regarding the attitude of the Turkish consul at Lingah, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to express to the Marquess of Crewe his regret that he feels unable to concur in his Lordship's opinion as to the suitability of the present moment for raising the question at Constantinople. The particular incident complained of took place over six months ago, and the actual state of our political relations with Turkey and of the important interest now forming the subject of negotiations with the Porte render it highly desirable to avoid at this juncture any unnecessary friction in regard to matters of comparatively minor importance.

Sir E. Grey will, however, be prepared to instruct the Ambassador to enter a strong protest if hereafter the behaviour of the Turkish consul at Lingah should give occasion for serious complaint.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

No. 381.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 336.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, September* 24, 1913.

MY telegram No. 234 of 17th June.

Following from Kerman, No. 119 of 23rd September :—

"Owing to efforts of Kerman Governor-General all goods have been recovered except sixty-five bales carpets, five large carpets, three odd carpets, two bags gum, and one bale carpets, property of [name omitted] and missionary, aggregate value about 2,000*l*., plus 8,000 dollars.

"Shiraz authorities seem to have done nothing. Only hope of further recoveries rests with them."

[40439] No. 382.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1913.

THE letter from this Office of the 27th March, forwarded a copy of a letter from Mr. Harrison, covering a memorandum drawn up by representatives of the three financial groups interested in the Trans-Persian Railway scheme, on the subject of the reorganisation of the finances of Persia by means of a Committee of Control at Paris and of a Council of Administration at Tehran. Mr. F. C. Harrison called recently to enquire what decision His Majesty's Government had taken, and was informed in reply that the matter was still under consideration.

Mr. Harrison's memorandum was at the time communicated to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury for their observations, and their Lordships' criticism of the scheme was set forth in the Treasury letter of the 9th May, a copy of which was communicated to your Office in the usual distribution of Confidential Print ("Persia," 10th May, Section 1).

Simultaneously the Government of India offered their observations on the proposed scheme in their telegram of the 9th May, a copy of which was sent to this Office on the following day. Both the Treasury and the Government of India suggested the provisional adoption of certain portions of the scheme recommended by Mr. Harrison, subject to a number of important modifications. But it appears to Sir E. Grey desirable, before communicating again with Mr. Harrison, to have the two sets of criticisms considered together. I am accordingly directed to say that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the considered opinion of the Secretary of State for India in Council as to how far it would be advisable, in the light of the criticism offered by the Treasury, to follow the recommendations of the Government of India in submitting revised or counter-suggestions to the representatives of the three groups.

I am to observe in this connection that some difficulty is found in interpreting the fourth recommendation set forth in the Viceroy's telegram, viz.: "Omission of the condition whereby the committee is given a control of the manner of spending the instalments of the loan," seeing that no mention of any such condition appears to be made in Mr. Harrison's scheme.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[43759] No. 383.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 196.)
Sir, *Tehran, September* 11, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the caravan statistics which I have received from His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz for the month of August.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports that 1,925 [*2,511*]* mules and some 3,624 [*1,036*] donkeys arrived and left that place during the month.

* Italic figures in brackets refer to preceding month's traffic.

The sub-report from Borasjun enumerates 2,300 [*2,767*] mules to Bushire, and 3,730 [*2,633*] animals (including donkeys) from Bushire.

The Kazerun sub-report records 1,230 animals to Bushire, and 2,380 (including donkeys) from Bushire.

His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reports as follows: departures to Bushire, 933 [*1,566*]; arrivals from Bushire, 1,226 [*2,535*]; departures to Ispahan, 821 [*2,125*]; arrivals from Ispahan, 363 [*594*].

Robberies: 4th August, post, 2 miles south of Yezdikhast; 10th August, near Sivand, ten donkeys; at Qadrabad, three chests of tea; 17th August, near Fesa, servants of British subject robbed of property valued at 1,500 tomans. Various small robberies committed by Kashgais near Guyum, &c.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[43947] No. 384.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 483.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 24, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Turkish reply received this afternoon. It is a long document with a memorandum attached.

It raises again a number of the disputed points in "Russian" part of frontier, but leaves them generally to be settled by the Delimitation Commission.

Points of more interest to ourselves are as follows:—

In the body of the note recognition of oil companies is restricted to territory north of Elvend River.

In the memorandum, frontier line from Sirvan to Mendeli is accepted with two observations—

1. It corrects line as shown in firman attached to identic notes of 18th August, asserting that line should cross Elvend River at a point a quarter-of-an-hour downstream from its confluence with the Guilan River. This change seems of small importance.

2. It asserts that Moukata [group undecypherable] of [?] Neft (*i.e.*, [?] Neft Meidan) is at a point 1 centim. [group undecypherable] ed on reduced map west from the point where longitude 45° [group undecypherable] cuts the Neft Sou (see my despatch No. 720 of 14th August). According to the original identic map this sphere of influence does not cut the above-mentioned stream at all. The alteration is of some territorial importance, but it might be of importance to the oil company if their rights were to be recognised south of the Elvend River.

The note states that the Turkish commissioners have been appointed.

The Russian Ambassador is inclined to accept the note and trust to our being able to make good our desiderata in drawing up the final protocol.

Copy of note by messenger to-morrow, and copy to Tehran by post.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[43898] No. 385.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 26.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 25, 1913.

WITH reference to your letters of the 15th and 16th September, 1913, relative to the Muin-ut-Tujjar's concessions in the Persian Gulf, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy on the subject.

The Marquess of Crewe concurs generally in the Government of India's views, and he adheres to the opinion expressed in Sir T. Holderness's letter of the 30th July last, that no undertaking, written or other, given by the Muin-ut-Tujjar would afford any real safeguard of British interests. He would therefore again urge that the

Muin's application should be opposed by all possible means. Should, however, this course be deemed impracticable—which his Lordship trusts will not be the case—the conditions proposed by Sir P. Cox appear to him as suitable as circumstances permit.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure in No. 385.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 19, 1913.

MUIN-UT-TUJJAR.

Please refer to your telegram of the 3rd instant.

Following telegram dated the 10th, addressed to Government of India and repeated to Minister, Tehran, has been received from Resident, Bushire:—

* * * * *

Please see my telegram dated the 16th July.

We adhere to the opinions expressed therein, but agree that, if the total elimination of Muin is impracticable, British interests would be adequately safeguarded if the conditions which Resident proposes are insisted on; in that event Muin might be given our support.

[43984] No. 386.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 337.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 26, 1913.

MY telegram No. 321 of the 14th September: Luristan.

The Governor-General at Kermanshah has telegraphed to the Foreign Office here strongly deprecating Captain Wilson's journey to Burujird in the circumstances prevailing. His Highness says that he can guarantee his safety in his district, but disclaims all responsibility for what may happen beyond, as he says that Malamir sowars cannot enter Burujird district.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has requested me to instruct Captain Wilson not to proceed.

There can be no doubt that Luristan is in a most disturbed state, and it would be useless to pretend that there is no risk attaching to the journey. At the same time such competent judges as the Bakhtiari khans have expressed the opinion that Captain Wilson may well get through safely, if there is urgent necessity that the journey should be performed now.

I have telegraphed to Hamadan, where I believe Captain Wilson to be, and shall be glad of your early instructions.

[44101] No. 387.

Note communicated by Russian Embassy, September 27, 1913.

LE Gouvernement britannique jugerait préférable que la demande d'option pour la construction du Transpersan soit présentée au Gouvernement de Téhéran par les légations et non pas par la Société d'Études elle-même.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ne s'y opposerait pas, mais demanderait la participation de la Légation de France dans cette démarche.

Le Cabinet de Londres a exclu du projet de déclaration au Gouvernement persan, élaboré par la Société d'Études, le point se rapportant à l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement du Schah de s'abstenir, sans accord préalable avec la Société d'Études, de toutes concessions de construction de ports le long du parcours du chemin de fer et de ses embranchements.

Les groupes russe et français sont, de leur côté, d'avis qu'une considérable entreprise de chemin de fer ne saurait être suffisamment garantie si elle ne pouvait avoir la certitude de ne pas rencontrer dans les grands ports d'approche le concours

entièrement amical de la part des administrations locales, sur l'absence de toute rivalité de concurrence et sur une bonne organisation de débarquement ou transbordement.

Les deux groupes désirent, en conséquence, qu'il soit fait mention dans la déclaration au Gouvernement persan que le libre accès des ports—nécessaire pour le transport des matériaux—tant au point de vue économique que téchnique, sera pleinement garanti.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, pour sa part, approuve le bien-fondé de ces demandes.

Pour ce qui est de la proposition du Cabinet de Londres comprenant l'envoi d'une commission d'investigation du tracé dans le sud, l'administration de la Société d'Études désirerait qu'un représentant du Gouvernement français soit aussi admis dans cette commission.

Le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg croirait pouvoir suggérer—pour le cas où pareille combinaison ne pouvait se réaliser—que les délégués russe et français de cette commission soient des représentants des groupes russe et français de la Société d'Études. Le montant des frais de l'expédition devrait dans ce cas retomber sur la Société d'Études.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 27 septembre, 1913.

[44087] No. 388.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 338.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 27, 1913.

IT is stated that the Regent has succeeded in temporarily reconciling the differences in the Cabinet, which has been reinforced by the return of Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.

His Highness told me two days ago he hoped to effect this, leaving the reconstitution of the Cabinet for a later date.

[44130] No. 389.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 27, 1913.

MY telegram No. 311 of 11th September: Muin-ut-Tujjar.

In spite of the assurances given me by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25th June last that no further action would be taken respecting Muin's concessions without reference to me, the Persian Government has signed a declaration stating that the duration of the concessions is for fifty years from 9th September.

By so doing they have not only wilfully ignored the communication addressed to this legation on 24th January, 1911, declaring the concessions terminated, but no heed has been paid to the assurance given to me by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, whilst it is extremely doubtful whether the Cabinet can legally reverse a decision of the Medjliss. The Cabinet only consists of four members, all of whom signed the declaration. The Prime Minister asserts that the Cabinet were not made aware of the representation made by me on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I would venture to express an opinion that it is most desirable that this unfriendly act should be visited by some mark of extreme displeasure, such as a demand for the instant dismissal of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the cancellation of the declaration. In the event of a refusal to comply with such demand, the islands or part of the same might be occupied.

Unless some strong action is taken it will be found impossible to control Muin, who has of course bribed on a large scale and who is inclined to be defiant, although he has agreed under pressure to sign a document undertaking to enter into partnership with no one but British subjects in the exploitation of the concessions.

(Addressed to the Foreign Office, No. 339; repeated to Bushire for communication to the Government of India.)

[44140] No. 390.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 340.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, September* 27, 1913.

FOLLOWING from consul at Tabriz, No. 65, 26th September:—

"You are no doubt cognisant of telegram sent by notables of Tabriz to Persian Government.

"If Shuja succeeds in defying the Persian Government and preventing the elections, the result will be virtual autonomy of Azerbaijan. His language in public is now frankly disloyal, and my Russian colleague in private conversations with me can hardly conceal his satisfaction at this state of things.

"Shuja tells me confidentially that he cannot allow the elections unless we protect him against Persian Nationalists and the Russians, but at the same time he urged that the return of the ex-Shah was the only chance of checking Russian encroachment.

"Only definite instructions to Russian agents here to tell Shuja that he should obey his Government can have any effect."

Telegram referred to was one protesting against elections.

Prospects for elections are far from promising, although the Regent hopes to be able to set matters right. His Highness considers that announcement of election was too precipitate, and that it was a capital error to put the declaration into the young Shah's mouth on his birthday, on the ground that if he is too young to reign he was too young to make such an important statement. It is not impossible that this argument may be used if it is decided to postpone the elections. The Regent also thinks that precipitation with which the elections were announced may have irritated the Russians.

My Russian colleague says that he has seen no sign of this, and that he never thought that the elections would be possible at Tabriz, where the remembrance of the effects of the last political disturbance is still fresh. He says that there is nothing to show that the elections will not be held in the other northern provinces, and asserts that his Government would strongly disapprove of a condition of autonomy in Azerbaijan.

[44131] No. 391.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 341.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tehran, September* 27, 1913.

MY telegram No. 295 of 27th August: Situation in Fars.

Acting consul at Shiraz reports that Kawam has been appointed Governor of Laristan, Sabeh, Juyim, Bidchahr, Sabeh, Rudanah, Ahmedi, Fesa, and the Hamseh tribes for two years. Revenue of above districts is 207,765 tomans per annum. Kawam is let off 73,000 tomans for the first year and 53,000 tomans for the second. Arrangement sounds good one, and acting consul points out that Kawam could be summoned to Shiraz at any moment to become Governor-General if such appointment were considered desirable. It is well that Kawam should be actively employed in a sphere where he may do good work.

[43984] No. 392.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 419.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 337 of 26th September: Captain Wilson's journey to Burujird.

While Captain Wilson's journey is urgent, it is of course essential to avoid unnecessary risk.

If, with local knowledge and advice and any opinion you may obtain from Captain Wilson himself, you consider journey should be abandoned, you are authorised

so to instruct him, informing Persian Government at the same time that in the circumstances period of option must be extended until journey is practicable (see your despatch No. 62 of 17th March).

[44131] No. 393.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 420.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 27, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 341 of 27th September: Kawam.

Am I to understand that you no longer share Major O'Connor's view that present Governor-General must go (see your telegram No. 324 of 16th September)?

[44150] No. 394.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 342.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 419 of 27th September.

Captain Wilson has reached Burujird and is apparently continuing his journey to Khoremabad, where telegrams will be sent by special messenger from Douletabad. Difficulties of his journey have been increased by a sudden attack on Lurs by a force of 250 gendarmerie under Swedish officers from Sultanabad. Force occupied Burujird before Captain Wilson arrived, and retired in early morning day after his arrival. They are reported to have killed some Lurs and to have taken many prisoners. Captain Wilson says they will have done more harm than good unless they can return to Burujird in strength, as they have committed local authorities to action against the powerful local chiefs, who are already preparing reprisals. I had no idea any such movement was intended, and believed intention was merely to defend Sultanabad against a threatened attack. Gendarmerie not sufficiently strong to hold Burujird and their line of communication, but there are 600 Cossacks at Hamadan and Kermanshah which may co-operate.

I fear any military operations may affect Captain Wilson's plans adversely. He says that several relations and friends of the chiefs upon whose friendship he is relying have been killed.

[44279] No. 395.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 199.)
Sir, *Tehran, September* 16, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 324 of to-day's date I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two telegrams which I have received from the Acting British Consul at Shiraz, reporting on the recent summary execution of a gendarme by the Governor-General, and the incidents connected therewith.

I to-day discussed the question with the President of the Council, who said that he and all his colleagues agreed that it was clear from Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's own report that he had acted wrongly in not inviting the Swedish officers to be present at the trial, and in not conforming to the usual procedure in the case of a military offender. His Highness added that the action of the Swedish officers in forcing their way to Mukhber's presence was a gross breach of etiquette, and an act that was of a nature to lower the Governor-General's dignity.

I replied that Major Uggla had at once apologized, and that the incident could be easily smoothed over, were it not for the fact that for some time past we have been suspicious of Mukhber's goodwill towards the gendarmerie. It looked very much as if the most had been made of the occasion to deal a blow at the prestige of the gendarmerie, and I much feared that under the conditions existing at Shiraz it would be very hard to ensure future genuine co-operation between the Governor-General and that force. The latter, I added, provided our only hope that order in Fars and South Persia generally may be restored and maintained.

Ala-es-Sultaneh took a note of what I said, and time must be left to show whether or not it will be possible or desirable to retain Mukhber in his post.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 395.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.) *Shiraz, September* 13, 1913.

I REGRET to report serious difference between Governor-General and gendarmerie. On the night of the 10th September a seyyid was killed in town by a negro gendarme. The latter was arrested by the police and confined in the ark. Next morning an enquiry was held in the Adliyyeh and the man was condemned to death. Captain Lundberg visited the Governor-General at noon, and asked that no execution should take place until Uggla had had opportunity of discussing the case with the Governor, to which the Governor agreed, and Uggla arranged to visit him at 5·30. In spite of this promise the Governor had the man executed in prison during the afternoon, and he was already dead when Uggla arrived. The affair had excited great indignation amongst the gendarmerie, especially amongst the Swedish officers, and it happens that the man was Captain Lundberg's orderly. The same evening Captain Lundberg and Killander marched a body of gendarmerie into the ark, and Killander entered the Governor's presence with eight armed native officers and demanded the corpse, which was eventually handed over, and was buried yesterday with full military honours. I understand that the Adliyyeh trial was a travesty of justice, at which neither accused nor Swedish officer was present. I have had a long interview with the Governor in Uggla's presence, and propose to communicate my opinion on the subject to your Excellency to-morrow, after I have had an opportunity of hearing all possible sides of the question and all details. The case is likely to be a test one and will need very careful consideration. At present feeling is running very high on both sides.

Enclosure 2 in No. 395.

Major O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 319.)
(Telegraphic.) *Shiraz, September* 14, 1913.

MY telegram No. 318.

As your Excellency is aware, I have for some time been dissatisfied with the Governor-General's general attitude towards the gendarmerie. He has plainly shown on numerous occasions that he is jealous of them, and in his heart dislikes them. His own explanation of having the accused gendarme executed within twenty-four hours of alleged crime and without proper trial or previous consultation with officer commanding the gendarmerie is that he was forced by the threatening attitude of the crowd to take some measure to pacify them. It is true that the crowd usual on such occasions was clamouring at the Palace doors, but it is known that they had been incited by the chief of police and others, and if necessary gendarmerie could have been summoned to protect the Palace. But if the Governor-General had any reason to apprehend danger from the crowd his obvious duty was to summon Uggla to come immediately to the Palace to consult with him as to what should be done. There is no excuse for his failure to do so, and his action in ordering execution of the gendarme between the visits of Lundberg and Uggla seems to me to have been a deliberate blow struck at the prestige of the Swedish officers. This impression is much strengthened when the Governor General's habitually weak and dilatory nature is considered, as for example, in Abadeh and other cases.

As to the unfortunate incidents which occurred later, officers in question acted without instructions from Uggla, who yesterday expressed his regret to the Governor-General in my presence. These incidents are certainly regrettable but they were the direct result of the Governor-General's unjustifiable action earlier in the day, and were due to angry and excited state of all ranks of the Gendarmerie. Governor-General is, of course, trying to make all the capital he can out of them, but their occurrence in no way alters the main facts of the case as recited above.

I think that after what has occurred amicable co-operation between the Governor-General and the gendarmerie has become almost impossible. It is therefore a question as to which of the two should receive the support of the Persian Government. I need scarcely say that both from the point of view of expediency and of justice I am of opinion that the Governor-General must go to the wall. The gendarmerie are absolutely indispensable for the security of province and order in southern Persia, and I believe that with our support and that of a suitable Governor-General they will succeed in their difficult task in spite of their many mistakes and failures. Your Excellency already knows my opinion regarding replacement of the present Governor-General. If it is decided to replace him now by the Kavam I should like to sound the latter beforehand and to explain to him the conditions upon which we should be prepared to recommend him for the Governor-Generalship and to support him afterwards. The change might conveniently be effected after the tribal migration, say the end of October.

[44169] No. 396.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 812.)

Constantinople, September 24, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 293 of the 15th instant, instructing me to take steps to obtain the consent of the Turkish Government to the free movement of the escort of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission on the Turkish side of the frontier.

I would venture to recall to your recollection that this point is mentioned in the draft of the "Règlement intérieur," which I had the honour to transmit to you in my despatch No. 777 of the 6th instant.

I should be glad to know whether you consider it necessary that this point should be provided for in some other manner, and whether the draft in question otherwise meets with your approval.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[44174] No. 397.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 817.)

Constantinople, September 25, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 483 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the note received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the identic note presented by the Russian Ambassador and myself to his Highness on the 18th August last regarding the delimitation of the Turco-Persian frontier.

I regret that there is no time to prepare my observations on this communication before the departure of the messenger to-day, but I hope to be able to do so before the next post leaves on the 27th instant.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 397.

Saïd Halim Pasha to Mr. Marling.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Sublime Porte, le 23 *septembre*, 1913.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir, avec ses annexes, la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 18 août dernier, relativement à la question de la délimitation de la frontière turco-persane.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s'est empressé d'étudier les données contenues tant dans cette note que dans les deux mémorandums y annexés.

Je suis heureux de porter, en réponse, à votre connaissance ce qui suit :—

Le Gouvernement Impérial admet le principe émis dans le paragraphe 1 de la note précitée du 18 août dernier, et transmet, ci-joint, un mémorandum indiquant la ligne du *statu quo*, tracée conformément à ce paragraphe et au contenu des notes échangées jusqu'ici à ce sujet entre les Gouvernements ottoman et anglais.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman adhère également à la proposition tendant à autoriser la Commission technique à procéder, selon les nécessités topographiques qui seront constitués au cours des travaux de délimitation sur les lieux mêmes, aux rectifications nécessaires sur la base du principe énoncé dans le paragraphe 1.

Pour ce qui est des paragraphes suivants, le Gouvernement Impérial, désirant éliminer toute contradiction entre ceux-ci et le paragraphe 1 admis de part et d'autre, et les rendre conformes aux décisions dernièrement prises au sujet de la délimitation et prévenir ainsi tout incident pouvant compromettre le rétablissement de la tranquillité sur la frontière, croit devoir développer ci-après ses considérations à leur endroit.

Toutefois, pour donner une nouvelle preuve de ses intentions conciliantes et mettre le Gouvernement anglais à même d'être renseigné exactement sur la destination des points cités dans ces paragraphes, le Gouvernement Impérial propose d'en remettre la solution à l'appréciation des membres de la Commission technique, chargée de délimiter la frontière sur la base du *statu quo* admis :—

1. Les degrés de longitude et de latitude mentionnés dans la note de l'Ambassade Royale d'Angleterre pour indiquer la position de certaines localités, ne concordant pas avec ceux de la carte anglaise, il serait préférable de prendre pour base tant au cours des délibérations que pendant les travaux de délimitation, les degrés de longitude et de latitude de la carte anglaise réduite à l'échelle de 1 : 253,440 de la carte officielle.

2. En ce qui concerne la ligne frontière indiquée dans le paragraphe 2 et le mémorandum (A), annexé à la note précitée, la note ministérielle du 31 mars, 1913, contient des indications précises au sujet des dépendances de Kazli Guieul et de la démolition du cordon de Boulak-Bachi. En d'autres termes, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a consenti à la démolition du koulé de Boulak-Bachi, à la cession de cette localité à la Perse et au retrait de son détachement militaire.

Cependant, pour ce qui concerne l'attribution à la Perse du système des eaux de Yarim Kaya, le Gouvernement Impérial pense qu'étant le manque d'explications à ce sujet, tant dans les cartes existantes que dans les croquis remis par l'Ambassade anglaise, il serait opportun de laisser à la Commission technique le soin d'indiquer la ligne frontière définitive sur la base dudit premier paragraphe.

3. Il est entendu que le village mentionné dans la note précitée est celui de Nefto. Pour ce qui est de Kizil Kaya, comme cette localité se trouve *ab antiquo* en deçà de la ligne du *statu quo* et sur la route Van–Bayazid, la seule route praticable en toutes saisons et reliant ces deux dernières villes, et comme les hauteurs situées à une distance de 400–500 mètres à l'est dudit village et par où passe la frontière actuelle, constituent la meilleure frontière, il est évident que Kizil Kaya doit être laissé en deçà de la ligne du *statu quo*. Toutefois, le Gouvernement Impérial consent à ce que, conformément aux décisions déjà intervenues à ce sujet, la Commission technique soit invitée à se prononcer au sujet de l'appartenance de ladite localité.

4. D'après le mémorandum (A), annexé à la note précitée, certains territoires compris dans les parties de la frontière venant après Dalamper et qui se sont trouvés *ab antiquo* en possession ottomane, sont attribués à la Perse. Cette proposition venant à l'encontre du principe énoncé dans le paragraphe 1 de la note précitée, le Gouvernement Impérial juge opportun de remettre la solution de la question y afférente à la Commission technique de délimitation.

5. Le Gouvernement Impérial partage l'avis de remettre à la Commission technique le soin de se prononcer au sujet de l'appartenance des localités de Chinié et de Tchamparaw.

6. En ce qui concerne le mémorandum (B), il est à noter qu'il existe aucun renseignement susceptible de faire établir que le village de Hani Kermélé situé sur le versant ouest de la ligne du partage des eaux, a appartenu jusqu'ici aux Persans. Les autres villages dont il est fait mention ne sont point connus, et les six villages qui se trouveraient sous l'occupation des troupes ottomanes et dont l'évacuation est demandée ne sont pas spécifiés.

Il importe dès lors de remettre à la Commission technique le soin de prendre à cet

égard une décision conforme tant au principe émis dans le paragraphe 1 qu'aux intérêts de la population locale.

7. Pour ce qui est des questions touchant l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company mentionnées dans la note précitée le Gouvernement Impérial reconnaît pour l'étendue du territoire qui lui revient au nord de la rivière Elvend, la concession octroyée jadis par le Gouvernement persan à cette compagnie.

A cette occasion, je crois devoir vous rappeler les réserves formulées dans ma note du 31 mars dernier pour le cas où le Gouvernement persan n'adhérerait pas aux propositions équitables de la Sublime Porte exposées comme ci-haut, et auquel cas le Gouvernement Impérial se verrait obligé de maintenir comme par le passé l'état de choses et la situation existante sur toute l'étendue de la frontière.

Eu égard à ce qui précède, la question devant être considérée comme terminée, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a d'ores et déjà désigné des commissaires pour la Commission technique précitée.

Agréez, &c.
SAÏD HALIM.

Memorandum.

1. *Considérations sur la Frontière indiquée dans le Mémorandum (A), annexé à la Note de l'Ambassade de Russie.*

La différence entre la description contenue dans le mémorandum (A) et le *statu quo* actuel quant à la partie comprise entre la borne XXXVII de Serdar Boulak et le point où le *statu quo* coupe le Sari-Sou, consiste en l'attribution aux Persans des territoires formant le système des eaux de Yarim Kaya et la position Boulak-Bachi. Le Gouvernement ottoman a donné son adhésion à la démolition du koulé de Boulak-Bachi et à la cession de cette place à la Perse, ainsi que cela a été notifié aux Puissances médiatrices par la note du 18 (31) mars, 1913.

En ce qui concerne le système des eaux de Yarim Kaya, il a été jugé opportun d'en référer la délimitation définitive sur la base du *statu quo* à la Commission technique de délimitation.

Les indications contenues dans le mémorandum russe pour la partie comprise entre le point où le *statu quo* coupe le Sari-Sou et Kotour sont, à l'exception de Kizil-Kaya, conformes en principe au *statu quo* actuel. Il est, par conséquent, bien naturel de faire délimiter cette partie par la Commission technique, conformément toujours à la base du *statu quo* actuel. Le tracé de la frontière du Kotour répond à la communication antérieure faite aux Puissances médiatrices par la note du 18 (31) mars, 1913. La partie comprise entre le mont Souvarva et Dalamper et indiquée dans le mémorandum russe est également conforme.

Ainsi qu'il est dit dans le paragraphe 4 de la note en date d'aujourd'hui, la description du mémorandum (A) précité ne concorde pas avec la ligne frontière existant de tout temps après Dalamper.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a l'honneur d'exposer comme suit les indications principales au sujet du tracé de cette ligne: la ligne frontière après avoir passé, en suivant la ligne de partage des eaux, par le sommet du mont Kanispi, coupe le Dader-Sou et monte au sommet de Chatré; de là, par le défilé de Kéléchine, et en passant par les monts Siah-Kuh et Spires, elle coupe le cours d'eau de Tchoumikéli aux environs de Zoka et monte au sommet de Kumé-Béran. Ainsi qu'il est dit dans la note précitée, la Commission technique de délimitation est chargée d'adopter une décision définitive à cet égard.

La partie suivante qui se rapporte aux régions Lahéidjan, Vezné et Bitoch, à la cession desquels le Gouvernement ottoman a donné son adhésion, est conforme à la ligne frontière arrêtée suivant les dernières décisions. La partie restante de la frontière déterminée par le mémorandum (A) est conforme. Il est également admis de référer à la Commission technique l'examen et la fixation de l'appartenance des villages de Scheiné et Tchamaraw ainsi que la délimitation de la frontière dans les susdites parties d'après les conditions topographiques et le *statu quo*.

2. *Considérations sur le Mémorandum (B).*

Il n'existe point de différence entre la frontière indiquée dans le mémorandum (B) et la ligne de démarcation actuelle jusqu'au point Kématchar. Quant aux considérations relatives à la partie comprise entre ce point et la rivière Sirvan, elles ont été développées d'une manière détaillée dans la note en date d'aujourd'hui. Il a été jugé convenable de confier à la Commission technique la délimitation de cette partie sur la base du *statu quo*.

3. *Considérations relatives à la Frontière restante à partir de Sirvan.*

Les points que suivra la frontière à partir de Sirvan jusqu'aux environs de Mendéli ont été établis par les correspondances et les décisions y relatives. Il existe, cependant, une petite différence entre la frontière indiquée sur les cartes remises par l'ambassade et la ligne de démarcation actuelle, à savoir: (1) la ligne de démarcation actuelle atteint le fleuve Elvend à un quart d'heure de distance vers l'aval à partir du point où ce cours d'eau conflue avec le Gueilan-Sou; (2) le moukataa de Neft est situé à 1 centim. de distance à l'ouest du point où le méridien de 45° 40′ de la carte anglaise coupe le Neft-Sou.

Néanmoins, il ne reste qu'à confier à la Commission technique la délimitation définitive sur le terrain de la frontière arrêtée du côté de Zohab, de même que les parties de la frontière qui se trouvent après Elvend, conformément à la base du *statu quo*. La Commission technique prendra une décision au sujet du partage du Kenghir-Sou entre Kelkhours et les Mendélis. Le Gouvernement ottoman consent à la délimitation de la frontière à partir de Kéléchouan sur la base du *statu quo* actuel.

[43233] No. 398.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 421.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 29, 1913.

YOUR despatch No. 190 of 2nd September: Azerbaijan.

In view of your telegram No. 331 of 18th September, do you consider representations to Government still necessary?

[44612] No. 399.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 343.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, September* 30, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 28th September: Luristan.

Withdrawal to Sultanabad was intended to draw Lurs on; further operations are in preparation. Colonel says that he had to observe great secrecy, as although the Government has repeatedly urged him to take action against the Lurs he felt convinced that if his plans had become known they would have been warned. The rapidity with which the blow was struck and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy by such a small force have created the utmost astonishment and have greatly enhanced the prestige of the gendarmerie in the eyes of the Government. This will probably be reflected throughout the country.

It is unlucky that the movement was made just at the moment of Captain Wilson's journey, of which the colonel knew nothing.

[44101] No. 400.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 422.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1913.

FRENCH and Russian Governments and groups of Société d'Études demand that French representative at Tehran should join his British and Russian colleagues in presenting note applying for option for trans-Persian railway to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Do you consider that this association of French Legation would enhance prospect of favourable reply?

[43409]

No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 144.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE received your telegram No. 333 of the 22nd instant, forwarding a proposal made by the acting British consul at Shiraz, that certain villages, confiscated by the Kawam for the State, should be sold to pay off a large portion of British claims in Fars, or that their revenue should be earmarked towards a gradual liquidation of such claims.

The proposal appears to me to be open to some objection.

While British claims in Fars amount to some 20,000*l.*, the total of all claims on behalf of British subjects is about 110,000, and that of all foreign claims 800,000*l.* approximately. Hitherto the reply which I have caused to be returned to British claimants has been to the effect that Persia has at present no funds in hand for the settlement of claims, but that when any loan is made for the purpose, their claims shall be treated as favourably as those of the nationals of other countries. And in conversation with the representatives of other Powers I have always given them to understand that claims would be dealt with when a loan was concluded and that then all claims would be treated on an equal footing.

If, however, the scheme proposed by Major O'Connor were adopted it would be likely to excite criticism as regards the selection of particular claims to be settled in part and others to be ignored for the present, and other Powers might be tempted to urge upon the Persian Government the despatch of military expeditions for the recovery of funds to settle their claims.

Would it not be preferable that such funds as may be obtained from the sale or revenue of the villages in question should be earmarked for the upkeep of the gendarmerie in Fars or for otherwise strengthening the local Administration?

I should be glad to receive your views on the subject after further consideration in the light of the above objections.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

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